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X SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
HEARINGS
BBFOBE THB
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMIMSTBATION OF THE INTERNAL SECUBITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THB
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAEY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION ON
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
PART 90
United Nations Reports and Documents Dealing
With the Hungarian Revolt
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAEY UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION ON
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
PART 90
United Nations Reports and Documents Dealing
With the Hungarian Revolt
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 93216 WASHINGTON : 1959
^3-3/, ^/^ ^
Boston Public Library Superintendent of Documents
MAY 1 1 1959 DEPOSITORY
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
ESTES KEFAUVBR, Tennessee ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota
THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Jr., Missouri WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, Wyoming EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
MATTHEW M. NEBLY, West Virginia JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
StJBCOMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SeCUEITY
Act and Other Internal Secubity Laws
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland
MATTHEW M. NEELY, West Virginia ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
Robert Morris, Chief Counsel J. G. SouRWiNB, Associate Counsel Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research II
CONTENTS
Pago Report of the Special Committee of the United Nations on the Problem
of Hungary, June 12, 1957 5062
Hungary Under Soviet Rule : A summary of developments since the report
of the U. N. Special Committee 5249
The Hungarian Situation and the Rule of Law : Report of International
Commission of Jurists 5333
The Continuing Situation of the Hungarian Situation to the Rule of Law 5479
Justice in Hungary Today : Additional Report of International Commission
of Jurists 5513
ui
EEPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON THE PROBLEM OF HUNGARY
12 June 1957
Rapporteur : Mr. K. C. O. Shann (Australia)
Document A/3592
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter I. Organization and Functions of the Committee: Paragraph
A. Introduction 1
B. The Witnesses 6
C. Conduct of Hearings 24
D. Documentary Material 27
E. Attempts to observe in Hungary and to meet Mr. Imre Nagy 32
F. Arrangement of the report of the Committee 35
O. General Observations on the Work of the Committee 44
Annex A: Resolution 1132 (XI) of the Oeneral Assembly of the United Nations.
Chapter II. A Brief History of the Hungarian Uprising:
A. Developments before 22 October 1956 47
B. Meetings and Demonstrations 52
C. The First Shots 55
D. The Armed Uprising 59
E. Revolutionary and Workers' Councils 62
F. Political Developments 64
O. Mr. Nagy Clarifies (iS
H. Declaration of Neutrality 74
I. Soviet Forces Intervene Again 75
J. Mr. Kadar Forms a Government 77
K. The Abduction of Mr. Nagy 80
L. Soviet Military Occupation 83
M. Recent Developments 88
N. Summary of Conclusions 89
Chapter III. The uprising as seen by the USSR and by the Government of Janes Kadar:
A. Introduction 90
B. The Issues at Stake 95
C. Justification of Soviet Intervention 103
D. The Progress of Events 113
1. Legitimate grievances 113
2. Alleged preparations for counter-revolution 120
3. Reaction In the saddle 1-32
E. Conclusion 149
Part A. Military Intervention and Its Political Background
Chapter IV. Soviet Military Intervention (24 October-3 November 1956) :
A. Introduction 151
B. Movements of Soviet Forces and Areas of Fighting 153
C. Resistance of the Hungarian People to the Soviet Attack IfiO
D. The Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Budapest 171
E. The Logistic Deployment of New Soviet Forces 178
F. Conclusions 185
Chapter V. Second Soviet Military Intervention:
A. Introduction 186
B. Relations between the Insurgents and the Hungarian Army 188
C. The Fighting in Budapest 196
D. The Fighting in the Industrial Districts of Budapest 199
E. Fighting in the Provinces 204
F. Conclusions 215
Chapter VI. The Political Circumstances of the First Military Intervention:
A. Introduction 216
B. The Popularity of Imre Nagy 218
C. Doubts Arise about Mr. Nagy's Position 221
D. Delegations' Limited Access to Prime Minister Nagy before 29 October 233
E. Mr. Nagy's Denials 241
F. Mr. Nagy's Detention in the Commimist Party Headquarters 246
Q. Was an Invitation Actually Extended? 259
H. Conclusions 266
Chapter VII. The Political Background of the Second Soviet Intervention:
A. Introduction 267
B. The Political Position of Mr. K4dSr prior to 4 November 271
C. Mr. Kadar's Relations with Mr. Nagy 285
D. The Overthrow of Mr. Nagy's Government 289
E. The Establishment of Mr. Kadar's Government 296
F. Conclusions 301
5062
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UlSnTED STATES 5063
Paragraph Chapter VIII. The Question of the Presence and the Utilization of the Soviet Armed Forces in Hungary in the Light of Hungary's International Commitments:
A. Introduct ion 304
B. Post-war International Instruments Governing Himgary's International Status 306
C. Applicability of these International Instruments to the Soviet Military Interventions 318
D. The Demand for Withdrawal of Soviet Armed Forces 326
E. Question of the Withdrawal of Soviet Armed Forces after 4 November 1956 348
F. Final Observations 365
Annex A: Agreement between the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic and the Gov- ernment of the USSR on the Legal Status of Soviet Forces temporarily stationed on the Terri- tory of the Hungarian People's Republic, concluded in Budapest, 27 May 1957.
Part B. Effects of the Use or Threat of Use of Force ox the Political IxDEPEN'DE>fCE
OF HlTNOARY
Chapter IX. Background and Aims of the Uprising:
A. Introduction 370
B. The Background of the Uprising 375
C. The Declared Aims of the Uprising 392
1. The Nature of the Uprising 392
2. The Resolutions and Manifestos of 20-23 October 1956 401
3. Analysis of the Demands Stated at the Outset of the Uprising 405
(a) Political Demands -- 405
(b) Economic Demands 414
(c) Cultural Demands - 421
D. Attitude of the Hungarian People to the State Security Police (AVH).._ 423
Annexes:
A. Appeal adopted by a meeting of Budapest Technological Students at the Andras Hess
Students' Hostel (the Central Students' Hostel of the Building Industry Technological University of Budapest) held on 19 October 1956.
B. Appeal issued by DISZ Members of the Medical Faculty of the University of Budapest,
22 October 1956.
C. Resolution ad(h-essed to the Participants of the DISZ Mass Meeting on 22 October 1956.
D. First Draft of the Demands of the Students of the Building Industry Technological Uni-
versity of Budapest, 22 October 1956.
E. The Ten Points of the Petofl Club, 22 October 1956.
F. The Aims of the League of Working Youth (DISZ), the Youth Group of the Hungarian
Workers' (Communist) Party, 23 October 1956. O. Appeal of the Revolutionary Committee of the Hungarian Intellectuals, 28 October 1956. Chapter X. Student Demonstrations and the Origius of Armed Conflict in Budapest:
A. Introduction 435
B. The Student Meetings on 22 October . 437
C. How the Demonstrations were Initiated and Organized.. 452
D. Demonstrations at the Petofi and Bem Statues 456
E. Demonstration at the Parliament 461
F. Removal of Stalm's Statue. ._ 467
G. The Fii-st Shots 468
H. Further Developments 476
I. Parliament Building on 25 October 481
Chapter. XI. Revolutionary and Workers' Councils:
I. Introduction 485
II. Revolutionary Councils 493
A. Territorial Councils:
1. The Provinces - - 493
2. The Transdanubian National Council.. 506
3. Budapest 510
B. Functional and Representative Councils:
1. Students and Youth 513
2. Armed Forces 518
3. The Revolutionary Committee of Hungarian Intellectuals 523
C. Establishment of Revolutionary Committees within Government Departments 524
D. Efforts for the Co-ordination of Revolutionary Councils and Committees 533
E. Contacts of Revolutionary Councils within the Government 637
III. Workers' Councils in Factories _ 539
A. The Establishment and Function of Workers' Councils 542
B. Authorization and Encouragement of Workers' Councils by Trade Unions, the Party
and the Government 549
C. Conclusions 560
Chapter XII. The Reassertion of Political Rights (26 October-3 November) :
A. Introduction _.. 562
B. The Transitional Period: The National Government of 27 October (26-29 October) 563
C. Abolition of the One-Party System and Establishment of the Inner Cabinet of 30 October-.. .573
D. The Rebirth of Political Parties 576
E. The Streamlined Coalition Government of 3 November 588
Chapter XIII. Soviet Intervention Under the Present Regime:
A. Introduction 595
B. Soviet Administration of Hungary 596
C. Soviet Repressive Measures 605
D. Relationship of Workers' Councils and Soviet Authorities 617
E. Attitude towards the Government of Hungary 622
F. The Abduction of Premier Imre Nagy 630
a. Conclusions 640
5064 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE msriTEP STATES
Chapter XIV. Political Rights After the Revolution: „
I. Workers' Councils: Paragraph
A. Relationship of the Workers' Councils and the Government 641
B. The Role of the Communist Party in the Workers' Councils 663
C. Workers' Councils and Trade Unions _. 671
II. Post-Revolutionary Status of Political Organizations:
A. Negotiations with Political Parties 676
B. The Fate of other Organizations and the Press 691
1. Revolutionary Councils 691
2. The Press 698
3. Youth Organizations 702
III. Conclusions _ 708
Part C. Specific Acts in Violation of Other Rights of the Hungarian People
Chapter XV. Deportations:
A. Introduction 713
B. Investigation by the Committee 720
C. Seizure of Deportees 723
D. Experience of Deportees in the USSR 731
E. Admission of Deportations by Soviet Authorities 737
Chapter XVI. Other Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms:
A. Preliminary Remarks 741
B. Hostilities 744
C. The Repression 752
D. The Spectre of the AVH 768
E. Human Rights 778
Chapter XVII. Conclusions 784
Annex
List of Material Relatuig to the Problem of Hungary. Map of Budapest. Map of Hungary.
ChaptebI. Okganization and Functions of the Committee A. introduction
1. The Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, composed of the repre- sentatives of Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia, and Uruguay, was established by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 January 1957.^ The follow-
. ing representatives were appointed by their Governments : Australia : Mr. K. C. O. Shann ; Ceylon, Mr. R. S. S. Gunawardene ; Denmark : Mr. Alsing Andersen ; Tunisia : Mr. Mongi Slim ; Uruguay : Professor Enrique Rodriguez Fabregat. The Secretary-General appointed Mr. W. M. Jordan as Principal Secretary of the Committee and Mr. P. Bang-Jensen as Deputy Secretary. The Committee held its first meeting at the United Nations Headquarters in New York on 17 January 1957, and elected Mr. Alsing Andersen as Chairman and Mr. K. C. O. Shann as Rapporteur.
2. The Committee was charged by the General Assembly with the duty of pro- viding the Assembly and all Members of the United Nations with "the fullest and best available information regarding the situation created by the intervention of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, through its use of armed force and other means, in the internal affairs of Hungary, as well as regarding developments relating to the recommendations of the Assembly on this subject".
3. The Committee submitted an Interim Report to the General Assembly on 20 February 1957.^ In this report, the Special Committee defined the scope of the inquiry which it had been called upon to conduct, and in a summary statement on the course of Soviet intervention in Hungary, indicated certain specific prob- lems to which the Committee would direct its attention.
4. The Committee's task has been to ascertain the facts and, after careful scrutiny of the evidence and information received, to present an objective report, together with findings, on the situation in question. The Committee regrets that, owing to the attitude of the Hungarian Government, it has not been in a position to establish and maintain direct observation in Hungary, as enjoined by the General Assembly resolution.
5. After a preliminary examination of the available documentation, the Com- mittee gave hearings to thirty-five witnesses at the Headquarters of the United Nations in New York. The Committee then proceeded to Europe where, from 11 March to 16 April 1957, it held hearings at the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva, and thereafter in Rome, Vienna, London, and again in Geneva. These hearings greatly augmented the range of information at the dis-
1 Resolution 1132 (XI), attached as annex A to this chapter. « A/3546.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE insnTED STATES 5065
posal of the Committee and contributed significantly to the Committee's under- standing of the character of the events in Hungary. An extensive outline of the report, submitted by the Rapporteur, received the provisional approval of the Committee at its 58th meeting in Geneva on 8 April 1957. After further hearings, the Committee returned to New York to complete the preparation of the report. The report has been adopted unanimously by the Committee, vehich held its last meeting on the report on Friday, 7 June 1957.
B. THE WITNESSES
6. The Committee has heard 111 witnesses : thirty-five were heard in New York, twenty-one in Geneva, sixteen in Rome, thirty in Vienna and nine in London.
7. The first three witnesses were heard in public. They were : Miss Anna Kethly, Minister of State in the Hungarian Government of Imre Nagy ; Major- General B61a Kiraly, Military Commander of the City of Budapest and Com- mander-in-Chief of the National Guard during the Hungarian uprising ; and J6zsef K6vdg6, Mayor of Budapest during the years 1945-1947 and again dur- ing the days from 31 October to 4 November 1956.^
8. These three witnesses and other prominent Hungarians requested the Com- mittee to hear certain other witnesses. In accordance with the provisions of the General Assembly resolution and at the request of the Committee, suggestions as to persons to be heard were also made by the Governments of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States. These Governments submitted data regarding Hungarians in their territory whose testimony might, in their opinion, be of special interest. During the hearings, witnesses also on occasion proposed the names of other witnesses who might confirm or supplement their statements. Some 200 Hungarians sent letters on their own initiative to the Committee requesting to be heard ; a decision as to the hearing of these persons was reached after obtaining from them further information regarding themselves and the testimony which they could offer.
9. The witnesses were selected under the authority of the Chairman and the Rapporteur. The primary consideration in the selection of witnesses was their capacity to place before the Committee evidence based on direct and personal knowledge of the events in Hungary. Attention was also paid to the need to ensure that the witnesses should be drawn from all segments of the Hungarian people and from all parts of the country. Towards the end of its hearings, the Committee had to exercise increasing discrimination in the selection of witnesses in order to ensure that the testimony did not become unduly repetitive.
10. Among the witnesses the larger number were workers, skilled and un- skilled, from light and heavy industry, but a number of white-collar workers, and workers who had been active in trade unions within Hungary were also heard. Many of these workers had participated in the revolt as ordinary "freedom fighters", but several had been leaders in various spheres during the uprising. Among these were members of the Revolutionary Councils in Budapest and the provinces and leading members of the Workers' Councils in Budapest and the provinces, including members of the Central Workers' Council of Csepel.
11. Testimony was also received from engineers and technicians, and from managers in state enterprises, including the uranium mines in Pecs.
12. Relatively few peasants were heard by the Committee, since comparatively little fighting had taken place in country areas. Many of the workers and students who testified before the Committee were, however, of peasant origin.
13. The witnesses included both Communist and non-Communist intellectuals. The Committee heard several members of the Pet(\fi Club, some outstanding Hungarian writers and journalists, an actress, an artist, an architect, professors of law, medicine, philosophy, history, science, technology, economy and agricul- ture, and several lawyers, including an assistant public prosecutor. The Com- mittee also gave hearings to a number of high school students of both sexes and to young men and women from universities, including members of students' councils.
14. Besides several ofllcers and soldiers of the Hungarian army and members of the Air Force, the Committee heard members of the National Guard and of the ordinary police as well as certain leaders of revolutionary forces, viz., the Commander and Deputy Commander of the National Guard at Csepel ; the Com-
* See chapter XI, para. 512.
5066 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY EST THE UNITED STATES
mander of the Corvin Block ; the Commander of the revolutionary forces ot southern Budapest ; and the leader of the "freedom fighters" and guerilla forces in southwestern Hungary. Valuable information was received from doctors and nurses who had taken care of the wounded and carried out Red Cross duties, and from railroad and communication workers regarding troop movements.
15. Testimony was also received from a considerable number of Government officials, including diplomats. Certain of these had held high rank or had been assistants to leading Hungarian politicians or Cabinet ministers of various parties. Some had been present in the Parliament Building with Prime Minister Nagy until 4 November and were able to provide valuable and detailed infor- mation about events within the Hungarian Government during this critical period.
16. Among the witnesses were Catholics, Protestants and .Tews.
17. Several of the witnesses had formerly been members of Parliament or leaders of political parties. Many of the witnesses were Communists or had formerly been Communists. Others were members of the Social Democratic Party or of the Independent Smallholders' Party.
18. The witnesses also included a convinced pacifist who, under the stress of events in Hungary, forgot his principles and found himself participating in the fighting.
19. Many of the witnesses had spent years in prison before 1945 on account of anti-Horthy or anti-Nazi activities. Some of these had spent more years in prison under the Communists. Among the witnesses were some who had been accused in the Rajk trial : all of these had undergone extreme torture, had been forced to sign confessions, and had been kept in prison or forced labour camps for many years without proper legal proceedings. Some of them had, later, after the fall of Rnkosi in 1953, been released and reinstated in the Communist Party. One witness had been a stenographer for the security police.
20. None of the witnesses had left Hungary before the October revolution; some had escaped only a few weeks before being heard by the Committee; one witness had revisited Hungary several times in order to bring out his family and various friends.
21. Most witnesses gave the explanation that they had fled because they feared arrest and deportation. Eight witnesses had themselves been deported to the USSR, but had escaped or been returned; other witnesses had been liberated from deportation trains. Many stated that their apartments had been searched and were watched, so that they did not dare to return. Several had been mem- bers of Workers' and Revolutionary Councils of which other members had been arrested.
22. The great majority of the witnesses were under thirty-five years of age ; many were much younger, the youngest being sixteen years of age.
23. The Committee has been impressed by the bearing of the witnesses in the sometimes trying circumstances of the hearings, and by the cogency and coherence of their evidence. Despite the events which they had lived through, their testimony was usually tendered in a level-headed and sober manner. The members of the Committee were especially impressed by the bearing and earnest- ness of the younger witnesses.
C. CONDtJCT OF HEARINGS
24. The first three prominent witnesses, Miss Anna Kethly, Major-General Kiraly and Mayor Kovago, were heard before the Committee in open meetings. It was, however, found more practical to hold closed meetings, since most of the refugees feared retaliation against their family and friends in Hungary, and since questioning could be more insistent in closed meetings. Eighty-one out of the 111 witnesses were, at their request, heard anonymously ; their names were made known to the Chairman and Rapporteur, and to other members of the Committee when they so desired.
25. At the beginning of his testimony, each witness would usually give his personal data and background, and would then make an introductory statement regarding those events of which he had special knowledge. The witnesses were instructed to give evidence based on their personal experience. After the intro ductory statement, which might last from a few minutes to a few hours, the wit nesses were subjected to close cross-examination by the members of the Com mittee. Some witnesses submitted important documents and original drafts, and some prepared memoranda to support or elaborate their testimony. Th«', verbatim records of the testimony comprise some 2,000 pages of evidence.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 5067
26. Throughout its work, the Committee has sought scrupulously to assess the value of the testimony and of the documentation placed before it. Care has been taken to subject witnesses to detailed interrogation in order to test the re- liability of their evidence. The Committee has on many points been in a posi- tion to check the testimony of one witness with the testimony of others and with the documentation available to the Committee. As the hearings progressed, it became possible to put to witnesses questions of a more and more precise character.
D. DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL
27. As mentioned in the Interim Report, the Committee, through the Secre- tary-General, requested the Member States to make relevant information in their possession available to it. Governments having diplomatic representation in Budapest received a special request from the Committee to this effect.
28. The Committee is grateful for the helpful and voluminous material re- ceived from Member States in response to these requests. Besides otlier docu- mentary material, the Governments of Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States submitted reports giving a detailed and extensive picture of events in Hungary based on information available to them. The Australian Government transmitted a valuable memorandum based on interviews with thirty-eight Hungarian refugees in Australia.
29. Several nongovernmental organizations have transmitted memoranda and documentary material. A detailed study was received from the International Commission of Jurists at The Hague. Sir Hartley Shawcross, Q. C, had the op- portunity to present this material orally to the Committee, and submitted to questioning by the Members regarding the facts and the views expressed In the memorandum.
30. The initial studies of the Committee were in the main based on monitor- ing reports, in English and Hungarian, of official Hungarian broadcasts up to the present time and of the unofficial stations which were broadcasting during the Revolution. Use has been made of the available official Hungarian documenta- tion, including issues of the Hungarian Gazette, the Hungarian White Book, and official statements by the Hungarian Government. The documentation utilized for the preparation of the Report comprises also Hungarian newspapers covering the time before, during and after the Revolution, including several revolutionary newspapers and leaflets published during the uprising. Annexed to the Report is a list of material of this nature available to the Committee.
31. The Committee has also had the opportunity to view certain films which were made during the uprising.
E. ATTEMPTS TO OBSERVE IN HUNGARY AND TO MEET IMRE NAGY
'62. AS Stated in the Interim Report, the Committee requested at an early stage, through the Secretary-General, that the Hungarian Government extend assistance or facilities for the Committee's work, especially with regard to the entry of the Committee and its staff within the territory of Hungary. In his reply of 5 February 1957, the Permanent Representative of Hungary informed the Secretary-General that, in the opinion of his Government, the Committee "violates, in its function, the Charter of the United Nations", and that "conse- qently, the Hungarian Government is not in a position to permit the members of the Special Committee and its staff to enter into the territory of Hungary".
33. In accordance with the undertaking stated in the Interim Report, the Committee renewed its request to the Hungarian Government during its stay in Europe. The Hungarian Government replied in a Note of 25 March 1947 that it maintained its position.
3i. On 14 March 1957, the Committee also requested the Secretary-General t() inform the Government of Romania that the Committee desired to meet Imre Nagy in the interest of a full and effective perfonuance of the functions en- trusted to it by the General Assembly. The Permanent Representative of Romania replied on .30 March that his Government ((jnsidered the establishment <»f tlie Committee as contrary to the spirit and provisions of the United Nations Charter, as well as to the interests of international cooperation.
F. ARRANGEMENT OP THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
35. In deciding the arrangement of information within the report, the Com- mittee has sought to ensure that the form of the report should reflect the nature of the task assigned to the Committee by the General Assembly.
5068 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITEB STATES
36. The Committee noted in its Interim Report that its primary concern was "to ascertain the extent and the impact of foreign intervention, by the threat or use of armed force or other means on the internal affairs and political in- dependence of Hungary and the rights of the Hungarian people". The internal affairs of Hungary and political and other developments of that country before 1956, vpere to be considered by the Committee as outside the framework of its investigation, save in so far as those developments had a direct bearing on the uprising of October 1956, the subsequent interventions of the USSR and the resultant aspects of the continuing situation within Hungary.
37. In view of these considerations, the Committee has considered that a chronological survey of events would not be an appropriate form for the report. It has seemed more appropriate that each chapter should deal with a defined aspect of the situation which the Committee has been called upon to investigate. Since this arrangement has involved a departure from chronological sequence in the presentation of information, the Committee has considered it proper in the following chapter to present a brief outline, in chronological order, of develop- ments in Hungary from 22 October 1956, prefaced by a summary of the political development of Hungary in preceding years. In chapter II references will be found to the places in the report where points at issue are developed at greater length. At the same time, the Committee has sought to present this chaper as an account of the events in Hungary which can be read independently.
38. In chapter III the Committee has endeavoured to state objectively the contentions advanced by the Governments of Hungary and of the USSR in justification of recourse to the assistance of the armed forces of the USSR. The Committee has also endeavoured to indicate within this chapter the degree to which the general contentions of the Governments in question correspond with known facts.
39. The remainder of the report is divided into three parts. The first part covers aspects of the situation directly related to the intervention of the armed forces of the USSR. Two chapters are devoted to an account of the military movements of the Soviet armed forces within Hungary in the last days of October and the early days of November 1956. These are followed by two chapters which deal with the alleged invitations by the Government of Hungary to the Government of the USSR to intervene. This first part closes with an examination of the international instruments bearing on Soviet intervention and gives an account of the negotiations between the Government of Hungary and the Government of the USSR regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.
40. Having in this first part dealt with the direct problems of Soviet inter- vention, the Committee has in part II endeavoured to assess the impact on the political independence of Hungary of the use of force by the Government of the USSR. For this purpose the Committee has found it essential to inquire with care into the immediate background of the uprising and into the aims of the different sections of the Hungarian people. In order to present a clear statement on their aims and aspirations, the examination of their social and political thought has been dealt with in chapter IX separately from the narrative of events. The course of events during the uprising is related in chapter X, commencing with the students' movements in the middle of October 1956.
41. Since a major aspect of the uprising was the establishment of Revolutionary Councils and of Workers' Councils in Budapest and in the provinces, the relevant information is brought together in chapter XI, which contains data regarding the course of the uprising in parts of Hungary other than Budapest. In chapter XII the Committee has sought to provide an accurate account of political developments in Hungary in the brief i)eriod between the successful termination of the uprising and its repression by a second intervention of Soviet armed force. Two further chapters of part II deal with the characteristics of the regime in Hungary since 4 November, the first providing information relating to the continuance of Soviet intervention in Hungary, and the second relating to the suppression of those political rights and freedoms which the Hungarian i)eople had sought to establish.
42. Part III of the report deals with matters relating to the treatment of individuals within Hungary, under the heading: "Specific acts in violation of other rights of the Hungarian people". One chapter deals with evidence of the violation of human rights in general. A second chapter deals with the problem of the deportation of Hungarians to the USSR.
43. In a final chapter the Committee states its general conclusions and find- ings.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE XHSTITED STATES 5069
Q. GENERAL OBSEBVATIONS ON THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE
44. The Committee regrets that the refusal of the Hungarian Government and of the Government of the USSR to co-operate has prevented it from obtaining the information which those Governments are in a position to place at its dis- posal. The Committee would undoubtedly have profited by the data which the two Governments could have placed before it. However, in view of the com- prehensive and detailed documentation and testimony wJiich have been made available, it is the opinion of the Committee that the data which might have been presented by the Government of the USSR and by the Hungarian Govern- ment would not have modified the Committee's main conclusions i-egarding what actually took place in Hungary, though it might possibly have changed or elab- orated certain specific points in this report. Conscious of its obligation to take all views into account, the Committee has examined carefully all evidence, both in documentation and in testimony, which might be adduced in support of the views of the two Governments. Moreover, in the questioning of witnesses, the members of the Committee have throughout borne in mind the description and interpretation of events in Hungary maintained by the two Governments and have endeavoured to test their validity.
45. Though the Committee is aware that in the course of time further docu- mentation and evidence will undoubtedly come to light regarding the situation with which the Committee has been concerned, the range of information at its disposal has been far greater than could have been anticipated at the outset of the inquiry. The Committee has sought throughout its Wiork to apply to the evidence the tests of authenticity and coherence which provide the essential criteria of the objectivity of any such investigation.
46. While therefore bearing in mind the resolutions of the General Assembly, the Committee has approached its task of investigation without prejudgment, deeming it essential to present a factual report based exclusively on the careful examination of reliable evidence. It has consistently sought to avoid any emo- tional evaluation of the facts. It has endeavoured to depict in restrained lan- guage the situation as revealed by the evidence received. The Committee has felt that it would best fulfil its task by rendering to the General Assembly a dispassionate survey of the situation which it has been the duty of the Com- mittee to investigate.
.VNNEX A TO CHAPTER
Resolution 1132 {XI) of the General Assembly of the United Nations
The General Assembly,
Recalling its previous resolutions on the Hungarian problem, Reaffirming the objectives contained therein and the continuing concern of the United Nations in this matter. Having Received the report of the Secretary-General of 5 January 1957,* Desiring to ensure that the General Assembly and all Member States shall be in possession of the fullest and best available information regarding the situ- atiou created by the intervention of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, through its use of armed force and other means, in the internal affairs of Hungary, as well as regarding developments relating to the recommendations of the General Assembly on this subject,
1. Establishes, for the above-mentioned purposes, a Special Committee, composed of representatives of Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia and Uru- guay, to investigate, and to establish and maintain direct observation in Hungary and elsewhere, taking testimony, collecting evidence and receiving information, as appropriate, in order to report its findings to the General Assembly at its eleventh session, and thereafter from time to time to prepare additional reports for the information of Member States and of the General Assembly if it is in session ;
2. Calls upon the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Hungary to co- operate in every way with the Committee and, in particular, to permit the Committee and its staff to enter the territory of Hungary and to travel freely therein ;
3. Requests all Member States to assist the Committee in any way appro- priate in its task, making available to it relevant information, including testi-
* Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, annexes. Agenda Item 67 document A/3485. '
5070 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY EST THE "DNITEI) STATES
mony and evidence, which Members may possess, and assisting it in securing such information ;
4. Invites the Secretary-General to render the Committee all appropriate assistance and facilities ;
5. Calls xtpon all Member States promptly to give effect to the present and previous resolutions of the General Assembly on the Hungarian problem ;
6. Reaffirms its request that the Secretary-General continue to take any initiative that he deems helpful in relation to the Hungarian problem, in con- formity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the reso- lutions of the General Assembly.
636th plenary meeting, 10 January 1957.
Chapter II. A Brief History op the Hungarian Uprising
A. DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE 22 OCTOBER 1956
47. Immediately after the Second World War, the Hungarian people sought to give expression to their political views. A general election was fought in 1945 by six political parties, authorized by the Allied Control Commission. Five of these won seats in Parliament. The Smallholders emerged with 245 seats. the Social Democrats with sixty-nine, the Communists with seventy, the National Peasants with twenty-three and the Democratic Party with two. The four major parties formed a coalition, but Communist influence steadily asserted itself. By 1948, leaders of the non-Communist parties had been silenced, had fled abroad or had been arrested, and in 1949, Hungary officially became a People's Democ- racy. Real power was in the hands of MStyas Rakosi, a Communist trained in Moscow. Under his regime, Hungary was modelled more and more closely on the Soviet pattern. Free speech and individual liberty ceased to exist. Arbi- trary imprisonment became common and purges were undertaken, both within and outside the ranks of the Party. In June 1949, the Foreign Minister Mszlo Bajk, was arrested ; he was charged vdth attempting to overthrow the democratic order and hanged. Many other people were the victims of similar action. This was made easier by the apparatus of the State security i>olice or AVH, using methods of terror in the hands of the regime, which became identified with Rdkosi's regime in the minds of the people.
48. The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR early in 1956 encouraged a movement within the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party which aimed at a measure of democratization and national indei)endence and a relaxation of police rule. In March 1956, Rdkosi announced that the Supreme CJourt had established that Rajk and others had been condemned on "fabricated charges". This official admission that crimes had been committed by the regime had profound repercussions in Hungary. It was followed in July by the dismissal of Rdkosi and, early in October, by the ceremonial reburial, in the presence of a large crowd, of Ldszlo Rajk and other victims of the 1949 trials. Rdkosi was succeeded as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party by Erno Gero. From the date of Rdkosi's fall, the Hungarian people looked for a softening of the regime. Associated in their minds with better days was the former Premier, Imre Nagy, whose period of office from 1953 to 1955 had been marked by a loosening of the controls imposed earlier by Rdkosi. Nagy had also been attacked as a deviationist and, while he had escaped trial, had been expelled from the Party and divested of all his offices. His name continued to stand for more liberal policies in the minds of many Hungarian Communists, who wished for his return to public life.
49. The first protests against the dictatorial regime of the Party were voiced by certain Hungarian writers, as early as the autumn of 1955. Articles pub- lished by these writers concerned mainly the doctrine of Party allegiance in literature and interference with creative writers and artists by Party spokesmen and bureaucrats. Although a number of writers were arrested, the scope of these protests gradually widened to take in other grievances of the Hungarian people. In the summer of 1956, the foundation of the Petofi Club provided a new forum for discussions, which were often critical of the regime. This Club was spon- sored by DISZ, the official Communist Youth Organization and its debates were mainly attended by young Communist intellectuals.
50. On 19 October, the Minister, of Education, Albert Konya, announced certain changes as a result of requests put forward by Hungarian students.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 5071
One of these was an undertaking to abolish the compulsory teaching of Russian in schools. This announcement was followed by student manifestations in Szeged and other towns, during which various demands of a more far-i-eaching character were discussed and adopted. Also on 19 October, news of Poland's move towards greater independence of the USSR was received in Hungary with enthusiasm. Friendship between the two peoples had been traditional for centuries.
51. Although Soviet troops are said to have been called in to deal with dis- orders that began during the night of 23-24 October, there is evidence that steps were being taken by the Soviet authorities from 20-22 October with a view to the use of armed force in Hungary. On 20-21 October, floating bridges were assembled at Zahony on the Hungarian-Soviet frontier. On 21-22 October, in neighboring areas of Romania, Soviet officers on leave and reserve officers speaking Hungarian were recalled. On 22 October, Soviet forces in Western Hungary were observed moving towards Budapest.
B. MEETINGS AND DEMONSTRATIONS
52. On the day before the holding of mass demonstrations, namely 22 October, a number of student meetings took place in Budapest. At the most important of these, held by students of the Building Industry Technological University, the students adopted a list of sixteen demands which expressed their views on national policy. These demands contained most of the points put forward dur- ing the uprising itself. They included the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops, the reconstitution of the Government under Imre Nagy, who had mean- while been re-admitted to the Communist Party, free elections, freedom of ex- pression, the re-establishment of political parties, and sweeping changes in the conditions both of workers and peasants. It was learnt during the meeting that the Hungarian Writers' Union proposed to express its solidarity with Poland on the following day by laying a wreath at the statute of General Bem, a hero of Pluugary's War of Independence of 1848-49, who was of Polish origin. The students thereupon decided to organize a silent demonstration of sympathy on the same occasion.
53. Early next morning, the students' demands had become known throughout Budapest. Witnesses speak of an atmosphere of elation and hoi>efulness. Radio BudaiJest referred to the planned demonstration, but later announced a com- munique prohibiting it from the Minister of the Interior. The ban was, how- ever, lifted during the early afternoon, when the demonstration was already under way. Thousands of young people took part in it, including students, factory workers, soldiers in uniform and others. A similar demonstration took place at the statute of Petofi.
54. Standing beside the statue of General Bem, Peter Veres, President of the Writers' Union, read a manifesto to the crowd, who also listenetl to a proclamation of the students' sixteen demands. Most of the crowd afterwards crossed the Danube to join demonstrators outside the Parliament Building where, by 6 p. m., between 200,000 and 300,000 people were gathered. Rei)eated calls for Imre Nagy eventually brought the former Premier. Mr. Nagy ad- dressed the crowd briefly from a balcony of the Parliament Building.
55. There had so far been nothing to suggest that the demonstration would end in any other way than by the crowds' returning home. An episode, however, at 8 p. m. greatly embittered the people. The First Secretary of the Central Com- mittee of the Party, Brno Gero, had returned that morning from a visit to Marshal Tito, and the public was eagerly awaiting a speech which he was to broadcast at that time. The general hope was that he would take account of the popular demands voiced by the students and would make some conciliatory announcement in connection with them. The speech, however, made none of the hoped-for concessions and its whole tone angered the people. At the same time, another crowd had taken it into their own hands to carry out one of the students' demands, namely that for the removal of the great statue of Stalin. Their efforts caused it to overturn at 9.30 p. m., by which time resentment was being freely expressed over Mr. Gero's speech.
56. On the evening of 22 October, some of the students had sought to have their demands broadcast by Budapest Radio, in order to bring them to the at- tention of the people as a whole. The censor had been unwilling to broadcast the demands for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and for free elections, and the students had refused to allow incomplete publication. The following day, some of the students went from the Bem statue to the Radio Building, with
5072 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY EST THE UTSHTED STATES
the intention of making another attempt to have their demands broadcast. A large crowd gathered at the Radio Building, which was guarded by the AVH or State security police. The students sent a delegation into the Building to negotiate with the Director. The crowd waited in vain for the return of this delegation, and eventually a rumour spread that one delegate had been shot. Shortly after 9 p. m., tear gas bombs were thrown from the upper windows and, one or two minutes later, AVH men opened fire on the crowd, killing a number of people and wounding others. In so far as any one moment can be selected as the turning point which changed a peaceable demonstration into a violent uprising, it would be this moment when the AVH, already intensely unpopular and universally feared by their compatriots, attacked defenceless people. The anger of the crowd was intensified when white ambulances, with Red Cross license plates, drove up. Instead of first aid teams, AVH police emerged, wearing doctors' white coats. A part of the infuriated crowd attacked them and, in this way, the demonstrators acquired their first weapons. Hungarian forces were rushed to the scene to reinforce the AVH but, after hesitating a moment, they sided with the crowd.
57. Meanwhile, workers from Csepel, Ujpest and other working-class districts learnt of the situation by telephone. They seized trucks and drove into Buda- pest, obtaining arms on the way from friendly soldiers or police, or from mili- tary barracks and arms factories known to them. From about 11 p. m., the Radio Building was under attack with light arms and, at midnight, the radio announced that clashes had taken place at "various points" in the city. During the early hours of 24 October, the demonstrators seized the Radio Building, but were driven out of it again. At the oflices of the Communist Party newspaper, Szabad N^p, other AA'^H guards opened fire on unarmed demonstrators. Later, insurgents who had obtained arms overcame the AVH and occupied the news- paper oflSces.
58. While fighting was in progress at the Radio Building, the first Soviet tanks made their appearance in Budapest at about 2 a. m. on 24 October, and were soon in action. However, no official announcement was made of the Soviet intervention until 9 a. m.
D. THE AEMED UPRISING
59. Before referring to the Russian troops, Budapest Radio had announced at 8 : 13 a. m. that Imre Nagy had been recommended to be the next Chairman of the Council of Ministers, at a night meeting of the Central Committee of the Hungarian AVorkers' (Communist) Party. Half an hour later came a statement that summary jurisdiction had been ordered, and this was read by the announcer as "signed by Imre Nagy, Chairman of the Council of Ministers." Only after this, at 9 a. m., was it reported that the Government had "applied for help to the Soviet formations stationed in Hungary". No indication was given as to the manner in which this alleged application was made. In spite of the skilful manner in which the radio presentation of developments gave the impression that Mr. Nagy was responsible for decisions, some, remembering his opposition to arbitrary measures and his fight for the relaxation of the regime, suspected a fraud. Moreover, Mr. Nagy had no official status the day before. If the appeal for help had, indeed, come from him, it was realized that the Soviet forces from Cegl^d and Szekesfehervar could not have arrived in Budapest by 2 a. m. on the 24th.
60. The first shots at the Radio Building marked the beginning of a hard- fought five-day battle, in which the people of Budapest found themselves in combat with Soviet armour and with the AVH. The ordinary police sympa- thized with the insurgents, giving them weapons or fighting at their side. Cer- tain units of the Hungarian Army fought as such on the side of the insurgents, but the Army as a whole disintegrated from the start of the uprising. Wherever they could succeed in doing so, Hungarian soldiers handed over weapons and ammunition to their fighting compatriots and, in very many cases, deserted, individually or in groups, to their ranks. However, in general, the senior officers were pro-Soviet and the insurgents mistrusted them. There was no single instance recorded of Hungarian troops fighting on the Soviet side against their fellow countrymen.
61. The freedom fighters, most of whom were workers, with a proportion of students, usually fought in small groups, although some of them occupied strongholds such as the Corvin Cinema. A frequent weapon used against Russian tanks was the "Molotov cocktail", a loosely-corked bottle filled with gasoline, which exploded when thrown against a tank. Such improvised meth-
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY UST THE UNITED STATES 5073
ods proved highly effective against the power of Soviet armour, which found it difficult to manoeuvre, especially in narrow streets, and to compete with the mobility of the young Hungarian fighters, who included some not yet out of childhood. The Soviet mechanized forces were also hampered by insufficient infantry support and inadequate food supplies. There was evidence that some of the Russian soldiers disliked the task assigned to them. Those who had spent some time in Hungary had often established friendly relations with the people, many of whom could talk to them in Russian. There were a number of cases of fraternization with the Hungarians.
E. BEVOLUTIONARY AND WORKERS' COUNCILS
62. Most of the available Soviet forces had been dispatched to Budapest and, meanwhile, there was comparatively little fighting in the provinces. Here, the first days of the uprising saw a transfer of power from the Communist bureauc- racy to the new RevoIuti(,)nary and Workers' Councils. In most cases, these Councils took over without opposition, although some incidents were reported during this process. These Councils represented a spontaneous reaction against the dictatorial methods of the regime. The Revolutionary Councils took over the various responsibilities of local government. There were also Revolutionary Councils or Committees in the Army, in Government departments and in pro- fessional groups and centres of activity such as the radio and the Hungarian Telegraph Agency. Members of the Councils were usually chosen at a meeting of those concerned. They were intended to prepare for the setting up of a genuinely democratic system of government. The Councils also put forward various political and economic demands, calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, free and secret elections, complete freedom of expression and the aboli- tion of the one-party system. The most influential of these bodies was probably the Transdanubian National Council, which represented the i>eople of Western Hungary. Using the Free Radio Station at Gyor, this Council demanded that Hungary should renounce the Warsaw Treaty and proclaim her neutrality. Should its demands not be accepted, it proposed to set up an independent Govern- ment.
63. The Workers' Councils were set up in a variety of centres of work, such as factories, mines, industrial undertakings and so so. They also put forward political demands and wielded conisderable influence. However, their principal purpose was to secure for the workers a real share in the management of enter- prises and to arrange for the setting up of machinery to protect their interests. Unpopular measures such as that of establishing "norms" of production for each worker, were abolished. The emergence of Revolutionary and Workers' Councils throughout Hungary was one of the most characteristic features of the uprising. It represented the first practical step to restore order and to reorganize the Hungarian economy on a socialist basis, but without rigid Party control or the apparatus of terror,
p. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
64. A serious episode occurred on 25 October, which greatly embittered the people and turned popular sympathy away from Mr. Nagy, whose part in the alleged invitation to the Soviet troops remained obscure. Soviet tanks guarding the Parliament Building, in which the Chairman of the Council of Ministers had his offices, oiiened fire on unarmed demonstrators, in support of the AVH, This massacre, in which many people lost their lives, shocked the nation. The Hungarian people did not know at this time that Mr. Nagy was detained at the Communist Party Hedquarters when the Russian tanks were firing on the un- armed crowd.
65. On the same day, the insurgents derived some encouragement from the news that Erno Gero had been replaced as First Secretary of the Central Com- mittee of the Party by Janos Kadar. The following day Mr. Gero sought the security of Soviet tanks — and later Soviet territory. The former Premier, Andras Hegediis, Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers, also fled from the Communist Headquarters.
66. Mr. Nagy was now free to move to the Parliament Building. On 27 Octo- ber, he formed a Government into which he invited both Communist and non- Communist Ministers. These included Zoltan Tildy, former Head of State, B61a Kovacs, former Secretary-General of the Independent Smallholders, and Ferenc Erdei of the National Peasants. The non-Communists, however, were serving in a personal, non-party capacity and several "Stalinists" were retained.
93215 — 59 — pt. 90 2
5074 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE IINIITE1> STATES
67. With the departure of Messrs. Gero and Hegediis, the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party announced that tlie Government would start negotiations with the USSR for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces. On 28 October, Mr. Nagy's Government ordered a cease-fire. Fighting stopped largely on the insurgents' terms. Apart from the successful adoption of guerilla tactics by the fighters, larger groups of the insurgents had withstood Soviet tanks in strongholds such as the Corvin Block. At the Kilidn Barracks, Hungarian Army units had fought successfully against repeated attacks under their leader. Colonel Pal Maleter, who had gone over to the insurgents after being sent with instructions to fight against them.
G. MR. NAGY CLARIFIES HIS POSITION
68. On the same day when Mr. Nagy's Government ordered a cease-fire, the Prime Minister announced that he would abolish the AVH, after the restoration of order. Popular resentment against the AVH was so universal and so deep that Mr. Nagy was obliged to take this decisive step on the following day, 29 October. As a result, he was himself freed for the first time from the control of the AVH, acting on behalf of the Communist hierarchy. The fall of a regime for which, in all Hungary, only the AVH was prepared to fight, followed as an inevitable consequence. On 30 October, Mr. Nagy announced that the Cabinet had abolished the "one-party system". Speaking in the name of the Communist Party, Mr. Kadar, still First Secretary of its Central Committee, agreed with this step to avoid, as he said, "further bloodshed". Zoltan Tildy, former leader of the Smallholders Party, announced that free elections would be held throughout Hungary. Representatives of both the Smallholders and National Peasants entered the Inner Cabinet in which they had, between them, as many posts as the Communists. A post was set aside for a Social-Demo- cratic nominee.
69. Once the AVH had been disbanded, Mr. Nagy felt free to explain his actions on and immediately after 24 October. A series of statements was made by himself, or on his behalf, in the press and on the radio. The most important of these declared that Mr. Nagy had not signed any decrees asking for Soviet military intervention or proclaiming summary jurisdiction. It was also stated that he had not subsequently approved of the invitation to the Soviet forces. These clarifications and the i)olitical steps taken by Mr. Nagy served to dispel popular doubts regarding his attitude towards the uprising, and his popularity rapidly returned.
70. Although a cease-fire had been ordered on 28 October, a few isolated skirmishes took place after that date, but the cease-fire became fully effective by the time the new Cabinet took office on 30 October. That same day saw the beginning of a withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from Budapest. The general expectation was that negotiations for their complete withdrawal from Hungarian territory would soon attain their objective. A number of revolu- tionary organs, the new political parties and newspapers beginning to appear on the streets all joined the Government in its efforts to stop the last mani- festations of lawlessness which had occurred. A fact reported by many credible witnesses, however, was that no looting occurred, although numerous shop win- dows had been destroyed and goods of value, including even jewellery, lay un- touched within reach of passers by. Hundreds of buildings in Budapest had become ruins as a result of the gunfire, and thousands more were severely damaged, although some areas of the city had suffered little.
71. The days that followed the cease-fire, up to 4 November, saw the people of Budapest take the first steps to clear away rubble and broken glass, to restore order and to bring life back to normal conditions. It was generally agreed that everyone would resume work on Monday, 5 November. The disbanding of the AVH and the renewed confidence in Mr. Nagy, together with the victory of those who had fought in the uprising, combined to create a general feeling of well- being and hopefulness, which impressed all observers. On 2 November the Government called on members of the AVH to report to the authorities, in order to appear before a screening commitee and, by the next day, great numbers of the former security police were reporting to prosecutors' offices. Meanwhile, political prisoners whom they had detained and tortured were released by the people. The most celebrated political prisoner to regain his freedom was Cardi- nal Mindszenty, who returned to Budapest and broadcast to the nation. When the prisons were opened, some common criminals also appear to have been freed. On 1 November, the freedom fighters, while maintaining their Identity,
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY EST THE UNTTED STATES 5075
agreed to be amalgamated into a National Guard whose members would be the «jnly Huugariaus, apart from the Anny and police, authorized to bear arms.
72. On 3 November, the Government was again reconstituted. Several Com- munists were dismissed, some of them having been ousted from their offices by the staff of their respective Ministries. Three Ministries each were allotted to the Communists, the Social Democrats, the Independent Smallholders, and two to the Petofi Party. The parties of the coalition were the same which in 1945 had received the blessing of the Allied Control Commission, on which the USSR was represented. Imre Nagy was now the head of a caretaker Government. The people regarded him as a good Hungarian who could be entrusted with the organization of the free general elections on which all Revolutionary and Workers' Councils had insisted, and as a suitable negotiator with the Soviet leaders on the withdrawal of Russian troops and on future relations with the USSR. One of the most trusted leaders of the Revolution, now Lieutenant General PSl Mal6ter, had become Minister of Defence. Reassuring statements were issued by various leaders regarding the policy to be followed. A Minister of State, Ferenc Farkas, himself a member of the National Peasant Party, announced that the four parties were unanimously agreed to retain from the socialist achievements everything which could be used in a free, democratic and socialist country, in accordance with the will of the people. It was made very clear that the condemnation of the old system which the uprising repre- sented would not affect those reforms under which ownership of the land and industrial undertakings had been transferred. The jjeasant parties did not agree on all issues with the Social Democrats, but they also were solidly opposed to the restoration of large estates, as they were to the forced collectivization and obligatory deliveries of produce imposed by the Communist regime.
73. The Communist Party itself realized that a drastic overhaul of its methods would be necessary to regain the confidence of its disillusioned supporters. At about 9 : 50 p. m. on 1 November, Mr. Kadiir read over Budapest Radio a message from the Preparatory Committee of what was to be a reformed party under the name of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. He spoke of the uprising in which "the Communist writers, journalists, university students, the youth of the Petfifi Club, thousands of workers and i)easants, the veteran fighters who had been imprisoned on false charges, fought in the front line against the RSkosi despotism and political hooliganism." The new party would defend the cause of socialism and democracy, "not by slavishly imitating foreign examples, but by taking a road suitable to the economic and historic characteristics of our country . . .". Mr. Kjld^r appealed to the "newly formed democratic parties" to "overcome the danger" of intervention from abroad by consolidating the Government. The people of Hungary had proved their intention unflinchingly to support the Government's efforts aimed at the complete withdrawal of the Soviet forces. "We do not want to be dependent any longer ; we do not want our country to become a battlefield."
H. DECLARATION OF NEUTRALITY
74. On the morning of 1 November, Mr. Nagy took over direct responsibility for foreign affairs. He told the Soviet Ambassador that he had received authorita- tive information on the entry of new Soviet military units into Hungary. This, he informed the Ambassador, was a violation of the Warsaw Treaty and the Hungarian Government would denounce the Treaty if the reinforcements were not withdra\vn. Later that day, the Soviet Ambassador stated that the Soviet troops had crossed the border only to relieve those troops who had been fighting and to protect the Russian civilian population in Hungary. He said that the Soviet Government was ready to negotiate a partial withdrawal of Soviet troops and suggested that two delegations be appointed, one to discuss political, and the other technical, questions associated with the withdrawal. At 2 : 00 p. m. Mr. Nagy telephoned the Ambassador and informed him that new Soviet troops had crossed the frontier within the last three hours. For this reason, effective immediately, Hungary was withdrawing from the Warsaw Treaty. At 4 : 00 p. m., the Council of Ministers, which included Mr. Kfiddr, approved this action without dissent and, at the same meeting, adopted a Declaration of Neutrality for Hungary. At 5 : 00 p. m., the Council of Ministers invited the Soviet Am- bassador to a meeting and informed him of these decisions. The same news was conveyed by the Hungarian Government to various heads of diplomatic missions in Budapest, who were also told of a request by Mr. Nagy to the United Nations, asking for the aid of the four Great Powers in defence of Hungary's neutrality.
5076 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY EST THE UNITED STATES
At 7 : 54 p. m., Mr. Nagy broadcast to the Hungarian i)eople the Declaration of Neutrality. His statement ended with the words : "We appeal to our neighbors,, countries near and far, to respect the unalterable decision of our people. It is indeed true that our people are as united in this decision as perhaps never before in their history. Working millions of Hungary ! Protect and strengthen with revolutionary determination, sacrificial work and the consolidation of order, our country — the free, independent, democratic and neutral Hungary".
I. SOVIET FORCES INTEBVENE AGAIN
75. While news came in of the massing of Soviet armoured forces, negotiation* continued for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. By the afternoon of 3 November, agreement appeared to be near and only certain technical details of the withdrawal remained to be settled. A Hungarian delegation consisting of the Minister of Defence, now General Mal6ter, the Minister of State Terene Erdei, the Chief of Staff General Kovacs, and Colonel Sziics was invited to settle these details at the Soviet Military Command at Tokol near Budapest, at 10 p. m. The Hungarian negotiators attended a banquet given in their honour by the Soviet military representatives at Tokol. It was nearly midnight when the party was interrupted by the arrival of General Serov, Chief of the Soviet Secu- rity Police, who entered the room accompanied by NKVD officers and ordered the arrest of the Hungarian delegation.
76. Communication having been interrupted between Mr. Nagy's Government and General Maleter, considerable anxiety was felt at the Parliament Building regarding developments. During the night, the gravity of the position was emphasized by numerous telephone calls received in the Parliament Building. These came from industrial districts surrounding Budapest and from various Revolutionary Councils in the provinces. They all reported that Soviet forces, in battle formation, were steadily advancing, and the Revolutionary organs asked urgently for permission to oppose them by force of arms. It has been estimated that some 2,500 Soviet tanks and 1,000 Soviet supporting vehicles were in Hungary by 3 November. All strategic centres, airfields, railroads and high- ways had been brought under Soviet control. Mr. Nagy, however, gave specific instructions not to open fire on the Russian troops, since he understood that a successful outcome of the negotiations for withdrawal of the Soviet troops was still expected. These instructions were not changed until news was received that Mr. Kaddr had set up another Government, whereupon Mr. Nagy sum- moned a Cabinet meeting at which it was decided to resist the Soviet troops by force of arms. At 5 : 20 a. m. Mr. Nagy announced over Budapest Radio that Soviet troops had attacked the capital "with the obvious intention of overthrow- ing the legal Hungarian democratic Government". He declared that that Gov- ernment was at its post and that the Hungarian troops were in combat. Battles were, in fact, being fought on the arterial roads at the approaches to Budapest. Notwithstanding the overwhelming power of the Soviet forces, barricades hastily erected by the Hungarian fighters presented a first obstacle to the Russian advance. The Hungarian Army, the National Guard, and groups of freedom fighters, mostly equipped only with light weapons fought side by side against the advancing tanks. Shortly after 8 a. m. Budapest Radio broadcast its last message before going off the air. Tliis was an appeal to the writers and scien- tists of the world to help the people of Hungary. By that time, Soviet ar- moured units had broken through the defences of Budapest and were in control of the Danube bridges, the Parliament Building and the Central telephone exchange.
J. MR. KAdAR forms a GOVERNMENT
77. At 5 : 05 a. m., only a quarter of an hour before Mr. Nagy broadcast news of the second Soviet intervention, another radio station had announced the for- mation of a Government by Mr. Kadar. The announcement consisted of an open: letter signed by Mr. Kadar and three other former members of the Nagy Gov- ernment. They declared that they had left that Government on 1 November, because of its inability to fight the "counter-revolutionary danger". In order to defeat "fascism and reaction", they had established the Hungarian Revolu- tionary Worker-Peasant Govemnaent. At 6 a. m. Mr. Kadar's voice was heard over the same wavelength announcing the composition of his Government. He declared that reactionary elements were seeking to overthrow socialism in Hungary and to restore the capitalists and landowners to iwwer. The new Government, he said, had requested the help of the Soviet troops to defeat these- "reactionary forces".
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVrTY IN THE UNITEID STATES 5077
78. Mr. Kadar gave no explanation of his change of attitude since his broad- cast supporting Mr. Nagy on the night of 1 November. There is no evidence that he had taken any steps to di.«sociate himself from Mr. Nagy's policies or to resign from his Government. It is known that he visited the Soviet Embassy after his broadcast on the night of 1 November, but he was present at negotia- tions with representatives of Revolutionary Councils the following day. If the circumstances in which he constituted his Cabinet are obscure, so also are his movements and those of his fellow Ministers at the time. According to wit- nesses, Mr. Kadar was in Moscow early in November and he and his Ministers made no public appearance in Budapest until they took the oath of office on 7 November. The controlling authority in Hungary was the Soviet Military Conmiand, which issued orders to the Hungarian people regarding the surrender •of arms, circulation in the streets, the supply of food and other matters falling within the province of civil administration. There is no evidence to suggest that any Hungarian group opposed the actions of Mr. Nagy which, in most cases, merely reflected what the Revolutionary and Workers' Councils had insisted upon from the outbreak of the uprising. All the evidence shows that the Soviet troops fought alone against the Hungarians. With the exception of former members of the AVH and a small number of former Party officials, no Hun- garians, whether organized or unorganized, fought on the Russian side. Many of the new Soviet troops brought into Hungary for the second intervention came from di-stant regions of Central Asia. Many believed that they were in Egypt, with the mission of fighting the Anglo-French "Imperialists". It would seem that the Soviet authorities had more confidence in troops who had had no opportunity to be affected by European associations and who might be counted upon to behave with indifference to the attitude of the Hungarian people.
79. After the Soviet forces had occupied Budapest, local resistance continued in various centres. Bitter fighting went on until Tuesday evening, 6 November, when most of the Hungarian fighters ran out of ammunition. Some centres within the city continued, however, to resist until the 8th and in the outlying industrial districts fighting went on until the 11th. Heavy destruction and considerable loss of life were caused by the Soviet armed forces, which often di- rected gunfire into buildings lining the streets. During this second armed inter- vention by Soviet forces, the fiercest fighting took place in working class suburbs of Budapest, such as Ujpest and Csepel Island. The workers at Csepel refused several Soviet calls to surrender and held out until the evening of 9 November, despite the use of artillery against them from various directions, supplemented by aerial bombardment. At the important industrial centre of Dunapentele, formerly Sztalinvaros, the workers showed an equal determination to resist the Soviet troops. On 7 November, during an all day battle, they repelled a Soviet attack from three directions using a large armoured force, self-propelled guns and tactical airforce. Eye witnesses described how the factory workers, with the Hmigarian officers and men of the local garrison, were entirely united, irrespective of party or religious affiliation. Only former members of the AVH, it was said, dissented from the policies of the Revolutionary Council.
K. THE ABDUCTION OF MB. NAGY
80. When Mr. Nagy's Government was overthrown by Soviet armed force, it was the Russian commanders, and not Mr. Kadsir's Government, who assumed control. The fate of Mr. Nagy and his immediate entourage soon showed the inability of the Hungarian Government to maintain its sovereign independence against Soviet intervention. Mr. Nagy left the Parliament Building at about 6 a. m. on 4 November and sought asylum at the Yugoslav Embassy. Later in the day, other leading Hungarians, including the widow of LSszlo Rajk, with fifteen women and seventeen children, sought asylum in the same building. During negotiations between the Yugoslav Government and Mr. KadSr that took place in November, the Yugoslav Government proposed that Mr. KadAr should provide a written guarantee that Mr. Nagy and his party would be allowed to return freely to their homes or, if this were not possible, to go to Yugoslavia. A sug- gestion by Mr. KadSr that the Nagy party should seek refuge in Romania was rejected by Mr. Nagy. Other demands by Mr. Kadar's Government considered unacceptable by Mr. Nagy were that he should resign from his position in the Government, should offer a self-criticism of his activities and should declare himself in sympathy with Mr. Kadar's Government. Eventually, the Yugoslav Government wrote to Mr. Kaddr that it would agree to the departure of Mr. Nagy and his friends only if Mr. KadSr, as President of the Hungarian Govern-
5078 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY UsT THE UNITED STATES
ment, guaranteed in writing that the party would be granted safe conduct to proceed freely to their respective homes. In his reply, Mr. Kad^r confirmed in writing that the Hungarian Government did not desire to apply sanctions against Imre Nagy and the members of his group for their past activities.
81. The next day, 22 November at 6:30 p. m. a bus arrived at the Yugoslav Embassy to take the party to their homes. Soviet military personnel arrived and insisted on entering the bus, whereupon the Yugoslav Ambassador asked that two Embassy officials should accompany the bus, to make certain that Mr. Nagy and his party reached their homes as agreed. The bus was driven to the Head- quarters of the Soviet Military Command, where a Russian Lieutenant-Colonel ordered the two Yugoslav oflicials to leave. The bus then drove away to an unknown destination escorted by Soviet armoured cars.
82. In a note verbale, the Yugoslav Government condemned the Hungarian action as "a flagrant breach of the agreement reached." The note declared that Mr. Nagy and his party had refused to go to Romania and it condemned the Hungarian action as completely contrary to the generally accepted practices of international law. Notwithstanding this reaction, Mr. KadSr's Government announced publicly that Mr. Nagy and some of the colleagues who had sought refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy had gone to Romania in accordance with a re- quest they had submitted previously to be permitted to go to the territory of another socialist country.
L. SOVIET MILITARY OCCUPATION
83. The action of the Soviet Military Command in intervening in an arrange- ment between Mr. Kiiditr's Government and the Yugoslav Embassy illustrates the degree of his subordination to the Soviet forces. Having taken over Hungary by armed intervention, the Soviet authorities were compelled by reason of the administrative vacuum to administer a country whose popularly supported Gov- ernment they had overthrown. The Soviet-installed Government of Mr. K^dar commanded no following in the country, with the exception of individual mem- bers of the former AVH, a few senior officers of the Hungarian Army and a small segment of former Communist Party officials, who had been dismissed during the uprising. Having broken the armed resistance of the Hungarian people in a massive attack, the Soviet authorities found themselves facing the passive resistance of the Hungarian population. This was particularly marked in the case of the workers who had borne the brunt of most of the fighting. In the industrial and mining districts, they steadily maintained their demands.
84. Finding themselves confronted by this nation-wide resistance, the Soviet Military Command began by resorting to mass arrests. Many of the people thus apprehended had not been directly involved in the fighting. In numerous cases, the captives were not transferred to the Hungarian authorities, but were crowded on trains or in trucks and deported, under Russian escort, to the USSR. In some instances, because of action by the Hungarian resistance and the railway workers, it was found necessary to run the trains entirely with Russian i)er- sonnel. No accurate figures exist regarding the numbers of Hungarian citizens deported, but these certainly run into thousands. By January 1957, some of these had been returnefl to Hungary, but it would appear that a considerable number still remain in the USSR.
85. In an effort to win popular support, Mr. Kadar announced that the policy of his Government would include the implementation of various demands put forward during the uprising. These included raising the workers' standard of living, factory management by Workers' Councils and the abolition of com^ pulsory deliveries of agricultural produce by the peasants. These promises, how- ever, failed to satisfy the Hungarian people, who continued to press for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, free elections and the return of Mr. Nagy. Since 23 October, industrial production had been completely disrupted in Hungary and the position continued to deteriorate after 4 November since the workers re- fused to resume work until the Government gave evidence that it would meet their dem?.nds.
86. As in the time of Mr. Xagy's premiership, the Workers' Councils were stilT the principal channels through which such demands were conveyed to Mr. Kadar's Government. The outcome of the negotiations was wholly unsatis- factory to the Councils. On 14 November, the factory Councils established the greater Budapest Workers' Council in order to present a united front. Until its abolition on 9 December, this Council strove to reach an agreement with Mr. Kddar and his Government. It became clear from the Government's attitude
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE IHSTITED STATES 5079
that it was in no ix)sition to satisfy the workers' demands. Meanwhile, in oi'der to secure control of the country, new security forces were organized, including many former members of the AVH. Through arrests of members of Workers' Councils and through the infiltration of trusted Party members into key posts, the power of the Councils was steadily undermined. When the Greater Buda- pest Workers' Council declared a forty-eight-hour protest strike to take place on 11 and 12 December, the Government issued a decree to abolish all Workers' Councils above factory level. Decrees were also issued instituting the death penalty for a large category of offences, including participation in strikes.
87. Hungarian factories had remained practically idle for nearly two months. Electric power plants had produced only a minimum amount of electricity due to the slow-down strike of the Hungarian coal miners. However, the weapon of passive resistance by the Hungarian workers could not be employed in- definitely. Dire necessity had enforced a resumption of work by mid-December, when the Hungarian workers found themselves in factories and coal mines which contained a novel element^ — the presence of Russian soldiers.
M. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
88. other steps taken by Mr. Kadar's Government to establish control over the Hungarian people include the opening on 20 December of a State Informa- tion Oflfice to control the press. The few newspapers which started out as "independent'' were gradually prevailed upon to reproduce the oflScial line. The Revolutionary Council of Intellectuals was dissolved on 0 December and the Writers' Union, which had branded the Soviet intervention in Hungary as a "historic mistake'', was disbanded on 21 April. The Petofi Club also ceased to function and Hungarians were without any forum where they could exchange ideas. All hope of a coalition Government vanished although, in negotiations between Mr. Kadar and the major democratic parties, the latter made it clear that they- accepted public ownership of the means of production and were willing "to defend the socialist achievements." By the beginning of 1957, non- Communist organizations had, in effect, been excluded from any role in public life. It was officially stated that the Social Democratic Party will not be allowed to function, while leaders of the Smallholders Party have retired from public life and the Petofi Party has virtually dissolved itself. The mandate of the present Hungarian Assembly was due to expire on 17 May 1957. How- ever, this mandate has been extended for two years by amendment to the Con- stitution, thereby depriving the Hungarian people of the exercise of their funda- mental political right to participate in the function of Government through elected representatives of their own choice.
N. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
89. The mandate given to the Special Committee by the General Assembly was to carry out a full and objective investigation on all aspects of Soviet intervention in Hungary by armed force and by other means and on the effects of such intervention on the political development of Hungary. In carrying out this mandate, the Committee studied a rich documentation supplied by Govern- ments and obtained from other sources, while it closely questioned more than a hundred witnesses, representing every stratum of Hungarian society, whose testimony fills 2,000 pages in the verbatim record. The General Assembly asked that investigations should be pursued in Hungary also, but the attitude of the Hungarian Government did not allow the Committee to carry out this part of its mandate. The Committee has summarized its conclusions as to the essential facts about the Hungarian uprising under thirteen points. The essence of these conclusions is as follows :
(i) What took place in Hungary was a spontaneous national uprising, caused by long-standing grievances. One of these was the inferior status of Hungary with regard to the USSR ;
(ii) The uprising was led by students, workers, soldiers and intellectuals, many of them Communists or former Communists. Those who took part in it insisted that democratic socialism should be the basis of the Hungarian political structure, and that the land reform and other social achievements should be safeguarded. It is untrue that the uprising was fomented by reactionary circles in Hungary or that it drew its strength from "Imperial- ist"' circles in the West :
5080 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE imiTED STATES
(iii) The uprising was not planned in advance, but actually took partici- pants by surprise. Its timing was connected with Poland's successful move for greater independence from the "USSR and with the disappointment caused by the speech of Mr. Erno Gero on his return from Yugoslavia on 23 October, when it was hoped that he would adopt a sympathetic attitude towards the popular demands voiced on 22 October by the Hungarian students ;
(iv) It would appear that the Soviet authorities had taken steps as early as 20 October to make armed intervention possible. Evidence exists of troop movements, or projected troop movements, from that date on, and Soviet troops from outside Hungary were used even in the first intervention. In Hungary, signs of opposition were evident before 23 October ;
(v) The demonstrations on 23 October were at first entirely peaceable and no evidence has been discovered that any demonstrators intended to resort to force. The change was due to the action of the AVH in opening fire on the people outside the Radio Building and to the appearance of Rus- sian soldiers in Budapest as enemies in combat ;
(vi) Mr. Nagy has established that he did not issue any invitation to the Soviet authorities to intervene and the Committee has no evidence as to the circumstances in which an invitation was issued or as to whether such an invitation was issued at all. Similar considerations apply to the alleged invitation by Mr. Kdd^r's Government for the Soviet troops to intervene on the second occasion. There is abundant evidence that Soviet preparations for this intervention had been under way since the last days of October ;
(vii) Mr. Nagy was not at first free to exercise the full powers of the Premiership. By the time the grip of the AVH had been loosened, the real power lay with the Revolutionary and Workers' Councils. Mr. Nagy, seeing that his countrymen were united in their desire for other forms of Govern- ment and for the departure of the Soviet troops, threw in his lot with the insurgents ;
(viii) During the few days of freedom, the popular nature of the uprising was proved by the appearance of a free press and radio and by general re- joicing among the i)eopIe ;
(ix) A number of lynchings and beatings by the crowds concerned, in al- most all cases, members of the AVH or those who were believed to have co-operated with them ;
(x) Steps taken by the Workers' Councils during this period were aimed at giving the workers real control of nationalized undertaking and at abolishing unpopular institutions, such as the production norms. Mean- while, negotiations were proceeding for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops and life in Budapest was beginning to return to normal ;
(xi) In contrast to demands put forward at this time for the re-establish- ment of political rights, basic human rights of the Hungarian people were violated by the Hungarian Governments before 23 October, especially up to the autumn of 1955, and such violations have been resumed since 4 November. The numerous accounts of inhuman treatment and tortures by the AVH must be accepted as true. In an attempt to break the revolution, numbers of Hungarians, including some women, were deported to the Soviet Union and some may not have been returned to their homes ;
(xii) Since the second Soviet intervention on 4 November there has been no evidence of popular support for Mr. Kadar's Government. Mr. KadS.r has proceeded step by step to destroy the power of the workers. Strong repressive measures have been introduced and general elections have been postponed for two years. He refuses in present circumstances to discuss withdrawal of the Soviet troops. Only a small fraction of the 190,000 Hungarians who fled the country have accepted the invitation to return ;
(xiii) Consideration of the Hungarian question by the United Nations was legally proper and paragraph 7 of Article 2 of the Charter does not jus- tify objections to such consideration. A massive armed intervention by one Power on the territory of another with the avowed intention of interfering in its internal affairs must, by the Soviet Union's own definition of aggression, be a matter of international concern.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 5081
Chapter III. The Uprising as Seen by the USSR and bt the Government
OF JANOS Kadar
A. INTRODUCTION
90. The Committee regrets that it was twice refused permission by Mr. Kadar's Government to enter Hungarian territory. This refusal meant, among other things, that it was denied the opportunity of obtaining first-hand infor- mation on the views of that Government. Throughout its investigations, the Committee has been guided by the desire to present an objective picture of what took place. It has, therefore, wished to include in its report a presentation of the opinions expressed by the Governments of the USSR and of Mr. Jdnos Kadar.
91. The outline which follows represents those opinions in so far as the Committee has had access to them. The main sources include the two volumes already published of the Hungarian White Book, The Counter-Revolutionary Forces in the October Events in Hungary, issued by the Information Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic ; the memo- randum on the question of Hungary addressed to Members of the United Nations on 4 February 1957 by Mr. P6ter Mod, Permanent Representative of Hungary ; ^ statements by members of the USSR and Hungarian delegations to the Security Council and the General Assembly ; and other ofiicial speeches or articles in officially sponsored publications.
92. The views expressed by Imre Nagy call for consideration in chapters VI, VIII and XII, where the Committee has assembled information regarding his actions and movements during the period of the uprising.
93. It should be made clear that inclusion in this report of a statement of the views advanced by the Governments of the USSR and of Mr. Kadar does not in any manner constitute endorsement of them by the Committee. In fact, a reading of the report will show that this interpretation of events in Hungary conflicts in many respects with what the Committee considers to be satisfactory evidence obtained from eye-witnesses and other reliable sources.
94. The main points which the Governments of the USSR and of Mr. Kaddr have sought to establish are summarized below.
B. THE ISSUES AT STAKE
95. "So long as there are exploiters and exploited in the world, so long as there are capitalists holding power in their hands and the working class," said an editorial which Pravda devoted to the Hungarian situation on 18 December 1956, "so long will the conflict betwen the bourgeoisie and the proletariat remain the starting point for an analysis of historical events. Revisionism has repeatedly attempted to snatch from the hands of the working class this Marxist compass, which enacles one to give a correct appraisal of the direction of events".
96. These words would seem to provide the key to the views expressed by the Governments of the USSR and of Mr. Kadar on the origin and nature of the Hungarian uprising. They would appear to proceed from a desire to fit events into a preconceived pattern, rather than to study them by an objective considera- tion of evidence. Their account of events starts from the assumption that all historical happenings must be viewed as aspects of the Communist conception of Marxism and of the class struggle, illustrating a permanent conflict between "good" Communist and "bad" bourgeois elements. While it is admitted by the Soviet Union and Mr. Kadar that errors and even "crimes" may occur in a Com- munist society, it is regarded as contrary to the destined course of history that such shortcomings could ever be so serious as to call in doubt the superiority of the Communist political structure. It follows that any radical criticism, such as a call for free elections, will be presented as the result, not of a genuine wish for improvement, but of "bourgeois" efforts to mislead the working masses and to reinstate capitalism. The committee found this interpretation of events in Hun- gary, studied in the light of the evidence, to be totally inadequate and superficial. It also found no evidence that either the Government of the USSR or that of Mr. Kadilr has hitherto published anything in the nature of an objective state- ment of the facts behind the Hungarian uprising. Various indications, however,, have suggested that the Soviet authorities were baflled by the spontaneous up- rising of the Hungarian people and that they did, apparently, make an effort tc
• A/3521.
5082 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IX THE UJSnTE© STATES
obtain information on it from various sources. Thus, the Committee has become aware that participants who were deported to the Soviet Union were closely questioned regarding the causes and nature of the uprising. The phenomenon of a working class movement directed against cherished Communist methods and ideals, and against emblems of the Soviet Union as symbols of those methods, would seem to have caused misgiving, and some of the Hungarians received the impression that their interrogators were not unsympathetic.
97. In the memorandum circulated by the Hungarian delegation to the United Nations on 4 February, it is stated that "the aim of the Hungarian counter- revolution was to reinstate the system of capitalists and estate owners, who
iave never given up hope since their defeat in 1945". The Pravda article on Hungary to which reference is made above, sng'^ests that no one regarding him- self as a Marxist could fail to understand thai a radical change in Hungary's
political system would inevitably mean the restoration of capitalism.
98. In the light of these considerations, spokesmen for the Gk)vernments of the USSR and of Janos Kadar have drawn attention to what they regard as two distinct elements in the Hungarian situation. Firstly, the Hungarian people had a number of legitimate grievances to which expression was given both before and after 23 October 1956. These concerned manifest errors and short- comings on the part of the Government headed by Rakosi, who failed, as did his successors, to meet even the most justified demands. In the second place, the spokesmen of these Governments maintain that both reactionary elements in Hungary itself and imperialist circles abroad took advantage of such legitimate grievances and of the unrest generated by them to mislead the people and to strive by violence to overthrow the People's Democratic Republic.
99. In the introduction to the Hungarian White Book, The Coimter-Revolutiwi- ary Farces in the October Events in Eungary (Volume 1 ), Rakosi's policy is de- scribed as "criminal". It is said to have aroused "deep indignation and a broad popular movement". However, states the writer, "the dark forces of counter-revolution tried from the very beginning to take advantage of the move- ment ... in order to overthroio the people's power" (italics in original), "For the first time since the defeat of facisra in the Second World War". Mr. D. T. Shepilov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, told the General Assembly on 22 November, "the world was witness to an open attempt by the underground fascist forces to defy the forces of democracy and to stage a comeback by means of an armed struggle".
100. The Introduction to Volume II of the White Book returns to this theme of an "attempted capitalist restoration" and draws what it calls "a number of irrefutable conclusions." They are stated as follows :
"1. The instigators and organizers of the armed uprising were foreign agents, Horthyite emigres and leaders of the underground organizations in the country, who took an organized part in the mass dehioustrations and increasingly assumed a leading role in them.
"2. Those representatives of the Horthy regime who had remained in Hungary began to restore the old order in the capital and in numerous towns, villages and districts in the countryside, while the emigres abroad, with the aid of their agents at home, were already prepared for the com- plete seizure of iwwer.
"3. The subversive broadcasts of Radio Free Euroi>e — backed by dollars, directed from America, and functioning on the territory of West Germany — played an essential role in the ideological preparation and practical direc- tion of the counter-revolution, in provoking the armed struggle, in the non- observance of the ceasefire, and in arousing the mass hysteria which led to the lynching of innocent men and women loyal to their ijeople and their country. The directors of Radio Free Europe carry a particularly heavy responsibility for the bloodshed between Hungarians and for the subsequent defections to the West, as well as for the tragedies they caused among many thousands of Hungarian families.
"4. After October 29, the aim of the counter-revolutionary rebels become more and more evident : to overthrow the socialist popular regime and to spread the sphere of influence of western capitalism over Hungary — in other words, bourgeois restoration."
101. The White Book contends fhat success by the counter-revolutionary forces would have meant more thao the wiping out of ten years of "•socialist progress" in Hungary and the abandonment of her people to a cruel and reactionary T^gime. Such success, it maintains, would have intensified the danger of an
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNriTED STATES 5083
.armed clash between Hungary and her neighbours, in which Hungary would have become the first battlefield in a new world war. "The only possibility of saving popular power and eliminating the threat of a new, devastating war in the Danul)e Valley," concludes the Introduction to Volume I of the Hungarian White Book, "was to suppress counter-revolution."
102. This the forces of the Hungarian Government and people were said to be unable to accomplish alone, so massive was the support claimed to have been given to the "counter-revolutionary" elements by "reactionary" and "imi)erialist" circles in the West.
C. JUSTIFICATION OF SOVIET INTEBVENTION
103. The Soviet Government's decision to come to the aid of the "revolution- ary forces" struggling against "reaction" in Hungary was, according to the published views of Soviet leaders, the only "correct" one in the circumstances prevailing at that time.
104. The Soviet Declaration of 30 October concerning the principles of de- velopment and future strengthening of friendship and co-operation between the Soviet Union and other "socialist" States included this comment on the Soviet intervention : "The Soviet Government, in common with the entire Soviet people, profoundly deplores the fact that the developments in Hungary have led to bloodshed. At the request of the Hungarian People's Government, the Soviet Government agreed to the entry into Budapest of Soviet Army units, in order to Jielp the Hungarian People's Army and Hungarian authorities to restore order in the city." After conceding the necessity for withdrawal, the Declaration continued : "The defense of the socialist gains of People's Democratic Hungary is today the chief and sacred obligation of the workers, peasants and intelligent- sia and of the entire Hungarian working people."
lO.j. On 23 November 1956, Pravda dn an editorial commented as follows on the Soviet intervention : "A socialist State", it declared, "could not remain an indifferent observer of the bloody reign of fascist reaction in People's Demo- cratic Hungary. When everything settles down in Hungary, when life becomes 3iormal again, the Hungarian working-class, peasantry and intelligentsia will undoubtedly understand our actions better and judge them aright. We regard our help to the Hungarian working-class in its struggle against the intrigues of counter-revolution as our international duty."
106. The position taken by the Government of the USSR is that it was the Hungarian Government which officially requested the help of Soviet military units stationed in Hungary in accordance with the Warsaw Pact. The assist- ance given by these troops was, they state, directed entirely to the restoration of order. Its effectiveness is said to have caused the "forces of reaction" to retreat and at this point. In accordance with the request of Imre Nagy, the Soviet Government ordered its troops to withdraw from Budapest. Thereupon, runs the Soviet contention, the counter-revolutionary forces in Hungary began a brutal settlement of accounts with Communists and members of the state secu- rity services, as well as "progressive" friends of the Soviet Union. Entrenched within the Parliament Building, the Government of Imre Nagy, according to this Tiew of events, had contact with the people only "through the agency of the microphone". It was criticized for making no attempt to prevent "counter- revolutionary elements" from seizing weapons and forming "armed gangs", which, Soviet spokesmen declared, proceeded to terrorize the Hungarian people. In these circumstances, seeing the People's Democratic Republic in imminent danger of collapse, Jdnos Kadar and other members of the Nagy Government were said to have broken away from it, set up a new Revolutionary Worker- Peasant Government and appealed to the Soviet Union for the assistance with- out which it is admitted that they could not have established that Government's authority.
107. When he formed his Government, Mr. Kddar said that there remained only two ways out of the grave situation which had developed. One, it was claimed, was to stand by helplessly while the "White Terror .slaughtered, first in Budapest, then in the provinces, the active masses of workers, peasants, in- telligentsia and Communists, then all those who sympathized with the Com- munists and then all patriotic democrats." He declared that, after this, a counter-revolution would have created a government which would have de- stroyed the forces of the people and surrendered the indeiiendence of Hungary to the "imperialist colonizers". The second solution was to use "every pos- sible force, including the assistance of Soviet units, to prevent the counter-
5084 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY LNT THE UNITED STATES
revolutionary war. . . The interests of the State and the people compelled us^ to choose this way as the only possible way out of the grave situation. And so we chose it." ^
108. The objectives of the uprising are held to have been quite other than those publicly announced. The Introduction to Volume II of the Hungarian White Book says that the "propaganda in favour of bourgeois restoration" was "characterized by a hypocritical dissimulation of its actual aims. This hypoc- risy represented a well-considered, underhanded means of misleading the social- ist-minded masses." The White Book maintains that the demands and pro- grammes that appeared in the press during the uprising "lagged far behind what it calls the orally proclaimed demands". As an example, it is said that no slogan was ever printed that all State and municipal functionaries in leading positions and all factory managers who were Communists or who co-operated with the Communists were to be relieved of their offices. "But", affirms the White Book, "in practice this is what actually began to take place in various administrations, institutions and enterprises." Moreover, the White Book states that, while the "counter-revolutionaries" were writing about friendship with the Soviet Union, they were tearing down red stars, outraging the monuments of Soviet heroes and burning Russian books.
109. It was always maintained that, despite such alleged provocations, the intervention of Soviet armed forces at the end of October and the beginning of November were undertaken in a spirit of self-sacrifice and good comradeship. On 5 November, the Commander of the Soviet troops in Hungary broadcast a communique calling his troops the "selfless friends" of the Hungarians. "Dark reaction prevails in Hungary", declared the communique. "Counter-revolution- ary gangs are looting and murdering. The Government of Imre Nagy has collapsed. Hungary addressed herself to the Soviet troops to re-establish order in the country. . . We address ourselves to the soldiers and officers of the Hungarian army to fight for sacred victory."
110. Janos Kadar has paid frequent tribute to what he declares to have been the high motives prompting Soviet intervention. In an interview broadcast by Moscow Radio on 29 November, he said that the help given by the USSR showed not merely the latter's determination to fulfill her duties proceeding from the Treaty but a deep understanding in a complicated situation. On 6 January 1957, Mr. Kadar's Government stated that the Soviet Army in Hungary was protecting the Hungarian people against a jwssible military attack by foreign and im- perialistic forces, and was thus ensuring that they might live in peace and devote their strength to the great cause of socialist construction and the prosperity of the country. Many later statements have reiterated this theme.
111. Such are the main gi-ounds advanced by the Governments of the USSR and of Mr. Kadar to justify Soviet intervention. Broadly speaking, it is main- tained that that intervention was necessary to protect the Hungarian people against reactionary landowners and foreign imperialists. In this report it will be seen how contrary is that view to the conclusions reached by the Committee. The evidence, both written and oral, which it examined left no doubt as to the universal character of the uprising. It was the Hungarian workers, both men and women, who bore the brunt of the fighting against Soviet tanks — a fact which did not fail in several instances to impress the Soviet troops involved. Witnesses spoke of the friendly attitude of many Russian soldiers towards participants in the earlier phases of the uprising. The Committee also heard numerous accounts of how Soviet troops, many of Tartar or Mongol origin, who were brought to Hungary during the second intervention, had been told, not that they were to fight Hungarian workers in a People's Democracy, but that they were being sent to Egypt to throw back the "Anglo-French imperialists". It is apparent that many of these Soviet troops were misinformed as to the real nature of their mission and that they mistook the Danube for the Suez Canal. They were probably utilized because those Soviet forces used in the first inter- vention could not be relied upon to proceed with indifference to the attitude of the Hungarian people.
112. In studying the Soviet thesis regarding the grounds for intervention, it is also appropriate to recall that some of the fiercest resistance to Russian troops occurred in typically working-class districts of Budapest, of Ujpest and of the Csepel Island. Workers in the steel factories of Dunapentele declared that they would defend against invading Soviet forces the plant and houses which they had built with their own hands. When these Soviet forces suc-
^Pravda, 13 November 1956.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY EST THE UNITED STATES 5085
-ceeded in crushing the armed uprising, it was again the Hungarian workers who continued to combat, by mass strikes and passive resistance, the very regime in support of which Soviet forces had intervened. In every case, the workers of Hungary announced their intention of keeping the mines and factories in their own hands. They made it abundantly clear, in the Workers' Coiancils and elsewhere, that no return to pre-ll)45 conditions would be tolerated. These workers had shown all over Hungary the strength of their will to resist. They had arms in their hands and, until the second Soviet intervention, they were virtually in control of the country. It is the Committee's view that no putsch by reactionary landowners or by dispossessed industrialists could have prevailed against the determination of these fully aroused workers and peasants to de- fend the reforms which they had gained and to pursue their genuine fulfillment.
D. THE PROGRESS OF EVENTS
113. Spokesmen for the Governments of the USSR and of Mr. Kadar have always maintained that the course of events in Hungary, being well-known, called for no further investigation. The version of these events put forward by the two Governments, beginning with their views on the legitimate grievances •of the Hungarian people, may be summarized as follows.
(1) Legitimate grievances
114. "There is no doubt that the blame for the Hungarian events rests with the former State and Party leadership of Hungary headed by Rakosi and Gero", wrote Pravda on 23 November.
115. Grave errors were said to have been made in the political, economic and cultural spheres and there was no attempt to remedy them, because Hungary's leaders had become isolated from the Hungarian working class, peasantry and intelligentsia. The methods used by Rakosi and his supporters had allegedly shaken the faith of the working masses in the Party and had undermined the foundations of its strength. On 1 November it was announced that the Hun- garian Workers' Party had changed its name to Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, in order to make it plain that a complete break was proposed with the past.
116. Legitimate grievances mentioned by spokesmen for the USSR and for Janos Kadar included "crudest violations of legality", in which many "honest Party and State workers" suffered unjustly, the Rajk case being only one of a number of well-known instances. It was said that little or no protest had been heard against these violations of the law, because the excessive growth of bureaucracy within the Party encouraged "boot-lickers and lackeys" of Rakosi, who repeated slogans like parrots in the interest of their careers; even the best officials were compelled to caiTy out many instructions running counter to the interests of the masses. This situation was declared to have arisen all the more easily because the Party had more than 900,000 members in a country with a total population of only 9 million. This meant, Soviet spokesmen ex- plained, that "nationalist" and "alien" elements poured into its ranks and, when diflSculties arose, the Party was found to lack essential training in a "Marxist- Leninist spirit" and could not rouse the forces of the people for a struggle against "reaction".*
117. Rakosi and Gero were criticized by Soviet commentators for mechanically following the slogan of accelerated industrialization which was appropriate to conditions in the USSR, but in Hungary led to the coni5truction of large new enterprises beyond the capacity of a small people. In so doing, they were said to have ignored "comradely advice" from the USSR to proceed from the specific conditions obtaining in Hungary and to raise the standard of living of the Hungarian people by devoting more resources to the development of agriculture and to the production of consumer goods. It was not only by slavishly followihg industrial methods appropriate to conditions in the USSR that the Party leaders did not, in the Soviet view, "take suflScient account of the national peculiarities of the country". Hungarians should have been promoted more often to leader- ship within the Party, while there were other acts wounding to national pride, such as the introduction of a military uniform resembling that of the USSR. "Is the same Army haircut" asked Pravda, "or the same system of school grades really indicative of the unity and. international solidarity of the socialist countries?" ^
• Pravda, 23 November 1956.
5086 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
118. While many grievances of the Hungarian people were well founded, it was said that certain recognizable limits had to be set to the demand for changes, unless this demand was to constitute a threat to the very structure of the People's Democratic system. It was this opportunity which was alleged to- have been seized by reactionary and bourgeois elements to "confuse" the people and to press demands to a point where acceptance of them would have brought the People's Democracy down in ruins. By its own natural dynamics, declared a Soviet spokesman, the counter-revolution could never stop half-way.
119. The argument put forward by some Communists that the excesses of bureaucratic rule might become the principal danger against which Communists had to fight was seen by Soviet commentators as misleading and dangerous. It was said to obscure the fact that the class enemy, namely bourgeois and re- actionary elements, would always constitute the standing menace to every" Communist people. The idea that bureaucracy, however excessive, could be the greatest danger for Communists would lead easily to a justification of counter-revolutionary rebellions against the People's Democracy itself.'
(2) Alleged preparations for counter-revolution
120. That such "counter-revolutionary" ideas were current in Hungarian in- tellectual circles before 23 October is, Soviet observers claim, a well-established fact. The forces of reaction had long been at work, they say, waiting for an. opportunity. A Russian man of letters declared that bourgeois ideology, "a wind from the West permeated with the foul odour of corruption", had long assailed Hungarian writers.* Before the events of October, many Hungarian writers had openly opposed the Leninist principle of Party allegiance in litera- ture. They were said to have spread false and "nihilistic" conceptions under the banner of "freedom of thought" or "freedom of creation". Open propaganda against the Government and the Party had been disguised as criticism of in- dividual leaders. In the ranks of the critics were to be found writers who were described as having long ago "severed themselves from the people and sold their souls to the West."
121. A celebrated example of the writings alluded to is the article published in the Irodalmi Ujsdg in June 1956 by Gyula Hay, the playwright, a veteran of the 1919 Communist regime in Hungary. Hay's article contained a plea for freedom of the press. It was said that this article threw the intellectuals of Hungary into a ferment. The "corruption" complained of by the Russian man of letters was declared, however, to have progressed in direct proportion to the mounting efforts allegedly being made abroad to bring about the downfall of the People's Democracies.
122. The Hungarian White Book, Volumes I and II, and the Hungarian memorandum to the United Nations of 4 Febiiiary " all gave examples of what were declared to be counter-revolutionary organs promoted by the West. The memorandum specifically claims that the existence of organized counter-revolu- tionary activity had been proved by "facts that have come to light during the events and every day since then." It was maintained in the memorandum that the peacefully demonstrating crowds of 23 October could not have planned such simultaneous attacks as were made, according to the memorandum, "on the in- ternational department of the Budapest Jozsefvdros telephone exchange, the- radio transmitter at Lakih^y, the Ferihegy airport, the ammunition plant and the military arsenal in Timot Street". The fact that these events took place almost concurrently and "in an organized manner" is brought forward to show that "the counter-revolution had a well-prepared purpose and a unified military command".
123. Spokesmen for the Soviet Government and for that of Mr. Kdd^r place the origin of that purjwse and the centre of that military command in Western Europe and, ultimately, in the United States. Thus, the White Book, Volume II, quotes a certain United States magazine as having said, as far back as- 9 April 1948, that there was a school of thought, both in Washington and abroad, which desired that "Operation X" should employ tactics behind the Iron Curtaia similar to those applied during the war by the OflSce of Strategic Services. It was said that ruthless means, "including murder where necessary", should be used "to keep the Russian part of the world in unrest". In October 1951, state* the White Book, the U. S. Congress adopted an amendment to the Mutual Secu-
' Pravda, 18 December 1956.
^ Al. Romanov, Literaturnaya Qazeta, 1 December 1956.
'A/3521.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNTTED STATES 5087
rity Act, providing funds of up to $100 million for financing the activity of "selected individuals who are residing in or escai>ees from" Eastern Europe. The White Book alleges that a detailed programme elaborated in the United States in the Spring of 1955, "envisaged the preparation of armed actions in- volving the traitors who had absconded from the People's Democracies". It declared that the President of the Radio Corporation of America was reported by American newspapers to have advocated the mass use of "well-organized and well-indoctrinated anti-communist groups".
124. Exponents of the Soviet thesis declared that a network of organizations was set up in Western Germany to train spies, saboteurs and diversionists. It was said that leaders were instructed in the formation of resistance groups and prepared for the task of carrying out administrative functions after the over- throw of the People's Democratic Regime. Volume II of the White Book de- clared that, apart from "countless numbers of fascists, emigr<^s, newspapermen, radio reporters, etc." other, more important, foreigners "of greater weight'" also walked in and out across the Hungarian frontier — and that "for obvious purposes".
125. The memorandum of the Permanent Delegate of Hungary dated 4 Feb- ruary 1957 claimed that the supply of arms from abroad had been proved by examples captured by the armed forces. These were alleged to include pistols, sub-machine-guns, and rifles of Western type.
126. Both the White Book and the Hungarian memorandum of 4 February — indeed all sources from which the views of the Governments of the USSR and of Mr. Kiidar have been obtained — stress the alleged role played by Radio Free Europe in stimulating and prolonging the insurrection. This station was said to have incited the revolt in the first place and also to have issued instruc- tions to the fighters while it was in progress. It was alleged that Radio Free Europe was one of the principal means chosen by the West to organize a move- ment that developed into a counter-revolution.
127. Spokesmen for the Soviet and Kfid^r version of events declared that the Hungarian authorities were aware of the activities allegedly directed against them. On 14 July 1956, the State security police was said to have arrested a group of persons who had been engaged in espionage for months, under the control of a former Horthy officer. Shortly before the uprising, the Hungarian Supreme Court was declared to have considered the case of seventeen men accused of establishing a counter-revolutionary organization.
128. The above is a summary of views put forward by official spokesmen for the Governments of the USSR and of Mr. KSdfir. Those Governments have maintained that the Hungarian uprising was planned well in advance, carefully thought out and directed during the fighting by leaders supplied or guided from abroad and by foreign broadcasting stations. The Committee gave thorough con- sideration to the possibility that the uprising may have been planned in advance, but it could find no evidence to justify any such hypothesis. The Committee is convinced that the demonstrators on 23 October had at first no thought of violence. When arms were obtained by the insurgents, they were almost always seized by workers from deiwts known to them or were voluntarily handed over by Hungarian troops, by the regular Hungarian police — not the AVH — and even» in some cases, by Russian troops themselves.
129. After its study of all the facts, the Committee has no doubt that the Hungarian uprising was not only nation-wide, but also spontaneous in character. The Committee was meticulous in its questioning on this point and sought to dis- cover in various ways the possibility of advance preparation. But the way in which great numbers of people, who could not possibly have shared secret orders in advance, organized themselves to press their demands and to fight the Soviet troops seems to the Committee to bear the hallmark of improvisation. Their efforts collapsed because of the Soviet armed intervention and because no sup- port was forthcoming for them from abroad. The thesis which alleges that the uprising owed its origin to such support from abroad did not survive the ex- amination to which the Committee subjected it.
130. The Committee took pains to ascertain from witnesses what precise role,, if any, Radio Free Europe had taken in the events of October and November. It was satisfied that this station had many listeners in Hungary, most of whom appear to have turned to it, as well as to the BBC and other Western broad- casts, as a relief from the stereotyped news service, with fulsome praise of the regime, to which they were accustomed. "I felt," said one student witness, "that its most positive contribution was its attempt to give a general picture
5088 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY EN" THE UNITED STATES
of the situation in the West and the help it gave to Hungarian youth through its youth programmes, together with detailed information about the political situa- tion, which unfortunately we could not get from our own newspapers." The Com- mittee was told that during the uprising, Radio Free Europe "was very en- couraging" and obviously sympathetic. Listeners had the feeling that Radio Free Europe promised help, although witnesses said clearly that it gave no reason for expecting military help. Rather, the general tone of these broad- casts aroused an expectation of support, which some listeners hoped might take the form of a United Nations token force to help in stabilizing the situation.
131. In a tense atmosphere such as that prevailing in Hungary during these critical weeks, optimistic and encouraging broadcasts, which paid tribute to the aims of the uprising, were welcomed. The generally hopeful tone of such broad- casts may well have been over-emphasized in the process of passing from mouth to mouth what various speakers were alleged to have said.^° The attitude of the Hungarian people toward foreign broadcasting was perhaps best summed up by the student referred to above, who said : "It was our only hope, and we tried to console ourselves with it." It would appear that certain broadcasts by Radio Free Europe helped to create an impression that support might be forthcoming for the Hungarians. The Committee feels that in such circumstances the greatest restraint and circumspection are called for in international broadcasting.
(3) Reaction in the saddle
132. Spokesmen for the USSR and the Government of Mr. KadJir maintain that reactionary influences changed the uprising, within a matter of days, into a fascist counter-revolution. One professor at the Budapest Academy of Fine Arts sought to compare what took place with his memories of the beginnings of the White counter-revolution in 1919. "I can say", he wrote, "that on the morning of 23 October my pupils, though they had a few just demands, had not the slightest inkling of the eventual development of events and within a few hours became, as a matter of fact, blind instruments in the hands of the counter revolutionary forces." "
133. The Government of Janos Kadar has condemned that of Imre Nagy for failing to take action to deal with this growing movement. Mr. Nagy was ac- cused of drifting helplessly in the face of events, making concession after con- cession to right wing forces. As he hesitated, it is said that the forces of reaction became more and more violent and the degree of assistance from the West was stepped up in proportion. On 2 November, the Soviet news agency Tass, quoting the Austrian Communist newspaper Oesterreichische Volksstimme, declared: "Squadrons of planes are continuously leaving Austrian airfields for Budapest. They are not only carrying medical supplies, as official reports try to show ; with such a large number of aii'craft. all continents could be provided with medical supplies. Observers are convinced that hundreds of Hungarian soldiers are being sent to Hungary from the West, including former officers of Horthy's army and hundreds of Hungarian officei'S and soldiers who served in the Hitlerite army. Among the aircraft, one could see some planes belonging to the West German frontier services, some British planes and others."
134. Many allegations were made that Red Cross facilities were usetl for the transportation of counter-revolutionary agents and arms. One report stated that, of one hundred Red Cross planes that landed in Hungary before Novem- ber 1956, more than forty brought counter-revolutionaries.
135. Meanwhile, frenzy— so it is contended — seized upon the people in Buda- pest and in other cities where, under the alleged influence of fascist provoca- teurs, armed gangs are said to have roamed about, looting and terrorizing the people. A man hunt was organized for members of the State security services and also, said the exponents of this thesis, for honest Communist Party mem- bers and "progressive-minded" friends of the USSR, great numbers of whom are alleged to have been hanged in the streets or otherwise done to death. Exponents of this view of events have maintained that the Hungarian crowds,
" At a press conference on 25 January 1957, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany made the following statement regarding Radio Free Europe : "This investigation has shown that the assertions which appeared in the press, that Radio Free Europe promised the Hungarians assistance by the West — armed assistance by the West — are not consistent with the facts. However, remarks were also made which were liable to cause misinterpretations. But a discussion, an exchange of views, took place which also re- sulted in personnel changes and I believe that the matter can be considered settled for the time being."
" Oi Shirikov Sovietskaya Kultura, 11 December 1956.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 5089
in tbeir sadistic fiuy, made no distinction between the AVH and tlie ordinary members of the Party or Communist officials. The Committee is convinced that the acts of violence which took place were directed, in all but a very few cases, against recognized members of the AVH and that many Communists were among the crowds which wreaked vengeance on them.
136. As soon as the "reactionary" leaders felt their power, it is said that popular demands for change became rapidly right wing in character and threatened the whole structure of the People's Democracy. The Hungarian White Book, Volume II, says that Archduke Joseph and Crown Prince Otto were among the personalities whose names "ag lin rose to the surface". Prai-da re- ported on 16 November that Admiral Horthy himself, then 88 years of age, had offered his services, and Prui-'da's correspondents in Budapest said that Prince Pal Eszterlulzy, formerly Hungary's largest landowner, re-established himself in that city, after his release from prison, and talked of joining the Government.
137. Much stress has been laid by spokesmen for the USSR and for Mr. Kadar on the reappearance of Cardinal Mindszenty, whose release from prison was said to have been engineered by Major Anton Pillinkas, referred to as a son of Count Pallavincini, "the butcher of the Hungarian workers" in the W^hite Terror of 1919. The Hungarian White Book declared that the Cardinal "lost no time in getting down to business", and on 3 November broadcast a message in which, "notwithstanding all its restraint, he openly set forth the aims of the counter- revolution". The Cardinal was said to have described the victory of the counter- revolution as an accomplished fact. However, the presence of Soviet troops at the approaches to Budapest and the news that Soviet reinforcements had arrived caused the Cardinal, in the words of the White Book, to "tread warily". Among other remarks, he was declared to have said that "there should be re- sponsibility before the law along all lines". The White Book deems this remark to be "nothing less than the proclamation of a general crusade against the sup- porters of proletarian rule".
138. Special attention has been given by spokesmen for the Soviet Union and for Mr. Kadar's Government to the phenomenon of the Workers' Councils, a feature of the Hungarian uprising which linked it with similar movements following the 1917 Revolution in Russia. "Horthyite" and other counter-revolu- tionary elements, it is alleged, installed themselves on these Councils and used them, according to the normal counter-revolutionary technique, to mislead the Hungarian workers and to oppose the "real organs of popular authority". In July 1917, Lenin had found himself obliged to withdraw the slogan "All power to the Soviets !", because the Mensheviks and Socialists, who had ensconced them- selves in the Soviets at the height of the struggle, deserted to what were called the "enemies of the working-class". According to Lenin, the passing of political authority from the Bolsheviks to some indeterminate alliances of heterogeneous elements, only slightly to the right of the Bolsheviks, or even to the left of them, would always signify a victory for the counter-revolution. Essentially the same tactics were declared to have been used by "bourgeois reactionary elements" in the Hungarian Workers' Councils.
139. In its examination of witnesses, the Committee has given particular attention to the thesis that the Hungarian uprising speedily degenerated into a reactionary movement reminiscent of fascism." It considers it appropriate, however, to suimmarize here certain of its comments on this aspect of the Soviet thesis.
140. The Committee has, indeed, noted that several times during the last week of October and the first days of November prominent personalities drew attention to the need to be on the alert for signs of counter-revolution. On 2 November, Byula Kelemen, the Secretary-General of the Social Democratic Party, wrote: "Let our peasant members unite their forces to frustrate all attempts to restore the large estates." ^ While the Committee has noted this and similar warnings, it feels that there was never, at any time a serious danger of counter- revolution in Hungary. The very few dispossessed landowners still living in that country exercised no influence either with the leaders or with the rank and file of those who took part in the uprising. No suggestion was entertained to return the estates to the former landowners or to undo the nationali:^ation of
^^ Two later Chapters of the present report also bear on the allegations of counter- revolutionary danger : Chapter IX, which sets out the objectives and character of the uprising and Chapter XII, which deals witli ciianges in the political structure of Huncnrv diirin'r the weelc preceding the second Soviet intervention.
^'^ Nepazava, 2 November IflSC.
03215 — 50 — pt. 90 3
5090 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY I2n THE UNITED STATES
Hungarian industrj'. Even aristocratic landowners such as Prince Pa! Eszter- hazy repudiated any such intention, while Cardinal Mindszentj' personally told one witness early in November that he had no intention of claiming the return of the great Church estates, but was proposing to ask for the reopening of Catholic schools. "Let no one dream", said Bela Koviics, leader of the Small- holders' Party, "of the old world returning : the world of the counts, the bankers and the capitalists is gone forever." "
141. In its extensive examination of developments between 23 October and 4 November, the Committee found no evidence whatsoever to suggest that any political personality associated with the pre-war regime exerted the slightest influence on events. At no time was there a demand for any such personality to be included in the new Government. lUoreover, it is a point of interest that the question of a counter-revolution seems not to have been raised by the Soviet authorities during their negotiations with the Government of Mr. Nagy. The Government which he was forming in the early days of November was a coalition composed of the parties included in the Hungarian National Independence Front of 1945. The parties composing this Independence Front had been sanctioned by the Allied Control Commission, on which the Government of the USSR was represented.
142. An interesting episode was the telephone conversation reported to the Committee as having taken place betv\-een Mr. Tildy and Ferenc Nagy, Prime Minister of Hungary from February 1946 to June 1947, who rang up Mr. Tildy from abroad. Mr. Tildy replied that the new developments in Hungary were developments with which Ferenc Nagy would be unfamiliar. He indicated to Mr. Nagy that his political ideas and connexions belonged to a world of the past.
143. The suggestion that considerable num.bers of agents, saboteurs, former fascists and so on, entered Hungary during the uprising is rejected by the Committee. In this connexion it noted that the Austrian Government addressed to the Government of Hungary on 3 November a statement protesting against this very allegation. "The Austrian Government", declared the statement, "has ordered the establishment of a closed zone along the Austro-Hungarian fron- tier . . . The Minister of Defence has inspected this zone in the company of the military attaches of the Four Great Powers, including the USSii. The military attaches were thus enabled to satisfy themselves of the measures which have been taken in the frontier zone with a view to protecting the Austrian frontier and Austrian neutrality." "
144. As to the suggestion that forty out of one hundred Red Cross aircraft landing in Budapest during the last days of October carried arms and agents, the Committee was authoritatively informed that the only Red Cross aircraft to arrive in Budapest during that time were five Yugoslav and one Swiss aircraft, each of which made three or four trips a day, and two Polish, two Czech, one Romanian and one Belgian aircraft, each of which made only one trip during the period in question. Tlie Ferihegy airport was occupied by Soviet forces at about midday on 29 October and was not handed back to the Hungarian authorities until 28 December.
145. Tliere still remains the question of popular demands breaking out of the orthodox Communist mould as the popular forces gathered strength. In the Committee's view, the fact that these demands culminated in the proclamation of neutrality and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact had nothing whatsoever to do v.ith fascist influence or the alleged pow-er of reactionary agents. The reasons for these more radical demands should be sought in such factors as popular hatred of the AVH and resentment against occupation by foreign troops which was intensified by the Soviet armed intervention, and by tl:e bitterness v>'ith which the AVH fought against the uprising in co-operation with Soviet trooys.
146. Before closing its comments on the conter-revolutionary thesis, the Com- mittee wishes to draw attention to the fact that this thesis should be read with the point in mind that Soviet authors use such words as "counter-revolutionary".
1* Kis Ujsdg, 1 November 1950.
1= In the same note the Austrian Government Informed the Hunnrarian Government that Ferenc Nagy unexpectedly arrived in Vienna on 29 October and was requested by the Austrian authorities to leave Austrian territory immediately. The Soviet Go\ ernnient was also informed of this action.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY EN" THE UNITED STATES 5091
"fascist", "reactionary" and "chauvinistic" in a special sense, i. e., that of a refusal to accept the political tenets of the Soviet Union. Thus, Mr. Gero in his highly unpoular broadcast on the evening of 2o October, told the Hungarians that there could be no chauvinism, no loosening of the ties with the Soviet Union.
147. The nature of the counter-revolution which was alleged to have been taking place in Hungary was defined en .5 December in the first resolution passed by Mr. Kruklr's re-named Socialist Workers' Party. This spoke of "a Horthyite- fascist-Hungarian capitalist-feudal counter-revolution"."' The Committee looked most carefully for evidence of such a heterogeneous movement, but found none. The only counter-revolution which did take place was that effected by the Soviet authorities when, by the use of overwhelming armed force, they replaced a socialist but democratic regime in formation in Hungary by a police-State.
148. The Committee considers it of interest that certain writers of Communist sympathies, of whose writings they have been apprised, have rejected the thesis of the USSR and of Mr. Kadar's Government regarding Hungarian events. In their efforts to publish what they believed to be a truer version, they have en- countered the obstacle of "Party allegiance in literature" to which reference has been made in quoting the comment of a Russian man of letters. One of these, Peter Fryer, claims to have been the first Communist journalist from abroad to visit Hungary after the uprising. He had lieen sent to Hungary by the London Daily Worker, which then suppressed or severely edited the dispatches which he sent from Hungary." "This was no counter-revolution, organized by fascists and reactionaries", Fryer wrote in an unpublished dispatch to London. "It was the upsurge of a whole people, in wliich rank and tile Communists took part,, against a police dictatorship dressed up as a Socialist society — a police dictator- ship backed up by Soviet armed might." Next day, readers of the Daily Worker were told only about "gangs of reactionaries" who v.ere "beating Communists to death in the streets" and the following day Hungary disappeared altogether from its front page. In consequence of what he saw in Hungary and of the refusal of his newspaper to print the facts as he reported them, Fryer resigned from the Daily Worker after eight years' service with it. His testimony would seeiii to be of particular value regarding the view of events in Hungary pre- sented by the Governments of the USSR and of Mr. Kadar, because he still re- mained faithlui to the ideals of Communism — "a movement", he calls it, "which has meant everything in the world to me". He has given as the reason for his being subsequently suspended from the Communist Party that the leaders of that Party are "afraid of the truth".
E. CONCLTJSION
149. It will be seen that the version of events favoured by the Governments of the USSR and of Mr. Kiidar is in conflict at many points, and points of funda- mental importance, with what the Committee believes to be the truth. For convenience, the Soviet and Kadfir version of the Hungarian uprising is repeated below in summary form.
l.'jf). Events ir. Hungary are said by spokesmen for the USSR and for the Kadar Government to have followed the classic pattern of the counter-revolution. First, shortcomings on the part of Hungary's leaders created among the people an atmospliere of justified discontent. Bourgeois and reactionary elements are alleged to have been waiting for an opportunity to recover their lost political and ecoi'omic domination. It is said that they made skilful use of this discontent to confuse even the workers and to induce them to put forward exaggerated demands. The argument runs that these Hungarian reactionaries were power- fully assisted by foreign sabotage organizations, propaganda, trained agents and a plentiful supply of arms. The Hungarian i)eople are said, by exponents of this view, to be fully conscious of the benefits of living in a People's Democracy, but to have lacked the power and effective leadership to resist so cunning a foe. Only the assistance of Soviet troops, it is claimed, enabled the true leaders of Himsary to throw hack the armed forces of "reaction".
18 N^pszabndadg, 8 December 1936.
" Peter Fryer : Hungarian Tragedy, London 1036.
5092 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
PART A. MILITARY INTERVENTION AND ITS POLITICAL BACKGROUND
Chapter IV. Soviet Military Intervention (24 October-3 November 1956>
A. INTRODUCTION
iSl. In chapter I the Committee has explained vrhy a detailed chronological account of the events in Hungary would be inappropriate for its report. The considerations indicated in chapter I may be briefly recalled insofar as they relate particularly to this chapter and to tlmse which immediately follow. At the students' meetings on 22 October 1956 and during the demonstrations of 23 October, demands were expressed for the removal of the severe restrictions which had come to be characteristic features of the regime. Had events continued along these lines, many Members of the United Nations would undoubtedly bave watched with sympathy the efforts of the Hungarian people to win for themselves a different form of government. However, such internal developments would not have constituted a matter of international concern calling for the attention of the United Nations. The feature of the developments in Hungary which compelled the attention of the Organization was the intervention of Soviet armed forces. This intervention tiansformed the uprising froin a demand for a change in the form and character of the domestic Government into a call for national liberation from external oppression. It is, therefore, appropriate that the report dwell in the flrst instance on the details of Soviet armed intervention. The Soviet apologia has been directed exclusively toward the statement of reasons which would justify such intervention, and not to a denial of the act.
152. In this chapter it is not proposed to deal with the uprising itself or to discuss the reasons which have been advanced to justify Soviet intervention. This and the following chapters are concerned solely with stating the known facts about the extent of intervention by Soviet armed forces and the nature of the conflict between those forces and the people of Hungary. The present chapter will deal with the time and manner of the first armed intervention which ostensil)ly commenced on 24 October 1956, and the subsequent chapter with the time and manner of the second armed intervention from the early morning of 4 November to the suppression of armed Hungarian resistance.
B. MOVEMENTS OF BOVIET FORCES AND AREAS OF FIGHTING
153. The Committee has received information from many sources regarding the movements of Soviet armed forces, and on the basis of this information it is possible to present the following account of the military operations involved.
154. At the time of the uprising the Soviet troop locations nearest to Buda- pest were Cegled and Sz^kesfehervar, both about 70 kilometres from Budapest, the former southeast and the latter southwest of the capital. The tanks coming from the southwest appeared in Budapest at about 2 a. m. on 24 October, at which time they were seen at ISIoricz Zsigmond Circle, in Buda, heading towards Pest. They had crossed the Szabadsag (formerly Ferencz .Jozsef) Bridge and were standing on the east, or Pest, side of the bridge between 3.30 a. m. and 5 a. m. Not all the tanks coming from the southwest crossed by the Szabadsag Bridge. Between 4.30 a. m. and 5.30 a. in. other tanks passed over the Margit Bridge on their way between Buda and Pest. Some tanks remained near tbe bridges, controlling passage over the river. Others occupied the embankment i'oad running north and south on the east side of the Daimbe. Still others con- centrated about major buildings in Pest. At the latter points they were shortly joined by tanks arriving from Cegled; these had passed throu'-ih the outlying suburbs of Budapest — Pestszeuterzsebet and Soroksar — at about 6 a. m. Thus the movement of Soviet forces gives the impression of a military movement planned in advance.
155. At the time of the entry of Soviet forces, the people of Budapest had been in conflict with the AVH for some hours. This conflict had begun at the Radio Building the previous evening, and during the night the peoplp, having secured arms, had continued to attack the AVH wherever they could be found.
156. As day broke on the morning of 24 Octolier, the people found themsehes no longer confronted only by the discredited AVH, but by the armed forces of the Soviet Union parading in strength through the streets of Hungary's capital. At 6 a. m., one of the columns of Soviet vehicles coming from the \yest opened five without warning at the point where the major thoroughfare of t'Uoi Street
SCOPE OP SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 5093
reaches the People's Park {Nepliget) ; no fighting was taking place there at the time. Soviet vehicles coming from the east are reported to have opened fire in the outskirts at 6 a. m. in the neighbourhood of the Slaughterhouse, and at 7 a. m. at the corner or Soroksari Street and Nagy Sandor Street. Thus began the conflict between the people of Budapest and the armed forces of the Soviet Union.
157. While the outbreak of fighting has focused attention on the actual entry of Soviet forces into Budapest, the Committee has good reason to believe that steps had been quietly taken during the two preceding days with a view to the use of Soviet forces for the repression of discontent in Hungary. It has been credibly reported that on 21-22 October, in the neighbouring areas in Romania, Soviet oflicers on leave and reserve officers speaking Himgarian or German were recalled.
158. On 20-21 October, floating bridges were assembled at ZShony on the frontier between the USSR and Hungary: it was over these pontoon bridges that Soviet troops from the USSR crossed on the morning of 24 October. It has also been credibly reported to the Committee that Soviet forces were seen on the march between Szombathely and Szekesfehervar as early as 22 October, moving from the west towards Budapest. During the night of 23-24 October, Soviet forces began to pass through Szeged and continued to move through the town along the road to Budapest for some thirty-six hours.
159. There is evidence also that, even in the first intervention by the armed forces of the USSR, use was made not only of Soviet troops stationed in Hun- gary, but of Soviet troops from the USSR itself and from Romania. It would appear that, of the Soviet forces used in the first intervention, only two divisions had been stationed in Hungary before the uprising, namely, the Second Mecha- nized Division and the Seventet^uih Mechanized Division. Seemingly, however, Soviet authorities had foreseen the probability that the troops stationed on Hungarian territory would be insufficient to deal with the situation, and had taken steps to call in forces from outside Hungary. The Soviet troops from the USSR who crossed the pontoon bridges at Zahony moved onwards to Miskolc, while those who crossed the border in the vicinity of Beregsurany proceeded towards Nyiregyhaza and Debrecen. The Hungarian political police at Nyir- bator reported at 1 a. m. on 24 October to the Ministry of Defence that Soviet troops had entered Hungary from Romania. When on 28 October soldiers of the Thirty-second and Thirty-fourth Mechanized Divisions were treated in the Verebely Clinic in Budapest, they were, on interrogation, found to be in possession oT Romanian money. Part of the two divisions had been stationed at Timisoara. Thus the forces used to repress the uprising in October were not exclusively forces which had been stationed in Hungary under the Warsaw Treaty.
C. RESISTANCE OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE TO THE SOVIET ATTACK
160. The Soviet forces had been given to understand that their task would be the liquidation of counter-revolutionary gangs. The situation in which they found themselves was that they were confronted by the unanimous opposition of an outraged people. Those elements on which they had presumably counted, with the exception of the secret police, failed to provide the expected support. The Communist Party, which had held the country in its grip during the pre- ceding years, was rapidly disintegrating. The detested AVH, which had been the main instrument of oppression, found itself paralyzed by the resentment of the people. Its members had been forced to seek refuge in various strongholds, where they were subjected to persistent attack, for the ruthlessness which they had themselves exercised now recoiled on them. The Hungarian Army, which the Budapest Radio announced as fighting on the side of the Soviet forces, is not known to have lent them any assistance whatever, while in at least one instance it engaged in active battle with them and in many other cases gave aid and supi)ort to the Hungarian people in their resistance to the Soviet army.
161. In combatting the new enemy, people of all ages and occupations showed remarkable unity of purpose. However important the role of the students in the initial stage of the demonstrations, it was matched by equal determination on the part of the workers as the fighting grew in intensity. The fighting was no- where more severe than in certain factory districts. The peasants lent aid and assistance by supplying the fighters in Budapest with food at little or no cost. Moreover, while there were many instances of middle-aged or elderly
5094 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
people participating in the fighting, the youth of the capital played a leading part.
162. Two of the first instances of the use of "Molotov cocktails" were by a man of some fifty years of age who destroyed an armoured car at 7 : 30 a. m. on 24 October near the Kilian Barracks, and by children who are reported to have blown up an armoured car with its crew at 8 : 30 a. m. Efforts made by leaders to prevent the distribution of arms to young boys seem in many instances to have been in vain ; they readily learned to make effective use of rifles which came into their possession.
163. In the highly industrialized area of Csepel Island at the southern end of Greater Budapest, the factory workers, reinforced by police and artillery units which had come over to their side, created an effective organization of their own. Though Soviet tanks arrived in Csei)el at 7 a. m. on 24 October, they made no persistent attempt to crush the uprising there. One incident was re- ported in which eight Soviet armoured cars, reinforced by AVH personnel, opened fire near the former Manfred Weiss factory ; ^ when, however, the fac- tory workers pressed with their attack on the AVH, the Soviet armoured cars retreated to Budapest. The Csepel workers were thus free to go to the help of those who were fighting in Budapest. They travelled northwards in cars, on bicycles, or on foot, to the centre of the city.
164. In the middle of Pest, two of the major points of opposition to the Soviet invasion were the Kilian Barracks and the Corvin Cinema. At the Kilian Barracks — the former Mjiria Terezia military barracks — an old and strong brick structure on tjlloi Street — a unit of the Hungarian Army under the leadership of Colonel Pal Maleter, took sides with the insurgents and continued to with- stand successive attacks by Soviet forces. The defenders of the Kilian Bar- racks, including the civilian reinforcements, are said to have numbered some 2,000. When fighting ended there, sixty to seventy Soviet soldiers had lost their lives. About fifty yards away from the Kilidn Barracks, just beyond "U1181 Street, the Corvin Cinema, standing at the point of convergence of three roads, tJlloi Street, Jozsef Boulevard and Kisfaludy Passage, was rapidly converted into a stronghold. Attack on the cinema, a strong, circular structure, was made difl3cult by the proximity on all sides of four-story buildings.
165. The Committee heard a graphic account of the conflict at the Corvin Block and of the use of the "Molotov cocktail" by the insurgents. An anti- tank gun, removed from a disabled Soviet tank, was placed against the steps in front of the cinema, and a mechanism was arranged to fire it from within the building. The tanks or arm.oured cars came from the side streets and. on turning into the boulevard, were within range of the anti-tank gun which was able to destroy their tracks before they could train their guns on the cinema. Observers posted on the top floors of buildings on the side streets signalled the approach of Soviet vehicles. At the signal, the preparation of "Molotov cock- tails" began. A bottle — perhaps a bottle of tomato preserve previously emptied for the purpose — was nearly filled with gasoline. It was then loosely corked, with towelling around the cork. At a second signal, given when the tank drew nearer to the Corvin Cinema, the bottle would be tipped downwards so that the gasoline could seep into the towelling. At the third signal, the towelling would be lit and the bottle thrown. As the loose cork fell out, the bottle would explode. A gasoline store on the premises of the Corvin Cinema provided its defenders with an adequate supply of fuel. The Corvin Block was one of the resistance groups in Budapest which successfully withstood attack during the first period of fighting.
166. At times the Hungarians met with sympathy from Soviet troops. Soviet forces normally stationed in Hungary or in Romania had been affected by their surroundings. Many a Plungarian had learnt some Russian — either at school, where it was a compulsory language, or in a prisoner-of-war camp. They were able to reproach the Soviet troops, when occasion offered, for their interference in Hungarian affairs. The Soviet soldiers were, indeed, in a situation of some embarrassment. The civilians whom they fought included women, children and elderly people. The.y could see that the people were unanimous in their fight against the AVH and foreign intervention ; that the men whom the Soviet Army was figliting and the prisoners who were captured were not fascists but work- ers and students, who demonstrably regarded Soviet soldiers not as liberators, but as oppressors. It was also an unusual experience for the Soviet soldiers.
^8 Subsequently called "Rdkosi Works" ; now known as "Csepel Works".
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTRITY EST THE UNTTED STATES 5095
jis for the Hungariaus themselves, to hear people speaking openly on subjects hitherto bniiijed in t-onversatiou. Some Russian officers and soldiers appear to have fought and died ou the Hungarian side.
167. Confronted by opposition in Budapest which they were unable to master, the Soviet forces were in no position to control the provinces. The concen- tration of forces in Budapest seemingly left certain parts of the country, par- ticularly the region between the Danube and the western frontiers— Trans- danubia — practically free from Soviet forces. In such centres as Pecs, no Soviet troops arrived until the beginning of November. In some other centres where Soviet garrisons were present but isolated, relations with the local inhabitants were amicable enough. On 23 October, Free Radio Gyor announced that the Soviet military commander had denied any intention of interfering "in your internal political affairs", adding that "the rising of the Hungarian people against oppressive leaders is justified". The Soviet commander thanked the population for supplying milk to the children of the Soviet garrison and requested the people to notify him of any violation of regulations by Soviet soldiers. In conclusion, he assured the people of Gyor that the Soviet troops were not preparing to attack the city.
168. In Veszprem, the Revolutionary Council, hearing of rumours on 28 October that Soviet troops at the Hajmask^r barracks were preparing to attack the city in order to reinstate the former officials, sent a three-man delegation to the Soviet commander. The commander deplored that at Varpalota, in the oounty of Veszprem, three Soviet citizens had been killed, but he recognized the right of the Hungarian people to choose their own form of government and to remove leaders who did not perform their tasks properly. He gave the assurance that, if the Hungarians refrained from attack, the Soviet troops would make no attack on Veszprem. The same Soviet commander refused to give asylum to members of the AVH who had sought refuge with Russian troops. At Jaszbereny the Soviet commander took the initiative of calling on the Revolutionary Council. Accompanied by two Soviet officers, he promised the Council that he would not interfere in Hungarian internal affairs and that the troops would not leave the barracks on manoeuvres. Jaszbereny was later the scene of a serious incident, but not until 4 November, when Soviet policy had changed. In Debrecen the Soviet forces withdrew from the city to the countryside. Soviet tanks had arrived there on 24 October, but, after negotia- tions between the Revolutionary Council and the Soviet commander had begun in the afternoon of the 20th, the commander agreed to withdraw the Soviet troops from the city and to lift the curfew, and Soviet withdrawal from Debrecen began on the 27th.
169. In the provinces, the eviden<'e suggests that the Soviet forces were con- cerned rather to avoid conflict with the Hungarian people.
170. In Budapest the fighting continued from the 24th to the 28th, as Soviet armour sought to eliminate the resisters' strongholds. The massacre in the square by the Parliament Building exasperated rather than terrified the people, and the severe Soviet attacks of 27 October were unsuccessful. Not until the cease-fire of 28 October did a lull ensue, and the fighting had, in effect, come to an end by 30 October.
D. THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM BUDAPEST
171. One central demand of the insurgents in Budapest was that Soviet troops should withdraw from the capital. Deputations of the Revolutionary Councils from the provinces and from the fighting groups in Budapest pressed their de- mands on the Government. They stressed that they would not lay down their arms until the Government had made its position clear regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the entire country. However, the insurgents conceded that the first step would be the evacuation of Budapest, to be followed within a given period of time by the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungarian territory. Such were the demands received from the Students' Revolutionary Council, the Miskolc Revolutionary Council, the Transdanubian National Council, and from numerous towns and villages in various parts of the country.
172. At .5.2.' p.m. on 28 October, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Mr. Nagy, announced that the Soviet Government had agreed to begin the withdrawal of its troops from "the city's territory". The following morning Premier Nagy and the Minister of Defence, General Karoly Janza, met the representatives of the more prominent insurgent groups at the Ministry of Defence. According to the evidence received, General .Tanza insisted during this meeting that the technical
5096 SCOPE OF SOVIEfT ACTIVITY IN THE TJlSnTED STATES
complexity of a withdrawal of troops made it difficult to effect this within the time limits set by the insurgents. Since, however, the discussions also concerned the re-establishment of order in Budapest, the meeting ended on a hopeful note. The Government was to seek to conclude with the Soviet authorities a time-table for actual withdrawal, while the insurgents would lend assistance in this task by maintaining order and showing due respect towards the withdrawing Soviet forces.
173. Negotiations between the Government and the Soviet authorities continued during the day. At the same time, General Kinily, as head of the Revolutionary Military Council, was establishing the foundations of the National Guard, with the intention of guiding and co-ordinating the various insurgent groups. During the evening General Janza announced the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the eighth district of Budapest, and called upon the insurgents to lay down their arms in conformity with the agreement. The next day he announced that the with- drawal of Soviet forces from Budapest would be completed by dawn of .31 October.
174. During the last days of October, Soviet armoured and other vehicles begnn to evacuate Budapest, with the exception of certain key positions, such as the Soviet Embassy and the main approaches to the Danube bridges. This with- drawal, however, took place simultaneously with the surrounding of the prin- cipal airports of Budapest — an action which provoked a resolution of the staff of the Hungarian National Air Command of SO October threatening that, unless the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest was effected within twelve hours, the Hungarian Air Force "would make an armed stand in support of the demands of the entire Hungarian working people". The Budapest airports of Ferihegy, Budaoi's and Tokol were under the control of Soviet troops or substan- tially so, owing to the proximity to these airfields of Soviet artillery and armoured units. The same was triie of Szentkiralyszabadja airport (between Veszprem and Lake Balaton) and the Kecskemet and Szolnok airports. Buda- pest was ringed by three airfields in its immediate vicinity, while the three others, lying at a distance of 100 kilometres, occupied strategic positions. It appears, however, that six military airfields — Papa, Szekesfehervar and Kaposvar in western Hungary, Kiskunlachiiza and Kalocsa in central Hungary, and Kun- madaras in northeastern Hungary — were not subject at that time to Soviet mili- tary control. They had, according to reports, some 200 Hungarian planes, of various types, available for immediate action.
17.5. General Kiraly, in accordance with Premier Nagy's instructions, forbade any military action on the part of the Hungarian Air Force. The position taken by the Premier was that, as discussions were under way regarding the with- drawal of the Soviet troops, any sign of belligerence on the part of the Hun- garian forces, particularly if not the result of direct provocation, would destroy the chance of resolving this question through negotiations and might, in fact, precipitate Soviet retaliation. However, air reconnaissance was permitted, and reports were received on Soviet trooji movements in Hungary for the period of
29 October to 2 November. In the vicinity of Budapest, to the north and south of the city on the Vac, Cegled and Kecskemet highways, there were stationed on
30 October some 200 tanks, tenders and other Soviet armoui-ed vehicles. Just to the west of Budapest were some thirty tanks, and at Szekesfehervar. twenty- five. In western Hungary, around Gyor and Szombathely, some ten to fifteen tanks and other service vehicles were located near each town. In Kecskemet, Szolnok, Bekescsaba and Debrecen there remnined a small number of tanks. It was calculated that, in all, there were less than 400 Soviet tanks in commis- sion in Hungary at that time. On 30 October an airlift from Tokol, Ferihegy and other airports was put into operation, and it is estimated that some 200 trans- port planes were used to evacuate the families of Soviet military and civilian personnel and wounded troops. Notwithstanding the reports that the incoming planes were carrying military supplies, the belief was generally entertained on the last day of October that the Soviet withdrawal might soon become a reality.
176. This hope was short-lived. At 11 : 30 p. m. on 1 November, Radio Buda- pest reported that, according to an announcement issued by the Soviet Embassy, airfields of the Hungarian Air Force had been surrounded by armoured forces of the Soviet Army in order to secure the air transport of the families of Soviet troops and the wounded. The radio statement added that "The Hungarian Air Force, in full complement, was ready to defend itself against overwhelming strength. The Government, however, fully realizing its responsibilities, pro- hibited the opening of fire. So the troops of the Air Force are now facing the Soviet forces present, without firing and with discipline. They await the de-
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 5097
parture of the Soviet troops." By this date, the possibility of action by the Hungarian Air Force was rapidly being curtailed. The staging areas of the Soviet troops were by now the Hungarian military airfields or those which the Soviet Air Force had previously occupied, such as Papa and Veszprem. Con- sidering that the number of civilians and wounded soldiers to be evacuated was relatively small, it seemed that the Soviet Embassy's announcement was in- tended to justify the seizure of the airfields and the immobilization of the Hungarian Air Force.
177. The available information indicates that, during the days following 29 October, the prevailing attitude in Budapest with regard to the withdrnwal of Soviet troops was one of quiet, though tense, expectancy. The new free I*ress and the radio, while rejoicing in the positive results achieved during the nego- tiations for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Budapest, asked the population to refrain from showing any signs of hostility towards the foreign troops. The Soviet forces did, in fact, withdraw from the city without obstruction. In the 20th District, Soroksar and Pestszenterzs<Jbet, which came vinder the Unified Command of the National Guard, the only incidents reported on the 29th were of fighting with some Soviet units which had been cut off from food supplies and were looting food stores. The next day, the cease-fire came into full effect and thereafter the armed truce was respected by both sides, and no infringe- ments occurred until the early hours of 4 November. The situation was similar in the suburban areas to the north and west of the capital. In the provincial centres, the Soviet troops withdrew from the towns or, if garrisoned there, to the barracks, giving the impression that their intervention in Hungary was com- ing to an end.
E. THE LOGISTIC DEPLOYMENT OF NEW SOVIET FORCES
178. In fact, during the last days of October and the beginning of November, the Soviet forces were effecting three types of troop movements in Hungary, The first was the withdrawal from the capital, and from public view in the provinces. The second was the dispatch of new forces from the East to certain strategic centres within Hungary, ostensibly, as announced by Soviet Ambassador Andropov, to assist in the organized withdrawal of the Soviet forces. The third was the massing on and within the Hungarian borders of heavy armoured units which were to be called upon four days later to crush the Hungarian uprising. The first two movements — outward from Budapest and inward from the eastern frontier, seem to have converged, at strategic locations along the main arterial road system, to form a crescent about 150 kms. east of Budapest. This con- solidation stretched from Gyongyos and Hatvan in the north on the Budapest- Miskolc highway, then through Cegled and Szolnok on the Budapest-Debrecen highway, and Kecskemet on the Budapest-Szeged highway, to Dunafoldvar which lies on the western bank of the Danube. In Transdanubia before 31 October, this military consolidation was not as extensive as in the Danubian plain except at Szekesfehervar, to which some of the troops from Budapest had been with- drawn.
179. On the eastern frontier, after two days of relative immobility — 27 and 28 October — new troop movement were observed. At Zahony, the frontier sta- tion on the Transcarpathian border, at least 100 tanks were located on Hungarian territory, while a considerable force of motorized infantry, with artillery ve- hicles and supporting tank units, was moving westwai'ds towards Nyiregyhaza. The next day, 133 light tanks and 80 of the latest model heavy tanks crossed the frontier at Zahony, more than compensating for the few tanks and infantry vehicles which were moving eastward from Nyiregyhaza, with the local inhabi- tants cheering them on their way.
180. In some cases, as reported from the frontier village of Csaroda, the convoy going eastwards had not really left Hungary, but had moved in a circular fashion, returning westwards by another road. Reports of new troops entering the country from 29 October appear to have continued daily. The Zahony sector was the principal venue, but from 31 October, most of the roads leading into Hungary were being used for the conveyance of Soviet troops. From the fron- tier village of Nyirbator close to Satu Mare in Romania, to the frontier post of Battonya, near Arad in Romania, the roads were blocked with incoming ve- hicles. At Debrecen, where a reconnaissance plane of the Hungarian Air Force was shot down on 31 October by a Soviet anti-aircraft battery, there were also considerable military activities. During the following three days, air recon- naissance became increasingly diflScult owing to the rapid diminution in the number of airfields free from Soviet control.
5098 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
181. It became clear that the new Soviet troops were advancing by stages towards strategic positions in the Danubian plain and even Transdannbia. Thus fresh units came to Szolnok and Kecskemet by 1 November, while another unit appears to have crossed the Danube and to have established itself by that date at Dombovar, 20 kilometres north of the city of Pecs. The Soviet Army used also the main raihoad line passing through Zahony for the transportation of troops. It is known that they seized the railway stations at Zahony, Kisvarda and Nyiregyhaza during 1 and 2 November, and some armed clashes occurred between the Hungarian railway workers and the Soviet troops. The eastern lines were commandeered by the Soviet Military Command, and fro-m 2 November on the Hungarian railways could not operate between Szolnok and' Nyiregyhaza.
182. The Soviet Military Command was also using the more developed com- munications system of Czechoslovakia. This proved helpful to them, as the Zahony approaches to Hungary tended to constitute a bottleneck, notwithstand- ing the building of auxiliary pontoon bridges over the Tisza. With regard to the Romanian crossings, although these lines were put into use, as far south as Timisoara, they tended to extend unduly the Soviet communications system. Thus, a deployment of Soviet forces took place on the north through Slovakia and along the Danube, possibly as far east as Esztergom (north of Budapest) to Rajka (north of Magyarovar). On 2 November Soviet troops from Czecho- slovakia crossed the Danube bridge at Komarom.
183. By the evening of 2 November, Hungary had to all intents and purposes been reinvaded. Premier Nagy continued negotiations with the Soviet repre- sentatives, in the hope that this i>owerful Soviet force was there only as a show of strength. Estimates of Soviet forces in Hungary vary from 1,600 to 4,000 tanks and from 75,000 men to 200,000. The Committee has been informed that a more probable figure is 2,500 tanks and armoured cars with 1,000 supporting vehicles.
184. By the evening of 3 November, communication between Budapest and the provinces was limited to the telephone, as the highways and railways were, for all practical purposes, sealed off by the Soviet forces. The agreement between the Hungarian Government and the Soviet authorities regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary had been reached in the afternoon. Certain outstanding matters relating to the withdrawal remained to be decided. For this. General Maleter, as head of a Delegation, was empowered to represent the Government. At 10 p. m. he proceeded to the headquarters i)f the Soviei- Military Command at Tokol on Csepel Island. Consequently, Premier Nagy had grounds for believing that Hungary, despite the presence of the large Soviet military force in the country, was destined to become free.
F. CONCLUSIONS
185. In the present chapter, the Committee has summarized the information available to it regarding the movement of Soviet forces within Hungary from the beginning of the first intervention to the eve of the second intervention. Simultaneously with the renewed concentration of military forces described in this chapter, negotiations were being conducted between the Government of Hungary and the Government of the USSR for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary. The course of these negotiations is dealt with in chapter VIII. The problem arises of reconciling the known facts regarding the political nego- tiations for complete withdrawal with the clear evidence of the continued re- introduction of forces and their concentration within the country. It may well be that, immediately before the second intervention, the political and military authorities of the USSR differed regarding the best way of meeting the unusual circumstances which had arisen, and that the military authorities at no point abandoned the belief that the only way to resolve the difliculties which had arisen in Hungary was by force.
Chapter V. Second Soviet ^Military Intervention
A. introduction
180. A period of less than a week intervened lietween the end of hostilities in October and the second attack by Soviet armed forces on the morning of Sun- day 4 November. The Committee received authoritative evidence regarding the conditions in Budapest during this brief period. Od the eve of the second attack, order was being rapidly restored in the damaged streets of the capital. People were already at work removing the rubble and glass. Despite innumerable
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 5099
broken shop windows, no looting took place. Good progress was being made in the direction of political consolidation, and the resumption of work could be confidently expected on Monday, 5 November. Negotiations had been completed for the formation of a National Guard under General Kiraly with a view to en- suring internal security. A sense of confidence had developed among the citizens of Budapest.
187. Evidence has been given in the preceding chapter that Soviet troop move- ments into Hungary on a considerable scale and other military preparations had been going on for some days. In view of the diflBculties of large-scale mili- tary planninsi, it would seem most prol)able that the design of the second inter- vention had been worked out during the last days of October, if not sooner. The purposes of this chapter is to assemble evidence as to the actual fighting which took place from early in the morning of 4 November until armed resistance ceased. It is thought appropriate, however, at this point to consider one aspect of the fighting that had a considerable bearing on the way in which it developed, namely the attitude of the regular Hungarian Army towards the uprising and of the insurgents towards the Army.
B. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE INSURGENTS AND THE HUNGARIAN ARMY
188. It is a significant fact that, throughout the uprising, no single unit of the Hungarian Army fought as such on the side of the Soviet troops. Not only at the Kilian Barracks, but later also on the Citadel in Budapest and in the Matra and Biikk mountains, Hungarian Army units fought on the side of the uprising. Apart from these organized Army units, numerous Hungarian sol- diers deserted to the insurgents or handed over weapons and ammunition. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Hungarian Army proved useless to the Soviet Command throughout Hungary as a means of quelling the insurrec- tion. In fact, it started to disintegrate at the outset. Desertions took place in such numbers that the Minister of Defence, Istvan Bata, was obliged to appeal over the radio in the follov^'ing terms at 8.56 a. m. on 2.5 October — only some thirty-six hours after the beginning of the revolt : "I instruct those members of the Army who, for one reason or another, have been separated from their units to report to their commanding officers at their formations immediately, and not later than 12.00, 25 October." Later appeals by radio called upon the troops to report to the nearest military post, since by then many soldiers had left their provincial garrisons to come to Budapest or to help in the" uprising elsewhere.
180. Since the junior ranks came from peasant or worliing class homes, where the grievances complained of were well known, their sympathies were quickly- engaged on behalf of the insurgents, and there is evidence that similar griev- ances to those of the civilians had been voiced in the garrisons also. For ex- ample, there was bitterness over the introduction of a Russian-type uniform for Hungarian soldiers and over the subordinate position of the Hungarian Army. This inferior status was to be seen in the supervision by Soviet officers of the Hungarian General Staff, in the Soviet control over heavy tactical weapons, heavy communications materials and the Air Force, and in the infiltration of the Hungai'ian Army by State security organs under Soviet supervision. A sense of inferiority had thus been bred in the rank and file of the Army which, for some time past, had led to complaints.
190. The resistance of the Hungarian people was considerably strengthened by the attitude of the soldiers, at first by their refusal to fight against the in.sur- gents and soon by their active help. This attitude, however, did not extend to most of the senior officers. Under Soviet inspiration, special cadres of Commu- nist officers had been developed to handle all key operations and commanding officers were chosen for their party affiliation rather than their military training. Senior Hungarian officers with military experience had, in most cases, been retired or assigned to teaching posts in one of the military academies. On the other hand, a number of younger officers had undergone training in the Soviet Union and were presumed to be not only Communists, l»nt also pro-Soviet. The' remainder of the Officer Corps had at one time or another during the past ten years received a special Communist indoctrination, and many were believed to have pro-Soviet sympathies. Hovi-ever, in the Budapest military academies, contrary to expectations, the cadets reacted differently to developments. They were aware of the grievances of the workers and took part eagerly in such dis- cussions as those at the Petofi Club. According to Budapest radio reports, when the demonstrations were organized on 23 October, about 800 cadets from the Petttfi Military Academy in Buda were among the demonstrators at the Bern
5100 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE XmiTED STATES
statue. Great encouragement was given to the demonstrators by the presence in their midst of cadets marching in their uniforms.
191. All these factors had created sympathy and confidence between the insur- gents and the rank and file of the Hungarian Army. Most of the insurgents, however, remained distrustful of the Army Command and of the senior ofiicers in general. During the days of freedom, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Army and the Command of the National Guard established a working relation- ship with the insurgents of Greater Budapest. In the provinces, the situation was still confused. Much depended on the attitude of the officer commanding the local garrison and on that of his staff. Often the senior officers had been against the uprising or had declared themselves neutral. In some cases, where the garrison had actually sided with the insurgents, it had been unable to act as an organized unit for lack of ammunition or through action by the AVH or by the Suviet MKVD.
102. The freedom fighters had welcomed deserting soldiers and officers into their ranks and made extensive use of weapons and equipment given them by the Army, but they preferred to keep the command of the insurgent groups in civilian hands. During the "days of freedom", it was proposed to reorganize the Army on non-political lines and to remove some of the officers known for their pro-Soviet views. This, however, would have taken time nnd, meanwhile, the Revolutionary Committees had little faith in the Ministry of Defence or in the Hungarian military command. They often insisted on personal confirma- tion of instructions by a leader they trusted, such as General Maleter or Kiraly.
193. At the first meeting of the Revolutionary National Defence Committee on 31 October, Generals Maleter and Kiraly and Colonel Nader of the Air Force, had been of the opinion that the reorganization of the Hungarian Army should be speeded up. They felt, however, that the attitude of the Army and of the insurgents towards the Russians should be above reproach during the negotiations for withdrawal of the Soviet troops. The possibility of a renewed Soviet attack was already borne in mind. W^hile Generals Maleter and Istvan Kovacs were concerned exclusively with the technical negotiations for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Colonel Andras Marton was called from the Zrinyi Military Academy to prepare a defence plan, for use in the event of a second Soviet at- tack. Colonel Marton, however, was released from the Zrinyi Academy only on 2 November. By that time, Soviet troop movements were going on in various parts of the country and communications were becoming extremely difficult. It was obvious that the Sojff^''comniand, if it wished to strike, had more than sufficient troops in Hungary to make any organized resistance impossible.
194. On 2 and 3 November various revolutionary groups in such positions as the Corvin Block and the Kilian Barracks and in the industrial suburbs of Budapest replenished their stocks of ammunition with the help of the National Guard. They appear to have received little, however, but rifle bullets. Some officers and non-commissioned officers attached to the various groups undertook a little hasty artillery training. Defensive positions were improved or alterna- tive sites chosen which provided better vantage points for anti-tank guns. It would appear, however, that no over-all plan was drawn up to protect Budapest in the event of an attack. The resistance organizers worked on the local level and with improvised means.
195. Leaders of Revolutionary Councils seemed to derive special satisfaction from being in direct telephone communication with Mr. Nagy, Mr. Tildy or Gen- eral Kiraly. From 9 o'clock in the evening of 3 November, reports came in from the Councils by telephone and special messenger both to Mr. Nagy and to General Kiraly, as they had no confidence in the hierarchy of officers transmitting their messages from the field to the highest echelons. This circumstance throws some light on the individualist nature of Hungarian military operations. Resistance followed no general plan, but was limited to local, although often fiercely fought, engagements. It is important to see these engagements against the background of a Hungarian Army which had virtually ceased to exist as such, with the resulting impossibility for most Army units to fight in formation, but with the corollary that the participation of soldiers in the resistance, individually or in groups, "became a common feature of the fighting. It was in such circumstances that the citizens of Budapest found themselves again under Soviet fire.
C. THE FIGHTING IN BUDAPEST
196. From 9 p. m. on 8 November the capital had been completely surrounded. Information that hundreds of tanks were advancing slowly towards the capital was received from observation posts on the major highways. Reports came in
SCX)PE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNTTED STATES 5101
that at some places such as Pestszenterzsebet, small units had entered the dis- trict possibly trying to make the insurgents open fire. Since, according to the withdrawal agreement of 31 October, Russian troops were to evacuate Greater Budapest local Commanders were ordered on instructions from Mr. Nagy not to open lire The Ministry of Defence also gave the same instruction many times Witnesses have testified that in no case was a shot fired by the insur- gents By 3 o'clock in the morning tanks were moving along Soroksar Avenue up to Boraros Square on the Pest side of the river, cutting off Csepel Island from the inner capital. Similar advances were made from the Vaci Avenue on the north down the east bank of the river, cutting off Ujpest from the Buda side. No precise information exists from the other sectors, but it is known that Soviet troops opened fire at 4:25 a. m. at Budaorsi Way, to the south of the old city of Buda. Shortly afterwards cannon fire was heard from all quarters of the city and from outlying districts. c â– ^ * i a
197. Fighting broke out at numerous points of resistance. Soviet tanks aa- vanced along the main boulevards radiating from the Danube. The insurgents set up barricades at important intersections on the Outer Ring of Pest and fierce fighting took place at tjlloi Street, Marx Square, Kalvin Square, at the Kiliaa Barracks, and at the Corvin Cinema. On the Buda side, there was fighting on the Gellert Hill, at the Citadel and on the Royal Palace Hill, at the Southern Railway Station, in Szena Square and in Moricz Zsigmond Circle. Resistance varied according to the available strength in men, weapons and ammunition. In some cases Russian troops were able, within a matter of hours, to fight through to such important points of the city as the Square by the Parliament Building, the banks of the Danube, the bridgeheads, the radio station, and the police headquarters. Whatever organized resistance may have been planned for the city as a whole had ceased by 8 o'clock in the morning, that is, shortly after the radio station had been taken over by Soviet troops. Thereafter the groups continued fighting until their ammunition was exhausted or until the defending positions had been destroyed by the heavy tank barrage. The Kilian Barracks were subjected to a three-hour assault and to aerial bombardment, but the building was not seized for three days. The Citadel military units, reinforced by freedom fighters, held out until 7 November. The Soviet losses were severe, and these defence positions were well organized. Fierce fighting also took place at Moricz Zsigmond Circle and in other parts of the city. From the evidence received, it would seem that for the first two days the Soviet attack was directed principally against those fortified positions which, by their continued resistance, prevented the Soviet Command from claiming that it was in full control of Budapest. The impression is gained that the Soviet troops avoided a systematic hunting down of secondary targets, such as snipers, in the belief that complete order would shortly be restored. When that proved not to be the case, Soviet tanks began to move again along the main boulevards, firing indiscriminately into houses to strike fear into the people and to force their surrender. This shocting c.uised severe damage to buildings on the boulevards and along the side streets, even where there had been no recent resistance by the freedom fighters. By 8 November much of Budapest bo?e severe traces of the fighting. Hundreds of buildings were completely destroyed and thousands more had been severely damaged. The destruction was especially marked in certain districts but, in a city as large as Budapest, many areas were fortunate enough to have escaped. By nightfall on the 7th the fighting had become intermittent and was mostly confined to the outlying industrial districts.
198. It must, however, be stated that on the evidence before the Committee it may safely be assumed that the whole population of Budapest took part in the resistance. No distinction, therefore, could have been made between civilian and military population. "Molotov cocktails" were thrown from apartment windows on upjier floors by men, women and children on a wide scale. It would, therefore, be difficult for any invading army to pick the objects of attack.
D. THE FIGHTING IN THE INDUSTRIAL DISTEICTS OF BUDAPEST
190. In the industrial districts of Budapest, most of the fighters were workers and t':e fighting became a struggle between the Hungarian factory workers and the Army of the Sovif^t Union. This was the case more particularly in those (T'strir'ts on the Pest side of the Danube where most of the heavy industries of Hungary are concentrated. As in the city itself, leadership of the resistance forces emerged at the local level. Each district or group of districts, under
5102 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
the command of its Revolutionary Councils, received army equipment and v?as reinforced by army personnel Vv'ho volunteered to join the freedom fighters. The Revolutionary Council of Csepel received some eiglity-five pieces of artillery from the barracks on the island when many officers and men joined them against the orders of their commanding officer.
200. The factory districts from Ujpest in the North, through Kobanya and southward to Pestszenterzsebet, Soroksiir and Csepel Island, put up the strongest resistance. This continued until 11 November. With the exception of a fevi^ clashes in tlie hills of Nograd and Baranya counties which occurred after this date, it can be said that these districts were the scene of the most tenacious Hungarian armed resistance during the second intervention. A detailed account of the fighting in all districts cannot be given, but considerable material has been received on the over-all situation. The primary objective of the Soviet forces would appear to have been the capture and control of the city. They did not enter the outlying industrial districts except to tiie extent that they had to go through them when following the main highways. In the morning of 4 Novem- ber, the centres of fighting were on the highway to Vac and on the other high- ways radiating southwards to Csepel Island. The Soviet troops, equipped with arnioured cars, light and heavy tanks, and self-propelled artillery, were faced, as in the city, with fighting on street corners against anti-tank guns, odd pieces of artillery, machine guns and incendiary hand grenades. The freedom fighters were always outnumbered, but, according to the evidence, when the situation became desperate they would withdraw and reappear from another street to hit the tail end of an advancing armoured column. In some cases the Soviet troops had to leave their tanks to clear road obstructions, giving the freedom fighters an opportunity to attack them with side arms. It appears that the situation on 4 and 5 November was one of constant harassment of the Soviet columns. The Soviet armoured units opened fire on all buildings along avenues and streets and inflicted heavy casualties among non-combatants. Several tenements and workers' apartment buildings collapsed as a result of cannon fire, with twenty to fifty people trapped in the cellars.
201. In many districts the factories, such as the Kobanya Beer Factory, the Ganz Works, the Electric Bulb Factory and the Csepel Steel Plant, were arsenals for the Hungarians. The fighting, however, varied in the different districts, according to the heavy weapons and ammunition available. Witnesses testified that action would continue until all artillery shells were exhausted. Then the freedom fighters, carrying their side arms, would either join up with another group, or go into hiding. The Soviet forces, on the other hand, had a super- abundance of fire power, and it was not necesary for the Soviet Army to employ all the armoured units which it had at its disposal.
202. The fighting in the 20th district — Pestszenterzsebet and Soroksar — was organized under one command and lasted from the morning of the 4th until the evening of the 8th. Sporadic fighting then continued until the morning of the 11th. Radio Station "Roka". which was heard outside Hungary up to S Novem- ber, was located in this district and did much to maintain the morale of the freedom fighters. Soroksar Avenue joins Csepel and the Tokol military airport with the capital. Soviet troops soon gained control of this Avenue, but they were subjected to harassment and their losses of men and materials were reported to be high. Tlie Soviet troops undertook a number of punitive sorties in tho side streets, killing many non-combatants and destroying many buildings. During these attacks.the Committee was told, the Soviet troops would shoot indiscrimi- nately at anything, even if it were not a legitimate target. Examples described to the Committee included a bread line of women and children, standing outside a bakery, which was shot at on 4 November. On 7 November a Red Cross ambulaiice was destroyed by machine gim fire; the wounded and the nurses in it were killed.
203. The Revolutionary Council of Csepel constituted another centre of re- sistance. It is noteworthy that certain witnesses, former members of the Revolutionary Council of Csepel, testified before the Committee that they and other members of the Council had advocated on the eve of the second interven- tion that, in case of a Soviet attack, the Csepel workers should not resist. . The Soviet forces, it was thought, were bound to win, and any resistance would be a futile sacrifice of life. The workers, however, made it clear that such a suggestion was unacceptable to them. In the outcome, the battle of Csepel was the hardest-fought of all, for the workers were united in their determination to fight and were well provided with weapons. Since Tiikol airport would be isolated from Budapest unless the Csepel workers were subdued, the Soviet
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 5103
Command was forced to break their resistance. Between 4 and 9 November, fighting went on incessantly in tlie area as a whole, although at various points only intermittently. The freedom fighters maintained an effective organized armed resistance in most of the area throughout these five days. On the 7th there was a concentrated artillery barrage against the whole area, supplemented by aerial bombardment. The next day an emissai-y from the Soviet Commander asked the freedom fighters to surrender. They refused, and the fighting con- tinued. The following day, the 0th, another emissary stated that unless the insurgents surrendered no one would be spared. This was also rejected. The shelling was intensified by artillery units converging from the north and by the heavy guns now stationed on the (Jeliert Hill. At 2 p. m. the Soviet forces used anti-personnel rocket moi'tars causing great destruction to the factories, instal- lation and surrounding buildings. At 6 p. m. the Revolutionary Council decided to end the fighting. Their ammunition was practically exhausted. With the cessation of hostilities in Budapest, it was possible for the Soviet forces to concentrate on Csepel. There was some shooting the next day^ — the 10th — but the armed resistance was, to all intents and purposes, over, as the Soviet tanks had by then occupied all the plants and warehouses vphich were formerly the bases of resistance.
E. FIGHTING IN THE PROVINCES
204. While the objectives of Soviet strategy were the suppression of the Hungarian national movement and the overthrow of the Nagy Government, whivh had been called upon to implement the demands of the insurgents, it was the apparent aim of the Soviet High Command to avoid clashes wherever possible. Thus, throughout the whole of southern Hungary, from Bek^scsaba in the east to Kormeud in the west — with the notable exception of Pecs — there was no actual fighting during the revolutiwu. The absence of resistance was due to a variety of reasons :
(a) In the towns and villages where no Soviet or Hungarian troops were stationed, the Revolutionary Councils which came into being between 25 and SO October could not secure any weapons. In niotit cases there w^as no immediate need for them, as the local members of the AVH had complied with the request that they turn over their offices and remain in their homes. At the time of the second intervention, these Revolutionary Councils had no weajxins in store with which to effect jsrmed resistance ;
(b) In .such towns as Szeged, where troops were usually garrisoned, special steps had been taken by Soviet Intelligence to neutralize the senior ofiicers of the Hungarian Army. It was thus possible for the Soviet troops to ensure from the outset that no weapons reached the insurgents. This was also the case in Kecskemet, where the commander of the Hungarian garrison, who was a Soviet-trained officer, had taken the necessary measures to keep his unit as such inactive during the uprising.
205. A full account of events throughout the country would run to great length, nor would it add to the conclusion that, irrespective of the degree or duration of military resistance by the Hungarian people, the overwhelming majority of them were determined to see their demands put into effect. The description here given will therefore be limited to the events in a few provincial centres which are broadly representative of w^hat happened in the provinces during the second intervention.
206. At Pecs, the chief city of Baranya county, and an important centre due to its proximity to the uranium mines, nothing of any military significance occurred between 23 October and 1 November. The AVII did open fire on the first demonstrators, but during a second demonstration on 1 November, it was forced to surrender and the Revolutionary Council took over all the functions previously discharged by Communist Party ofl3cials. A declaration of policy drawn up by the Council demanded as its first point the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. It also called for the exploitation of the uranium mines by the Hungarian State. On the evening of 1 November, the Soviet officials of the uranium mines were asked to leave with their families : they were sent by truck to Szekszard, where some Soviet units were stationed. During the next two days, everything was quiet at Pecs and the Revolutionary Council went to work to reorganize the various public services. After 1 November, however, reports regarding the systematic build up of Soviet troops at Dombovar, some 25 kms north of Pecs, created an atmosphere of anxiety. Before the Russians returned, the uranium mines w^ere flooded.
5104 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE' UNITED STATES
207. By the evening of 3 November, it was obvious that the Soviet troops intended to take military action against the insurgents. The commander of the Hungarian forces in Pecs, who had originally agreed to fight in case of a Soviet attack, decided during the night to disarm his troops. The Revolutionary Council, in order to avoid the destruction of the city, resolved to resist in the hilly regions surrounding Pecs. On the morning of 4 November, the Soviet troops took over the city. In the meantime, some 5,000 volunteers — mostly miners and students carrying arms and ammunition — .ioined the insurgents in the Mecsek mountains. The Soviet troops made numerous sorties against the positions of the insurgents but, owning to the mobility of the latter and their lightning guer- rilla tactics, the Soviet troops suffered many casualties and, for some three weeks, were unable to subdue the insurgents. On the 8th, the insurgents attacked a convoy and killed the Commander of the Soviet forces. Day by day, they harassed the Soviet troops by commando raids and, though the insurgents had lost many men, it was mainly lack of ammunition that forced them to give up the fight and escape across the border to Yugoslavia. The Committee was in- formed by two witnesses that many of the Hungarian wounded, who were to be sent down from the mountain hospital by Red Cross ambulances, never reached their destination alive. One witness stated that two wounded freedom fighters were taken out of a truck by Soviet troops, made to kneel in a public square with their hands tied behind their back and were then shot with a sub-machine gun. This isolated instance, however, could not be checked by the Committee.
208. The events during the uprising at the important industrial centre of Dunapentele are particularly noteworthy because of the representative character of its population. After the war, it rapidly developed from a small village into an industrial city under the name of Sztalinvaros. Steel foundries, iron works and chemical industries caused its industrial population to grow to 28,000 by 1956. It was the most important experiment undertaken by the Party in its industrialization programme and was considered to be one of the main strong- holds of Communism. On 24 October the workers decided to follow the example of Budapest. They organized a Revolutionary Council to represent them and established Workers' Councils in the various factories. The next day, during a demonstration, the AVH opened fire on the crowd, killing 8 people and wound- ing 28. During the next two days, there was more fighting with the AVH, who were now barricaded in the Army barracks. On the 29th, a helicopter landed on the barrack-ground and a Soviet official with his family, the senior officers of the AVH and two senior Hungarian officers were flown away. Shortly after- wards, a deputation from the barracks declared that the Army was on the side of the revolution.
209. The following days were spent in organizing the activities of the Revolu- tionary Council and in the military training of some 800 workers." Radio "Rakoczi", which was transmitting from Dunai>entele after 4 November, was repeatedly heard asking for assistance in weapons and equipment. It called on Radio Free Europe to pass on these appeals for outside assistance against the Soviet intervention and also retransmitted the appeals of other "free" Hungarian stations. On the 5th, Radio "Rakoczi" appealed to the International Red Cross for medical supplies. On the 6th, a Russian armoured unit stopped on the outskirts of the town and asked for the surrender of the insurgents. The commanding officer, with an AVH interpreter, was escorted into the town and met the leaders of the Revolutionary Council. It was pointed out to him that the insurgents were not "fascists" or "capitalist agents" but principally workers, many of whom had been staunch supporters of the Communist Party. To con- vince him of this he was asked to hear two card-bearing members of the Party from the crowd which was assembled outside. These men explained that they had been taught to believe that the Soviet Union defended human rights and was the liberator of the peoples. They declared they wanted now to be free of Soviet intervention and had demanded the abolition of the AVH. When the Soviet officer stated that he had to carry out his orders, the two Communist freedom fighters tore up their Party cards and threw them at his feet. The Soviet Commander withdrew, stating that he would take no action against Dunapentele until he received new orders. Nevertheless, the next day — 7 No- vember— the Soviet forces attacked the town from three directions using a large armoured force, self-propelled guns and tactical air force. The battle lasted all day, but the freedom fighters held strongly organized positions and were able to' withstand the onslaught. By the evening of 8 November, the ammunition had been exhausted and most of the fighters were ordered to go into hiding. Some 300 men with side arms managed to escape during the night.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 5105
They continued armed resistance in the countryside until 11 November when it was decided to disperse, as any further resistance appeared to be futile.
210. It was reported that during the fishting in Dunapentele the factories did not suffer as much as the living quarters of the population, where considerable damage was done by bombing. The freedom fighters lost 240 men during the fighting; 12 tanks and 8 armoured cars of the Soviet forces were desti-oyed. Witnesses stated before the Committee that the purpose of the workers' resist- ance in Dunapentele was to demonstrate tliat all Hungarians wanted to see their country freed from external domination. Witnesses were emphatic in pointing out that, irrespective of creed or party affiliation, the factory workers, with the officers and men of the garrison, were entirely united in their objectives and that throughout the period 27) October to 8 November no one, except the members of the AVII, dissented from the policies of the Revolutionary Council.
211. In the county of Veszpi-cMn, northwest of Lake Balaton, th' Revolutionary Council, having consolidated its position by 26 October, concerned itself princi- pally with political and administrative matters, as military questions appeared to be less pressing. There had been no fighting in the county with Soviet troops during the first intervention except at Varpalota, where the miners, in attacking the AVII. had als) killed three Soviet political advisers. However, the Veszprem Revolutionary Council assisted in the formulation of a co-ordinated policy with the other Transdanubian provincial councils, for the purpose of creating a mili- tary command to protect Transdanubia in case of a second militai-y intervention. Its llrst act was to purge from its membership four of the five officers who had been originally elected, on suspicion of maintaining contacts with the Soviet forces ; it elected instead a soldier and the head of the County Police, thus setting up, according to the testimony received, a Council which was truly representative of all sections of the population of the province. The next three days were devoted to political negotiations for the resumption of work and for the organiza- tion of the National Guard. By Saturday, 3 November, however, the systematic build-up of the Soviet forces within the county had become so apparent that the National Guard, consisting of students, workers and soldiers, made hasty prepa- rations in the city of Veszprem in anticipation of a Soviet attack. This attack came at 5 a. m. the next morning. For two and a half days the National Guard, besieged in the old city of Veszprem, fought against greatly superior Soviet forces which had launclied the attack from three directions. By midday of 6 November, the ammunition of the insurgents was exhausted. About 40 Hungarians and possibly an equal number of Russians had lost their lives. The battle caused considerable destruction in the city, including damage to buildings of historical and artistic significance. Most of the insurgents were able to escape and at- tempted to hide their side arms. However, by the evening Soviet trucks were being loaded with students seized from their homes and taken to unknown destinations. According to the evidence, by 1 December none of these students had been returned. At the end of the battle, it was reported that some Soviet troop.s, in a spirit of i-evenge, entered the University buildings and destroyed the chemical equipment in the laboratory.
212. At Miskolc, the university and industrial city of northeast Hungary, military action during the second Soviet intervention differed in some respects from that in western Hungary. This no doubt can be attributed to the presence in the area of Soviet troops who were moving constantly in and out of the city, since Miskolc is on one of the arterial roads between Budapest and the north- eastern frontiers. The presence of the Soviet troops tended to make it impos- sible for the insurgents to organize a resistance plan based on the city itself. This same problem confronted the insurgents of other cities in eastern Hungary, and as there was no time for organized resistance in the countryside, armed resistance in eastern Hungary did not endure as long as in Pecs, Dunapentele and Veszprem. The passage of troops through the city in the early morning of Sunday, 4 November, was not unusual, and the attack against the University buildings, one of the principal centres of the uprising in the city, was to some extent a surprise. The students fought for about one hour with whatever weapons had been given them. Several students were killed and the Soviet troops also suffered a number of casualties. The Committee was told that, when the fighting was over, many students were seized by the Soviet troops and taken to an unknown destination. On the other hand, troops of the National Guard, who were fighting through the day in Miskolc and the Hejocsaba district, retreated towards the Biikk mountains. In the city itself fighting went on until the afternoon when the Revolutionary Council of Borsod County was obliged to capitulate.
;»3215— 50 — pt. 00 4
5106 SCOPE OF .SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
213. From various sources of information, including radio reports emanating both from the "free" stations within Hungary and from those coming under the control of Soviet forces, it is possible to conclude that the Soviet troops during the night of 3 to 4 November advanced in a forced march from Dunafold- vdr and possibly Baja towards Kaposvar and Nagykanizsa which were captured with little or no resistance. From Szombathely northwards there was fighting throughout the day of 4 November. Battles took place in the north at Gyor, on the Gyor-Sopron road and on the Gyor-Hegyeshalom road against parachute troops and forces crossing the Czechoslovak frontier possibly through Rajka. At Komarom on the Danube, Hungarian military units with freedom fighters fought throughout the day against powerful Soviet units attacking from Hun- garian territory and from Czechoslovakia across the Danube bridge. At Tatabanya, the miners fought with weapons which they had received from the Army. At Sz6kesfeh6rvar, the Hungarian military garrison, after breaking through the Soviet encirclement, moved to positions in the Vertes mountains, while others proceeded southwest towards the Bakony mountains. There they established bases for guerrilla operations against Soviet troop movements along the highways connecting Budapest with western Hungary. The students of the Zrinyi Military Academy of Budapest and the Budapest armoured brigade fought valiantly in the Matra mountains against an armoured division. The information regarding the crossing of the Danube by Soviet troops at other points east of Komarom is considered unreliable in view of the fact that for a period of more than ten days various Hungarian units were able to move from the northeast between the Biikk and M^tra mountains across the Danube to the southwestern chain of the Vertes mountains.
214. The fighting round the Danubian military centres of Szolnok, Kecskemet and Kolcosa is illustrative of the Soviet control exercised over the Hungarian Army. These three garrisons were, throughout the period of the revolution, under the command of pro-Soviet officers. As the strength of the Soviet troops was increasing from 1 November, the Hungarian garrisons were unable to assist the local National Guard as other garrisons had been able to do. At the outbreak of hostilities on 4 November, the liarracks at Szolnok were surrounded and the Soviet tanks inflicted many casualties on the Hungarian troops who were taken by surprise. At Kecskemet and Kalocsa there was no fighting in the town, but a number of officers and men were able to break through the encirclenient, and for many days fought with the freedom fighters in the Danubian plain, inflicting damage on the Soviet forces and supplies moving on the highways.
V. OONCTAISIONS
215. A survey of the movement of Soviet forces in Hungary during the period from 29 October to 4 November shows that, irresi)ective of the assurances given to Premier Nagy by Soviet political personalities, there existed a definite plan for the re-conque.st and military sub.iugation of Hungary. This plan in fact was carried through fully. Contrary to the contentions of the Soviet Government that the Hungarian revolution was inspired by capitalist elements residing outside Hungary, the Committee cannot but conclude that the Hungarian resist- ance to the second Soviet intervention was a heroic demonstration of the will of the Hungarian people to fight for their national independence.^"
19 The Committee is not in possession of what it would regard as reliable figures for the casualties that occurred during the Hungarian uprising. From an official Hungarian sou'-ce (The Iiiin"--^Tian rontrai Statistical Office (Statisztikai Szctnle). issue number 11-12, Volume XXXIV, of November-December 1956, p. 929), it is stated that the number of all registered deaths from October through December 1956 was 27,000, 1. e. 10 per cent higher than in the same months of 1955. The number of people who died in the fighting, nccording to this source, can be estimated at some 1,800-2.000 in Budapest and 2,500- .S.OOO in the whole country. Among those who died in the fighting between 23 October and .SO November and whose deaths had been registered up to 1 .January 1957, 84 per cent were men and 10 per cent women. More than one-fifth of these people were under twenty years of age, 28 per cent were between twenty and twenty-nine years old, 15 per cent between thirty and thirty-nine years old and 15 per cent between forty and forty-nine. In the
Srovinces, the greatest number of deaths in the fighting occurred in the counties of Pest, y8r-Sopron, Fej6r and Pacs-Kiskiin.
The same official Hungarian source has stated that about 13,000 wounded (11 500 in Budapest) were treated in hospitals and clinics up to the end of November. In addition doctors, ambulances and first-aid stations are said to have rendered first-aid to a lar^-e number of slightly wounded people. It is possible that the above figures do not present^a complete picture. Some sources have placed the number of dead and wounded far above that suggested by the Hungarian Government. Speaking in the Indian Parliament on
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 5107
Chapter VT. The Politicai- Circttmstance.s of the First Military
Intervention
A. introduction
216. In its Interim Report the Committee pointed out tliat further investi- gation was called for as to the exact circumstances and timing of the "decision" to invite the assistance of Soviet troops. As explained in that report, Imre Nagy's nomination as Chairman of the Council of Ministers on Wednesday morning, 24 October, was announced over the radio before the announcement of the call for Soviet assistance; and in a broadcast address in the evening of 25 October, Mr. Nagy referred to the intervention of Soviet troops as "necessi- tated by the vital interests of our socialist ordnr". However, in a statement of 30 October and in subsequent statements Mr. Nagy denied responsibility for, or co;nizance of, the decision to invite the Soviet foi'ces.
217. The Committee has looked carefully into tlie siguiticance of these denials. Mr. Nagy was in fact not yet Prime Minister vihen, in the early hours of 24 October, the first Soviet tanlis arrived in Budapest to quell the uprising. Quite apart from this, the Committee has received evidence that, for almost three •days after he was appointed Prime Minister, Mr. Nagy was Prime Minister in name only : he was in fact not present at the Office of the Prime Minister in the Parliament but was detained in the Communist Party Headquarters.
B. the popularity of imre nagy
21.N. Mr. Imre Nagy, who is sixty-three years old and of peasant stock, became â– a member of the Communist Party in 1918, and had to leave Hungary during the Hortliy regime. He lived in Moscow for about fifteen years until he returned to BudaTiest with the Soviet Army in 1!)44, and was appointed Minister of Agri- cultute in the first post-war Government ; in this capacity he implemented the land reform. He became Minister of the Interior in November 1945 and later held other portfolios. In July 1953, after Stalin's death, he became Prime Minister, replacing Stalin's protege Rakosi. During his time as Prime Minister he succeeded in improving the life of the workers and peasants by slowing down the expansion of heavy industry, by stopping forcible collectivization and the persecution of the "kulaks". But what perhaps made him even more popular was that he took a firm and effective stand against the illegalities of the police and the judiciary, and condemned unlawful administrative methods and ex- cesses and crimes committed by the Government and the Communist Party oflicials. He succeeded in having a large number of the survivors released. Conditions for other political prisoners were improved and enforced displace- ments inside Hungary were brought to an end.
219. Mr. Hegediis took over as Prime Minister in April 1955, and Mr. Nagy was immediately expelled from the Politburo and later from the Party. In the beginning, he lived more or less in retirement, but later he began to write and establislied contacts with intellectuals, peasants and workers. Inside the Com- munist Party lie thus became a leader for the anti-Stalinist groups and the advocate of a policy of liberalization. He was admired beyond the limited circle of Communists. Several non-Communist witnesses stated to the Com- mittee that, though he was a Communist, they still considered him to be "a good Hungarian", and an lionest. able and courageous man, though, some said, a poor politician. Mr. Nagy appears to be endowed with certain warm human qualities which appealed to the masses.
220. On 4 October he sent a letter to the Central Committee" in which he demanded to be reinstated in the Party. Expelled — so he affirmed — in violation of the Party's statutes, he asked that ideological and political accusations against him should be discussed in public before a leading Party forum. In the course of this debate, he was ready to acknowledge his real errors, while calling for the rectification of unfounded accusations. Evoking his forty years' activity
l.*^ December, Mr. Nehru said that, from such information as he had received, "it would apiiear that about 25,000 Hungarians and about 7.000 Russians died in the fightinf?". The Committee, however, received the impression that this figure may well be too high. On many occasions, efforts were made by the Committee to obtain p'racise knowledge of the casualties occasioned by the uprising. This did not prove to be possible, and it may well ho some time before nccnrate figures are available. According to a doctor in the biggest Hospital. SO'^r of the wounded were saved. ^ S!r(1hn<J Tiep, 14 October 1956.
5108 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY EST THE UNITED STATES
within the Party, Mr. Nagy declared his agreement with the Party's main i>olitical line : that the entire national economy should be based on socialism in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, but in accordance with the special conditions existing in Hungary. He was equally in agreement with the Leninist principle of democratic centralism : as a niei ber of the Party, it was his duty to bow before its decisions, even if he did not a i/ee with them. Finally, he was in agreement in principle with the objectives of the Central Committee's resolution of July 1956 looking towards socialist democracy in the spirit of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, and although differing in opinion on certain points, he held the resolution to be binding on him. Mr. Nagy's position had already become a focal point in the discussions going on amongst the intellectuals and students during the months preceding the uprising. He was in fact re-admitted to the Party on 13 October and shortly afterwards to his Chair as Professor of Agri- cultural Economy ; but this did not satisfy the public. It became one of the demands adopted by the students and the writers on 22-23 October, that Mr. Nagy should be included in the Government and again become a member of the Politburo.
C. DOUBTS ARISE ABOUT MR. NAGY'S POSITION
221. On Tuesday evening. 23 October. Mr. Nagy and his son-in-law, Mr. Ferene Janosi, a Protestant Minister, were brought to the Parliament by some friends in response to the persistent demand of the people crowded before the Parlia- ment Building that they wanted to see Imre Nagy. Upon Mr. Nagy's arrival, Ferene Erdei, asked him to try to calm the crowd. Mr. Nagy's short address was not too well received, perhaps partly because few seemed able to hear him. A little later that evening, shortly after 9 p. m., the shooting began at the Radio Building."
222. Everything the Hungarian public learnt al)out Mr. Nagy during the next few days was gathered from the radio. It was the content and the arrangement of the radio reports and announcements which cau.sed doubts with regard to Mr. Nagy's position.
22.">. Ermi Gei("), the P^irst Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hun- garian Workers' (Communist) Party, in his radio speech at 8 p. in. on 28 October, which infuriated the people of Budapest, had stated that the Politburo decided to convene the Central Committee during the next few days." However, at 10.22 p. m. the same evening, after the beginning of the shooting, it was announced that the Central Committee would meet innnediately in order to discuss what action to take. This announcement was preceded by a state- ment that "Comrade Imre Nagy is now conferring with youth delegates and several deputies".
224. The radio made no mention of the fighting until early Wednesday morn- ing at 4.30 a. m. on 24 October, when an announcement allegedly signed by the Council of Ministers was broadcast. It stated that "Fascist, reactionary ele- ments have launched an armed attack on our public buildings and on our armed security formations . . . Until further measui*es are taken, all meetings, gatherings, and marches are banned . . .". The same announcement was read over the radio twice during the next few hours ; however, the word "Fascist" was replaced by the word "counter-revolutionary".
225. At 8.13 on Wednesday morning an official statement was broadcast to the effect that the Central Committee had recommended that the Praesidium of the People's Republic elect Mr. Nagy as Chairman of the Council of Ministers while Mr. Hegediis was to become First Deputy Chairman instead of Prime Minister."' It was alst) jinnounced that Mr. Nagy had been elected member of the Politburo of the Centi-al Committee of the Communist Party. It was not clear from the announcement whether the Praesidium had already elected Mr. Nagy Prime Minister, or if so, at v/hat time he had taken over his func- tions.'* However, half an hour later, at 8.45 a. ra.. an announcement was read over the Radio which was said to be signed by "Imre Nagy. Chairman of the Council of Ministers". It stated that :
-^ Spo chapter X for a fuller account.
-â– = S~abolc>i-^zatmari NepUip, 24 October 1956.
-'An article in Egt/etemi Ifjuadi/ on 20 October stated that Jlr. Xagy only learne.I on 24 October at 6 a. m. from a telephone call he had from the office of the Hungarian Writers' Union, that he had become Prime Minister.
2* 3Mr. Istvan Dobi. Ciiairman of the Praesidium of the Hun'.rarian People's Rf^puhlic, stated before the National Assembly on 9 May 1957 that th<' Prai sidiiim on 24 October 'elected Imre Nagy Prime Minister".
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY TNT THE UNITED STATES 5109
"The Council of Ministers . . . has ordered that summary jurisdiction shall be applied throughout the country to acts calculated to overthrow the People's Republic and to acts of revolt; incitement, appeal and conspiracy to revolt; murder ; manslaughter ; arson ; possession of explosives ; crimes committed with explosives ; indirect crimes ; the use of force against the official authori- ties; the use of force against private individuals and the illegal possession of arms. Crimes in the categories coming under summary jurisdiction are pun- ishable by death. This order comes into force inmiediately."
226. Fifteen minutes later, at 0.00 a. m., another announcement was read declaring that "the dastardly armed attack of counter-revolutionary gangs during the night has created an extremely serious situation . . . The Gov- ernmental organs were unprepared for these bloody dastardly attacks, and have therefore applied for help to the Soviet formations stationed in Hungary under the terms of the Warsaw Treaty"."^ The Government also appealed to the inhabitants to keep calm and to support everywhere the Hungarian and Soviet troops who were maintaining order. The statement concluded : "The licpiida- tion of the counter-revolutionary gangs is the most sacred cause of every honest Hungarian worker". There was no indication given as to the source of this ofncial announcement or as to whose signature, if any, it bore ; but many listeners received apparently the impression that it was an announcement of the new Imre Nagy Government, since it was made shortly after the announce- ment regarding the establishment of this Government and the broadcast of the decree of summary jurisdiction which was said to be signed by Mr. Nagy.
227. Several witnesses have stated that they felt immediately that this was a fraud, since the Russian tanks had appeared in Budapest and had participated in the fighting hours before these announcements. For some it was particularly difficult to believe that Imre Nagy, who had been a champion of legality, .should have signed the decree under which the mere possession of arms would come under summary jurisdiction and be punishable by death. However, it is certain that even many of those who had admired Mr. Nagy began to feel uncertain about his true feelings.
228. Their suspicion increased when at noon they heard Mr. Nagy address the nation over the radio as follows :
"People of Budapest, I inform you that all those who, in the interest of avoid- ing further bloodshed, lay down their arms and cease fighting by 2 p. m. today will be exempted from prosecution under summary jurisdiction. At the same time, I state that, using all the means at our disposal, we will realize as soon as possible the systematic democratization of our country in every field of Party, State, political and economic life on the basis of the June 19.")3 Programme. Heed our appeal, stop fighting and secure the restoration of calm and order in theinterest of the future of our people and our country * * *."'
229. Mr. Nagy in this address also spoke about "hostile elements" who had "joined the ranks of peacefully-demonstrating Hungarian youth" and "turned against the People's Democracy, against the power of the people." He asked listeners to "line up behind the Party, line up behind the Government." This si)eech strengthened the impression that Mr. Nagy actually had signed the decree of summary jurisdiction and was in full control.
230. More doubt was sown when Mr. Nagy made another radio speech next afternoon, 25 October, at 3.25 p. m. shortly after it had been announced that Mr. Ki'idar had replaced Mr. Gen") as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party. He said :
"In this address as Premier, I wish to announce that the Hungarian Govern- ment will initiate negotiations on the relations between the Hungarian People's Republic and the Soviet Union, and, among other things, concerning the with- drawal of the Soviet forces stationed in Hungary. These talks will be carried out on the basis of Soviet-Hungarian friendship, proletarian internationalism and equality and national independence between Communist Parties and Socialist countries. I am convinced that Hungarian-Soviet relations resting on this basis will provide a firm groundwork for the future friendship between our peoples, for our national development and our Socialist future. The recall of those Soviet forces whose intervention in the fighting has been necessitated by the vital interests of our Socialist order, will take place without delay after the restoration of peace and order."
" The following is the original Hungarian text of this last sentence : "A. kormdnyzati seervek nem szdmoltak a veres orytdmaddaokkal a ezert segitsefiert fordultak a varsdi sneraodes 6rtelm6ben a Magyarorszdgon tartozkodd szovjet alakulatokhoz" .
5110 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
231. The plirase : "has been necessitated by the vital interests of our Socialist order" was obviously apt to create the impression that Mr. Nagy was at least in sympathy