A NARRATIVE

OF THE

RUSSIAN MILITARY EXPEDITION

to

KHIVA,

UNDER GENERAL PEROFSKI,

TRANSLATED FROM THE RUSSIAN FOR THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

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A NARRATIVE
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BRIEF HISTORICAL SKETCH OF EVENTS IN CENTRAL ASIA, AND OF THE
PROGRESSIVE INTERCOURSE OF EUROPEANS WITH THAT COUNTRY.

The first accounts of direct intercourse between Europe and Central Asia, after the Christian era, date from the 9th century,* that is, when the Anglo-Saxon King Alfred the Great despatched the Bishop of Shernburg on a pastoral mission to the Christian communities of India by a route leading, according to Abul Kasim, a contemporary Arabian writer, through the country of the Hazars, across the Caspian and by way of Balkh.†

No detailed written description of this journey has been preserved, and it is only after an interval of 400 years, that we find an example of a similar visit to Central Asiatic

*Although we possess information respecting Central Asia of more ancient origin, contained in the writings of Greek, Roman, Arab, and Chinese authors, it would be inexpedient to swell out this Chapter by carrying the enquiry so far back; we shall therefore confine ourselves here to pointing to a work in the Russian language which may be consulted on this subject, entitled “Historical Review of events in Central Asia from the earliest times to the 9th century of the Christian era, compiled from Chinese sources by Father Hyacinth, of the Greek Church, in 1851.”

† Géographie d’Aboulfeda, Reynaud, t. I. p. LIX.
countries, namely, when the Rabbi Benjamin, of Toudella, a small town of Navarre, undertook to visit all the synagogues in the world, on which tour he reached the western confines of Persia.*

It is consequently natural that the information of Europeans respecting the countries of Central Asia was very erroneous. We accordingly see in the existing planispheres of the 11th, 12th, and 13th centuries, the Tanais, or modern Don, represented as flowing from the fabulous Riphean Mountains, while the Caspian appears as a bay of the Northern Ocean.

From the 13th century, however, frequent intercourse between Europe and the western portion of Central Asia is maintained, with political and commercial objects.

In 1204 the Crusaders (4th Crusade) drove the Greek dynasty out of Constantinople, while at the same time the Venetians spread their colonies along the shores of the Black Sea, and carried on a vigorous trade with the far east.

The rule of the Venetians on the Black Sea lasted about half a century, and it is to this period that the celebrated travels of the brothers Paolo and others relate.

In 1260 the Greek dynasty was reinstated with the assistance of the Genoese, who were accorded the sole privilege of trading in the Black Sea, which privilege they enjoyed for nearly 200 years.

Simultaneous with the movement of Europeans eastwards, there was a movement from thence to the west, consequent on the conquests of Jengis-Khan (1204—1250), who conquered nearly the whole of Asia and a portion of Europe.

*Voyage de Ruisbriques dans le recueil de Bergeron, t. I., page 48.
Such a contact naturally led to frequent political and commercial communications with Central Asia. We have consequently many records of travels in this region during the 13th, 14th, 15th, and commencement of the 16th centuries.*

The information relating to Central Asia became at the same time more accurate and extensive. The planisphere of Marino Sunuto in 1375 (in the Florentine and Catalonian libraries) shows the Caspian in the form of a lake, and the Sea of Aral, although inaccurately laid down, appears to the east of the Caspian, &c., &c.

Towards the end of the 15th century, communication with Central Asia was again interrupted for a long period. This was owing, firstly, to the destruction of Kaffa and other Genoese colonies along the shores of the Black Sea by the Turks, which closed for 300 years all European access to those parts;† secondly, to the discovery of a commercial maritime highway to India, by which means the trade was diverted into another channel, and, lastly, to the expulsion of the followers of Jengis-Khan and Timur out of Mavricnahar and Harezm by the Uzbeks, resulting in the subjection of the greater portion of Central Asia to the arbitrary

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* Desborough Cooley (Histor. gend. de voyages Traduc. Frane.); Abel Remusat (memoire sur les relations des princes chretiens avec les empereurs Mongols), and Averve (notes sur les anciens voyages en Tartarie), an unknown Englishman in 1243, and the following Monks: Benedict, Laurence, John Planicarpin, Aszelin, St. Quentin, Alexander, Albert, Guichard, Longjourel, 1245 to 1247; the Monk Andrew, 1248; Ruisbrueque, 1253; Nicholas and Matthew Paolo, 1250-60; Marco Paolo, 1271 to 1295; Highton (?), 1254; Ricold de Montecroce, 1290; John de Montecroce, 1288 to 1307; Odesico Matenevi, 1317; John de Caro, 1330; Jourdan Cataliani, 1330; Pascal de Victoria au Juan de Marinioli, 1339-53; Francesco Pegoletta, 1335; Mandeville, 1322 to 1355; Arigo, 1374; Gomez de Satomajar and Herman Sanitz, 1393; Gonzales de Clavigo, 1403; Schildlerger, 1395 to 1427; Conti, 1424 to 1449; Joseph Barbaro, 1471; Ambrose Contarini, 1473; Bartem, 1502 to 1508.

† Murzakevitch, History of the Genoese Settlements in the Crimea, pp. 77 to 91.
rule of petty and barbarous despots, whose territories were encompassed by wandering hordes, who completely barred the former channels of trade. In this manner, for more than a century, no journeys to Central Asia were undertaken by Europeans. After the fall, however, of the kingdoms of Astrakhan and Kazan, in the latter half of the 16th century, and with the gradual spread of Russian dominion in Siberia, as a natural consequence, Russia entered into commercial relations with Central Asia, through the medium of her newly acquired Siberian subjects, and strove to obtain accurate information in respect to the former country.

This is evidenced by the book of the "Great Cher-toj," which contains much accurate information concerning the Sea of Aral and the Caspian, and a faithful description of the extent of country lying between these inland waters, as well as accounts respecting the Rivers Obi and Yaika. Thus, while Russia from the end of the 16th century was, owing to her geographical position, brought into constant commercial contact with Central Asia, this country was also visited by western Europeans, in the hope of finding out new routes to India, in which attempts they were actuated by jealousy towards the Spaniards and Portuguese, who strictly guarded the Indian trade and its approaches by sea for their own benefit.

So early as 1520, we already find the Genoese Paul Centurione visiting Moscow with the object of gaining information respecting a commercial route to India by way of the Caspian and Oxus. The same object led the Venetian Marco Foscarini to Muscovy in 1537. Similar designs are also expressed in a work entitled "Rellazione dell' imperio

* Book of the "Bolchago Cherteja," pages 4 and 5, edition of the 16th century; and pages 67 to 76 and 203 to 211 of the last edition of the 17th century.
di Moscovia," by an unknown Italian, who was at Moscow in 1553, and who relates that John the Terrible aided and supported the scheme.

Towards the end of the 16th century, a company was formed in England, under John Cabot and his son Sebastian, with the object of discovering a route to India along the north-eastern coast of Asia; another trading company having with the same objects originated in Holland, from whence two vessels were despatched in 1597, under the command of Cornelius Nai; the Stadtholder Maurice of Nassau and the States-General likewise participating in the enterprise.

A northern sea route to India failed to be discovered, and all attention was then directed to an overland road through Central Asia, particularly after the voyage of Richard Chancellor in 1553, who, in attempting to reach India by way of the Northern Ocean, arrived at Archangel, subsequently visiting Moscow, where he learned from a Persian that silk was more plentiful in Persia than hemp and flax in Muscovy. From this period Cabot's company made active efforts to discover a commercial route to Turan and Persia through the Caspian. The example of England was followed by Austria and Holstein.* Considerations of a political character were also attached to this question: the successes of the Persian Shah Abbas the Great against the Turks encouraged the European Powers to hope that they might weaken the power of Turkey, which was becoming dangerous to Europe, by engaging its attention in the east.

The increasing knowledge of eastern languages in Europe and the commercial intercourse with India also had the effect of attracting travellers to the east. We have

* The Holstein Envoy Olearius has left a highly interesting account of his journey; the part relating to the Caucasus is more especially valuable.
consequently a long list of travellers visiting Central Asia in the latter part of the 16th and during the 17th centuries. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the journeys of Europeans to this region were of more frequent occurrence, and were undertaken not only from the west, but likewise from the north-east and south-east. These journeys were not always performed in the pursuit of commerce, but were also occasionally undertaken with scientific objects, by which means further information was gained respecting Central Asia. The causes that led to the exploration of the eastern part of Central Asia arose from the revolution in China at the end of the 18th century.

The race of Manchjurs, which, previous to 1586, was altogether insignificant, commenced in 1610 making incursions into China, and having assisted the Chinese in 1644 in deposing an usurper, proclaimed Shun-shi (an infant son of the last Manchjurian Khan) Emperor of China at Pekin. On the death of Shun-shi in 1662, Kangi or Kanhi ascended the throne, and during his reign of 62 years the Manchjur dynasty was securely established in China, and a foundation laid to that influence in the eastern part of Central Asia which the Chinese exercise even to the present day.† Profiting by the disturbances in China and the Manchjur

* Jenkinson and Johnson in 1568; Jenkinson in 1516; Aldcock and Chiny (F) in 1564; Edwards and Johnson, 1565; Edwards and Chapman, 1568; Borough, Edwards, Turnbull, Talboys, and Hasasde from 1579 to 1581; Nivberri (F), 1582; Kichel, 1585 to 1589; Kakasch and Deactander, 1602; Benedict Goss, 1603; Tesseiro, 1604; Stell and Crofter, 1615; Posère, 1621; Garcia Silva, 1621; Piestro de Lavalli, 1614 to 1626; Olearius, Krusius, and Herbert, 1628 to 1641; Mandeilo and Fleming, 1636 to 1638; John de Lucca, 1637; Anderson, 1644 to 1650; Tavernier, 1645 to 1670; Shardan, 1666, 1669, and 1673 to 1677; Heidenfeldt, 1680; Struiss, 1645 to 1670, and Kempfer, 1684.

† Hue and Gabet. According to the testimony of Chinese historians, China had influence in this part of Asia long before the Christian era, but subsequently it was gradually lost.
dynasty, the Jesuits managed to acquire an ascendancy in China, and greatly extended their influence in that country; with such success were their labours attended, that the Jesuit Adam Chalu was entrusted with the compilation of the Emperor's calendar, and the Emperor Shun-shi appointed him President of the Pekin Astronomical Chamber. In the reign of the Emperor Kang, this post was filled by the Febrist, who also instructed the Emperor in mathematics.

On the recommendation of Colbert, the Academy of Paris despatched in 1685 to China the monk Bouvé and five other Jesuits (Tontanay, Tishar, Gerbillon, Lecomte, and Visdelon) for the purpose of making mathematico-geographical observations. Two of these, Gerbillon and Bouvé, were retained near the person of the Emperor, whom they taught mathematics, and permission was granted them to fit up a Church in the palace itself.

Gerbillon was more than once despatched during 1688-89 to Mongolia and Nerchinsk for the purpose of fixing the boundary line with Russia.* The geodactical labours of

* The Russian Plenipotentiary at Pekin at that time was Count Rudzinski, who by Hue and Gabet is simply called Vladeslavitch. He was followed by Ismailoff, despatched by Peter the Great to Pekin with presents and to purchase goods in the Chinese capital, from whence he returned in 1721 (according to Bergholtz); in 1728 a misunderstanding having arisen respecting the Amur, Ismailoff was sent to China a second time. In 1697 the Jesuit Bouvé was sent to France for reinforcements of missionaries, and returned in 1699 with 10 monks, amongst who were Prémar (?), Desguise (?), and Parenting (?). In 1708 the Emperor Kangi wishing to have a correct map of his dominions, confided its compilation to the Jesuits Bouvé, Reguise, and Jartoux, who by the year 1709 constructed a map of 15 square feet of the country bordering the Great Wall. In the beginning of the year 1710 Reguise, Jartoux, and Fridelli were charged with a survey of Manchuria, and completed this task by the end of the same year. During the same year a survey was made of the Pecheli province, and later Kangi ordered two parties of Jesuits to draw up a map of the northern bordering province of Shen-i and of the country of the Khalkas. Surveys were next rapidly made of the remaining territories and provinces, so that by 1718 Jartoux was able to present Kangi with a complete map of his empire, Requis supplying at the same time an account of the manner in which the survey was made. The results of a survey of Eastern Thibet made by two Lamas in 1717 were incorporated into this general map.
the Jesuits in the 17th and 18th centuries embraced all the limits of the Chinese Empire, and their learned researches were at the same time extended towards the eastern portion of Central Asia; the success of these investigations was mainly due to the repeated military expeditions sent by the Chinese to these distant regions for the purpose of quelling the disturbances which arose in Mongolia during the reign of Hang and that of his successor Yung-Ching. These disorders were produced by the Osets or Djungars in their efforts to re-establish their supremacy and to conquer China, and by the attempts of the Turuts, a Mongolian race, to form an independent kingdom. This warfare was carried on during the reigns of Yung-Ching’s successors until the Djungars were completely annihilated, and the Kalmyks compelled to fly across the Ural into Russian territories, this latter event taking place in the year 1703 under the head of the celebrated Khan Ayuk.*

* The Djungars rose in rebellion under the leadership of their Kontaisha (the title of their ruler) Galdan. The Djungars remaining still unsubdued after a warfare of two years with the Chinese, the Emperor Kangi personally took the field against Galdan in 1697, and forced him to take flight. At the same time the Emperor’s nephew Chevang Arabdak also revolted and formed an independent kingdom in the valley of the Ili, his Kalmyks being joined by the Djungars of Galdan, who died in 1697. In this manner the rule of Chevang extended from Lake Balkhash and the Altai mountains to the Kuen-Ian range and the upper course of the Rivers Syr and Amu, and embraced, in addition to the towns of Yarkend, Turfan, Hami (the westernmost point determined astronomically by the Jesuits), those of Kashgar, Samarkand, and Bokhara, which acknowledged his sovereignty. In 1703, in consequence of a quarrel between Chevang and his brother-in-law Ayuk, the latter decamped with a tribe of Turguts or Kalmyks beyond the Ural into Russian territory.

In 1709 Chevang formed the plan of conquering Thibet, and with this object he agreed to give his daughter in marriage to the son of Chinits, the Kalmyk ruler of that country; but suddenly declaring his son-in-law a prisoner, he despatched a force to Thibet, which deposed the Dalai Lama, and put Chinits to death. This event, coupled with the refusal of the Emperor of China to give one of his daughters in marriage to Chevang, led to a war with China. In 1713 the Djungars were defeated, but from 1717 to 1719 they made successful inroads into China and Thibet, in which latter
While Europeans, through the medium of the Chinese, were penetrating into Central Asia from the east, we find the English gaining a footing in India, and their skilful emissaries becoming acquainted with Central Asia on the south-east, and the Russians penetrating into that region since the days of Peter the Great from the north and west.

Peter the Great, as it is known, entertained the idea of establishing commercial intercourse with India. With this object, and for the purpose of exploring the routes, Simon Malenki was despatched to India in 1694, but died on his way thither at Sheinakha. The subsequent wars with the Swedes and Turks diverted for a time the attention of Peter from this scheme; in 1703, however, he received the allegiance of the Khan of Khiva, who was then sorely pressed by the Bucharians, and later, from 1714 to 1717, he endeavoured to establish his authority on the shores of the Caspian and in Turkestan. Expeditions on a large scale were undertaken with this object from they plundered Lahissa, the capital. In 1721 Kangi at last succeeded in expelling Chevang from Thibet, but the attempt of the Emperor in 1722 to destroy the whole race of the Djungars on the banks of Ili, was a failure. Fortunately for China the terrible Chevang was murdered in the same year by his son Galdan Cheren, which enabled the Emperor Yung-Ching, the successor of Kang, to suspend further military operations, and to confine himself merely to watching the Djungars, amongst whom internal dissensions had already arisen. Galdan Cheren was soon assassinated by his youngest brother, who in his turn was murdered by his eldest brother Dardji, whilst against the latter, two heads of tribes, Davadsi and Amursana, rose in rebellion. After the murder of Dardji by the treachery of Davadsi, the latter was proclaimed Kontaisha. This excited the jealousy of Amursana, who in 1754 fled to Pekin for succour and protection.

The imperious demands made by Davadsi for the delivery of Amursana into his hands, excited the indignation of Kiang-Lung (successor to Yung-Ching), who under pretence of establishing the rights of Amursana, determined to destroy the Djungars entirely; he accordingly despatched an army of 150,000 men under the command of Punti, who finished the campaign in five months, installed Amursana as ruler of the Djungars, and brought Davadsi as prisoner to Pekin, where he soon died in captivity. Amursana, however, did not long remain submissive under Chinese
Siberia under Colonel Bucholtz, and from Astrakhan under Prince Bekovitch.* Notwithstanding their successful issue, the attention of Peter the Great continued to be steadily directed to these regions, for the exploration of which he despatched Beneveni to Bukhara in 1718.

Soon after, in 1722, Peter the Great conducted an expedition against Persia, and established himself on the south-eastern shore of the Caspian, but by the treaty of peace of 1732, this conquest was ceded back to Persia.

For the purpose of exploring the routes to India, it was first decided to send Ashur-Bek, who in 1714 was Khivan Envoy at St. Petersburg; but subsequently, at the time of the expedition to Khiva, Tevkelef was despatched

protection; an army was accordingly sent against him in 1756, which made two unsuccessful attempts to subdue him. A third expedition terminated more successfully, the Chinese forcing Amursana to take flight and to seek refuge in Tobolsk, where he died of small-pox; his body, however, was sent by the Russians to Kiakhta and surrendered to the Chinese. The total annihilation of the Djungars followed this event. The vast territory of the Djungars ruled over by their Kotaishi, and extending between the Tian-Shan, Bolor, and Kuen-lun were apportioned by the Chinese between the two sons of Mahmud Hodga, the quondam of Davadsí and administrative ruler of Eastern Turkestan, but who was subsequently deprived of power by the Chinese, in consequence of being suspected of harbouring seditious designs. Mahmud’s youngest son secretly conspired to establish himself as independent ruler in Turkestan, and induced his elder brother to join him in these machinations. Information of their intentions was given to the Chinese at Ili by some rival petty Turkestan princes, which compelled the two brothers to rise in open revolt. A force was sent against them under the command of Chao-lun, who with his coadjutor Futhâ made his way across the Tian-Shan, entered the valley of the Tarim in 1759, and conquered all the towns of Eastern Turkestan; in pursuing the fugitive brothers, he even penetrated as far as the upper valleys of the Amu and Syr, in Kokandian and Badagshàn territories. Madji, one of the brothers, died shortly afterwards, and the other was put to death by the Khan of Badagshan, in consequence of a quarrel between them.

* Short accounts of these expeditions may be found in Mr. Popof’s articles contained in the Journal of the Imperial Geographical Society for 1853, under the title: “Relations with Khiva and Bukhara during the reign of Peter the Great; ibid, respecting Benevenis’ mission to Bukhara, 1718 to 1721;” and also in the article “Expedition to Khiva in 1717,” of the Military Journal, No. 10, 1861.
with the above object; the result of this mission was unfavorable, as Tevkelef was shipwrecked near Astrabad, where he was taken captive, and only obtained his liberty through the agency of Prince Volynski, Russian ambassador to Persia.

Tevkelef was the first to point out the necessity of occupying the Kirghiz Steppe; but on the death of Peter the Great, his scheme was neglected, and it was not adopted until the year 1730, when Abul-hair, Khan of the Lesser Kirghiz Horde, finding himself oppressed by the Djungars, Kalmyks, and Bashkirs, implored the assistance of Russia, offering to place himself under her subjection. The negotiations were conducted by Tevkelef, and in 1732 the Lesser Horde was received under Russian protection. The first organisation of the new country was entrusted to the Secretary of Senate, Kirilof, and subsequently to Talischeff (the celebrated historian) and Nepluyef. In consequence of their exertions, the extent of country between the towns of Omsk and Uralsk, which prior to 1730 was only occupied by the small town of Sakmarsk,* was soon united by a line of settlements along the banks of the Rivers Ural and Yuia, which separated the lands of the Bashkirs from the Steppes of the Kirghiz Horde, and by this means an end was put to the constant contentions which formerly existed between the Bashkirs and Kirghizes.

Dating from this time, civil order was gradually introduced into the depths of Central Asia. In 1822 a series of regulations were promulgated for the government of the Kirghizes, who wandered in the Irtysh-Ishim Steppe, and from 1834 they are under the jurisdiction of local courts.

* Sakmarsk was founded in 1719 by Siberian fugitives, and was occupied in 1721 by direction of the Government, by Yaitsk Cossacks.
In 1831 the Alexandrofski fortification was erected near Kaidak, a bay of the Caspian. In 1846 the fortresses of Orenburg and Uralsk were founded in the heart of the Steppe, on the rivers Irgiz and Turgai respectively. In 1847 Fort Raimsk was erected near the mouth of the Syr-Daria, and on the reduction of Ak-Mechet in 1853, the Russians established themselves along the whole of this river.

We shall now proceed to a review of the routes along which Europeans succeeded, in the 17th and 18th centuries, in penetrating into Central Asia from the south-east; we shall at the same time describe the events which were occurring in Central Asia at the time that Europeans were making efforts to reach it.

In the beginning of the 13th century, Chinghiz Khan having established his rule in Mongolia, and commenced his career of conquest (1203), became master of China already in 1217, and being seized with the desire of universal power, marched with his hordes against a powerful foe, Allah-Edene-Muhamed, of Harezm. This ruler had established himself along the middle course of the Amu-Daria (Oxus), and had extended his possessions from the Bolur Mountains to the Caspian, and from the Sea of Aral to the Tigra and the southern boundaries of Afghanistan. To the east of the Bolur Mountains, in the present districts of Yarkend and Kashgar, lay the powerful Karadjalai territory from which Allah-Edene-Muhamed had seized Bukhara and Samarkand. To the south of the kingdom of Harezm lay small possessions of the Seldjuks, while others occupied by petty Turk princes and by wandering tribes occurred on the north-west. In 1223 the whole of these regions were conquered by Chinghiz Khan, and divided among his three sons, Tuli, Djagatai, and Ogatai, in three separate allotments, viz., the Eastern, Djagatai, and Kipchak.
The eastern division soon embraced all Eastern Asia; the Djagatai, the whole extent of country to the north-east of the Amu-Daria, the valley of the river Ili, and Southern Siberia; and the Kipchak, nearly all Russia, the western portion of the Kirghiz Steppe as far as the Sea of Aral and the mouth of the Syr-Daria.

The descendants of Chinghiz Khan established themselves finally in Persia in 1285 after the capture of Bagdad by the Khan Hulogu, who founded there the Persian Dynasty of the Il-Khans, and these Khans ruled over the countries between the rivers Amu, Tigra, and Indus.

Naturally the possessions of the descendants of Chinghiz Khan had, from the very first, no political cohesion, but were merely kept together by the relationship existing between the different tribes and communities, who were to a certain extent independent, but bound to pay tribute and perform military service.

As might be expected, the Mongol territories soon began to fall asunder, and formed several independent principalities. In 1371, however, another Mongol conqueror appears in Tamurlane, who had subdued the Djagatai or Middle Horde. Tamurlane in the course of 25 years fought his way successfully from Samarkand to the river Irtysh on the north-east, to Riazán on the north-west, as far as Smyrna and Damascus on the south-west, and to the Ganges on the south-east, dying finally in 1405 when on his march to China. The conquests of Timur or Tamurlane rapidly dissolved: in Persia, Turkmen Chiefs were first in the ascendant, but from 1499 we find a foundation laid to the House of Safi by Ismail Safi; the power of the Kipchak Horde is finally broken at the period of the conquest of the kingdoms of Kazan, Astrakhan, and Siberia by the Russians, and lastly in 1644 the Mongol dynasty is overthrown in China.
In the valleys of the rivers Syr and Amu, some petty princes, descendants of Timur, had established themselves under the nominal protection of the ruler of Samarkand, and waged incessant warfare with each other. These dissensions were taken advantage of by the small Turk tribe of Uzbeks, whose camping grounds were beyond the Belur Mountains, and they conquered the valleys of the above rivers* and part of Khorassan, which for a long time remained a source of contention between the Uzbeks and the Persians.†

Dating from this period, the Uzbeks have continued to rule on the river Amu and along the upper course of the Syr-Daria, as well as in the Oases surrounded by waterless and sandy deserts, and rendered inaccessible by high mountain ranges. (Although it is true that at one period, one of the descendants of Chinghiz Khan, Din-Mohamed,‡ was elected Khan of Bukhara, he was, however, partly an Uzbek, being the son of Ishnader Khan’s sister, who was of the Shai-bek race.)

The Uzbeks were threatened with greater danger by the new development of the power of the Djungars under Galdan Cheren; but they escaped the danger from this quarter by the complete destruction of the Djungars by the Chinese, as previously related.

* This mid-fluvial region, namely, the country between the rivers Syr and Amu, was in ancient times called Trans-Oxiana and Mavernegre or Mavr-elnahar.

† Shai-bek, Chief of the Uzbeks, commenced making inroads into Mavr-elnahar in 1498, established himself there in 1504, and conquered a part of Khorassan in 1507. Although Shai-bek fell in battle against the Persian Shah Ismail-Safi and Baber, the brilliant representative of the race of Timur, his son Kundj-kandji re-established the sway of the Uzbeks in Khorassan.

‡ Din-Mohamed was raised to the throne on the assassination of Abdul-Munmen-Bohadur, the last of the Shai-beks, and was the son of Djani-Khan and grandson of Yar-Mohamed, who abdicated the throne of Astrakhan in consequence of family disputes in the second half of the 16th century, and retired to Bukhara.
Subsequently the territory of the Uzbeks nearly fell under Persian subjection at the time when Nadir Shah having destroyed the dynasty of the Safis of Persia in 1736, and on his march to India in 1740, succeeded in temporarily subduing Khiva and Bukhara, though at a great loss of men. This conquest was, however, lost on the withdrawal of the Persian army.

The territory of the Uzbeks consisted of several small principalities, whose rulers were vassals of the Emir of Bukhara. The supremacy of Bukhara, however, was only nominal, particularly for the distant territories, such as Harezm, Khiva, Ferganah, Tashkend, and Kokan. The vassals very frequently plundered the possessions of the Emir of Bukhara; the Khivans in particular were distinguished for their attacks on Bukhara under their famous Abul-Gazi in the 17th century.

The Bukharis, however, succeeded, towards the latter part of the 17th century, in conquering the Khanat of Khiva. This event led the Khans of Khiva to seek the aid of Peter the Great, and consequently in 1700, in compliance with his request, the Khan Shaniaz was taken under the protection of Russia, and this protection was also extended to his successor in 1703. It was at this time that the expedition of Prince Bekovitch Cherkaski was undertaken by order of Peter the Great for the purpose of establishing the ascendancy of Russia in Khiva.

In the middle of the 18th century, however, Mohamed Rahim at Khiva and Narbutá Bi at Kokan managed to free themselves from the yoke of Bukhara, and in 1821 another Uzbek State, that of Kunduz, whose ruler Murat Beg conquered nearly the whole south-eastern part of the upper Amu region, sprang into existence to the south of Bukhara.
It is evident that the immediate influence of Russia over the fate of the western portion of Central Asia enabled European trade to penetrate into these parts; from the commencement, therefore, of the 18th century up to recent times, that part of Asia has been visited by expeditions and travellers of every description, who have thrown great light on the whole of Central Asia.*

At the time that the Uzbeks established themselves in the midfluvial region early in the 16th century, there rose in Persia (the western part of Iran), on the ruins of the Mongol dominion, the Dynasty of Sofi, which ruled with power and splendor until the reign of Abbas the Great (1628) over the whole extent of country from Lake Van to the Indus, and from the confines of Khorassan to the Indian Ocean.

* Among those who visited Central Asia in the 18th and 19th centuries, and the account of whose travels are more or less known, are:—

Meyer, 1708; Trushinski, 1713; Lieutenant Colonel Bueholtz (Military expedition), 1714; Prince Bekovitch (Military expedition), 1714 to 1717; Volynski, 1718; Beneveni, 1718; Werden, Soimonof, and Prince Urusof, 1719; Likharef, 1720; Soimonof, 1722; Harber, 1722 and 1723; Bruce, 1723; Soimonof and Dalmatof, 1726; Dubrovin, 1729; Harber, 1731; Tevkelef, 1731; Ugrumef, 1732; Miller, 1734; Kashelef, 1735; Miller 1739; Thompson, 1740; Moravin, 1741; Gladishef, 1742; Miller, 1743; Elton, 1743; Lereche, 1747; Riegelmann, 1750; Ruktavkin and Makulof, 1753; Military expedition, 1767; Gordayef, Tokmahceo, and Panin, 1764; Military expedition, 1767; Pallas and Kraft, 1769; Gmelin, 1770; Military expedition, 1771; Lovitch and Inokhdasef, 1769 to 1771; Islenie, Lepelkin, Rytchko, Palek, and Sokolof, 1771; Military expedition, 1774; Thermishof, 1780; Efftemof, 1774—1782; Voinof, 1781; Military expedition, 1784, 1785, and 1790; Herman, 1790; Sivers 1791; Blankenagel, 1793; Chevkin, 1794; Sunigref, 1795; Isipanof, 1796; Pospelof and Burnashof, 1800; Gaverdooski, 1803; Telckerzam, 1805; Klapproth, 1807; Kolodkin, 1809 to 1817; Nazarof, 1813; Vishuevefki, 1806 to 1815; expedition to Svinsovi Mountains, 1814 to 1815; Bystrinski, Zvialof, Meushenin, Losef, and Leshof, 1817; Burnashof, 1818; Muravief, 1819; Negri, Meyendorf, and Eversman, 1820; Siberian Line Surveys, 1820 to 1830; Levshin, 1820 to 1822; Muravief, 1821; Berg, 1822; Bronevski, Grigorief, and Gorski, 1823; Jemehnjiokof, 1823 and 1824; Berg Iemim and Eversman, 1825 and 1826; Tafayef and Yagmin, 1825; Bassargin, 1823, 1824, 1825; Eichward and Ladyjinsk, 1826; Meyer, 1826; Engelhardt and Helmersen, 1826; Reconnoissance from Semiarsk
About this time, however, in the eastern portion of Iran, the Afghan Ruler, Subuktegin, began to extend his power in India, and his son Mahmud laid the foundation to a solid Mahomedan domination in that country.

Invasions from Central Asia into India commenced from the time of Chingis Khan: the Mongols of the Djagatai Ulus or Division made several inructions into India, but their conquests there (as every where else) were never lasting. Tamurlane penetrated into India as far as Delhi, but his success also was not permanent. It was only Baber, the great grandson of Tamurlane, who succeeded in effectually conquering this country.

The Ruler of Ferganah, a small town in Kokan, was in 1503 expelled thence, amongst other descendants of Timur, by the Uzbeks. He wandered about for nearly a year near the upper course of the Amu (Oxus), and entertained at one time the idea of marching into China, but at last selected Outpost to River Chu, 1827; Helmersen and Hofman, 1828; Humboldt and Rose, 1826; Survey of Orenburg Region, 1830 to 1850; Lenz Larin and Karelin, 1830; Parrot, 1831; Karelin, from 1831 and 1832; Fedorof, 1832 to 1837; Helmersen, 1833; Reconnaissance of territory of Siberian Kirghizs, 1832 to 1841; Helbel, Vasiliev, and Demaison, 1834; Sozi and Vitkevitch, 1835; Lessing, 1833 to 1836; Helmersen, 1835; Karelin, Telkner, and Blaramberg, 1836; Caspian expedition, 1836 and 1837; Homer de Hell, 1836 to 1840; Jacobskhanikof, 1836 to 1840; Survey of territory of Inner Kirghiz Horde, 1836 to 1839; Mausurof and Danilefski, 1837; Vitkevitch, 1837 and 1838; Leman, 1838; Eversman, Leman, Bodisco, Shirkof, Nicholas Khanykof, Khiva expedition; and Vasilief, 1839; Kovalefski and Herrugrosz, 1839 and 1840; Reichenberg, 1840; Romanof, Blaramberg, and Nikiforof, 1840; Butenef, Leman and Niekanyof, 1840 and 1841; Karelin, 1840 to 1842; Dal, 1832 to 1841; Danilefski and Basinero, 1841 and 1842; Gentz and Schrenck, 1840 to 1844; Murehison, 1841; Sokolof, 1842; Ivanin and Leman, 1846; Jerebtsof, 1847; Butakof, 1848 and 1849; Surveying Corps, 1850.

* Sic in Mr. Michell's manuscript. But the mistake is obvious. The date of Subuktegin is 977 A. D. and Mahmood of Ghuznee invaded India 1022. There may be some hiatus in the translation.

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for the field of his enterprise Eastern Khorassan, where, with the aid of a body of Mongolians, he conquered Badakschan, and established himself in 1504 in Kaboulistan. Baber continued his conquests up to 1519, and strove hard to expel the Uzbeks from Maveranegra, but all his efforts were ineffectual. He then directed his arms towards India, to which country he made several unsuccessful expeditions, and it was only in 1526 that he conquered Delhi, where he established his dominion under the sounding title of the Empire of the Great Mogul. In the reign of his second successor, Akbar, these possessions became so extensive that they consisted of 15 Viceroyalties.

Meanwhile, Europeans commenced to penetrate into India, and in the middle of the 16th century the Portuguese were already in possession of some important points along the western, and other foreigners along the south-eastern, coasts of Hindustan; in the course of a century, the Dutch, the French, the Danes, and the English had acquired territory in India.*

Such was the position of affairs at the commencement of the 17th century in the south-eastern portion of Central Asia and of India, from whence the English made efforts to penetrate into Central Asia, with the view of subjecting it to their power for the advantages of their commerce.

We shall now review more minutely the events of the 18th and the commencement of the 19th centuries in the south-eastern portion of Central Asia and of India, in order

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* In 1602 the Dutch destroyed the Spanish or Portuguese fleet in the Indian Seas. In 1612 the English India Company (founded by Elizabeth in 1509) established its first Colony in Surat. In 1604 the French East India Company was organized; but it was not till 1672 that the Colony of Pondicherry was founded on and purchased of the Prince of Bedjapour. In 1612 a Company was organized in Denmark, which in 1616 bought Tranquebar.
to understand more distinctly the relations of Russia to Asia, and what led the English, who had already firmly established themselves in India in the 17th and 18th centuries, to penetrate with their arms into these regions, and then to have recourse to other means— to gold and skilful agents— for counteracting the influence of Russia in that part of Asia.

In the south-western portion of Asia, as already mentioned above, the Safi Dynasty had established itself, and after the death of Abbas the Great, was rapidly declining. The final downfall of this dynasty was carried out by a tribe of Afghans from the neighbourhood of Kandahar. This tribe from 1714 became independent of Persia, and in 1722, profiting by a revolt among the Kurds, who were under the subjection of the Persians, seized Ispahan, and in 1727 extended their power over the greatest part of Persia, so that Hossein-Tomashib-Mirza the son of the last Shah, killed by the Afghans, only retained a small portion of his father's dominions on the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. It was there in the Persian ranks that Nadir-Kuli Khan made his appearance; he had been formerly a leader of a robber band, and soon afterwards became sovereign of Persia and the last dreaded Mussulman conqueror.

In 1729 Nadir drove the Afghans out of Ispahan; in 1732, in defiance of a treaty of peace, he expelled the Turks from the western confines of Persia, and overthrowing Tomashib, placed his son Abas 3rd on the vacant throne. At last in 1736, after new brilliant victories over the Turks, and as if yielding to the desires of the people, Nadir proclaimed himself Shah. Next, having pacified the western parts of Persia by the repression of the Kurds, Nadir Shah sent his son Riza-Kuli north-eastwards to punish the Uzbeks, whilst he himself marched to Kandahar to complete the sub-
jection of the Afghans. All south-eastern Afghanistan submitted to his arms, and then one of those circumstances so common in that part of Asia took place, viz., the conquered became the chief instruments of the conqueror in his ulterior enterprises: the Afghans formed the largest and most favorite portion of Nadir Shah's army.

Meanwhile, after the siege of Kandahar, inimical relations sprung up between Nadir Shah and the Court of the Great Mogul concerning the delivery of Afghan refugees. The Great Moguls at that time had nearly lost all their former power. Djegangir, the son of Akbar, as well as the successors of the former, Djegan and Evrengzib, still continued to extend and support their dominion over India; but with the death of Evrengzib in 1707, the power of the Great Mogul Empire commences to decline. The Mahrattas, who had been gradually rising since the 17th century to political importance, began making repeated invasions into the Empire from the south, spreading devastation wherever they went. Added to this, the convulsions at Court prevented the oft-succeeding princes from curbing the insolent plunderers, while the commanders sent against the enemy only profited by the forces at their disposal for establishing themselves in independent territories. Such was Nizam Ulmulk, the Viceroy of Mahomed Shah, who in 1738 governed the Deccan, which was counterminous with the territories of the Mahrattas. With the object of finally securing his independence, Nizam called Nadir Shah to his assistance; the latter did not fail to profit by this opportunity, and entering India in 1739, took Delhi, where he put to death about 1,000,000 inhabitants, plundered the town and treasures of the Mogul Court; and after extorting very heavy ransom from the Emperor, and levying heavy imposts on the people, returned with his army to Persia. After this catastrophe,
internal disturbances finally reduced the strength of the Mogul Empire to such a degree that in 1750 the Mogul Emperors only possessed Delhi with the adjacent country. The Persian Shahs could not benefit by this weakness of their neighbour, as since the death of Nadir, who was killed in 1747, disturbances had broken out in Persia, and although Mahomed-Keram (by birth a Kurd) managed from 1759-1779 to introduce order in his kingdom, yet after his death dissensions again arose between the numerous pretenders to the throne of Persia, till at length the death of the last in 1794 cleared the way for Aga-Mahomed (of Kadjar lineage) to the throne. Aga-Mahomed, taking flight from Shiraz, where he had been imprisoned, established himself first on the southern shores of the Caspian Sea, viz., on the country occupied by the Kadjars; he next reduced the whole of Persia to his rule, and became the founder of the present reigning Dynasty in that country.

During these Persian and Mogul disturbances, a new power, but which also soon passed away, sprang to existence in the eastern part of Iran; Akhmet Durali, commander of the Afghan contingent of Nadir Shah’s army, after the assassination of the latter, desiring to avenge himself on the perpetrators of this murder, or perhaps to seat himself on Nadir’s throne, left Western Persia with his followers, and, profiting by the existing disorders, drove the Persians out of Gazi, Kabul, Peshawur, Balkh, and in 1748 crossed the Indus and gained possession of the Punjab and Cashmere, as well as of the country along the middle course of the Indus. Later in 1750, having extended his conquests westward to Herat, and having subjugated Mesched and the adjoining country (which was then under the rule of Shah Rok, Nadir’s son), Akhmet directed his attention to the East. The Court of Delhi, in 1756, meditated wresting the Punjab from Akhmet;
but the Mogul army was driven back to the walls of the capital, and Akhmet, appeased by the disgrace of the Imperial Vizier, left Alemgir in the possession of his power, and even defended him against the Mahrattas, retaining the Mogul, however, at the same time under his subjection. In 1761 Akhmet marched again into India, routed the Mahrattas, and, although placing Djivan-Bakhty, Alemgir's grandson, on the throne, he in reality governed the Empire himself through Medjid-Ed-Devle, the guardian appointed by him over the Emperor. In 1773 Akhmet died, and although his successor Timur Shah succeeded in maintaining order within his own territories, he lost all the possession beyond the Indus. All subsequent attempts to re-establish the Afghan dominion beyond the Indus proved futile, and in the mean while internal disorders among the Afghans themselves terminated in their being dispossessed of Khorassan by the Persians.

At length, in 1809, Shah Shudja, the Afghan conqueror, deposed by his rival Mahmud, and abandoning the remaining portion of the Afghan country to the conqueror, fled to India.

Thus the Afghans, as we have seen, failed in gaining possession of the Great Mogul Empire, which fell into the hands of the English, who, after founding the Surat Factory, opened a similar establishment at Madras in 1654, and another in 1664 in Bombay. The English, however, for a considerable time had no political influence over the internal affairs of the Indian kingdoms, especially over those of the north, as they were at first obliged to struggle with their rivals, the Portuguese and the Dutch, and encountered the opposition of several English trading Companies. But in 1717, when all these Companies had merged into one, and later in 1785, when all serious danger from the French had
disappeared, the English Rule was apparently firmly established in India.* Soon all Northern India submitted to British Rule; and already, in 1801, the Nabob of Oudh, in lieu of the sum which he was required to furnish, ceded to the English 32,000 square miles of land with 15,000,000 inhabitants; and in 1803 the Ruler of Delhi, while retaining the title of Emperor, resigned his real authority for a yearly pension, by which means the English power was established in all the upper part of the valleys of the Ganges and Djumna; at the same time the successes in 1818 in Nepaul extended their possessions as far as the Himalaya mountains. The final suppression of the turbulent Mahrattas by Lord Hastings in 1818, and of the Burmese in 1826, secured in Northern India the security and stability of the English dominion, which in this manner advanced to the south-eastern countries of Central Asia.

* Already dating from the 17th century, English trade had penetrated into Northern India. Dr. Boughton, attached to the Mission despatched by the Surat Factory to Agra to the Emperor Djegan, saved the life of that potentate's favorite daughter, and was granted in recompense the privilege of free trade in the whole Empire. Boughton sold his privilege to the Company, and the latter, eager to avail itself of this stroke of good fortune, founded a factory in Gosli, on one of the branches of the Ganges, in Bengal; soon depôts of trade were established in Chimbolar and Patna on the same river. In consequence of some misunderstandings having arisen in 1686 between the factory of Gosli and the Nabob of Bengal, the English merchants crossed over to the left bank of the river, and there founded Calcutta. In 1696, Europeans were allowed, for their own security during the internal commotions raging at the time, to fortify their factories; and in 1700, the Company, profiting by the Emperor's lack of money, purchased the land round the factory of Gosli, and erected Fort William on that ground. But in 1756 the Nabob seized this Fort and smothered the garrison. To avenge their death, Colonel Clive marched from Madras; defeated the Nabob, and restored the Calcutta Factory. Clive, at the same time, taking advantage of the war with the French, destroyed all their establishments on the mouth of the Ganges, and after a series of new victories, forced the Emperor to conclude a treaty by which the whole of Bengal to the confluence of the Djumna and Ganges was ceded to the English at a certain annual payment. The Nabob of Bengal was, besides, obliged to pay an annual subsidy for supporting the troops who were to maintain peace and order throughout Bengal.
Together with the extension of the English power, its aim and object underwent a complete change, that is to say, its commercial character became political. At last, in 1785, the Government took an active part in the internal administration of India, which then virtually became a British Colony.

While England was acquiring influence and power in Hindustan, political circumstances obliged Russia to come into closer contact with the south-western portions of Asia.

It has been already mentioned that Russia, according to the Ganjin treaty of 1732, returned to Persia, the territory bordering on the Caspian Sea. Nadir Shah, not being contented with this restitution, secretly extended his influence as far as Daghistan, and expelling the Turks from Georgia, placed on the throne of that country, as his vassal, Tei-Murza, the former Shah of Kakhetea. The disorders which followed the death of Nadir, afforded Tei-Murza the opportunity of establishing the independence of Georgia, but in order to secure this independence, especially against the pretensions put forward by the Dynasty of the Kadjars, Irakly, the successor of Tei-Murza, was forced to seek assistance of Russian troops, and his successor, George XIIIth, threw himself under Russian protection, which was formally extended to him by Imperial Edict in 1801. Since that period, Russian power began to spread rapidly beyond the Caucasus, although not without opposition on the part of the neighbouring powers, Turkey and Persia, who were loth to resign their influence over the Trans-Caucasian countries.

After the death of Shah Mahomed, the first Shah of the Kadjar Dynasty, the throne of Persia was occupied by his nephew Fet-Ali-Shah, who immediately on his accession directed his energies to the restoration of the former limits of Persia, for which purpose he was obliged
to wage war—on the east with the Afghans, on the west with the Turks, and on the north-west with the Russians. Fet-Ali-Shah first commenced operations against the Afghans by supporting Mahomed, the Ruler of Herat, against the Ruler of Afghanistan.

At the same time in India a struggle was taking place between Tipoo-Saib upheld by the French, and the East India Company, and both sides sought the co-operation of the Persians. The envoy of the Governor General of India, Colonel Malcolm (the first envoy was Medi-Alihan), concluded a treaty with the Shah in 1821, by which Fet-Ali was bound to attack Khorassan with the object of diverting the Afghan force from India. Mesched at that period was ruled, under the protectorate of the Afghans, by Shah Nadir's grandson, Nadir Mirza, to whose father the Afghan Prince Akhmet Durali had granted this territory. The Persians took Mesched, killed Nadir-Murza, and annexed Western Khorassan to their own territories. After this, Fet-Ali, instigated by the English, turned his attention westwards with the special object of opposing Russia. The eldest son of Fet-Ali, Mahomed-Ali, was at that time Ruler of Kermanshah, on the boundaries of Turkey, and Abas Mirza, his third son, was appointed, in 1804, Ruler of Tavriz, on the borders of Russia, and was eager to win military renown. The result of this was, that the unfriendly terms so long existing between the Russians and Persians terminated in an aggressive advance, in the same year, of the Persian army into Russian territory. But when the report reached the Persian Court of the project of alliance entertained between Russia and England terminating, in 1806, with a treaty, Fet-Ali, relying no longer on English assistance, determined to seek the co-operation of the French, and with this object despatched a letter by an Armenian
to the French Ambassador at Constantinople. These overtures led to Zobert in 1805, and Gardanne in 1806, being sent to Teheran, and they persuaded the Shah that, under the influence of France, Russia would be induced to restore the Trans-Caucasian provinces to Persia. But soon the groundlessness of these hopes became manifest, and the English were enabled to regain their former influence at Teheran, first by the aid of Malcolm, the Agent of the Governor General of India, and afterwards through the English Ambassadors Harford Jones and Ousely. At their instance, the French were obliged to leave Persia; but this, however, did not conduce to improve the relations between Russia and Persia; first French and then English Officers encouraged Abas Mirza in the opinion that, by employing European Officers in the Persian service, he would be able, after the example of Peter the Great, to reform the Persian army, and they also, by these means, stimulated the ambitious views of the heir apparent. At length, at the instigations of Turkey, which had been induced, through intrigues of the French, to commence hostilities against Russia in 1807, the Persians were also drawn into the struggle against the latter country.

This led to a continuation of military operations with Persia from 1804 till 1813; owing, however, to the masterly tactics of Prince Tsitsian and General Kotliarefsky, all the Persian efforts were unsuccessful, and the war ended gloriously for Russia, with the conclusion of the Gulistan treaty, which so effectually secured the Russian dominion in Trans-Caucasia, that a new attempt of Abas Mirza's after a lapse of 13 years, when he treacherously invaded the Russian territories without proclaiming war, only led to the Russian occupation of Tavriz, Urmia, and Ardebil, and
to the Turkmanchai treaty in 1828, by which Russia additionally secured the Khanships of Erivan and Nakhichevan.

The failure of these attempts ultimately obliged Persia to direct all her attention to the East, towards that extent of country where, between the East-Indian-English and Persian territories, such important changes took place in the latter end of the 18th century.

In 1773, at the time of the death of Akhmet, the founder of the Afghan Dynasty of Durali, his possessions consisted of Mesched, Balkh, Herat, Kabul, Great Horbund, Kandahar, Gazna, Peshawur, Cashmere, the Punjab, Nishapour, Jellabad, Deragazi-Khan, Der-Ishmael-Khan, Multan, Scinde, Beloochistan, and all the extent of country from the River Indus as far as Sirkhind; and Delhi, in addition, was under Afghan sway. After the death, however, of Zeman, Akhmet's grandson, dissensions arose between his son, Mahmud, and the latter's uncle, Shah Shudja, which ended by Shudja's flight into India, whilst Mahmud, with the aid of the astute and firm counsellor Fati-Khan, soon established himself on the throne. But weary of the influence of his counsellor, and instigated by his son Kamran, in 1818 Mahmud treacherously killed Fati Khan, who, during his life-time, had conferred the most important posts of the kingdom on his own 18 brothers, and these did not fail to avenge Fati Khan's death by a general conspiracy. Mahmud speedily fled to Herat, where he died in 1829, leaving that town, with a small district, as the only inheritance to his son Kamran.

With the flight of Mahmud, the Afghan territories were divided in the following manner: one-half on the western side of the Indus formed three principal territories;
that of Herat and Kandahar, which, after the death of Fati Khan's eldest brother, was ruled by his nephew Azim-Khan, and that of Kaboul, where, after numerous disturbances, the brother of Azim-Khan, Dost-Mahomed, established himself, and who, in 1826, acquired possession of Gazna Jellablad and the surrounding country. Herat and Kandahar, however, remained independent, and besides this several small independent principalities became established in the Seistan and in Kelat.

The Afghan territories situated to the east of the River Indus fell under the rapidly spreading power of the Seikhs and Scinds, concerning whom we shall here give some particulars.

The power of the Seikhs first rose in the 15th century, when the fanatical Nanan-Shah endeavoured, by his new doctrine, to unite Brahmanism with Mahomedanism, and to establish his power on this foundation; but instead of reconciling these two creeds, he only produced a more violent hatred for Islamism, which at last, in the middle of the 17th century, led Hargavind, the Head of the "Huru" or new doctrine, to rise in open revolt against the Mussulman Rule of the Afghans; and in order to strengthen his cause, he added to his former doctrine the new article of faith, that all castes were equal in sight of God, and that, therefore, men of the lower caste also possessed the right of bearing arms. Hargavind, at the same time, formed a Council in Umrutsir for the government of his followers, and organized a system of a federal republic, so that after his death there was no acknowledged head, but each community was governed by its own Sirdar, possessing equal rights of power.

The growth of the Afghan power served as a temporary check to the Seikhs, but it did not entirely repress that sect,
for even after their defeat by Akhmet in 1762 and after the return of the Shah to Kaboul, the Seikhs attacked Sirkhind, destroyed it, and in 1764, having taken Lahor, established themselves firmly there, founding 12 united districts or missouls. The rapid decline of the Afghan power was favorable to the growing ascendancy of the Seikhs, and although, during the reign of Shah Zeman in 1795 and 1798, they generally retired to the mountains when invaded by the Afghans, on the withdrawal of their enemies they again returned to the places they had previously occupied. With the appearance of Renghit-Sing the Seikhs rose to their highest power.

Renghit-Sing was born in 1782, and was the son of the Sirdar Maga-Sing, who had succeeded in subjecting three missouls to his rule; after his death, Renghit-Sing, freeing himself from his mother's guardianship by poisoning her, conceived the plan of supplanting in his own person three Sirdars, who had taken to flight on an Afghan invasion. With this object, feigning subjection, he induced Shah Zeman to intrust him with the Rulership of Lahor, acquiring, in this manner, the support of the whole Mussulman population; in the same way by stratagem he gained possession of four guns out of 12 which the Afghans had lost; in 1800 Renghit-Sing secured Lahor, and from that period his power gradually increased. In 1805 the Hurumata or Federal Council assembled for the last time, and after that the greater part of the missouls surrendered unconditionally to the rule of Renghit-Sing. In 1805, refusing to co-operate with Holkar against the English, he gained the favor of the latter, who by two treaties in 1805 and 1809 acknowledged his independence, and defined the limits of his eastern boundaries by the River Sutledj. Since that time Renghit-Sing observed his
treaties with the English with fidelity rare among Asiatics, and firmly established himself in a part of North-Western India. *

To secure his conquests Renghit-Sing directed particular attention to the improvement of his Military Forces, and in these endeavors Fortune favored him by the arrival at Lahor, in 1822, of two talented Officers of Napoleon, Allard and Ventour, who brought the standing army, the artillery, and fortresses of Renghit-Sing to a state of perfection rarely found in Asia, and thus enabling Renghit-Sing to preserve his dominion over the Punjab till his death. At the same time the decline of the Afghan power led to the organization of another powerful State, that of Scinde, along the lower course of the Indus, which State flourished till a recent period. The tribe of Beloochees having conquered these territories in 1780, at first acknowledged themselves tributaries of the Kabul Rulers; but later some local petty princes of the race of Talpur founded three united and independent principalities; within these latter, and in the territories of the Seikhs, another small independent State, that of Daut-Putra, on the River Sutlej, was, in the commencement of the present century, established by Daud-Khan, an Afghan Prince. Such was the state of affairs about the year 1830, when the English Government turned its attention to the Valley of the Indus. Lieutenant Alexander Burns, despatched

* In 1809 Renghit-Sing seized the federal treasures in Umrusir, and in 1814, by the application of torture, he compelled Shah Shudja, who had sought his protection, to give up the riches which the latter had brought with him. Soon after the Afghan commotions yielded him an opportunity for making fresh acquisitions. In 1823 he seized Attok, Cashmere, Multan, and subjected Peshawur to his power. All the efforts of Mahomed Khan to regain these losses were fruitless, and after having suffered a complete defeat at Noshero, he died of grief: Renghit-Sing continued from that period to extend his conquests to the North, and in 1855 took Ladakh, but was expelled thence by the Chinese.
as Agent, investigated the Valley of the Indus, and on the strength of the reports he presented, a commercial treaty was concluded, in 1832, with the Scinde Rulers, by which a new highway for traffic was opened to the English along the Indus as far as Central Asia.

But for the successful development of commerce it was necessary to establish tranquillity throughout the above-mentioned extent of country, and great difficulties presented themselves in the support of this trade: on the one hand, Renghit-Sing was striving to gain possession of the lower course of the Indus, while his final conquest of Peshawur in 1831 rekindled the hatred of the Kabol Rulers against the Head of the Seikhs. All the efforts of Burns, who was sent to Kabol in 1837 to quench this feeling of animosity, were of no avail, and the English were therefore compelled to side with one of the contending parties. They decided in supporting Renghit-Sing, who had shown himself capable of preserving order in the countries he ruled, and who had always been well disposed towards the English; and they also calculated on the possibility of seizing this part of India on the inevitable disturbances that would follow on Renghit-Sing's death, relying on the assistance of Allard and Ventour, who were on good terms with the English Agents, for the accomplishment of this scheme. In the mean time, in Persia, as already observed, the Turkmanchai treaty had obliged Abas Mirza to direct his projects of conquest to the East, and as soon as he was able to re-establish his influence with Fet-Ali-Shah, which had temporarily declined during his unsuccessful expedition against the Russians, he marched against Khorassan, subdued some local refractory princes, and then conceived the plan of expelling the descendants of Akhmet Shah from their only remaining territory of Herat; but this expedition proved a failure. Soon after this event, Abas
Mirza and Fet-Ali died, and were succeeded in 1834 by Abas Mirza's son Mahomed, who, pursuing the policy of his father, advanced against Herat in 1836, and although this second attempt was as unsuccessful as the first, these persistent endeavors to extend the Persian power in the East were opposed to the views of the English, and caused them great anxiety; they, therefore, strove to dissuade the Persians from a fresh attack in 1836 against Herat. When these persuasions failed, MacNaughten, the English Minister at the Court of Persia, broke off diplomatic relations, and Captain Pottinger was despatched to the defence of Herat. The English also hoped to oppose the Persians with Dost-Mahomed; but in this, Burns, in spite of all his endeavors, was unsuccessful, and in 1838 he was compelled to leave Kabul, and lost his life on the road. Dost-Mahomed continued to display openly his sympathy for the Persians, and a hostile feeling against Renghit-Sing, the ally of the English.

These circumstances, the importance of which was heightened by Burns' failure, induced the English with one final stroke, to establish their influence in Afghanistan, by depositing Dost-Mahomed and replacing him by a Ruler well disposed to England, such as Shah Shudja was recognized to be, and who had, in 1834, unsuccessfully attempted to penetrate into Afghanistan. A treaty was therefore concluded in 1838 between the English, Renghit-Sing, and Shah Shudja, fully securing the interests of the English, and in 1839 a British Force crossed the Indus for carrying out the provisions of this treaty. In August the English had already become masters of Kabul, after which they occupied Kandahar and Gazna, and proclaimed Shah Shudja as Ruler in the place of Dost-Mahomed. The conflict lasted for two years, and was marked by incessant outbreaks; at last, in October 1842, a general rising took place, when Lord Elphinstone
was forced to conclude a treaty for the withdrawal of the English troops from Kabul. In spite, however, of this treaty, the English were all massacred on effecting their retreat. To revenge this perfidy, two English columns were despatched from Jellabad and Kandahar in 1842, who burnt all the towns on their route; their further advance, however, was arrested by a sudden change in the policy of the English with respect to this war and to the affairs of the Afghans generally; the change of this policy was owing to the Ministry of the Whigs being superseded by that of Sir Robert Peel, who was of opinion that the sacrifices required for the maintenance of British Rule in Afghanistan were not commensurate with the advantages to be gained, and the government of this country was left to the Afghans themselves, a proclamation to which effect was made by Lord Ellenborough in February 1842. The English troops were then withdrawn to the left bank of the Indus. Such an arrangement was all the more necessary, as the death of Renghit-Sing was the forerunner of disturbances in the Punjab, while marked symptoms of animosity towards the English were at the same time displayed in Scinde. Both these circumstances eventually led the way to the English making acquisitions more advantageous than the occupation of Afghanistan; thus, between the years 1842 and 1844, Scinde was finally conquered by Sir Charles Napier, and between 1846 and 1849, Multan and the Punjab were brought under complete subjection by the English Government, which next directed all its attention to the consolidation of its rule in Hindustan.

The English, however, did not cease extending their influence over the countries of Central Asia, whither their Agents were constantly being despatched, not alone to explore
those regions, but also to watch the march of events there and to forward the commercial and political interests of England.

This rapid review of events in Central Asia is sufficient to show by what means Europeans penetrated into those countries, and how all the occurrences described facilitated investigations of every description relating to Central Asia. Recently, the following circumstances have favored the prosecution of these enquiries:

(1.) The extension of English power in the northwestern part of Hindustan, which enabled many travellers to visit not alone Central Asia, but to return to Europe overland through India.

(2.) The growth of political importance of Persia owing to its central position, led to frequent diplomatic intercourse with that country and to the establishment of permanent missions there.

(3.) The desire not alone of the Persian Shahs and of Renghit-Sing, but also of Dost-Mahomied, to organize their troops on a European footing, afforded Europeans the opportunity of studying these regions.

(4.) The Russian military operations in Northern Persia and in the Kirghiz Steppes, and those of the English in Afghanistan, likewise led to a nearer acquaintance with those countries.

(5.) The attempts of the English to open commercial intercourse from India with Afghanistan and Mavrenahar, and their important traffic with Persia through Trebizond, also greatly conduced to a more intimate knowledge with Central Asia.

(6.) The natural desire of Russia to consolidate her commercial relations with Central Asia, particularly with
Khiva and Bukhara; hence the Caravan trade with these regions, and the frequent missions and embassies for the settlement of misunderstandings arising out of such intercourse.

(7.) Surveys and reconnoiterings of the English in North-Western Hindustan and of the Russians in Trans Caucasia, and from 1830 in the Kirghiz Steppes between the Ural, Altai, and the Caspian and Ural Seas.

It is, therefore, natural that the number of embassies, journeys, and local explorations in the 18th and 19th centuries increased in Central Asia and in the adjoining regions. *

* The following are the most remarkable:—

(a.) Missions to Persia.—Malcolm in 1800; Jobert, 1805; Gardanne accompanied by Triolhière, Tressel, Dussret, Jouannin, who explored Persia in different directions in 1806; the Second Mission of Malcolm, accompanied by Pottinger, Christie, Grant, and others in 1808; Elphinstone in 1809; Harford-Jones accompanied by Morier, 1809; Ousey with his brother and Morier, 1812; Ernolof accompanied by Negra, Borozdana, Moaraviz, and Kotsebon in 1817; Prince Menchikof in 1852; the Agents, Maconald and Kinneir in 1831. Permanent Russian and English Missions in Teheran and the Consulate in Tavriz and Resht in the year 1830. The French Embassy of Peirne, accompanied by Beaufort, in 1840; Russian Missions to Khiva; Kirilof in 1841 Danilefsky in 1842, and Ignatief in 1858.

(b.) Diplomatic Agents: English in Afghanistan.—Connolly in 1830; Burns in 1831; Burns, Wood, Lord, Pottinger, Todd, in 1831 to 1839; Russian: Vitkevitch, Gut, Blaramberg, Lemm in 1836 to 1839. English Agents in Turan: Wood, Lord, Abbot, Shakespear, Stoddart, Connolly, 1836 to 1841.

(c.) Military operations.—The Russian war with Persia, 1826 to 1828, and with Khiva, from 1839 to 1840. The English war with Afghanistan, 1839 to 1842.

(d.) European Officers attached to Asiatic Courts.—To that of Abas Mirza, Sutherland, Kerport, and others from 1815 to 1830; to Dost-Mahomed, Garland, Campbell, and Avitabile from 1825 to 1839; to Renghit-Sing, Venura, Allard, and others from 1822 to 1840.

(e.) Travellers.—Forster in 1784; Olivier in 1796; John Johnson in 1817; Frazer in 1822; Stirling in 1820; Masson in 1826 to 1829; Todd in 1836; Spid in 1837; Frazer in 1837; and many others.
The only parts remaining unexplored are the inaccessible deserts surrounding the Khanates of Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokan; but our knowledge even of these places is being gradually amplified.

The foregoing is all that we have considered necessary to dwell on in this brief exposition of the history of Central Asia and of the surrounding regions. A similar concise narrative of the events in the Asiatic countries neighbouring Russia will be more useful than a detailed historical description of the adjoining Khanates of Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokan, for which sufficiently accurate materials do not exist, and, besides, the histories of these semi-barbarous countries, desolated by plunder, despotism, and ignorance, cannot excite any particular interest; it would naturally consist of an enumeration of Mussulman names intermixed by murders, treacheries, and other acts of violence and despotism of irresponsible Asiatic tyrants. Moreover, the events which successively followed up to the years 1839 and 1840, when two first class powers, Russia and England (in 1839) penetrated simultaneously with armed forces into Central Asia (Russia into Khiva, England into Afghanistan), will sufficiently explain the position of affairs in Central Asia at the period of the Russian expedition against Khiva.

The immediate causes for the war in 1839 of the Russians with Khiva, as well as a detailed account of the Russian expedition, are set forth in the chapters following these historical exposé.
PART I.

REVIEW OF THE CAUSES THAT LED TO THE WAR WITH KHIVA.

From the times of John the Terrible, the Russians have always sought means for opening a channel for their trade, through Central Asia, with India, in order to acquire some of that fabulous wealth for which India was always so famous; it was Peter the Great who was first enabled to take energetic measures in this direction. The unsuccessful expedition to Khiva in 1717 made the Russians acquainted with the difficulties of the route to Central Asia, and with the treacherous character of the rulers of that country; and though the great Russian Reformer, when on his death-bed, bequeathed to his successor a legacy of vengeance on the Khivans for their barbarous murder of the members of Prince Bekovitch's mission, he was at the same time convinced that, as a preliminary measure for chastising them, it was necessary to effect the complete subjugation of the Kirghiz Kaisak Horde, which occupied the countries situated between Russia and Khiva.

The successors of Peter the Great, following out his instructions and views, also entertained the idea of establishing themselves in Central Asia, and thus to open a new route for Russian commerce to the East. In furtherance of these views, in 1730 Aboul-Hair Khan, Sultan of the lesser Horde, with the Kaisaks under his rule, was placed under the protection of Russia, and a commencement was thus made to the subjugation of the Kirghiz Steppes, which also led to the establishment of intercourse with the neighbouring Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara.
Bukhara had ever been eager, even since the mission of Benevene, sent there by Peter the Great in 1729, to sustain a commercial intercourse with Russia; while Khiva, convulsed since an early period by internal dissensions, formed, as it were, a centre for pillagers who lived by the plunder of caravans, and the capture and sale of their prisoners. To escape this influence of Khiva, so pernicious to the development of the rising trade of Russia in the East, Colonel Herberg was sent to Khiva, in 1731, for the purpose of opening negotiations; the Khivans, however, would not allow him to reach Khiva, and robbed him on his journey back. The year 1741 promised to be more successful in the establishment of peaceful commercial relations between Russia and Khiva, as at this time the Khivans elected as their Khan (in the place of Ulbars, murdered by Nadir Shah at Hanki) Aboul-Hair-Khan, of the lesser Kirghiz Horde, who, 10 years back, had voluntarily placed himself under the subjection of Russia. In the suite of Aboul-Hair, at his entry in 1741 into Khiva, were Lieutenant Gladyshef,* the Geodesist Mouravin, and the Engineer Nazimof, from among these, Mouravin was sent to meet Nadir Shah with the following petition: "that he, Nadir Shah, should surrender to Aboul-Hair the town of Khiva in the name of his Imperial Majesty, the Khan elected being a faithful subject of the Russian Empire." Nadir Shah, who had always entertained feelings of esteem towards Russia, and wishing to preserve amicable relations with her, loaded the Envoy with gifts and begged the Khan with his Russian followers to await his arrival at Khiva; but Aboul-Hair, mistrusting the promises of Nadir Shah, fled to his Horde, while Nadir Shah soon after occupied Khiva; in proof, however,

* In the Archives of the Etât Major of the Orenburg Corps are preserved the original Memoirs of Gladyshef relating to the Kirghiz Steppe and to Khiva; Mouravin likewise left a Manuscript Diary and several Memoirs.
of the sincerity of his intentions, he made liberal presents to all the Russian prisoners he could collect there, and restored them their liberty.* On his withdrawal from Khiva, Shah Nadir installed one of his Officers in the Khanship; his rule, however, was of short duration, as the Khivans soon put him to death, and elected as their Khan Nourali-Khan, son of Aboul-Hair-Khan, and subsequently (at the end of the 18th century) they chose as their ruler another Russian subject, the Kirghiz Khan Gaib.

Thus from the very commencement of the 18th century, the Khivans had chosen five Khans who were Russian subjects. In 1700 Khan Shaniaz paid voluntary homage to Russia; in 1708 Khan Aran-Mamet† did the same; from 1741 the already-mentioned Aboul-Hair-Khan and his son Nourali (till 1750), and the Khan Gaib in 1770 to 1780. Hence arises the positive right of Russia to the Khanate of Khiva.

Notwithstanding this indisputable claim of Russia to Khiva, the Russian Government only sought to obtain one thing, that is, protection for the Russian trade in Central Asia, and they took advantage of every opportunity for cementing a friendly relation with the Khivans.

At this period the Russian Government had become acquainted with the extreme difficulties of entering Central Asia and farther into India, and therefore turned its attention exclusively to the organization of the south-eastern boundaries of the Empire, which, for a long time during the whole of the 18th century, were the scene of disturbances

* Among these were several men who had been captured after the destruction of Prince Bekovitch's detachment in 1717, and now restored to freedom after a captivity of 24 years.
† Concerning the subjection of the first two above-mentioned Khiva Khans, see the "Expedition to Khiva in 1717, in the Veenowi Ibornik No. 10 for 1801."
arising between the various tribes established there. Thus, first the disorders in the Kirghiz Steppes (which continued almost without intermission until a very recent period), the insurrections of the Bashkirs,* the flight of the Kalmucks into the Chinese territories,† and, lastly in 1773 and 1774, the Pugachef rebellion, for a long time absorbed the attention of the Government, and diverted its views from other schemes in the East.

A detailed account of all the measures adopted by the Government for the defence and pacification of the south-eastern territories of the Empire would lead us too far from our present subject,‡ and we shall, therefore, only mention here that from 1736, and to the end of the 18th century, tranquillity in the Orenburg region was more or less re-established; the Russian settlements on the Rivers Yuyia, Tobol, and Ural separated the hostile races of the

* The Bashkirs, until the 16th century, paid tribute, partly to the Tsarate of Siberia, and partly to that of Kazan, but after the conquest of these, they became vassals to the Tsarate of Muscovy, and were ruled by the Boevoda or Military Satrap of Kazan. In 1574, owing to the remoteness of Kazan, it was found necessary to erect the fortress of Ufa, the Commander of which was charged with the immediate supervision of the Bashkirs, who were constantly rebelling; thus from 1676 the Boevoda Zelenin was engaged three years in their subjugation. In 1707 they devastated all the country as far as Kazan, and in 1735 the Bashkirs’ insurrection continued six years after the erection of the fortresses along the River Yaika (Ural), which had temporarily checked their pillaging in the Kirghiz Steppe. At this period about 30,000 Bashkirs perished. A portion of Bashkirs revolted in 1755, when 10,000 of them retired into the Steppe, but again returned. (See Military Lexicon under the Article of “Bashkirs.”)

† In the Historical Introduction, it has already been explained that the Kalmucks entered Russian territories in consequence of the conquests of the Chinese; in 1771, owing to some intrigues of the Chinese, they determined to return to their native country on the borders of the River Ili, and they crossed the Steppe 30,000 Kibitkas strong, but some hostile Kirghizes, and a force under the command of General Fravensberg, sent on their track, nearly destroyed all the fugitives.

‡ Concerning the disturbances at this period in the Orenburg region, see Nos. 9 and 10 of the Journal of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society for 1860.
Bashkirs and Kalmucks from the Kirghiz Kaisaks. Subsequently, military Cossack settlements were established all along the Steppe frontier, and the line itself was fortified; the Cossack armies were reinforced with Bashkiro-Meschiriat and Kalmuck troops and with infantry of the line; in the neighbouring Steppe, in order to keep a stricter watch over the lesser Kirghiz Horde, the latter was divided into two parts, the eastern and western; the power of the Khan was abolished, and at first two Sultan Rulers (from the race of Aboul-Hair-Khan) were appointed, but later a portion of these Hordes formed another or middle Horde under the government of a third Sultan Ruler.*

The gradual installation of order and tranquillity in the Orenburg region was favorable to the maintenance of commercial relations with the neighbouring Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara, but disturbances in the Steppes occasionally broke out, which secondary causes were principally created by the unfriendly attitude of the Khivans towards Russia. Assuming power over the tribes wandering near Khiva, over the Kirghizes under Russian subjection, over the Karakalpaks and Turcomans,† the Khivans exacted tribute from these tribes by violence and oppression, while Khivan emissaries, penetrating into the Kirghiz Steppes with trade caravans, and under the guise of Mullahs, excited religious fanaticism and hatred between the tribes, and not only incited them to plunder caravans, but to attack the line and the Russian fish-traders for the purpose of making prisoners and selling them as slaves in the Khivan Markets.

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* The middle and part of the Great Kirghiz Hordes are attached to Western Siberia, and the remaining part of the Great Horde wanders in the Chinese and Kokan territories.

† The Karakalpaks swore allegiance to Russia in 1732, and the Turcomans on the 31st October 1791.
The unfriendly disposition of the Khivans towards Russia dated from the time of the expedition of Prince Bekovitch Cherkaski to Khiva in 1717, and did not cease until 1839, when (as will be seen from the description of the new Russian military expedition to Khiva in this year) the Khan of Khiva became more amicably inclined. But previous to this the Russian Government had treated the perfidy and incessant robberies of the Khivans with contempt, but on auspicious occasions they forgot the past, and even tried to establish friendly relations with Khiva. Thus in 1793, at the particular request of the Khan of Khiva, the Empress Catherine II sent to Khiva her Oculist, the Court Councillor Blankenagel, who pronounced the eyes of the Khan's uncle Fezl-Bee to be incurable, and Fezl-Bee did eventually lose his sight. But the barbarous Khivans insisted on a cure being made, threatening the Russian Oculist, in case he did not comply with their wishes, to treat him as a spy. Blankenagel soon learnt from the Russian prisoners that, at a special consultation, it was determined to keep him under surveillance while a necessity of his medical skill existed (for the Khan's uncle was still in the hopes of recovering his sight), after which he was to be sent back to Russia, but before arriving at his destination, he was to be murdered in order that he should not relate anything he had seen. This intelligence induced Blankenagel to seek means for flight, and he contrived to gain over several Turcomans, who got him safely to Mangishlak, from whence he proceeded by sea to Astrakhan.* In 1819 a mission was sent to Khiva under the command of Captain Mouravief; but this embassy as well was received with distrust, and did not lead

* Detailed accounts of this were given by Blankenagel himself in his Memoirs, which were re-published by Gregorief, with explanations, in Journal No. 3 of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society for 1858.
CAUSES OF THE RUSSIAN WAR WITH KHIVA.

The blind infatuation and gross barbarism of the Khivans saw in the conciliation, and long-suffering displayed by Russia undoubted superiority of their own strength; hence their conduct was marked with the greatest mendacity and insolence. Khiva continued to be, as formerly, the head quarters for all the robbers of Central Asia, and openly violated every international law in her dealing with the neighbouring power of Russia.

If the perfidious murder of the sacred person of an envoy, and the almost total destruction of his escort, during a period of solemnly concluded peace (Prince Bekovitch and his detachment in 1717) was to be attributed to fortuitous circumstances, and not to a premeditated act of treachery, there was nothing, on the other hand, to palliate the plundering of caravans belonging to a friendly power, and the continual robberies and the systematic traffic in Russian prisoners. The Khivans had, moreover, arbitrarily assigned to Russian caravans a very circuitous and inconvenient route, and compelled them, whatever their destination in Central Asia, to pass through Khiva in order that they might there levy on them duties and taxes which were raised to an exorbitant degree. All the caravans that deviated from the Khiva route were exposed to plunder by order of the Khan, even by his troops, the Khan deriving a considerable share of the spoil.

Such a condition of things prevented the pacification of the Kirghiz Hordes, and acted injuriously on the commercial relations of Russia with the friendly Khanate of Bukhara; the Russian Government, therefore, seeing that Khiva was not disposed to peaceful relations, sought means to quell

* Captain Mouravief published, in 1822, an account of his travels to Turkmania and Khiva, and his work was accompanied with sketches, tables, and charts. (This work is now very rare.)
the disturbances in the Steppe, and to protect the trade of Central Asia against the rapacity of the Khivans, and the violence and plunder of the Kirghiz-Kaisaks who were instigated by Khiva.

It was first thought to accomplish this by sending out detachments to repel the attacks of the Kirghizes and to punish those who would not pay submission to Russia, but the failure of two such expeditions in 1809* proved the insufficiency of these means; the marauding Kirghizes being able easily to evade the Russian detachment in the extensive Steppes which at that time were but little known to the Russians. The whole attention of the Government was soon after directed to the west, on which quarter Russia was threatened by Napoleon, and it was only in 1815, on the conclusion of the peace of Vienna, that "the pacification of the south-eastern frontiers of the Empire was seriously discussed by the administration.

During 1830 and 1830, on the recommendation of General Essen, and in the absence of any better suggestion, the former plan of preserving order in the Steppe by sending out expeditionary forces and despatching caravans under military escorts was again adopted.†

* Under the Command of General Herzberg, to whom was attached Colonel Strukof; the diary kept by the latter during this campaign in the Steppe is to be found in the valuable manuscript collection of General Gens, who for a long time was President of the Orenburg Frontier Commission.

† By a decision of the Asiatic Committee in 1823, Colonel Berg was despatched to examine the condition of affairs on the spot. In the month of December of the same year, the Council, on the strength of the reports of General Essen and Colonel Berg, decided, 1st, to divide the little Kirghiz Horde, which was under Russian subjection, into two parts, the eastern and western, and to place over them two Sultan Rulers; 2nd, to protect the Orenburg Line by fortifying it, and increasing its military Force; and 3rd, to establish a Company which would carry on the caravan trade under the protection of military escorts.
The Russian Government, acknowledging the advantages of the trade with Bukhara, and seeing that this trade was rendered very precarious from the rapacity of the Kirghiz and Khivans, and that the passage of caravans was attended every year with greater danger, despatched an embassy to Bukhara in 1820 (simultaneously with the mission of Muraviev to Khiva) with the object of concerting measures with the Khan of Bukhara for ensuring and strengthening commercial relations; but the Emir or Khan of Bukhara, though promising an amicable reception for the caravans, would not undertake to protect their passage through the Kirghiz Steppes, but left that duty to devolve entirely on Russian escorts. It was consequently considered most advantageous to establish a trading Company which should enjoy the exclusive right of trade with Central Asia; the Company was to have a working capital of R. S. 6,000,000, and to possess its own camels, so as to avoid any obstacles and delays in the transport of goods. To convey the caravans of the Company, it was proposed to give an escort of 280 men with two guns, who were to be maintained at the cost of the Company, which was also to be allowed to erect a Caravan-Sarai and fortifications on the Syr-Daria and on other points of the caravan route. But as it was impossible to create such a Company in a short time, and as it was uncertain whether it would ever become formed by Russian merchants, it was proposed in the mean time to furnish the ordinary caravans with an escort at the expense of the Government, and to charge this outlay under this head to the Custom-house dues of the Orenburg region. A caravan was accordingly despatched to Bukhara in 1824 under the protection of 500 men; it was, however, encountered by the Khivans, who plundered part of it, and the other part returned. On this occasion, the loss suffered by private individuals amounted to R. S. 547,000, while the expense to the
Government in furnishing the convoy was 224,000 Rubles. Thus the attempt failed, and naturally in such a state of affairs, the Company could not be formed. The scheme was abandoned, although there is no doubt that such a plan, if realized at that period, would have spared the Government many expenses to which it was put by subsequent events.

In 1825-26, when a report spread (owing to the appearance in the Ust-Urt of the detachment of Colonel Berg employed in taking levels and surveys between the Caspian and Ural Seas) that the Russian Emperor was bent on punishing the Khivans by force of arms, a Khivan Envoy, Vais-Niaz, made his appearance at the Saraichikovsky Fort on the Ural, bringing with him an elephant as a present to the Emperor of Russia; but the envoy was informed that he would be allowed to proceed to St. Petersburg only on two conditions: 1stly, that the Khan of Khiva should indemnify the Russian traders for all the losses they had sustained by the attack on their caravan in 1824; and 2ndly, the return of all Russian prisoners in Khiva, and strict prohibition of the traffic in slaves for the future. These conditions were not agreed to by the Khan, and so the envoy was sent back to Khiva, where it was given out that he had returned on account of a dispute with the Russian Government as to the route he was to pursue in proceeding to St. Petersburg. The apprehensions of the Khivans soon subsided, and matters went on in the old way, becoming, one may almost say, even worse, as later in 1833, the audacity of the Khivans reached such a height that the Chief Collector of Customs at Khiva was sent to Orenburg to inform the Russian and Bukhara merchants privately that their caravans would inevitably be plundered if they did not pass through Khiva; this, it was evident, was merely a ruse to screen themselves from all responsibility in the event of future robberies. At
the same time the subjects of the Khan of Khiva carried on an uninterrupted trade with Russia, and their caravans crossed to Orenburg Line to and fro every year. It was plain then that force of arms could alone bring the matter to a definite conclusion.

In addition to crippling Russian trade in the East by the constant plunder of caravans and inciting the Kirghizes to commit these depredations, the Government of Khiva had since many years encouraged the pirates of the Caspian, who kidnapped Russian fishermen on that sea in great numbers every year, and sold them in all the markets of the East, and particularly in Khiva. These unfortunate prisoners were doomed to pass their lives in hard toil, suffering every privation, and they usually ended their insupportable lives under the blows of their taskmasters, whose Mahomedan creed freed them from all considerations of humanity with respect to Kafirs or unbelievers, while the civil law gave them irresponsible power over the lives of their slaves.

Already in the 18th century the Russian Government tried to devise means for the liberation of Russian prisoners in the East: thus by an Ukaz of the 28th January 1767, hostages were ordered to be seized, for the purpose of compelling the Asiatics to exchange them for Russian prisoners. This measure was quite justifiable, seeing that Khivans and Bukharees* traded and lived in safety along the Orenburg and Siberian lines and at Astrakhan, while Russian merchants dared not venture themselves within Central Asiatic territory without standing a risk of falling into life-long

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* The Bukharees also participated in the traffic in Russian prisoners whom they purchased in Khiva, and notwithstanding the uninterrupted and friendly relations with Russia, they always endeavored to evade the question of the liberation of Russian prisoners; when, however, they did liberate them, it was only in small numbers, and this was chiefly done by Bukhara merchants who had dealings with Russia.
bondage. The distance and inaccessibility of the Khanats of Central Asia proved, and still prove, a serious obstacle in adopting more effectual measures for the liberation of prisoners.

By the above-mentioned Ukaz of 1767, however, hostages were only allowed to be detained in cases "when they were convicted of having kidnapped Russian subjects;" such a limitation, owing to the difficulty of bringing the charge home to the offenders, deprived the measure of all its force, as shown by subsequent events. The capture of Russians consequently was still continued, and the high prices commanded by such prisoners* gradually induced the Kirghizes to take part in this shameful traffic.

All the attempts of the Russian Government to obtain the release of prisoners by negotiation were not attended with success, and convinced them that it was quite useless to treat with the Governments of Khiva and Bukhara, as all correspondence and negotiation led to nothing. The best proof of this is afforded by Negri's mission to Bukhara in 1820, and that of Demaison in 1833, which did not mend matters in the least; the Bukharians from that time forward always tried to evade the question of Russian prisoners, never thought of surrendering them, and continued purchasing them in spite of their formal stipulation with M. Negri, and in defiance of all the rights of humanity. And if this was the practice of the Emir of Bukhara, who had striven to maintain friendly relations with Russia, then, as a matter of course, the Khan of Khiva, who had always been at enmity with Russia, did not, even for the

* The price given for a strong middle-aged Russian was 300 Rubles, while slaves of other countries could be purchased for half the sum; women were valued at half the price of a man.
sake of appearances, attempt to disguise his dealings in this respect. His territories were equally inaccessible to all Christians.

The Government at last assigned 3,000 Rubles for the redemption of Russian prisoners; this, however, likewise led to nothing on account of the slaveholders refusing to accept any ransom, as they found it more profitable to retain their hard-working bondsmen, and on account of the extreme difficulty of liberating the prisoners by other means through intermediate agents, who, if caught, were liable to be put to death, or made slaves of. In 1830 the position of the question of Russian prisoners in Central Asia was, according to authentic accounts, as follows:—

"Incited by the high prices fetched by Russians, the Kirghizes kidnapped them even on the line, and disposed of them in the neighbouring countries of Central Asia, principally at Khiva, where, according to reliable information received at the time, there were more than 2,000 Russians in bondage. In remote times men were seized from settlements in the interior, even on the Vo'ga, and beyond that river, and subsequently on the line, but about the year 1830 Russian fishermen on the Caspian were exclusively kidnapped by Kirghizes and Turkmen at the rate of 200 every year. Russian prisoners were sold at Khiva at the Bazaars, and this traffic was participated in not only by the highest Khivan officials, but likewise by Khiva traders, who visited Russia every year, and who, when frequenting the Kirghiz encampments for the purposes of trade, incited the Kirghizes to make prisoners, buying them up beforehand and giving money in anticipation. Although the Orenburg Frontier Commission had at its disposal the above sum of 3,000 Rubles for the redemption of Russian prisoners, it was able only to procure the liberation of a very small number, as sentence
of death was awarded at Khiva to any one who consented to sell his slave in order that he might be restored to his native country."* The Russian prisoners, while sinking under hard labor, and suffering privations of every description, were carefully guarded, and for a first attempt to escape, they were deprived of their nose and ears, a second attempt being punished by sticking the offender on a pole; very few, therefore, ventured to fly, knowing the severe punishment that awaited them in case they were retaken. To deter slaves, as much as possible, from attempting to escape, many were forced to marry native women, and different expedients were employed to convert them to the Mahomedan faith.† In order to diminish this system of man-stealing, efforts were made to detain Kirghizes belonging to the same tribe as the kidnappers. But even this failed, and besides it was hardly just to make a whole tribe answerable for the delinquencies of some of its members. The prisoners in the meanwhile took advantage of every opportunity to implore succour, and their helpless families assailed the local authorities with their prayers, and even accused them of intentionally allowing their relatives to remain in captivity.

Under such circumstances, it was necessary to have recourse to decided and final measures, which were to lay an embargo on all the persons and property of the subjects of Khiva in Russian territory until the liberation of Russian prisoners, and if this should not have the desired effect, to compel restitution by force of arms, the adoption of which latter alternative was repeatedly urged on the Government by the local Russian authorities. The state of affairs in the

* Extracts from notes in the Archives of the Orenburg Corps.
† Count Sukhtelin's letter of the 26th August 1831, accompanied with extracts from 12 letters of Russian prisoners in Central Asia; from these it appears that five Russian prisoners were stuck on a pole for making a second attempt at escaping.
East was at this time extremely favorable for carrying out energetic measures: Baltee-Kuly-Bek, the Bukhara Envoy, and Dus-Nazar, a Tashlikendian, who reached Orenburg in 1830, reported that the dissensions between the Governments of Khiva and Bukhara were ready to break out into open hostilities. The Bukhara Envoy was even instructed to ask the Emperor of Russia to put a limit to the insolent conduct of Khiva, and to promise the co-operation of the then reigning Emir Nasyr-Ulla. All the Bukharrians at Orenburg asserted positively that their Emir, Nasyr-Ulla, should he not actively assist the Russians, would at all events be very glad to see their common enemy curbed and punished. Subsequently the state of animosity existing between the Khivans and some of the Kirghiz Chiefs, the failure of the harvest in Khiva, and the war with Persia, placed Khiva in a very critical position, and promised success for a Russian military expedition; unfortunately, by the events of 1830 to 1832, all the energy of the Government and its military resources were diverted to the West.

The adoption of active measures against Khiva was consequently postponed, and the Khivans remaining so long unpunished, and seeing that the Russians, forgetful of the past, were rather inclined to put an end to the existing strife by friendly negotiation, attributed this in their ignorance to the weakness and even timidity of the Russian Government; hence they did not cease their barbarities and vaunted their strength and invincibility.

It was necessary, however, to alleviate, to some extent, the sufferings of Russian prisoners, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, therefore, while disapproving of the detention of Khivan traders from fear of damaging the trade of Central Asia, proposed the formation in Orenburg of a Philanthropic Society (with a liberal but secret subsidy
from the Government), the chief object of which should be the rescue of Russian prisoners from bondage. But as it has already been explained, the sum of 3,000 Rubles annually allowed by Government was quite sufficient to meet those few cases in which the redemption of a prisoner was possible, and also if the source from whence the proposed Society would derive the greater part of its means were to have become known to the local population and to the Asiatics, the daring and rapacity of the Central Asiatics would have thereby greatly increased, and would have led them to suppose that the Russian Government was really afraid of them, and, therefore, had recourse to secret half measures. On these grounds, the formation of the Philanthropic Society was not deemed expedient, and it was then decided to employ force of arms, for which purpose General Perofski, the Military Governor of Orenburg, was to furnish the Minister of War with a detailed plan of a campaign to Khiva under the disguise of a learned expedition, under military escort, to the Sea of Aral.

With the punishment of the Khivans, who were the prime instigators of the disorders in the Kirghiz Steppes, it was to be expected that the plunder of Caravans and the traffic in Russian prisoners would terminate; and that the penalty incurred by Khiva in the matter of Russian prisoners would serve as a salutary example to the Bukharians, and induce them sooner than any negotiation to surrender the bondsmen held by them.

Circumstances again, however, necessitated the postponement of a war with Khiva until 1839. The cause of this delay was owing to various events in the neighbouring districts and on the line, which entailed on the local administration considerable care and trouble: these were the disturbances among the Kirghizses under the Orenburg and
Siberian jurisdiction, the arrival of new envoys from Khiva and Bukhara giving rise to futile hopes of a pacific solution of affairs in Central Asia, and, lastly, the journey of the present Emperor Alexander, in 1837, through the Orenburg region, all which demanded the presence of the Governor General of Orenburg in the region.

The vastness of the Orenburg region, the variety in race and religion of its population scattered from the southern limits of the Government of Kerim to the Caspian, and from the banks of the Volga to the Rivers Ubagan (an affluent of the Tobol), Irghiz, Turgai, and Emba, its remoteness from the centres of industry and enlightenment in the Empire;—all this for a long time retarded the complete administrative organization of the south-eastern frontiers of the Empire.

Here, besides Russians, were to be found from the River Kama to the River Samara (falling into the Ural near Orenburg) Bashkirs mixed with Mescheriaks, Tep ters, Bobyls, and Kazan Tartars; southwards there were the Kalmyks; from the mouths of the River Ural along the shores of the Caspian and the banks of the Little and Great Uzeney roamed the Kirghizes of the Inner Horde; along the left bank of the Ural were the settlements of the Ural Cossacks; northwards the frontier of the Empire and the confines of the Steppe were in the occupation of the Orenburg Cossacks, while in the Steppe wandered the Kirghizes of the Little Horde. Heterogeneous as was this population, the contrast of its elements was still more striking on account of the diversity of their religious creeds: Mahomedanism (professed by the Bashkirs, Tartars, and Kirghizes), with sects of every description, and even idolatry (this latter by the Kalmyks, and partly by the Tep ters and Mescheriaks), naturally presented great obstacle to a fusion of the population.
Reports of the fertility of some of the districts and the abundance of unoccupied land in this region attracted to it a great number of settlers, who flocked thither in thousands from the neighbouring Governments; the vastness of the country, and the impossibility of having an efficient watch over the population, conduced to the great spread of vagrantism and other disorders, while the remoteness of the region and the hard nature of the service prevented the local authorities finding a sufficient number of trustworthy and educated officials;* for this reason the projected reforms were but slowly carried out, and the change to a new system created discontent among the rude masses,† giving rise to new difficulties and embarrassments. The Kirghizes continued their forays and depredations as formerly, robbing Caravans and seizing settlers as slaves; the Khivans likewise maintained their inimical attitude towards Russia.

Notwithstanding so many obstacles, General Perofski, at that time Military Governor of Orenburg, determined to initiate vigorous measures for allaying the disturbances in the Steppe, and protecting Russian trade from the dangers and obstacles by which it was beset.

The Kirghiz tribes of Djegalbai, Kipchak, Yapas or Djapas, and Durt-Kara had long been in hostile terms, hence

* During 1836 and 1837, 120 Government Officials were prosecuted or expelled the service for various offences committed in their official capacity.

† Thus, in 1836 and 1837, there were disturbances among the workmen of the Iral Iron Works and among the Ural Cossack Troops on account of military reforms, which required the presence of the Military Governor and Troops in the Town of Uralsk. Discontent was also rife among the Orenburg Cossacks on account of their removal to new cantonments. This dissatisfaction was aggravated by incendiaries, who out of revenge, or for the purpose of plunder, set fire to towns and villages. The Steppe was also the scene of frequent conflagrations; on one occasion, near the Town of Troitsk, 300 tents, 20,000 herd of cattle, and 70 Kirghizes were destroyed by these means.
fierce encounters between them were of frequent occurrence, and cattle-lifting expeditions or "Barantas" were carried on without intermission. In addition to this, there were the commotions encouraged by the Khivans in the Steppe; and with the demarcation of the new Orenburg Line in 1833, when land was required for the Cossack settlements, a portion of the land of the Kirghizens was allotted to the former, which created great discontent among the Kirghizens; in 1836 the first attempt was made to collect a tax from the Kirghizens at the rate of R. 150 per tent, and this was regarded by them as another strong grievance. Advantage was taken of these disturbances by robbers, who formed bands and plundered trade caravans and kidnapped Russian subjects.

In 1834, in order to strengthen the influence of Russia over the wandering tribes near the Caspian, and thus to put an end to the existing state of insecurity, the fortress of Novo-Alexandrofsk was erected at the head of Kultuk Bay, and to defend the rest of the boundaries of the Empire from the inructions of the plundering Kirghizens, it was decided to erect a wall and fosse of a hundred versts in length along the whole of that part of the boundary which was not protected by any physical bulwarks; part of this wall was finished in 1836.* But this did not mend matters. In 1836 the Kirghizens of Orenburg plundered the Kirghizens of the Siberian jurisdiction, despoiled the Bukhara Caravan

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* The Orenburg Line extended on the north from the River Tobol, and the Onia, which empties itself in the Tobol as far as Tuguzaki (an affluent of the Onia); from the mouth of Tuguzaki as far as the River Ori the boundary was open, and on this extent it was proposed to erect a continuous rampart similar to the Chinese wall; from the fortress of Orsk the line proceeded along the River Aral as far as the Caspian Sea. In 1836, 18 versts of the wall were finished. It was commenced 45 versts north of the Orsk fortress, and was six feet high, which was also the depth of the moat. It was expected that the whole work would be completed in six years, and R. S. 2,50,000 were assigned for its execution.
proceeding from Troitsk with 50 camels, robbed two Russian Merchants, contrived to drive off cattle from the line, and to carry away prisoners, whilst near the fortress of Novo-Alexandrofsk, instigated by the Khivans, the Adaefs (the Kirghizes of the Adaef Horde) drove away 26,000 sheep belonging to Russian Merchants, seized R. S. 15,000 worth of merchandize, which was being sent from Novo-Alexandrofsk overland to Gurief-Gorodok, and even menaced the fortress itself. At the same time the pirates obtained possession of a Government boat on the Caspian, capturing Lieutenant Gusef and five of his crew,* and also took two Cossack barges which were sailing from Astrakhan to Gurief. It was determined to punish the Kirghizes by force of arms without loss of time, and several expeditions were accordingly made in the Steppes, the details of which we give at foot.†

* Lieutenant Gusef and two men of his command were ransomed by the Commander of the Novo-Alexandrofsk fortress for R. S. 3,985.

† Cruise over the Caspian in 1836.—For the punishment of the pirates on the Caspian, a detachment of Ural Cossacks cruised about for three and half months in four vessels; the pirates, however, did not venture to show themselves.

The expedition to Buzachi, 1836 and 1837.—A detachment of Cavalry, composed of Ural Cossacks, and under the command of Colonel Mansurof, was despatched during the winter against the Kirghiz tribe of Adaefs, with whom the fugitive pirates and Khiva Emissaries generally found shelter. The detachment was composed of one Staff Officer, ten superior Officers, nine Under-officers, and 530 Cossacks. To the force were attached Lieutenant Colonel Danilefsky, and Chilliayef, Adjutant of the Governor General. The detachment left Gurief on the 20th December, and proceeded over the ice in sledges to the fortress of Novo-Alexandrofsk; on the 24th December it safely reached the Prorvin post (which connected the fortress of Novo-Alexandrofsk with the Ural Line), having in four days traversed more than 200 verstes over a very difficult route, often obstructed by ridges of ice so steep that the horses were unable to cross them without assistance. In some places the ice gave way; to obtain water for drinking and cooking purposes they were obliged to melt the ice and snow. On the road between Prorvinsk islands and the fortress of Novo-Alexandrofsk (where a supply of provisions and forage had been prepared for the detachment), a violent gale broke up the ice, and 150 of the Cossacks were cut off from the main body and carried out to sea
The result produced by these active measures was the restoration of tranquillity during the whole of 1837, and a temporary increase in the trade with the neighbouring countries of Central Asia; several tribes of Turkmen likewise, awed by the strength of Russian arms, evinced a readiness to subject themselves to Russia.

As early as 1835, the Turkmen tribes of Igdyr and Barunchuk, who wandered between Mangishlak and Alexander-Bai, petitioned through the Commander of Novo-Alexandrofsk to be taken under Russian protection, and now the Kuldai and Gdavdyr tribes made a similar request through the authorities at Astrakhan.

on floating pieces of ice. With great presence of mind the Cossacks formed a bridge of the broken pieces of ice (by means of ropes which they attached to their pikes), and in this manner they reached the firm ice and gained the shore in safety after having lost only two horses. After loading their stores on camels supplied by Kirghizes, the detachment reached Novo-Alexandrofsk the 2nd January 1837, and set out again on the following day in two separate bodies, and proceeded across the Gulf of Kaidak, after which one portion proceeded on as a flying detachment, whilst the other loaded horses with provisions and provender, and followed on foot in the rear by easy stages. The 7th January the light detachment came upon the Auls of the tribe of Djemeni, who were pirates by profession; the unexpected attack of the Russians was crowned with complete success; the Kirghizes were put to rout; the spoil taken consisted of 350 camels, which were loaded with provisions, and the detachment was again divided. Lieutenant Colonel Danilefsky advanced westwards to the Buzachi Peninsula, whilst Colonel Mansuref marched to the south and south-west of Mangishlak; small patrols besides were sent in all directions in search of pirates, who were attacked and scattered over all points, and some were captured having in their possession property plundered from the Government cutter. Lieutenant Colonel Danilefsky set fire to all the pirate vessels he found on the sea coast, and Adjutant Chilliayef with a detached party chased the robbers far southwards. On the 24th January the detachment returned safely to Novo-Alexandrofsk with 53 prisoners, and the quantity of cattle seized was so great that the sale of these animals covered all the expenses of the expedition. In this manner the detachment traversed 120 versts in the course of 20 days at a time when the frost was not less than 15° and sometimes even 25°; the loss consisted of two deaths, and a few Cossacks wounded in the skirmishes. The Cossack horses which had fallen were all replaced with those of the enemy.
It has been already observed that the Turkmen took the oath of allegiance to Russia in 1791, but as little attention was paid to them, they attached themselves to Khiva. The matter was again taken into consideration, and it was proposed to place the Turkmen and Adaefs under the control of a special Sultan-Governor, giving him a special force of Cossacks for supporting his authority, as had been done in the case of three Kirghiz Rulers of the eastern, middle, and western portion of the lesser Kirghiz-Kaisak-Horde.

After this, notice was given to the Adaefs and their allies, the Turkmen, that all future pillage and robberies would be visited by a similar punishment.

Expedition in 1836 as far as the Barsuki Sands.—A report having reached the Russian authorities of the appearance of Khiva Emissaries in the Russian Steppe for inciting the Kirghizes to disobedience and robbery, a proclamation was issued, threatening severe punishment in case of any violence or lawless proceedings. Disregarding, however, this warning, and instigated by the Khivans, the Kirghizes attacked, near the River Irits, a caravan belonging to an Orenburg Merchant, and kidnapped two clerks. To punish the perpetrators of this outrage, a detachment, consisting of 1,000 men, who volunteered from the Bashkir cantonments on the frontier, was sent off under General Dreminakin. To the force were attached 31 Bashkir Elders, 40 Under-officers, and 30 foot soldiers mounted on horses. On the 6th July the detachment set out, and crossing the Ural was joined at Orsk by a train of provisions sufficient for 15 days. (Besides this supply the Bashkirs were furnished with 20 days' rations placed on 350 horses.) On the appearance of the detachment in the Steppes the Russian clerks were immediately set at liberty, and even a part of the goods was returned. After an uninterrupted pursuit of the robbers, the detachment came upon part of them, 500 versts from the line, beyond the River Emba; here the Auls of the plunderers were surrounded, the chief culprits seized, and the cattle taken to defray the expenses of the expedition. The other body of the robbers fled to the Barsuki Sands, where pursuit would have been attended with great difficulty; the detachment, therefore, returned to the fortress of the Ihiusk on the line, having been absent 20 days, and lost only one Bashkir.

Expedition in 1836 to the Sands of Taisingan.—Intelligence was received that a portion of Adaefs, having sent their property into the Taisingon Sands (opposite the fortress of Kulgan, on the lower Ural Line), meditated an attack on the fortress of Novo-Alexandrofsk; 300 Ural Cossacks of the line were therefore sent to the above Sands, under the command of Colonel Osipof; only a few of the robbers were caught, but a large quantity of cattle was taken. In this expedition one Cossack was killed, and several horses; the Kirghizes lost about 15 men.
But the Imperial Asiatic Committee was of opinion, the subjection of the Turkmen to Russian authority was at that period untimely, and proposed, without giving a decisive answer, to keep them well-disposed towards Russia by flattering them with promises of countenance and support, in order to secure them as allies in the event of a war with Khiva.

The operations of the Russian detachments in 1838 are enumerated in the accompanying note,* in order not to break the thread of the narrative respecting the obstructions

* The chief instigators and leaders of the marauders in the Steppe in 1838 were the Sultans Kassim and Kenissoor, father and son of the Siberian Kirghizes, and Tsetai, who fled beyond the Ural in 1837, and allied himself with a former fugitive of the same horde, Khaip Galief; lastly, Djulaman, who withdrew at the time of the Russian occupation of the Ilets Line in 1820, and had since then continued to harbour a bitter feeling towards the Russians; all these three belonged to the middle Horde. They all, more or less, found an asylum at Khiva, but Khaip and Tsetai were more especially supported by the Khivans. Khaip had commenced his plundering exploits already in 1832 on the line itself; he was, however, soon obliged to leave the scenes of his exploits, and on his re-appearance in the Russian Steppe in 1835, led a quiet nomad life, wishing, as it were, to expiate his past offences. But he was soon summoned to Khiva, allied himself to the Khan by giving his daughter in marriage to the latter, and adopted the name of Khan of the Western (from Khiva) Kirghizes (similarly as Menembai had formerly taken the name of Khan of the Eastern [from Khiva] Kirghizes); but in 1838, acting in concert with other fugitives, he appeared with a band of Kirghizes and Tureomans to collect a tribute from the Russian Kaisaks. His band attract-ed many unruly spirits, and he soon found himself at the head of 3,000 men; he then directed his steps towards the Rivers Ilek, Kobra, Ora, to the source of the Tobol, and gradually approached the Russian Line. The position of the well-disposed tribes of Kirghizes in such cases is very embarrassing; if they do not manage to find refuge near the line, they are obliged to make common cause with the marauders, as all oppo-sition would entail immediate loss of all they possess.

In June 1838 the detachments were despatched into the Steppe for the protection of the peaceful Kirghizes and the defence of the picket line, which was not able to prevent the irruption of so large a band as that headed by Khaip; these detachments consisted (1) of 500 Bashkirs, 50 mounted sharp shooters with two light field guns, under the command of Colonel Padurof, Commander of the permanent force at Orenburg; (2) of 450 Orenburg and Ural Cossacks, 50 sharp shooters and two field guns, under the command of Colonel Heke; (3) of 700 Cossacks of the Orenburg and Bashkirk troops,
which the trade encountered in consequence of the disturbances in the Steppe and the hostile conduct of the Khivans; we shall only here observe that, as the chief cause of all the difficulties in the way of the trade—the unpunished rapacity of the Khivans—still existed, affairs from 1838 resumed their former aspect.

with five guns, under the command of Colonel Mansurof. The duty imposed on the first of these detachments was to protect the central portion of the line and the Kirghizes in the vicinity; this detachment, therefore, remained behind, while the two others were marched into the Steppe; the second detachment was reinforced at the Ural Line by the Sultan-Ruler of the western portion of the Horde, against which Tsotai was meditating an attack; the united force of Russians and Kirghizes fell unexpectedly on the marauders and gained a complete victory over them; Tsotai losing his life during the conflict. On the Russian side were only seven wounded. The third detachment joining the Sultan-Ruler of the central portion of the Horde marched to the East to the upper source of the River Irgiz, where it succeeded in surrounding the Allies of the rebellious tribe of Durt-Kar, and capturing several ringleaders; a great quantity of cattle was driven off for compensating the Kirghizes who had been plundered by the marauders, and for covering the expenses of the expedition. On this occasion about 80 Kirghizes were killed, and on the Russian side two men were wounded.

The chief ringleader of the rebels, Sultan Khaip-Galief, fled to Khiva, whilst Kassim and Keïissari, against whom the Governor General of Western Siberia had sought the aid of Orenburg Troops, retired to Tashkend.

In the winter of 1838, intelligence was received that the Ablaef Sultans of the Siberian jurisdiction, with the relations and followers of Keïissari, were wintering on the River Turgai, and that Kassim and Keïissari were about to join them there for the purpose of organizing fresh robberies and attacks on the line. To prevent this attack, early in the spring (March 1839), a force of 1,900 Cossacks and Bashkirs, accompanied by a hundred friendly Kirghizes (of the tribes of Chipchak and Kyreisk) with two guns, was despatched under the command of Colonel Tebedef. This force surprised Ablaef with all his followers in their winter quarters, captured Ablaef himself and 13 other Kirghizes, and killed about 50 of the enemy, many head of cattle falling into the hands of the captors. To pursue the marauders farther was deemed impossible on account of the approaching spring and overflowing of the rivers. On its return to the line, the expeditionary force encountered heavy frosts and snow storms, which succeeding heavy rains caused it to suffer considerably, especially the horses, of which nearly 600 perished. In the mean while, Keïissari having awaited the return of Tebedef's force to the line, re-appeared on the River Turgai with 3,000 men, plundered the Kirghizes of the eastern portion of the Horde, to the amount of 200,000 whilst his detached bands attacked the line, where they took eight Russian prisoners and captured some Russian fishermen on the River Tobol.
The tranquillity that marked the year 1837 sufficiently showed the extent of development the Russian trade might attain in the East under more favorable circumstances. At this period (at the latter end of 1836 and 1837) merchandise was brought to Orenburg, Troitsk, and Orsk from Bukhara, Khiva, and Tashkend on 12,000 camels, and to the amount of more than R. 6,000,000, and the value of goods exported to Central Asia amounted to about R. 5,000,000, the chief article of importation consisting of cotton, which only finds a market in Russia. The exports from Russia to Central Asia did not increase at the same time; on the contrary, they yearly decreased owing to the unsafety of the routes leading to the neighbouring Khanates, to the dangers to which Russian traders were exposed when visiting the Khanates, and to the oppression they suffered in the eastern markets. It has been repeatedly stated during this narrative that Russian Merchants did not dare to appear at all in Khiva, and that even at Bukhara, which always preserved commercial intercourse with Russia, they were subjected to great hardships: thus, for instance, from the Asiatic Merchants the Bukharians collected a duty of 10 per cent., while from the Russians they took 40 per cent., subjecting them at the same time to other exactions, such as always valuing the Russian goods at a higher rate than they were worth; this was very provoking, seeing that the traders from the Central Asiatic States were liberally treated in Russia, and even enjoyed certain immunities from taxation. On these grounds, the Russian traders feeling aggrieved complained that the whole trade was in the hands of Asiatics, and in 1837 they petitioned the Government to insist that, 1stly, the Russian Merchants in Bukhara should possess the same privileges as Asiatics; 2ndly, that permission should be granted for a Consul to reside there for the protection of the interests of the Russian Merchants; 3rdly, that a fortress might be
established on the Syr-Daria for the safety of the trade; and
4thly, that the Asiatic traders should pay the customary guild
dues, and that a 10 per cent. *ad valorem* duty be levied on
their goods.

But as many years of experience had shown the Rus-
sians the uselessness of negotiating with the Central Asiatic
Rulers, it was deemed more advisable to free the trade from
the restrictions imposed on it by the Asiatics by severe
measures, and from 1836 preparations were commenced for
carrying them out.

Beyond all doubt the proper plan to pursue was, to show
by severe example that every violation of international rights
would be visited with punishment. Accordingly, in the sum-
mer of 1836, an imperial decree was issued ordering the
detention on the Orenburg and Siberian Lines, and in the
town of Astrakhan, of all Khivans, they being the subjects
of the neighbouring Khanate most hostile to Russia; these
prisoners were not to be liberated before all the just demands
of Russia were satisfied, especially those relating to the
liberation of the Russian bondsmen.

This edict was proclaimed in Orenburg on the 28th
August, when all the Khiva Merchants were at the Bazaar,
their camels loaded with goods, and the caravan was on
the point of starting. These Khivans were confined at
Orenburg and in the district towns, in the guard houses,
prisons, and unoccupied Government Buildings, and an allow-
ance of 50 Cop. per diem was granted at first for each indi-
vidual a day, but when they were formed into messes, half
the sum was found sufficient.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Goods Amounting to</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Orenburg</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>700,000 R. S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Astrakhan</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>572</td>
<td><strong>1,400,000</strong> R. S.</td>
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Not a single Khivan subject happened to be on the Siberian Line at the time the decree was issued.

The captured Khivans had recourse to all possible stratagems to obtain their liberty and save their goods: they disavowed themselves as subjects of Khiva, and asserted the goods were not theirs, but that they belonged to Bukharians; some even evinced a desire to become Russian subjects; but this desire on their part was disregarded by the authorities, as it was known that the application, if successful, would be followed by all the prisoners merely with a view of escaping from Russia.

Meanwhile the Khans of Khiva and Bukhara were formally made acquainted with the step that had been taken; the Khan of Bukhara was assured of the friendliness of Russia, but the Khan of Khiva was informed that his captured subjects would only receive their liberty on the release of all the Russian prisoners in the Khanate.

Following this, in January 1837, with the return of the Tartar messenger, a Tartar from Khiva, who had been the bearer of the above communication, there arrived at Orenburg a Khivan Envoy, Kabylbai, on a mission of mediation; he was, however, informed that, under the existing circumstances, it was quite impossible to recognize him as ambassador, and that the Russian prisoners must be released before any negotiations could be entered into; the letters of which he was the bearer were nevertheless examined; one bore no address, and was alleged by Kabylbai to have been written by the Khan to his Imperial Majesty the Emperor; the other was from the Mehter or Minister of Finances to the Governor General; but in neither of these was there any mention made of the release of the prisoners. The Khan, among other things, attributed all the misunderstandings to private
Court intrigues, and complained of the erection of the Novo-Alexandrofsk Fortress. The letter to the Governor General was more indefinite and evasive, and may serve as a pattern of Asiatic diplomacy. The Khiva Envoy was furnished with a fresh demand in a letter from the Vice Chancellor to the Khan for the release of all the Russian prisoners within four months' time as an earnest of the pacific intentions of the Khan of Khiva.

Shortly afterwards (27th September), a special courier arrived from Khiva with an important letter to the President of the Boundary Commission, stating that the Khan had ordered that all the Russian prisoners should be collected and sent back to their native country; by the end of October intelligence was received from Kabylbai, from the banks of the River Emba, to the effect that he was on his road to Orenburg with the Russian prisoners. Preparations were immediately commenced for the reception of several hundreds of these poor sufferers, but when at last, on the 30th November, the Bukharian caravan arrived, accompanied by the Khiva Envoy Kabylbai, it was found that only 25 Russians had been set free.

The return even of so small a number of prisoners was unprecedented, and the rejoicing at such a happy event was general; the whole population of Orenburg turned out to meet their released countrymen, and received them near the Bazaar; the Clergy offered public thanksgivings and besprinkled the released captives with holy water, while the merchants gave them a dinner.

The Khiva Envoy was again the bearer of letters which, according to the custom of those Asiatics, were without signatures. One of them, with the seal of the Khan on a separate piece of paper, was said to be addressed to His Majesty the
Emperor; the others to the Governor General and the President of the Boundary Commission. All the letters, as of old, were vague and indefinite, affairs being but slightly alluded to; at the same time the Russian prisoners who had been released were almost all old men, who had been in slavery for 30 and 40 years, and one of them for 55 years; they were all consequently worn out and of no further use to the Khivans.

According to the statements of the liberated men, Ala-keel, the Khan of Khiva, was in favor of releasing the Russians, and was strongly urged to adopt this measure by his brother, a clever and popular man, but apprehensions soon arose in the Council of the Khan that an immediate fulfilment of the Russian demands would lead to fresh requests, and Khiva, conscious of the many injuries she had inflicted on Russia, feared lest, sooner or later, she would be called on to make reparation for the robberies committed on the Caravans, and to give satisfaction for the murder of Prince Bekovitch Cherkeski, Ambassador to Khiva under Peter the Great.

It was, therefore, decided not to yield at once to the demands of Russia, but to temporize by releasing a few prisoners at a time and by sending presents. It was owing to the adoption of this policy that, regardless of the Khan's formal announcement of the liberation of all the Russian prisoners, only 25 were sent with the Khiva Envoy Kabylbai, and that rich presents, consisting of costly shawls and valuable horses with magnificent trappings, were offered as gifts to the Emperor.

But Kabylbai was again informed, both verbally and in writing, that the detained subjects of Khiva would not receive their liberty until all the Russian prisoners were released; the presents were rejected, and the Khiva merchandise,
which had been brought by 20 merchants in the suite of the ambassador, was sealed and returned. For the released 25 Russian prisoners, five Khivans, with all their property, were immediately restored to liberty.

The Khan of Khiva, seeing that the time of reckoning with Russia had arrived, and finding that promises alone were of little avail, strove hard to induce Bukhara to join him in a league against Russia; but, notwithstanding his persistent endeavours in this direction, the Emir of Bukhara not only rejected the alliance, but even despatched (in August 1836) an envoy to Russia, in order to strengthen the friendly relations with that Empire. This envoy, Balta-Kuli-Bek, arrived at Orenburg with a suite of 20 persons, and with an elephant as a present for the Emperor, and also brought with him three Russians who had escaped from Khiva. The Bukhara Envoy visited St. Petersburg, from whence he returned in 1839 to Orenburg, and in October the same year he departed, accompanied by some mine-engineers (Captain Kobalefsky and Lieutenant Hengros) who were sent expressly at the desire of the Emir for the purpose of making minerological surveys; meeting, however, some Khiva tribute collectors on their route, these Officers were compelled to take flight, and unexpectedly made their appearance at the Russian fort on the Ak-Bulak, and were afterwards sent back to Petersburg.

In August 1838, two Khiva Envoys, bringing five Russian prisoners, arrived with a Bukhara Caravan. The letter brought by them (as usual without signature and unsealed) contained a request that a Russian Official should be sent to Khiva to collect and receive the Russian prisoners; the five prisoners who were returned were, however, not sent by the Khan, but by a merchant whose relations were detained at Orenburg. As the Khan had
been repeatedly warned against sending envoys until the release of the Russian prisoners, the rejected envoy, or more properly the representative of the Khiva traders, was charged to inform the Emir that, as long as the Russian demands were not fulfilled, the Khiva Envoys would not be recognised, and if sent would be detained. All the Khivans to the number of 13, who had accompanied the envoy, were detained at Orenburg.

Regardless, however, of this discomfiture, in August 1839, two envoys again arrived, Imbai-Babaef and Seid-Mametniaz with 80 Russians, sent in the name of the Khan: of these, 32 men were taken from the Caspian Sea during the spring of the same year, and, as the Khan naively expressed himself in his letter, formed his share, having been received by him in tribute from the sea robbers. The hasty despatch of these envoys from Khiva was owing to intelligence having been received there of the establishment of some Russian forts or intermediate posts on the Rivers Emba and Ak-Bulak, preparatory to the expedition to Khiva; already in March 1839 the plan drawn up by the Committee, consisting of the Vice-Chancellor, the Minister of War, and the Governor General of Orenburg received the Imperial sanction; this was the plan of an expedition to Khiva for the purpose of compelling the Khan by force of arms to deliver up all the Russians, and to establish complete security for the Russian Caravan trade. Preparations were accordingly made in the summer of 1839 for the construction of advanced posts in the Steppe for storing the provisions necessary for the expedition.

The authorities having been informed that Seid, one of the Khiva Envoys sent to Orenburg, had bought seven Russians of some Turkmen on the eve of starting to Orenburg, would not allow him to return; the other, Imbai,
was sent back with a letter similar in tenor to the former. In the mean while, notwithstanding the many promises of the Khan to release all the Russians and the embassies sent by him, bands of Kaisak robbers invaded the Russian territory in 1838 at the instigation of the Khivans for the purpose of plunder; and in 1839 the Khan ordered 300 of these freebooters to proceed to Mangishlak on a plundering expedition, and in the same year 150 men were captured on the Caspian and sold into slavery. The Khan also sent emissaries to the River Emba, the Syr-Daria, to the Mangishlak, and Busach Peninsula, with verbal and written orders for the destruction of all tribes that acknowledged the Russian rule, and would not supply Khiva with a contingent of armed horsemen. It appeared subsequently that all these measures were adopted, not with the intention of declaring war against Russia, but with the sole object of making as many Russian prisoners as possible, in order to force the Russians to exchange them for the Khivans detained at Orenburg.

The Khan himself at this time was in a very undecided state of mind; he mistrusted the moderate demands of Russia. Being a man of small intellect and no education, and wielding irresponsible power, the Khan Alakul could not reconcile himself to the thought of yielding to the necessity of the moment. Councils were held at the palace in the nighttime; it was several times decided to deliver up the Russian prisoners, but at the end of a few days, on reconsideration, an attempt would again be made to deceive the Russians with another letter and further false promises. At the same time, foreign goods became dearer every year at Khiva, while their own produce remained unsold; for raw cotton, the principal staple of Khiva, there was no price and no purchasers; besides all the chief merchants were detained in
Russia, and the limit of time allowed the Khan for the fulfilment of the demands of the Russians having long expired, there could be no hopes of their release. But the Khan still continued obdurate.

Thus Russia was compelled by force of circumstances to adopt strong measures against Khiva; the recommendation of the Special Committee, approved by his Imperial Majesty on the 24th March 1839, were as follows:—

1st.—To commence at once the organization of an expedition against Khiva, and to establish the necessary depots and stations on the route without delay.

2nd.—To conceal the real object of the expedition, which was to be given out as a scientific expedition to the Aral Sea.

3rd.—To postpone the departure of the expedition until the settlement of English matters in Afghanistan, in order that the influence and impression of the Russian proceedings in Central Asia might have more weight, and that England, in consequence of her own conquests, might no longer have any right for troubling the Russian Government for explanations; on no account, however, to delay the expedition later than the spring of 1840.

4th.—In the event of the expedition terminating successfully, to replace the Khan of Khiva by a trustworthy Kaisak Sultan; to establish order and security as far as possible; to release all the prisoners, and to give full freedom to the Russian trade.

5th.—To assign 425,000 Silver Rubles and 12,000 Gold Ducats, the estimated amount of the expedition, and to supply the detachment with arms and the indispensable material, and to allow the Governor General of Orenburg to avail himself of the assistance of the local Artillery and Engineer Force.
Soon after (on the 10th October 1839), final dispositions were issued for the Russian operations on the occupation of Khiva, and a formal instrument was drawn up for the guidance of the future Khan of Khiva, defining his relations towards Russia, and guaranteeing peace between the two countries.

Thus, at the outside of the limit of time proposed for the expedition, that is, from the spring of 1839 until the spring of 1840, there remained only a year for making the necessary preparations, but circumstances, however, required the departure of the expedition eight months earlier than originally contemplated; the reasons for hastening the expedition were—1stly, the important consideration that, if the detachment were to leave Orenburg early in the spring of 1840, it would have to traverse the arid saline Steppes in the sultry summer months, while, on the other hand, the lateness of the autumn and winter of 1839 were considered particularly favorable for the march of the troops, inasmuch as a sufficient supply of water could be obtained on the route; and 2ndly, the efforts of the English at this period to penetrate into Central Asia, with the object of establishing their influence there and inciting the Khivans, offered an obstinate resistance against Russia, on which latter point it will be necessary to dwell at greater length.

No one can seriously affirm that the English are not anxious for the welfare of other nations, but each, we trust, will agree with us when we say that, nevertheless, the interests of England are held by them as paramount to everything. It is also generally known that the English have from remote times diligently watched the progress of events in the whole world (in the interest of Great Britain be it observed), and that they are always troubled and dissatisfied if fate allows any other nation to have influence over the progress of
mankind; this is the policy of the ancient Phœnicians and Carthaginians, and of the more modern Venetians, Genoese, Spaniards, and Dutch; in one word, this is the policy of maritime and commercial powers.

It is not astonishing, therefore, that the English, not being thoroughly acquainted with the existing state of affairs in Central Asia, should have been considerably alarmed at the Russian proceedings in the Kirghiz Steppe, and have attributed the measures adopted by the Russian Government for securing the boundaries and trade of the Empire to aggressive projects, and even to the old project of penetrating into India, the possibility of which was again recalled to their recollection by the first Napoleon’s well-known scheme of an overland expedition to India.* Hence arose a natural desire on the part of the English to ascertain the real importance in political respects of the possession of the Central Asiatic Steppes by Russia, and the possibility of penetrating from this side into India.

From 1824, therefore, a succession of English Agents, regardless of all obstacles, penetrate into Central Asia, and even some of them return to their native country through Russia.

At first (in the year 1830), many Englishmen, under motives ostensibly evangelical, settled themselves in the town of Orenburg; but when it was perceived that these Missionaries turned their attention to other matters, they were

* While yet first Consul, Napoleon I in 1800 proposed, as is known, to the Emperor Paul I, the plan of a combined French and Russian Campaign to India, and at that time a rupture had broken out between England and Russia, the despatch of Don Cossacks to India was agreed on, and the Cossack Altaman or Commander-in-Chief, Count Orloff-Denisof, received orders to march on India with all the Don Regiments. The "Rescript" of the Emperor Paul I relating to this is inserted in the Appendix of General Milutin’s Works on “Suvarof’s Campaigns in 1779,” published in 1853.
requested to leave. Losing all hope of extending their influence in Central Asia from the side of Russia, the English commenced penetrating thither principally from India and through Persia. Thus from 1824 Central Asia had been visited by Moorcroft, Connoly, Wolf, Burns, and Strange, and later by Stoddard, Abbot, Shakespere, and again by Burns near the time of the Russian Khiva Expedition, or during the very period.

All the persons here enumerated, with the exception of Wolf, were in the employ of the enterprizing East India Company, and, of course, it was not curiosity alone and their own affairs that allured them into Central Asia. While these English agents were collecting every possible information on the spot, the Russians had no means of following this example, and were even unacquainted with their movements; the visits of these English agents to the various Khanats and the details of their journeys became only known to Russia incidentally through their published works, which, of course, did not contain all the results of their investigations. All the information that the Russians procured was meagre and obscure, and was supplied to them by Asiatics, who either through ignorance or timidity were not always able to furnish really important and useful accounts: owing to a want of officials well acquainted with the Oriental languages, it was found necessary to confide in uneducated Asiatics, or to employ agents who, being ignorant of the Oriental languages, were obliged to have interpreters attached to them. The principal purveyors of intelligence to the Russians were consequently almost always Mahomedans, who being involuntarily under the influence of the Rulers of Central Asia, in whom under the régime of Mahomedanism was also centred the highest ecclesiastical power, did not discharge their duties very willingly, nor in a reliable manner they were
not always able to disclose all they knew, and were altogether very uncertain media of communication, notwithstanding that, as Mahomedans, they had in every respect much greater facilities than Christians for gaining access to the different countries of Central Asia.

Already in 1828 Alexander Burns commenced his survey of the River Indus; and having become convinced in 1830 of the navigability of the Indus over its whole course of about 700 miles, he represented to the English Government all the importance of this river, both in political and commercial respects. At the same time some Russian goods which had by accident found their way to the banks of the Indus, led him to the conclusion that rivalry between the Russian and English manufactures had already commenced at this point, and he not only succeeded in convincing his Government of this false supposition, but also induced it to believe in the possibility of the appearance of Russian political agents on the River Indus, and even of a Russian force.

Here then we have an explanation of the repeated attempts made by English agents to penetrate from India through the whole of Central Asia as far as the Russian boundaries, in order to assure themselves of the justness or otherwise of these apprehensions, and these movements on the part of the English were at the same time a source of serious alarm to the Russian Government.

The Russians had reliable information that the agents of the East India Company were continually appearing either at Khiva or Bukhara; they were also aware that this enterprising Company having enormous means at its command was endeavouring not only to establish its commercial influence throughout the whole of Asia, but was also desirous of extending the limits of its Asiatic possessions. The law
of England, the industry and wealth of the people, the tendency of the English to act in unison in commercial associations, and lastly the cupidity of the Asiatic Rulers,—all this supplied the English with great facilities for strengthening their influence in Central Asia, the principal market for Russian manufactured goods, and for doing her serious damage by establishing regular commercial relations with Central Asia; it was only necessary to allow the possibility of the English supplying the Khivans and Turkmen the nearest and most hostile neighbours of Russia, and likewise the Kirghizes with arms and ammunition in order to become convinced of the necessity of counteracting the schemes of England, whose agents did not even try to conceal their hopes, in their published accounts, of becoming masters not only of the whole trade between the River Indus and the Hindoo Kush, but likewise of the market of Bukhara, the most important in Central Asia.

It was accordingly decided in 1835, in order to watch the English agents and counteract their efforts, to send Russian agents into Central Asia, and to establish a Russian Company so as to enable Russia to compete then with the English trade. Although a small trading Company was formed after the Khiva expedition, when the Steppes were rendered comparatively safe, the Company soon suspended operations. At the same time, in order to watch the march of events in Central Asia, Sub-Lieutenant Vitkevitch was despatched thither in the capacity of agent: in the winter of 1835 he accidentally got to Bukhara accompanied by some Kirghizes, and without concealing the fact of his being a Russian Officer, spent several months at Bukhara, and returned safely to Orenburg, proving his aptitude for such a mission. This Officer travelled several years in Persia and Caboul during the most interesting period of the English
expedition to Afghanistan, contrived to acquire the friendship of Dost-Mahomed of Caboul, whom he succeeded in disposing favorably towards Russia, and returned to Petersburg in 1839. Unfortunately, in the same year, he committed suicide, destroying before his death all the materials he had collected.*

* This encounter with Vitkevitch is mentioned by Burns in his Notes on Caboul, but Burns incorrectly calls him there Vilkevitch and Vikovitch. At the same time, Vitkevitch is spoken of by Burns as being an accomplished Officer, and thoroughly acquainted with the French, Turkish, and Persian languages. The following particulars which we have collected concerning Vitkevitch may not be considered uninteresting:—

Ivan Vitkevitch, a noble of the Government of Vilna, and a pupil of the Kroquesk School, was in 1824 sentenced to forfeiture of nobility and banishment to Orenburg for organizing a Secret Society, called the "black brothers," and for writing revolutionary letters and verses. In April of the same year, he was transported to Orenburg, and drafted as Private into one of the Battalions of the Orenburg Corps, but was afterwards transferred to the Garrison Battalion of Orsk, which is now the 5th Regiment of the line. After the lapse of six years (namely, in October 1830), on the recommendation of the Commander of the Corps, Count Suchtelen, and in consideration of his praiseworthy conduct, good talents, and knowledge of the Persian and Kirghiz languages, Ivan Vitkevitch was promoted by Imperial command to the grade of Under-Officer, and attached to the Orenburg Boundary Commission. In 1831 Vitkevitch was despatched to the camp of the Sultan Ruler of the central portion of the Lesser Kirghiz-Kaisak Horde, and whilst camping with the Sultan, frequently rendered valuable service, and displayed great bravery on several occasions (especially at the attack made by the rapacious Djagalbalints on the Sultan's uals). His reports, moreover, "were always full of interesting information and remarks, and not one of his predecessors in the Steppe had been able to form so correct a judgment of the Kirghizes or of their relations to each other." In August of the same year, Count Suchtelen recommended the promotion of so useful a man to the rank of Officer; and reported that, with the exception of secretiveness of disposition (the natural result of so many misfortunes), the behaviour of Vitkevitch was everything that could be desired; the ability and talents of Vitkevitch attracted general attention, particularly that of the celebrated Alexander Humboldt, who also interested himself on behalf of Vitkevitch at St. Petersburg. But Vitkevitch's promotion to the rank of Officer only took place in 1834 when he was appointed to the Orenburg Regiment of Cossacks.

In 1835 when sent in search and for the release of two Russian prisoners reported to be amongst the Kirghizes wandering on the rivers Irgiz and Surgai, he was driven by a snow-storm to Bukharn, from whence, however, he returned in safety.
Meanwhile the intelligence which reached the Russians from Central Asia in 1839 gave rise to further apprehensions. Tulia-Bergan, a caravan leader, on his return from Bukhara in the same year, reported "that 25 English had arrived at Khiva from Caboul with offers to the Khan of troops and money against the Russians." The reports of the appearance of English agents and of their persistent interference in the relations between Khiva and Russia received still greater confirmation at later periods, and as at this time the English forces had penetrated into Caboul, whence they had expelled Dost-Mahomed, who was favorable to Russia, and were only divided from the territory of Bukhara by the Hindoo Kush; it was to these circumstances that the vacillation of the Khan of Khiva in the

On being promoted to the next rank, Vitkevitch, owing to his knowledge of the Oriental languages and his striking abilities, was appointed secret agent in 1837, and sent through Persia to Caboul. From all that has been stated in this chapter, the aim of Vitkevitch's perilous journey must be evident. The Russian agent received only verbal instructions, and as he was not to disclose anywhere that he was sent by the Government, very little is known of his travels; the only records in existence relating to his journeys are short reports to the Commanding Officer of the Orenburg District, announcing his arrival at the different eastern towns; in one of these reports the Commanding Officer mentions (the report from Nishapour, 30th September 1837), "that the intelligence received at Teheran, of the arrival of Burns at Caboul, had compelled Count Simoultch to send Vitkevitch immediately thither;" on this occasion the Shah himself selected the route he was to take, which was east of Herat through Tursliz and Kapi, and through the deserts of Sistan to Kandahar. "But the intrigues of the English and the attacks of the plundering Jezare Turkomans and Beluchis present formidable obstacles, and it requires some stroke of good fortune to avoid a disagreeable encounter," says Vitkevitch in his report. However, he reached Caboul, where, as already said, he greatly surprised Burns by appearing before him in his uniform of a Cossack Officer.

The most important result gained by Vitkevitch during his stay at Caboul lay in the acquisition of the good favour of the Caboul Ruler, Dost-Mahomed, with whom Vitkevitch was on very friendly terms; he kept up a constant correspondence with him, and even received letters from him on his return to Russia. It was at this time that Dost-Mahomed presented the Emperor of Russia with an elephant.
matter of the surrender of the Russian prisoners was attributed at Orenburg. It was, therefore, of the greatest importance to hasten the expedition for the punishment of Khiva, so as to prevent the English from supporting the resistance of this Khanat against Russia, and to anticipate the possibility of any other Central Asiatic Rulers being induced to join Khiva by means of any threats and promises of reward that might be employed by the English agents.

Vitkevitch’s account of these regions, so little known to the Russians, was awaited with great impatience; on his return to Petersburg, in the end of April 1839, he was very well received by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, by whom he was immediately recommended for promotion in the Guards, and he was rewarded by an order of Knighthood and a sum in money. About eight days after his arrival at St. Petersburg, Vitkevitch shot himself, leaving behind him a short note in which he said he had burnt all his papers before his death.

The cause of this suicide remains hidden up to the present time. Loof Seniavin in a letter to General Perofsky, says—"that Prince Saltykof (the celebrated Russian traveller) having made the acquaintance of Vitkevitch in Persia, had heard the latter repeatedly declare he would at some time or other shoot himself, and even showed the pistol with which he was going to do the deed, and with which he did eventually shoot himself. He could not have felt dissatisfied with the military authorities, for, as it has already been said, he was most graciously received, and on the very day of his death was presented with the above-mentioned rewards. On the night of his death, he was seen at the theatre, where he had chatted gaily the whole evening with Saltykof; the day before he committed suicide, he was in excellent spirits, and on returning from the theatre, before retiring to bed, he gave orders to be called early in the morning: in the mean time, however, he deliberately blew his brains out. From the letters left by Vitkevitch after his death, it appears that he was discontented with the whole world; not a word is said about his mother, or brother, about whom he was most anxious, fearing lest the latter should have got implicated in the existing disturbances at Vilna, but he was reliably informed that his brother had not been concerned in the outbreak. The papers destroyed by Vitkevitch consisted by all accounts of, first, his notes which he was to embody in a report, and to present to the Asiatic Department on the affairs of Afghanistan; and second, copies of his correspondence with the English agents and other personages during his sojourn in Afghanistan. With Vitkevitch perished a mass of valuable information which, from his remarkable talents and gifts of observation, we have every reason to suppose his papers contained.
The English agents who were in Central Asia during the years 1839 and 1840 were Abbot and Shakspeare. In May 1840 Captain Abbot, of the East India Company's service, reached Novo-Alexandrofsk Fortress from Khiva, and proceeded thence to Orenburg. Whether Abbot had the intention to return home through Russia, or whether, like Burns, he selected this route for the purpose of making a survey of the Caspian and of the Russian fortresses on it, is subject to much doubt; in his communications, however, he styled himself English Chargé d'Affaires to the Russian Court,* by the order of the Khan he was robbed and wounded on his route to the Caspian by a gang of Turkomans (who had even been instructed by the Khivans to kill him), and from Orenburg he was sent in a suitable manner to Petersburg, whilst the Afghans that had accompanied him were sent back to their native country. Shakspeare, the other English officer, reached Orenburg via Novo-Alexandrofsk with the Russian prisoners who had been released from Khiva; he was likewise immediately sent on to Petersburg. Both these agents strove to take an active part in the Russian affairs with Khiva, especially Shakspeare, who wished to take credit for the release of the Russian prisoners; these, however, prior to his arrival at Khiva, had been

* Appearing, however, in Russia without any credentials, Captain Abbot did not even give a satisfactory answer as to his employment at Khiva. From the "Asiatic Journal" for August 1840, it appears that Abbot, when appearing before the Khan of Khiva, proposed the purchase of all the Russian prisoners, on the condition that no Russians should in future be allowed admittance into the Khiva dominions, promising in return an offensive and defensive alliance with England. The Khan asked how much the English would give if he consented to their proposal, and demanded from Abbot proof of his being actually empowered to carry out the negotiation; but as he could not give a satisfactory answer to these questions, the Khan infuriated expelled Abbot from his presence and commanded him to be imprisoned. Notwithstanding this, Abbot found means even from prison to send home the absurd reports that had reached him concerning the Russian expedition to Khiva, and about which rumours some further particulars will be given in the last chapter.
collected and registered by the Russian Comet Aitof, which circumstance will be more fully dwelt on in the following chapters. Shakspeare even quarrelled on the road with the Khiva Envoy Ataniaz, in charge of the Russian prisoners, about the gifts sent to the Russian Court, alleging that their delivery had been entrusted to him, and during his stay at Orenburg, he likewise attempted to interfere in local political matters, but was told that everything of a political nature was decided at Petersburg, whither he was despatched.

From all this, it will appear that the main objects in view in a war with Khiva were—

a.—To secure permanently the south-eastern boundaries of the empire by the subjugation of the Kirghiz Horde, which could not be effected without the punishment of Khiva, the chief author of all disturbances in the Kirghiz Steppes.

b.—To secure the Russian trade with Central Asia by putting a stop to the plundering of caravans, and this also could not be carried out without the punishment of Khiva.

c.—To release several thousands of Russians from cruel bondage.

d.—To establish not the dominion, but the strong influence of Russia in the neighbouring Khanats for the reciprocal advantages of trade, and to prevent the influence of the East India Company in Central Asia, so dangerous to Russia, from taking root in Central Asia, and lastly

e.—To take advantage of this favorable opportunity for the scientific exploration of Central Asia, by making a survey of the shores of the Sea of Aral and of the mouth of the River Amu, and settling the long disputed question of the original course of this river to the Caspian.
PART II.


Notwithstanding the vast disparity of strength between Russia and Khiva to inflict punishment on this Khanat by force of arms was no easy matter. In order that the reader may be fully convinced of this, and that he shall understand in what the plan of the campaign consisted, it is necessary first of all to throw a glance at the space of country intervening between Russia and Khiva, to point out what information was available at the time respecting the Kirghiz Steppe and the Khanat of Khiva, and to review the routes leading from Russia to that Khanat.

Khiva is separated from Russia by extensive Steppes, which are almost impassable even for small detachments of troops, and which are only occasionally traversed by small trading Caravans, and roamed over by pastoral tribes with their herds, which constitute their only means of subsistence. The departure of the caravans and the transmigration of the Kirghizes takes place generally in early spring from south to north, and in the commencement of autumn from north to south. This order of movement is regulated by the climatic conditions of the country.

In the southern division of the Steppe spring commences earlier, and autumn later, than in the northern; the summer is also of longer duration, being also sultry and
STEPPES BETWEEN RUSSIA AND KHIVA.

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dry, while the winter is short and almost always moderate, Plants and shrubs on their appearance in the spring turn immediately yellow from the heat and drought, and become unfit for food for cattle; the same plants, however, and even the reeds of rivers, those of the Sea of Aral, and of some lakes in the Steppe, may serve in winter when touched by the frost as pasturage, though scanty and poor, for supporting the herds during the short winter. Fresh water in the southern portion of the Steppe, excepting the Rivers Syr and Amu-Darias, and in the Bassuki Sands, is very scarce, but the whole of this zone of the Steppe yields an abundance of salt and bitter water, and is covered with salines. As one approaches nearer northwards, vegetation and fresh water become more and more plentiful, while the salines gradually disappear.

The soil nearly throughout the Steppe is partly stony and partly sandy, consisting also of drifted hillocks of saline clay; the marshy salt ground becomes parched by the heat, and forms large cracks of an inch and more in breadth. In the southern portion, the grass is low, two or three inches high (with the exception, however, in some small valleys), and it is so thin that there is a distance of nearly two feet between each blade, the space between being entirely bare. As the Northern zone is approached, the vegetation becomes thicker, more varied, and the grass is higher; but land formed of black earth and covered with turf, as found in the Novo-Rossuk Steppe, is very rarely to be met with even here in the northern portions of the Steppe. The dryness of the climate, as well as the practice pursued periodically by the Nomads of setting fire to the Steppe (destroying the seeds of plants and young roots), in order to obtain fresh green crops of grass, checks the formation of a black soil. These Steppe conflagrations spread for tens and hundreds of verst, consuming everything on their way, and leaving a trail of
blackened and scorched soil, which in a few weeks is covered with fresh grass as scanty as the first, but at least tender and succulent.

The Steppes are sometimes purposely set on fire with the intention of injuring Russian Military detachments or hostile tribes; in some instances whole encampments with the herds of cattle have been surrounded by this burning Steppe, and become victims to the flames.

It is owing to the character of the Steppe here described that the pastoral Kirghizes of these parts roam successively from north to south, and again from south to north, in order to avoid in the south the hot summer months, the dearth and draught, and in the north, the winter, with its prolonged frost, storms (heavy snow drifts accompanied by sharp winds), and heavy falls of snow during which the cattle cannot be grazed.

The Russian and Native Central Asiatic traders see and regulate their trade according to these periods of migration, sending their caravans in the spring to the north and in the winter to the south.* As the camels grow extremely lean during the winter from the poor pasturage and inclement weather, the spring removals are always slower; in the autumn, however, after the camels have regained their strength, the migrations are made more speedily.

If this nature of the Kirghiz Kaisak Steppes has such a decided influence on the life and movements of the natives, it is obviously necessary that all Military movements should be regulated by these local climatic conditions, more particularly when a large force is sent into the field, because the greater the force, the more dependent it is on the pasturage and water, of which in the

* The opening of the Nijni Novgorod fair in August corresponds with this order of movement of the caravans.
Steppe there is always a scarcity. Besides, Military detachments in the Steppe cannot enjoy the same facilities when on the march as caravans or migrating Kirghizes. The detachments being accompanied by Artillery waggons, are often obliged to follow the routes which are best adapted for wheels, and such routes do not always afford sufficient pasturage and water.

In the southern portion of the Steppe, for a distance of some hundreds of versts, there is no other fresh water, either in summer or autumn, except that found in holes or wells, which are capable of supplying only one or two hundred camels a day; even small caravans divide here into several parts, so that each should have a sufficient supply of water, while to procure better pasturage for their camels, they even diverge from their direct road; this a Military detachment could not do on account of the additional danger to which it would be exposed, as well as on account of the loss of time attending any departure from the direct route, time being of the greatest moment in expeditions in the Steppe; here also, where the troops have to carry with them all supplies and provisions, time becomes all the more valuable, as the longer the distance and duration of the proposed march, the greater of course must be the quantity of stores to be transported in the waggons. In consequence of the scarcity of water and the above-mentioned difficulties along the route, large detachments of troops cannot traverse the southern portion of the Steppe at any other time than in the winter, after the fall of the snow, or in early spring; before the snow has melted.*

* That the sultry and arid Steppes of Central Asia should be crossed in the winter or early in the spring is proven by the following examples of the most celebrated Tarter conquerors, who were of course taught by experience when and how to march with their hordes:—

Jengiz-Khan, in 1211, wishing to conquer China, started on his march from the upper courses of the Rivers Telenga and Onon in the autumn, in order to cross the Steppe
Let us now proceed to review the most convenient routes leading from Russia to Khiva through the inhospitable Kirghiz Steppes. These routes run in two principal directions: first, the routes leading from the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea; and second, those from the Orenburg and Ural "Lines."

I. The following routes extend from the shores of the Caspian:

a.—From Krasnovodsk to Khiva (pursued by Captain Mouravief in 1819). This route, although the shortest, being only 600 versts in length from the Balkhan Bay, is not abundant in pasturage and water; besides the Turkomans who wander here are dependent on Khiva, and any Russian force were it to follow this route could not rely on procuring horses, camels, sheep, and guides from the wandering native tribes, who are more likely to display hostility, or treacherously feign co-operation.

b.—From the Tuk-Karagan promontory (on the Peninsula of Mangishlak), about 900 versts long.

c.—From the former Alexandrofsk fortification* (near Kaidak Bay), about 700 versts long. Both these routes,

of Gobi, when it was covered with snow; in 1219, in the war with Mahomed, ruler of Harezm, in his progress from the upper course of the Irtish to the Syr-Daria, he also set out in autumn, in order to cross the barren and arid Steppe of Betpak in winter.

Timurlane, in his frequent invasions from the banks of the Syr-Daria into the present limits of Southern Siberia and of the Orenburg region, always collected his forces in winter, and commenced his march at the end of winter or in early spring.

Prince Bekovitch Cherkasky, on the other hand, set out from Gurier to Khiva in 1718 with his division in the summer, completely exhausted his force, and lost a quarter part of it in the Steppe.

* Founded in 1834, but in consequence of the shallowness of Kaidak Bay and of the Miortvi Kultuk, and owing to the entire absence of water, pasturage, and fuel, the Alexandrofsk Fortress was eventually removed to Mangishlak, where it exists to the present day under the name of Fort-Nov-Alexandrofsk. (It was first called Novo-Petrofsk, after the former fortress of St. Peter and Paul built by Prince Bekovitch.)
besides being more inconvenient than the foregoing, afford but scanty pasturage and little water; moreover, water can only be found in deep wells (20 feet and often deeper), which can be easily concealed by being covered over with earth, poisoned with carrion or filled up altogether, so that any detachment advancing by this road would be completely deprived of water, as it would not have time to dig fresh wells of such a considerable depth, more especially as the soil here is mostly hard and strong.

To the drawbacks above described, we must add that in case any of these routes were chosen for the march of the expedition to Khiva, the organization of the force and the collection of stores of material and provisions at Orenburg would, owing to the distance of this base of operations, be attended with great difficulties and delays, and one may say that the successful result of the expedition, if despatched by the above routes, would have been extremely doubtful for the following reasons:—

The strength of the Caspian Flotilla at the time of the projected expedition to Khiva was inconsiderable, and the number of private vessels available for the conveyance of troops insufficient; moreover foul winds and storms might very easily retard the arrival of the troops and provisions by which the whole enterprise might miscarry. *

There were no steamers at that period on the Caspian. But even if there had been, and if a detachment with all its stores were to have been successfully landed at any of

* In fact, during the expedition of Prince Bekovitch Cherkasky in 1715 to 1717, the Russian flotillas frequently suffered from the storms in the Caspian Sea. Similarly, in 1722, during the war with Persia, Peter the Great, having advanced as far as Derbent, was compelled to return, as the vessels which were to convey the supplies of provisions for the forces were scattered by a storm.
the above-mentioned points, where were horses to be procured or the Cavalry and Artillery and camels for the carriage of the provisions?

The conveyance across the Caspian Sea of a considerable number of horses, camels, and sheep for consumption, even with the present means at the command of Russia, is hardly feasible.

The tribes wandering on the eastern shore of the Caspian were either devoted to Khiva, like the Adaef tribe of Kirghiz-Kaisaks, or subject to Khiva like the Turkomans; both these Mahomedan races maintain constant commercial relations with Khiva, and had, besides, since a remote period, been engaged in kidnapping Russian subjects and selling them at Khiva; it was consequently not to be expected that the Russians would be able to procure from them either camels, horses, cattle, or trustworthy guides.

On these considerations, all intention of despatching the expedition to Khiva from the side of the Caspian was abandoned. Fort Alexandrofsk, however, which had been erected not long before the Khiva expedition, was chosen as a depôt for a portion of the provisions indispensable for the expedition, and the route from hence, as we shall immediately explain, was chosen to serve as a collateral and secondary route for the advance of a small detachment with commissariat stores.

II. From the Russian land frontier to Khiva hence, there are several routes; those leading from the Siberian line, or else from Troitsk, might have been chosen, though only for an expedition to Tashkend, but to Khiva these routes are inconvenient owing to their remoteness, it will, therefore, be unnecessary to notice them here.

a. — The route from the fortress of Orsk along the eastern shore of the Aral Sea led to the River Irgiz past
Aksakul-Barbi over the Karakum sands across the ferry over the Syr-Daria near Raim, from hence to the Khiva fort of Bish-Kala, then along the Kuvan Daria (the estuary of the River Syr reaching the sea), from which it trended to the Yany-Daria (another almost desiccated mouth of the Syr), emerging near the lake Dan-Kar on the barren and arid sands of Kizyl-Kum, and crossing the Amu-Daria opposite to the Khiva settlement of Kipchak.

The whole distance along this route is about 1,500 versts (1,000 miles), and as far as the River Irgiz, viz., 500 versts from Orsk, there is no deficiency of water or pasturage, but farther, about 300 versts beyond the River Syr, it traverses sandy, barren, and arid places, where fuel is altogether absent. From the Syr-Daria, for an extent of 300 versts before it reaches the Kizyl-Kum sands, the pasturage is poor, but there is no lack of water; beyond, until reaching the Amu, a distance of 400 versts, there is a great scarcity of water and pasturage. In this manner, this route extending over about 1,000 versts of sterile and arid country offers but few facilities for the march of any considerable body of troops.

b.—From Orenburg to Khiva, there are two routes along the eastern and western side of the Aral Sea. The first as far as the lake of Hodja-Kul, a distance of nearly 500 versts, passes over tracts of land yielding good pasturage and an abundance of water, but then when it traverses the Barsuki sands and the Kara-Kum, over an extent of 300 versts as far as the Syr-Daria, the country is as barren, arid, and sandy as the foregoing route from the fortress of Orsk to the River Syr, which latter route it afterwards joins. The length of this route is also about 1,500 versts, and the sterile and arid portion of it is likewise about 1,000 versts long.
The second route from Orenburg to Khiva on the western side of the Aral Sea is abundant with water, pasturage, and fuel for a distance of 500 versts as far as the Emba and Aty-Djaksy; beyond, before it approaches the ascent to the Ust-Urt for about 300 or 250 versts, some portion of this road traverses saline marshes, and a want of pasturage, water, and fuel is experienced; then, running along the flat plateau of the Ust-Urt for 500 versts, the pasturage is scanty, and water only to be found in the valleys in the spring after the melting of the snow, and in wells 8, 10, 20 fathoms deep and even more;* but there is no scarcity of fuel after descending the Ust-Urt, and although herbage is not plentiful, enough fresh water may be obtained. Within a thousand versts of Kune-Urgench, the road enters the cultivated zone of the Khanat of Khiva. The length of the whole rout to Kune-Urgench is about 1,400 versts; in places, however, it is waterless and barren.

We have now to review the routes leading from the lower portion of the Ural Line between the Kalmyk and Saraichik stations.

From the lower portion of the Ural Line to the ascent of the Ust-Urt for a distance of 300 to 500 versts, the country consists mostly of salt marshes, the pasturage is scanty, good water is scarce, and occasionally the road passes through oozy salt marshes, which can only be traversed by heavy loads during the great heats or hard frosts. Beyond, for more than 700 or 800 versts, as far as the town of Kune-Urgench, the roads pass over similar tracts of country, as described above, in the route from Orenburg to Kune-Urgench. The

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* There are wells of less depth; but in shallow wells the water is nearly always bitter and salt. The deeper the wells, the better the water; probably because the soil here is for several feet impregnated with sea salt, the solution always accumulating in the shallow wells.
whole length of the routes which run through this district as far as Kune-Urgench is from 1,300 to 1,150 versets, and they are all more or less sterile and waterless; but nevertheless, being the shortest, they served from the most remote period as the caravan route to Khiva.*

Of all the routes described, those leading along the eastern side of the Aral Sea, being the longest and stretching for nearly 1,000 versets through sandy waterless deserts, were pronounced as the most difficult, particularly, as, along this route, it would have been necessary to cross two deep and wide rivers (the Syr-Daria at Raim, 100 fathoms wide, the Amu, about 250 fathoms, and a branch of the Syr Daria, the Kavan-Daria, 20 fathoms wide) without the aid of any local facilities for effecting the passage.

Of the routes along the western shore of the Aral Sea as far as Kune-Urgench, those from the lower portion of the Ural Line are about 150 or 200 versets shorter than the road leading from Orenburg; but the former pass over swampy salines. Besides, the lower portion of the frontier line does not present any suitable place for the collection of troops, camels, and horses. If, in addition, it be taken into consideration that Orenburg is the centre of administration of the region, has an Artillery, Arsenal, and a Military Establishment; that

* In 1717 Prince Bekovitch Cherkaski, in his expedition to Khiva, marched according to tradition from Guriev Gorodok, and advanced along the sea-shore, crossing some small rivers, as far as Boga-Chash settlement, where he emerged out on the old Khivan route, which leads from the present Saraichik station. According to the same traditions, the route for a distance of 300 versets, as far as the River Emba, did not present any difficulties, but beyond this point its features resembled those of the roads already described, leading from the Lower Ural Line. At present, from the constant shallowing of the north-eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, the mouths of all the small rivers, which at one time emptied themselves into the sea, are choked with sand, and they have in consequence overflowed and formed great marshes, overgrown with high reeds, and only to be crossed during hard frosts.
for a campaign against Khiva great preparations were necessary, which, from their novelty and diversity, demanded vigilant supervision; that stores could be more easily forwarded from Russia to Orenburg, from whence they might be despatched in a direct line into the heart of the Steppe towards Khiva through a tract of country abounding, for 500 versts from Orenburg, with good pasture and water; and lastly, that camels, owing to the central position of Orenburg and the favorable character of the circumjacent country, could be more easily collected here—under these circumstances, therefore, it must be admitted that the route from Orenburg along the western side of the Sea of Aral was, at the time of the projected expedition, preferable to any of the other routes, and that the roads from the lower Uralsk Line and from Androfshi Fort could only be used as secondary ways of communication for the advance of small auxiliary detachments.

On these considerations, the plan of the campaign was based.

Having examined the routes to Khiva, we shall now proceed to give a short account of the Khanat of Khiva, the object of the Russian operations in 1839.

This Khanat lies to the south of the Sea of Aral, and occupies the fertile and cultivated tract of country along the lower course of the Amu-Daria; its extreme length does not exceed 300 versts, and its breadth is about 80 versts. It is surrounded by sterile Steppes, the more accessible parts of which are occupied by tribes acknowledging the rule of Khiva, such as the Kirghizes and Karakalpaks near the Sea of Aral, and the Turkomans near the Caspian. From the dryness of the climate, and the absence of rain, the ground can only be cultivated with the assistance of artificial irrigation, for which purpose several canals intersecting the whole length of the Khanat are conducted from
the Amu. The breadth of these canals is from 10 to 25 fathoms at their commencement, but diminishes as they proceed to two or three fathoms. Many of these canals are navigable. Smaller canals branch off into the fields, and plots of arable land from the larger ones; in this manner the whole Khanat is intersected in all directions by canals of greater or smaller depth and breadth. Roads adapted for the transport of a large quantity of goods do not exist here; bridges over the canals are rare and but slightly built. For this reason travelling in vehicles is attended with great difficulties, and although the Khivans use an Araba or two-wheeled cart drawn by horses or camels, in which they perform short journeys at certain times of the season, and carry a small quantity of goods with them, the internal traffic is mostly conducted on camels, horses, or donkeys, or on barges along the canals of the River Amu. The population of the Khanat is concentrated on the left bank of the Amu, and the most populated and cultivated zone of the Khanat of Khiva is the southern, extending to the small towns of Kipchak and Ilial. To the north of these places the population is much thinner, the land is less cultivated; the Amu commences to bifurcate into several branches, which, during the overflowing of the river, flood a great portion of the northern part of the Khanat, forming a quantity of lakes overgrown with high reeds, between which only small patches of ground are occasionally cultivated. During the high flooding of the River Amu, the whole of the Khanat is liable to inundation,* and as the chief floods take place there

* During the overflowing of the Amu, the waters are generally higher than the surface of the fields, and are confined within the canals and ducts by earthen embankments. For the irrigation of the fields a part of the embankment is pulled down, or else the pipes which pass through the embankment are opened. It is only in elevated parts which do not allow of this method of irrigation that water pumps and water-wheels, two feet in diameter, with earthen and leathern buckets attached for lifting the water, are used.
twice in the year, the first in May and June, and the second in July and August, this time should be considered the most inconvenient for the entry of a Military Force into Khiva.

The crops here, from the artificial irrigation of the fields, are pretty good and almost always regular; and when there is a superabundance of grain, the Khivans sell it to the neighbouring pastoral tribes, so that in case of a dearth, they never have a stock of corn to fall back on.

There are but few towns in the Khanat, the principal towns are Khiva, the residence of the Khan, and surrounded by a rampart; Hazarasn and Ket also encircled with walls, and Kuné-Urgeneh, the commercial town of the Khanat. The other towns are also surrounded by walls, but these walls have either fallen to pieces, or are in course of crumbling away. Nearly all the towns are surrounded by large gardens, and at the present time fruit trees are planted along most of the canals.

The remaining population of the Khanat is scattered about in villages, consisting of three, four, and occasionally ten houses or families. The Khivans live in mud hovels with flat roofs; the courts and gardens which are attached to every house are surrounded with thick clay walls six feet thick at the bottom and one and half feet at the top, and about twelve feet in height. The population of Khiva is generally poor; they have no manufactories or costly buildings; all the riches of the people, in addition to their fields, consist of cattle and slaves, the latter being burdened with all the heavy labour, such as digging and cleaning ditches and canals, ploughing the fields, and performing the work of the house.

From the foregoing, it will appear that the greater part of the Khivans could easily, in case of a hostile invasion during the winter, collect their corn, cattle, slaves, and all
their property, and seek shelter for a time in the neighbouring Steppe, or else flee to another territory of Khiva, situated about 300 versts south of Khiva, beyond the barren sands, and forming another oasis with its town of Merv. Consequently the force destined for the expedition to Khiva could not rely, in case it arrived there in the winter, on finding any considerable stock of provisions, and it was therefore necessary to reach Khiva while the corn was yet standing in the fields.

Naturally growing timber for building ships and houses is not to be found; but the Khivans plant trees artificially for these purposes in their gardens and along the canals, and this, in a measure, compensates for the deficiency of natural forests.

The number of the fixed population of the Khanat is reckoned at 500,000 of both sexes, consisting of Uzbeks, the conquering race, Sarts, the primitive inhabitants of the country, Karakalpaks, Persians, and Russians; of late years even Turkomans have commenced to settle here. In addition to these, the Khan of Khiva claims allegiance from several tribes of Turkomans and Kirghizes, who roam between the Amu and the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, and in the country adjoining the Sea of Aral, on the lower course of the River Amu. At the time of the Khiva Expedition, the Kirghizes and Karakalpaks near the mouth of the Syr-Daria were also under Khivan subjection.

The Khivans, notwithstanding their rapacity, are not a warlike race. Although the Khan is able, in case of war, to bring into the field a mounted force of 20,000 men, this force has no regular formation or discipline, is badly armed, and, therefore, incapable of offering any serious resistance. The Khivan Artillery consisted at that time of about a dozen heavy unwieldy guns. The powder of the Khivaüs is
of a bad quality, the cannon balls are of irregular form, and, as they do not fit the calibre of the guns, are wrapped in felt and so rammed down into the guns; the Artillery men are generally Russian prisoners, and show but little skill. There are ramparts, as we have already said, in almost every town, and they consist of thick high walls of clay.

From this short sketch of the Khanat of Khiva,* it may easily be seen that it could afford but few means of support for an invading army; it was accordingly necessary that the troops should take with them all the requisite supplies for the whole period of the march to and stay at Khiva; they also could not calculate on obtaining fresh horses and camels to replace those which would be lost on the route from exhaustion and other causes. Arrangements for transport had, therefore, to be made on a large scale, and measures adopted for forwarding to the line, in case of need, not only provisions, but also camels and horses.

These are the chief obstacles which had to be surmounted and taken into account in drawing up the plan of the campaign, and it was necessary to keep in view the great distinction which exists between campaigns in the Steppe and those in populated parts of Europe. On this point it may be as well to make a few observations in order that the reader might fully understand the character of the proposed operations. Those who have only taken part in European wars, or read descriptions of them, will not be able

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* Before the expedition of General Perofsky several Cossacks escaped from Khiva to the Orenburg line, and about a hundred Cossacks and peasants were bought by the Russian Government. Colonel Ivanin carefully collected the accounts of these liberated captives, and drew up a description of the Khanat of Khiva, which served as a standard book for all later works on the subject. The absence of all progress in the Central Asiatic countries explains the cause of Khiva remaining in the same barbarous condition as Prince Bekovitch Cherkasky found it in the XVIIIth century, and as it remains to the present day.
to understand, easily, what a campaign in the Steppes of Central Asia really is. In European campaigns (not including, however, campaigns in Turkey) a scarcity of water is hardly ever experienced, and it is very seldom necessary for the troops to supply themselves with water for the day's march; forces march along established roads, through cultivated and inhabited districts, in which not only a sufficient quantity of provisions can be had for the army, but where there are very often means for furnishing the force with horses, clothing, and ammunition.

But in Central Asia a scarcity of water forms one of the principal difficulties attending an expedition, and is a source of great anxiety to the Commander. There are no established roads, the soldiers are obliged to march by compass, or under the direction of a guide; the wandering natives retreat at your approach, and, after marching a hundred versts, you will not meet a soul, or obtain any information as to the position of the enemy. Local resources for supplying a force with provisions do not exist; everything must, consequently, follow in the train of the attacking force. The boundless and exposed character of the Steppes facilitates flank movements; attacks, therefore, must be expected from all sides, and the ordinary disposition of the force must be in square, or in some such order.

Hence it follows that a Military expedition in Central Asia is, strictly speaking, only a caravan or train following no regular route, always suffering from a want of water and fuel, and being liable at each halt to have its horses and camels driven away, and, consequently, to be deprived of the means of advancing. The train of an expeditionary force in the Steppe, where everything must follow the troops, must necessarily be a very large one: an European Force of 1,000 men can be limited to 20 or 30 waggons, or one
waggon to every 40 or 50 men, whereas in the Khiva Expedition of 1839, each soldier had to be apportioned with two camels, and a Kirghiz to two soldiers to attend to the camels. Although the Kirghizes were absolutely indispensable to the force on account of their knowledge of the nature and habits of the camels and their acquaintance with the Steppe, the Russians could not place full confidence in them, and, in case of a hostile attack, it would be necessary to take measures of precaution to prevent them not only from running away, but also from having any intercourse with the hostile Kirghizes and Khivans, and assisting them in driving away the horses and camels of the Russians. In this manner a Military expeditionary force in the Steppe is only an escort for the protection of its own baggage and provision train.

The difficulties attending these distant expeditions were still further augmented by the insufficient knowledge which the Russians then possessed of this region. To march a force against Khiva, it was first of all requisite to obtain complete knowledge of the Steppe and the routes across it; but this was utterly impossible owing to the treachery, suspicion, and distrust of the Khiva Government, and the rapacity of the wandering tribes surrounding the Khanat. The Russian embassies and trading caravans were but seldom allowed admittance into Khiva, and when the Khivans did receive the ambassadors and Russian envoys, they were placed in confinement. Travellers were scarcely ever permitted to enter the country, and, besides, but few had any wish to visit it, as on the slightest suspicion a traveller was liable to be stuck on a sharp stake, or buried alive.

Respecting the previous two Russian marches to Khiva, that of the Yaitsk Cossacks in 1610, and of Prince Bekovitch in 1717, only scanty and incomplete accounts, founded
on inquiries and conjectures, were in existence at the period of the expedition contemplated by Perofski. Captain Mouravief, who was at Khiva in 1819, wrote a description of the route thither from Krasnovodsk, that is, from the Caspian Sea; but being kept in confinement at Khiva and in danger of losing his life, he could not collect and verify native accounts relating to Khiva, or to the routes leading thither from the Orenburgo-Uralsk cordon line. The information given by travellers who have visited Khiva, and by fugitives from that country is still less satisfactory. Some accounts carefully gathered from the Russian prisoners released in 1837-39 bore only on Khiva itself; respecting the routes leading thither and with reference to the surrounding Steppe they could of course give no correct data. The testimony on these points of the Asiatics, who are so prone to deceit and exaggeration, can in no degree be relied on.

Thus, in 1839, the Russians were in possession of reliable information relating only to the northern, the most accessible and explored part of the Steppe; its southern portion and the routes leading from it to Khiva over a distance of 700 versts were only partly known by verbal accounts, which were, more or less, inaccurate, obscure, and conflicting, being obtained from uncultivated Russian prisoners from Khiva, or from Asiatics unworthy of entire credit. To this ignorance of the physical features and routes of nearly half of the Steppe must be added the variability of the climate in its southern portion, in order that all the difficulty of the contemplated expedition to Khiva in 1839 may be appreciated. If, for instance, it had been known that every winter in December, the whole Steppe becomes covered with snow, the greater part of the baggage might have been transported on sledges, and a portion of the forces furnished with
snow-shoes and light sledges.* In the same manner, knowing beforehand the exact period of the fall of the snow, its depth, or the sort of winter to be expected, the time for assembling the camels and forces might have then been regulated accordingly, the army could have been suitably equipped, or a mild winter chosen with a slight fall of snow.

But in the southern part of the Steppe, as far as was then known, snow is not often seen. There are at times slight falls of snow, which do not, however, impede the progress of travellers, but supply them with the means of obtaining water for drinking and boiling purposes; it rarely happens that the snow falls very heavily. The winter sets in sometimes in November, at other times in December and January, and is either mild, temperate, or very severe, accompanied by prolonged snow-storms.

In addition to these great changes in the weather during winter, the grass is frequently covered with a crust of ice, and as the horses, camels, and cattle are only fed on grass during the journey, the deep snow and ice deprives them of pasturage, and exposes them to death by starvation.

It will be seen, from the foregoing account, that the principal difficulty in organizing the expedition lay in provisioning the force and in providing the requisite means for its transport. The length of the route extending over 1,000 miles, about 500 of which passed through a barren Steppe, rendered the conveyance of all the stores by the same camels impossible, for the whole distance. It was, therefore, first necessary to form a depot of provisions, &c., at a point in the interior of the Steppe, as near to Khiva as possible, and to provide other means for transporting the stores to this

* This was done in the reign of John the Terrible, in the expedition to the Rivers Irtish and Obi.
point, from whence the troops being furnished with the requisite supplies of food, ammunition, &c., might push on to Khiva on camels. That is to say, as a preliminary measure, it was necessary to select on the route fixed on for the march of the expeditionary force, a point for the erection of a fortification, and formation of a depot yielding in its vicinity an abundant supply of water and grass.

The plan of the campaign was drawn up on the following basis:

1. The principal detachment against Khiva to consist of 5,000 men, of which 3,000 would be sufficient for inflicting punishment on Khiva; the remainder of the force to be employed in guarding the depot of stores at the intermediate point. The force to consist of troops of the Orenburg Corps.

2. All preparations for the expedition to be made at Orenburg, on account of greater convenience and economy, and the possibility of their superintendence by the authorities; the main body of the force to march from Orenburg.

3. A detachment to be sent in advance for selecting on the route to Khiva, the most convenient spot for establishing a depot, and for the purpose of fortifying and garrisoning it.

4. To transport the stores gradually, as they would be supplied, on carts provided by the Bashkir troops from Orenburg, to the point in the Steppe chosen for an intermediate depot.

5. In order to protect the train of transports despatched from the frontier to the intermediate depot against hostile Kirghizes and Khivans, to form a separate detachment, independent of the main body of the force.
6. The transport of all provisions, &c., for the main body, as well as of the troops themselves, from the depot to Khiva to be performed by camels, for which purpose the requisite number of these animals to be obtained and collected during the summer from the Kirghiz tribes under Russian subjection.

7. After the occupation of Khiva, or any other town of the Khanat, all further Military operations to be regulated by circumstances.

To defray the expenses of the expedition 571,714-28 cop. (£86,000) were assigned by the War Department, and the conduct of the campaign was entrusted to General Perofski, at that time Military Governor of Orenburg.
PART III.

CHARACTER AND ORGANIZATION OF THE TROOPS OF THE ORENBURG REGION—COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE CHOSEN FOR MARCHING AGAINST KHIVA—PREPARATION OF SUPPLIES OF CLOTHING, PROVISIONS, AMMUNITION, SIEGE INSTRUMENTS, HOSPITAL STORES, &C.—TRANSPORT OF STORES TO ORENBURG.

The following was the composition of the Orenburg Corps, from which the men for the expeditionary force against Khiva were to be drawn:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Staff and other Officers</th>
<th>Rank and File</th>
<th>Non-effective</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>Combatant</td>
<td>Non-combatant</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,03,566</td>
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<td>B. Infantry</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>8,999</td>
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<td>C. Artillery</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>2,202</td>
<td>1,13,369</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In detail the constitution of these troops was as follows:

A.—Cavalry.

Regular Cossack Regiments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Superior and other Officers</th>
<th>Rank and File</th>
<th>Horses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>Non-effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Orenburg Regiment</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Regiment of Orenburg</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stavropol Kalmyk Regiment</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>683</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Irregular Cossack Forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rank and File</th>
<th>Horses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>Non-effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ural Force...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orenburg Force</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashkir Force</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1,362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mescheriak Force</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of Cavalry</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2,002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Cossack horses are not shown, as some of the men have none, while others possess several and even whole studs.

B.—Infantry.

22nd Division of Infantry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Superior and Other Officers</th>
<th>Rank and File</th>
<th>Horses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Combatant</td>
<td>Non-effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Orenburg line Battalions</td>
<td></td>
<td>94</td>
<td>5,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Companies of Pensioners and 2 of Warders</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1,684</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Battalions of the line stationed at the Government Ural Mines</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1,539</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total of Infantry</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>181</td>
<td>8,999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C.—Artillery.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Superior and Other Officers</th>
<th>Gunners</th>
<th>Horses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>Non-effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Cossack Horse Batteries of the Orenburg Corps</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3½ Companies of the 14th Garrison Artillery Brigade</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached to the Orenburg Arsenal</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total of Artillery</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total of the whole Corps</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,202</td>
<td>1,13,369</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the Cavalry troops the Ural Cossacks were distinguished for their knowledge of the Steppe, as well as for their powers of enduring fatigue and hardship, and as they
were often called on to repel the inroads of marauding Kirghizes they had become familiar with warfare, and were considered the best troops for campaigns in the Steppe. For the same reason the Orenburg Cossacks, settled near the line, were equally serviceable in expeditions into the Steppe; but a large portion of these Cossacks located at a great distance from the Military frontier, had altogether lost the martial qualifications which they formerly possessed, while another portion of them consisted of raw peasants, who, though figuring on the strength of the force, were complete strangers to discipline and Military organization; for these reasons, therefore, the Orenburg Cossacks were not available for the contemplated expedition. Moreover, a new line had then recently been established, and a larger number of Military cordon troops was required to maintain it; this duty had, accordingly, been entrusted to the Orenburg Cossacks.*

As regards the Bashkir, Mescheriak, and Kalmyk forces, although several Regiments might have been formed out of them, yet owing to the scarcity of Officers, the absence of Military organization, and their unsatisfactory equipment, they could not be utilised for the expedition.

The Infantry of the Orenburg Corps also laboured under serious defects, it had never been in action, nor had it seen any service whatever in the field, and being besides stationed in permanent quarters at Stanitsas (Stations) along the line, it was never assembled in camp, in consequence of which it was

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* The Orenburg line formerly ran from the mouth of the Berdianka up the Ural, and towards the upper course of the Uga, then along the Uga and Tobol Rivers; but from 1835 and 1836 it was extended from the mouth of the Ori almost in a straight line to the mouth of the River Tuguzak, and in this direction it was at first proposed to raise a continuous wall and dig a trench, a portion of this work having been completed as contemplated; it was, however, ultimately abandoned. The remaining portion of the line, as far as the Caspian, runs along the River Ural, and is guarded by the Cossacks of the Ural.
badly drilled, and altogether inefficient for Military purposes. Being, moreover, permanently quartered at certain points along the line, many of the Cossacks had erected houses, and were employed in trade and agriculture, and in this manner regular Battalions of the line had imperceptibly become converted into a body of Military colonists. In order to put an end to this condition of things, and to ameliorate the Military organization of the Infantry of the Orenburg Corps, General Perofski transferred all the Battalions to new quarters, and assembled them periodically in camps. Although this could not make the Infantry more martial, yet it had the effect of improving its discipline and drill. It must also be mentioned that the very composition of the Orenburg Infantry was unfavorable to Military perfection. In April 1839, on the strength of the seven Orenburg Battalions of the line were borne:

**Recruits.**

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>582-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles previously drafted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exiles and Criminals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,403</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That is to say, out of 8,999 Infantry men, 4,403, or nearly the half, consisted either of recruits or exiles.

The Artillery of the Orenburg Corps, *i.e.*, the 14th Cossack Brigade of Horse Artillery, had the common defect of the Orenburg troops, namely, want of experience and an insufficiency of Officers.

Hence it was considered more expedient to organize the expeditionary force out of Ural Cossacks; but as a certain complement of Infantry was requisite in advancing over a broken country as well as in operating against the
enemy's forts, and protecting the train of stores and provisions at the different halting places and intermediate fortified depôts, and as the Ural Cossacks were also bound to perform Cordon duty along the borders of their territory extending over nearly 700 versts, it was necessary to limit their contingent of Cavalry to as small a force as possible, more especially on account of the great difficulty of supplying a large number of horses with dry provender in the Steppe. For the same reason and on account of the ruggedness of some parts of the country which would have to be traversed, only a very small number of guns, and those of a small calibre, could accompany the force.

On these considerations the force destined to march against Khiva was organized out of the following troops:

**Infantry.**

Three and a half Battalions of the line (Battalions of Orenburg Nos. 2, 4, 5, and two Companies of No. 1), their strength, where it was below the regular complement, being made up from the other Battalions.

**Cavalry.**

Two Regiments of Ural Cossacks (4th and 5th Regiments), 3 Sotnias (hundreds) of Orenburg Cossacks and Bashkirs, and one Division of the Orenburg Regiment of Cossacks. This force was also to be supplemented by the Sultan-Ruler of the Western portion of the Kaisak horde with 250 Kirghizes.

**Artillery.**

Two 12-pounder guns, two 2½ pood howitzers, eight 6-pounders, six 10-pounders, two 6-pounder mortars, two 1-pounder howitzers for the proposed Sea of Aral vessels, and 4 rocket stands, in all 22 guns and 4 rocket stands.
### General Composition of the Force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Staff Officers</th>
<th>Subaltern Officers</th>
<th>Non-Commissioned Officers</th>
<th>Musicians</th>
<th>Privates</th>
<th>Non-Combatants</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infantry.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the 3½ Battalions. Total...</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>2,520</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>3,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cavalry.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the Division of the 1st Orenburg Regiment.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the 2 Ural Regiments...</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orenburg Cossacks...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashkirs...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Total of Cavalry...</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,627</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Artillery.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cossack Horse Artillery...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orenburg Garrison Artillery...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached to Rocket Stands...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of Artillery...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached to the expedition from various branches...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General complement...</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>4,465</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>5,217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 250 Kirghizes were to join in the Steppe.

**Staff.**

Generals 3, Staff Officers 4, Subaltern Officers 15, Non-Commissioned Officers 14, Orderly Clerks, Dressers, and Artificers 20, Officers’ Servants 41. In addition, 10 Civil functionaries and 1 Chaplain were attached to the Staff, making a general total of 108.
The above number included 1 Staff Officer and 6 Subaltern Officers of the Etat Major and Corps of Topographers.

The whole numerical strength of the force was, thus, 5,325 men with 22 guns and 4 rocket stands.

The force was, moreover, supplied with mining tools, 6 canvas pontoons, 2 portable boats, &c.

With the exception of the Ural Cossacks, all the troops who were to take part in the expedition were assembled at Orenburg in the month of October 1839. Arrangements were at once made for supplying the troops with the necessary stores and provisions, for which purpose Commissariat Officers were despatched to make purchases of provender, oats, matting, felt, sheepskins, utensils, &c.; tailors and bootmakers were employed for the proper equipment of the soldiers, workmen were engaged for preparing "Djislameeks" or felt tents, and other articles which were needful for the march.

The soldiers of the regular troops were supplied with woollen under-clothing, lambskin jackets, warm forage caps, capacious grey over-coats, high leather boots and felt shoes, warm gloves, linen, &c., &c.

The Cossacks were ordered to supply themselves with grey over-coats, warm trousers, large boots, woollen stockings, and woollen binders for wrapping round their legs and knees, warm caps, and a sufficient quantity of linen. They were also to provide their own arms, such as pikes, guns or rifles, pistols, swords, horse cloths, bags to carry three days' rations of biscuits; spare horse shoes, kettles, scythes, spades, buckets, &c., &c.

The Officers were instructed to provide themselves at their discretion with everything that was needful for the
march and to procure horses, for which purpose they received a sum equal to the yearly amount of the pay of each, and were awarded a double rate of pay during the campaign.

In addition to the above precautions against the cold, a large quantity of felting was purchased to serve as bedding. Horse hair shades to protect the eyes from the glare of the sun on the snow were also provided.

The provisioning of the expeditionary force was a matter of equal solicitude to the Authorities.

The following quantities of provisions were supplied to the force:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Six months.</th>
<th>Biscuits, Chetverts</th>
<th>Buckwheat, Chetverts</th>
<th>Meat, Poods</th>
<th>Salt, Poods</th>
<th>Corn, Brandy, Vedros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rations for 2,325 men</td>
<td>8,121</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>7,566</td>
<td>1,997</td>
<td>5,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For 250 kirghizes and 800 camel drivers</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,208</td>
<td>2,415</td>
<td>394</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate allowance for 1,100 camel drivers for 3½ months</td>
<td></td>
<td>936</td>
<td>1,873</td>
<td>315</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the garrison at the intermediate points</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra supply</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11,653</td>
<td>3,223</td>
<td>13,954</td>
<td>3,406</td>
<td>8,286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Also cabbage, cucumbers, cheese, sheep's fat, lard, onions, pepper, vinegar, honey, &c., were provided in addition to the above.

Former experience in the Steppe had proved that horses soon became worn out when kept on grass alone; it was, therefore, necessary, on the distant march to Khiva, to carry a supply of forage; 15,828 poods of oats for the horses, and 3,793 poods of flour and 1,925 poods of salt for the camels,
were accordingly ordered to be provided. Ten thousand poods of hay were obtained from the cordon posts,* and hydraulically compressed for greater portability into bundles of 6 or 7 poods each, which were to be carried along with the force. Along the route to Khiva, 20,000 poods of hay were stored at Bish-Tamok, 25,000 on the River Emba and at Aty-Yakshi, and 25,000 near Ak-Bulak.

The following Artillery and Ammunition Stores were provided:

Double complement of powder and shot.
200 shells, with grape for the howitzers.
1,200 ditto ditto mortars.
350 congreve rockets of different calibre and weight.
1,120,000 musket cartridges.
204,000 carbine and pistol ditto.
2,280 signal rockets, &c.
150 poods powder.
10 poods lead.
2 camp forges.

Owing to the absence of any roads in the Southern Steppe, and as it was anticipated that the force would be obliged to march through heavy snows, it was deemed advisable to provide a large quantity of spades, pick-axes, &c.

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* Special outposts or cordons existed along the whole frontier line, at a distance of from 15 to 20 from each other, and parties of Cossacks were annually told off for service at these points, a part of their duty being to gather a stock of hay in the vicinity of the outposts as forage for their horses. All the superfluous quantity is generally sold to the kirghizes, and the money realised went to the general fund of the Cossack troops.
The portable flat-bottomed boats which were to be transported in separate parts were to be employed for navigation on the Amu, and for surveying the shores of the Sea of Aral; each boat was armed with a swivel gun or falconet.

Eighty Arabas were prepared for transporting the sick, and each battalion was provided with the regulated quantity of hospital stores and drugs. In addition to these stores, a large quantity of articles in Asiatic taste were bought at Nijni-Noogorod for distribution as presents to the Kirghizes and Turkmen.

The principal difficulties that the expedition to Khiva was expected to encounter would be in the waterless Steppes that surrounded the Khanat. It was known that there were wells along the Ust Urt of a depth varying from 15, 20, and 30 fathoms; according to Kirghiz accounts, these wells were paved round with stone, and protected from the drifting sands and straying cattle, by large stone slabs pierced with a small hole through which buckets could be lowered, a stone trough for watering cattle was generally attached to each well. Small caravans could consequently traverse these Steppes with facility; but large caravans could not, in former years, perform the journey through the Ust-Urt without dividing themselves into sections or échelons, because, in addition to the scarcity of water, the great depth of the wells presented serious obstacles, as out of these only 10 or 15 buckets of water could be raised in an hour, and consequently only 200 or 300 camels or horses watered in the course of 24 hours. The expeditionary force could not be divided up into small parties without great danger, and the different detachments would have been obliged to wait several days at the wells for water, while it was drawn up in ordinary buckets. A special portable water-lifting apparatus was devised, by means of which the water could be rapidly
drawn from the wells and distributed through India-rubber conduits, either into the boats, or into leather and canvas waterproof reservoirs fixed on wooden frames.

It was proposed to transport all the above-mentioned stores on camels, with the exception of the pontoons, boats, arabas, and sledges, which on account of their weight could not be carried by these animals; the falconets, however, were to be carried on the backs of camels and so disposed as to be mounted and brought to bear on the enemy in a quarter of an hour. In order to spare the Artillery Horses as much fatigue as possible, the gun caissons that could not be carried on the backs of camels were yoked to camels which were harnessed like oxen.

In order, also, to husband the strength of the Infantry soldiers, and to accustom them to camel riding (so that in case of need they might be despatched like dragoons in flying detachments), it was resolved to transport a portion of the Infantry on the spare camels, two men on each camel, changing the men by turns on the march.

Thus a new difficulty presented itself,—that of obtaining a great number of camels, the required quantity being provisionally estimated at 10,000. The measures adopted for obtaining them will be set forth in the succeeding chapter.

As the stores and provisions were gradually purchased and prepared, it was necessary to transport them to Orenburg and from thence into the interior of the Steppe, to the intermediate depôts. For this purpose 7,750 three-horse carts, with their drivers, were supplied by the Bashkirs, with the requisite number of Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers to superintend this operation.
The Bashkir and Mescheriak carts, after leaving their different cantons, were ordered to take up en route at the towns of Sterlitamak, Beleber Birsk, Cheliab, and other places, the oats which had been prepared there for the expedition and the siege tools from Zlataust. The other stores were conveyed to Orenburg by the Cossacks and by hired carters.
PART IV.


Before despatching into the Steppe the stores, &c., which were being rapidly transported to Orenburg, it was necessary, in the first place, to select and establish depôts for their reception. With this object Colonel Heke was despatched in the month of May with two Companies of Orenburg Infantry, 200 Bashkirs, and 4 Light Field Guns.

The first Bashkir Store Train consisting of 1,200 carts set out under the protection of this detachment.

Colonel Heke crossed the Iletsks line on the 30th May, and by the 15th June reached the Emba, distant more than 400 versts from the line. In order to avoid any unnecessary transportation of the stores either backwards or forwards, Colonel Heke, leaving the train on the River Emba, proceeded forward with a flying column, consisting of a platoon of Infantry transported in carts, and 400 Mounted Bashkirs with 2 Howitzers to Donguz-Tan, where a convenient spot for forming a Store Depot was expected to be found. This locality, however, proved to be inconvenient for the purpose, owing to the scarcity of water and the scantiness of the herbage in the neighbourhood. The locality of Chushka-Kul, on the River Ak-Bulak, 53 versts behind Donguz-Tan, was found to possess the necessary advantages for an intermediate stage, as the water, although bitter, was plentiful and the grass abundant, with a sufficient supply.
of reeds and willow-trees for fuel, within a distance of 20
versts. Having fixed on this point for massing the stores,
Colonel Heke detached on the 20th July 300 Bashkirs for the
waggons left behind at the Emba, while with his remaining
escort he retired two stages back to Bakgir Hill (57 versts
from Chuska-Kul) where he awaited the arrival of the train.

The rugged character of the country, intersected with
gullies, and in parts covered with deep sands and stagnant
salines, added to the great heats which had set in, impeded
the progress of the train of stores which was only enabled
to join Colonel Heke at Bakgir Hill by the 15th July.* On
the 16th July the train advanced a stage of 17 versts to Aly
Mountain, on which journey 50 waggons were obliged to be

* All the particulars respecting Colonel Heke’s movements are partly drawn from
the letters (written in French) which he addressed to General Perofski. These letters
often contain unjust strictures on the Russian Soldiers. Thus in one letter Colonel
Heke, among other matters, describes the following occurrence: Having concealed
himself behind Bakgir Hill, he awaited the arrival of the train of stores which ad-
vanced to the Hill in two divisions, and as soon as the first échelon appeared in sight,
Colonel Heke, with his Bashkirs, suddenly showed themselves on the Hill, “in order to
cause an alarm among the train followers and to watch the result.” It appears that
the men conveying the stores did take the Bashkirs for Khivans, and immediately
despatched a messenger to the second division of the train with the intelligence that a
body of Khivan troops, to the number of 8,000, had been discovered on Bakgir Hill;
in the mean time Captain Simbugin formed square with the carts and waggons, and
posting his guns at intervals on the sides of the square, awaited the attack of the
supposed enemy; very different was the effect produced by the reported appearance
of the foe on the rear division of the train: a general panic ensued among the men there,
and it was with difficulty that they were prevented from running away. Colonel Heke
was privately informed of this and expressed his disapprobation of the conduct of the
detachment in severe terms. Describing this occurrence to Count Perofski, Heke
remarks that all this “is a bad omen for the Khiva Expedition.” Colonel Heke
instead of throwing doubts on the bravery of the Russian Soldier, should rather have
said that, before entering the enemy’s country, he had not taken the precaution to test
the military efficiency of the troops entrusted to his Command, and did not instruct
them to keep themselves in constant readiness against meeting the enemy. The same
troops, in spite of their military inexperience subsequently proved the injustice of his
censure, and displayed their great powers of endurance, having suffered as much hard-
ship and fatigue as is possible for the human frame to bear.
abandoned on the road in consequence of the horses breaking down with the fatigue, and many of the cart-wheels splitting from the great heat. A halt was ordered to collect the carts left behind, to rest the horses, and to muster fresh strength for performing the tedious stage of 40 versts which still remained to be passed before reaching the depot point on the Ak-Bulak River. As for the whole distance of the intermediate stage to Chushka-kul no water or grass would be found, the Bashkirs supplied themselves with grass and water in leather-bags (Tursuks), and the soldiers replenished their water cans. The march was resumed at 5 o'clock in the morning, and by 11 o'clock, 17½ versts having been traversed, a halt was made. At 3 o'clock the march was resumed. The day was a sultry one, and, there being no wind, stifling clouds of dust enveloped the column; the heat of the sun was as powerful as in the deserts of Africa, the thermometer showing from 32° to 38° Reaumur in the shade, and 42° to 45° Reaumur in the sun. After passing six versts the men began to suffer from thirst. All the water that still remained was mixed with vinegar and distributed among the troops, the Officers humanely sharing their stock with the men, but even this was not sufficient; men and horses fell down exhausted in numbers, and were only saved from death by being immediately bled. Messengers were despatched on the best horses to Chushka-kul for water, and the detachment moving slowly forward soon after discovered at the side of the road a small well with brackish water and some small muddy pools. These were soon drained dry. At length, about midnight, a portion of the train reached the Chushka-kul wells, and sent a supply of water to those who had been left behind. It was only on the 24th of July that the whole caravan was gathered together on the banks of the Ak-Bulak, when the erection of the advanced Chushka-kul fortification was at once commenced.
The spot chosen for the erection of a fortification was on the bank of the stream; the sandy soil and the entire absence of turf and wood, coupled with the enormous heat, considerably retarded the progress of the work. By dint of the uninterrupted exertions of 300 men, the fortification, with bastion fronts, was completed by the 3rd August. A redoubt capable of containing 30 men was immediately afterwards commenced on a commanding elevation in close vicinity of the earth-work; in the interior of the latter no time was lost in erecting mud huts for the soldiers, an infirmary, baths, stables, and spirit and powder vaults. The supplies of provisions and stores were piled under temporary sheds. About 25,000 poods of hay were mown and ricked, and supplies of reeds and willow logs procured from the neighbourhood.

In spite, however, of the satisfactory progress of the work, the difficulty of the journey, particularly for carts, between the River Emba and Ak-Bulak, led to a change being made in the original arrangements; it was determined to convert the Chushka-kul point on the Ak-Bulak into a temporary and secondary stage, and to establish the principal depôt on the Emba on account of the abundance of grass for hay, a large stock of which could be prepared for the winter march of the principal detachment to Khiva.

Colonel Jemchijnikof, Quarter Master General of the Orenburg Corps, was charged with the selection of a point on the Emba for the establishment of a principal depôt.

Colonel Jemchijnikof was instructed to leave the Sultan-Ruler and his force with 315 Bashkirs in charge at Bish-Tamak for the protection of the hay that had been stored there, and for overawing the Kirghizes, who were being incited to opposition against the advance of the Russians by
Kenisar; with the remaining force, Colonel Jemchijnikof, after the arrival of the Bashkir Transport Train No. 2, which had left Orenburg under convoy of a Company of Infantry and two 6-pounder guns, was to proceed from Bish-Tamak to the River Emba as already stated. The store train here alluded to reached Bish-Tamak on the 1st August, and the 17th the Colonel, accompanied by 300 Orenburg Cossacks and 50 Bashkirs, started off to the Emba. On the 22nd August he reached the mouth of the Aty-yakshi rivulet, and on its right bank, 301 fathoms above its fall into Emba, established the depot. The fortification of the point was immediately commenced, and the beginning of September saw the completion of the earth-work in which all the stores, &c., that had arrived from Orenburg during the summer, were placed. At the same time, about 25,000 poods of hay were mown on the banks of the Emba and its tributary rivulets.

Colonel Heke, agreeably to the orders given him, arrived at the Emba fortification (or Aty-Yakshi) with a portion of the Ak-Bulak (or Chushka-Kul) garrison and four 3-pounder guns on the 10th September.

Having given over the fortification and stores to Colonel Heke, Colonel Jemchajnikof returned to the "Line" on the 20th September, having, during four months, lost only four men from sickness, and 48 horses from fatigue and privation.

Permission was granted to the Sultan-Ruler to return with his followers to his winter encampments, leaving at Bish-Tamak 75 Orenburg Cossacks in charge of the stored hay. From the Ak-Bulak and Emba fortifications 200 Bashkirs were relieved from doing duty, and in their place the newly constructed fortifications were garrisoned with 350 Orenburg Cossacks.
In consequence of these changes, the garrisons of the fortified points consisted of—

At the Emba ... 634 men
At Ak-Bulak ... 399 "

Having secured means of transport to the depôts, stations, it was now requisite to secure the further conveyance of the stores with the detachment on its march to Khiva. Owing to the inconstancy of the winter in these parts, and to the complete uselessness of carts and sledges as means of conveyance, as had been proved by former experience, it was necessary to have recourse to the local mode of transporting heavy weights on camels. European armies are unacquainted with this method of carrying stores, and the nature of the camel is generally but little known. It is sufficient here to observe that the best camels are made to carry on a journey extending over 700 or 800 versts, a load of 20 or 22 poods when the road presents no great difficulties, and no great speed is required for the transit. For longer journeys the load is from 12 to 16 poods. As camels cannot endure cold, dampness, and wet, they are mostly kept in the southern part of the Steppe. This would naturally retard and render more difficult the collection of the camels and their transmission to Orenburg, the more so, as the southern Kirghiz tribes were less under Russian subjection than those in the north, being more amenable to the influence of Khiva.

To save great expense, it was determined to obtain the camels by hire instead of by purchase. As already observed, the camels being chiefly bred in the southern portion of the Steppe, General Genz was despatched beyond the River Ural in May to the camp of the Sultan-Ruler of the western part of the Horde of Orenburg Kirghizès; the latter had received previous intimation of this intended visit, and had been instructed to assemble all the principal elders of the different
tribes for discussing the matter. The late spring, great drought, and scantiness of the vegetation had reduced the cattle of the Kirghizes to a miserable condition, in consequence of which the summons of the Sultan-Ruler to attend a council was only obeyed by the nearest tribes. Having explained the object of his visit, Major General Genz requested those present to make the requirements of the Russian Government known throughout the Horde, and at the same time instructed the Sultan-Ruler to despatch messengers with invitations to the distant elders and Bis to assemble in his camp by the 11th June.

Although the Kirghiz Elders present at the first gathering received the intimation respecting the supply of camels with proper submission, and promised complete obedience to the wishes of the Government, nevertheless, the demand, on account of its novelty, gave rise to many rumours. Hence at the second gathering, which was attended by the representatives of all the branches of the Bagulinsk, Kitinsk, and Churinoosk tribes, General Genz announced that what the Government expected from the Kaisaks was not idle discussion, but obedience to the wishes of the Emperor. He also informed them that in case they should not carry out the behests of His Majesty, these might possibly be executed without their consent and without any indemnification. To this all present unanimously replied that they were quite ready to fulfil the orders of the Government, and even volunteered to arrest and bring before the Sultan-Ruler all those evilly-disposed Kirghizes who, at the instigation of Khiva, purposed creating disturbances in the Steppe by spreading false rumours respecting the Russian movements. A list of the quantity of camels required to be supplied by each tribe was at once drawn up, and written instructions respecting their delivery were distributed to the different elders.
The following address was despatched with Cornet Aitof to the Kirghizes of the Udjriav, Nazarov, Karakisak, Ille-kabarsk, Djanklyn, and Djakormovsk tribes, in order to ensure the success of the arrangements in progress:

"Elders, Bis, and all esteemed Members of the Horde.

"By wish of His Imperial Majesty, a detachment with learned men will this autumn march into the Kirghiz Steppe.* To carry the heavy baggage many camels are necessary. These camels will be required for six months, commencing from the 1st November 1839. To every five camels there must be one driver; the load of each camel will altogether not exceed 10 Poods.

"Each driver must supply himself with a stock of provisions for a month, that is, to the 1st December.

"For each camel the Government is prepared to pay 10 Rubles Silver in three payments; the first on the conclusion of the agreement, the second at starting, and the third after the performance of the journey.

"From the 1st December until the termination of the campaign, each camel driver will receive daily 2 lbs. of buckwheat, and half a lb. of meat. When requisite, 3 lbs. of flour will be issued each day for the camels.

"Those tribes who will show zeal in furnishing camels will be exempt from punishment for any infraction of the law committed prior to the present date.

"The Sultans, Elders, and others, who will be employed in this duty, will receive special rewards and presents according to the zeal displayed by each, in addition to the stipulated payment for the camels.

* Until the Official Notification of the Military Expedition against Khiva, made on the 24th November 1839, the arrangements in progress for the campaign were given out as preparations for a Scientific Expedition to the Sea of Aral.
"By carrying out the wishes of the Russian Government the Kirghizes will have rendered good service, and have earned a special claim to the favor and protection of the Emperor.

"As many camels as are required for the expedition can be got from the Kalmuks and the Khan Djangir, but I have asked that the Steppe Kirghizes might be allowed to furnish these animals so as to give them an opportunity of earning the gracious acknowledgments of His Imperial Majesty.

"I write you in order that you may be acquainted with what is really wanted, and I request you to send as many trustworthy and sensible men as possible to the Sultan-Bai-Mahomed-Aichuvakof, who is charged with the collection of the camels.

"Lastly, I inform you that the detachments which are going to enter the Steppe will not molest the Kirghizes, nor interfere with them in any way. Approach them, therefore, fearlessly, and camp where you list."

Similar notifications were sent to the Tomin, Chumenkeen, and Djegalbaimni tribes, whose encampments General Genz soon after visited in person.

These measures were successful beyond expectation. The Kirghizes of the Bayulin tribe alone failed to fulfil their promise, and in order that such an example should not produce a damaging effect, Colonel Jemchujnikof's detachment was ordered to seize the recalcitrant tribes, when migrating across the valley of the Tyk-Temir, to take forcible possession of their serviceable camels, and then to chase the tribe beyond the Mugodjai Hills, forbidding them ever to approach the line. For their further pursuit Colonel Padurof marched into the Steppe with 300 Orenburg Cossacks. All the other
Kaisak tribes voluntarily agreed to furnish 11,444 camels. In addition, the following camels were secured permanently for the expedition:

One thousand camels presented by Khan Djanger of the Inner Horde.

One hundred and thirty camels obtained as ransom from the Nazar tribe for the release of their Chief.

Two hundred and ten camels purchased and bartered from the Kirghizes.

The whole number secured for the expedition, and if supplied by the time stipulated, would have amounted to 12,784.

Some of the tribes, however, had not supplied their quota of camels by the time fixed, i.e., the 1st November, in consequence of which the expeditionary force started with only 9,500 camels, and about 900 more, which joined it on the first stages of the march. The whole number collected was 10,400. Camel drivers were also furnished by the Kirghizes, one man to every four or five camels.

Notwithstanding the hitherto unprecedented establishment of forts in the heart of the Steppe and the transit of Russian store Caravans, the Kaisaks remained perfectly quiet during these movements, and became gradually familiarised with the preparations made in their midst, which but a short time previously they would have resisted and considered as an infringement of the rights of the Horde; only on three occasions were cattle driven away by the Kirghizes from under the walls of the new fortifications during the six months that the preparations were in progress, and these depredations were sooner to be attributed to the ordinary thievish propensities of the inhabitants of the Steppe, than to any
organized raid. The cattle-lifters drove off a large numb of Bashkir horses and bullocks, but many of these we recaptured and the thieves punished.

This peaceful condition of the Steppe facilitated the passage of the Bashkir provision trains to the depôts in the Steppe; 30,000 chetverts of Commissariat Stores and 8,000 Poods of matériel were safely transported to the seven points; on the other hand, however, the unfavorable condition of the atmosphere, combined with the scarcity of fodder, and the great prevalence of disease, occasioned considerable loss among the men and cattle belonging to the different trains.

The mortality among the Bashkirs attached to the trains amounted to 199 men, while the number of horses lost on the journey through disease and exhaustion was 8,869, or a third of the whole number employed. At the same time the dampness of the turf huts, the rapid change from the sultry heat of the day to the cold temperature of the night,* and the bad quality of the water at Ak-Bulak, had a pernicious effect on the health of the garrisons of the advanced fortified points, where, towards the end of October, the number of invalids was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sick</th>
<th>Infirm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At the Emba Fortifications</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ak-Bulak</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0</td>
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The prevailing diseases were scurvy, nervous fever, dysentery, and ague.

With the approach of cold weather the sickness increased considerably; thus, by the middle of December, the

* In the latter part of July the heat in the day time at Ak-Bulak reached 36° Reaumur, while at midnight it sank to 6 1/2° Reaumur.
were 168 men under medical treatment at the Emba, and 164 at Ak-Bulak; the number of deaths at this period in the two forts from fevers, dysentery, dropsy, and chiefly scurvy amounted to 93.

As soon as the greater portion of the stores for the expedition had been conveyed to the advanced depôts by the first five trains, and the success of the arrangements made the possibility of commencing the campaign in October a matter of certainty, a store and provision train or camel caravan, was despatched by way of experiment under Colonel Danilevski, who received instructions to direct his attention to everything relating to the caravan, such as the loading of the camels, the order to be observed in marching and halting, &c. This caravan consisting of 1,128 camels, left Orenburg on the 21st October under convoy of one Company of Infantry (234 men) one sotnia of Cossacks (116 men), and 25 Artillery men, with four light howitzers and 16 camel-borne ammunition boxes, and proceeded to the Emba, where they were to await the main detachment. There was no snow then on the ground, but the progress of the caravan was considerably impeded by the slippery surface of the ground produced by frost after a fall of rain. In spite of this the caravan reached the Emba by the 1st November, having traversed 500 versts, or one-third of the whole distance between Orenburg and Khiva in 23 days.

From this preliminary essay it was to be concluded that the journey to Khiva could be performed in 60, or at the utmost in 65 days, were it not for the existence of a barren Steppe which stretched ahead for 800 versts, necessitating the transport of large supplies of fodder for the camels and horses with the expedition, which formed nearly half of the
whole train.* While the stores were in course of convey-ance from Orenburg into the interior of the Steppe, expe-
riments were tried with the galvanic battery and combusti-
ble rockets; the pioneers were exercised in the management
of pontoon bridges; special boats, which were to take to
pieces, were being built under the superintendence of Cap-
tain Bodisko; Kirghizes and camels were concentrated in
the Steppe; the Regimental Bands practised new marching
airs on the public square at Orenburg, while Companies of
Soldier-Choristers mastered the difficulties of a martial song
composed purposely for the expedition.

The hour for the departure of the force at length
arrived.

* For the sustenance of the camels and horses it was necessary to procure a
supply of 4,005 chetverts of flour, 16,098 chetverts of oats, and 10,000 poods of hay,
which makes a total weight of 1,30,000 poods. If the Steppe yielded a plentiful
supply of fresh fodder, the camels would require no flour, while the quantity of oats
and hay which it would be necessary to transport would be but small.

This clearly shows that it was not so much the great distance of the contem-
plated journey, as the barrenness and aridity of 800 versts of country, which presented
the principal difficulty of a campaign to Khiva. These difficulties could not be avoided
from any point that might have been selected for the departure of the expedition, and
the only thing that remained to be done was to forward a proper supply of all that
was requisite to points in the Steppe as near to Khiva as possible, by special means of
transport (as was done by the engagement of the Bashkirs), in order that the strength
of the camels might be reserved for the second half of the journey. This unfor-
tunately could not be done altogether, in consequence of the Kirghizes not supplying
the whole quantity of camels requisite for the purpose.
PART V.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST KHIVA—DIVISION OF THE DETACHMENT INTO COLUMNS—DEPARTURE OF THE COLUMNS FROM ORENBURG AND THEIR MARCH TO CARAVAN LAKE—ORGANIZATION OF THE DETACHMENT, ITS ADVANCE TO BISK-TAMAK—ORDER OF ADVANCE AND DISPOSITION OF COLUMNS—ADVANCE OF THE MAIN DETACHMENT TO THE EMBA FORTIFICATION—DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED ON THIS JOURNEY—ARRIVAL OF COLONEL DIZIANOF AT THE EMBA WITH A BODY OF URAL COSSACKS.

All the preparations for the campaign were made under the pretence of a scientific expedition to the Sea of Aral; but the large quantity of stores that were being collected, the unusual activity displayed, the preparation of winter clothing for troops, and the concentration of an extraordinarily large body of soldiers and camels, roused general suspicion at Orenburg respecting the professed objects of the expedition, and gave rise to all manner of rumours and surmises. In measure as the preparations approached maturity, the curiosity of the uninitiated public became more excited. The secret, however, was soon disclosed. The troops destined for the expedition were mustered on the town square a few days before their departure, and the following order of the Commander of the Orenburg Corps was read:

"By order of His Majesty the Emperor, I am going to march with a portion of the troops under my command against Khiva. Khiva has for many years tried the long-suffering patience of a strong and magnanimous Power, and has at length brought down upon herself the wrath which her hostile conduct has provoked.

"Honor and glory to those who, by God's mercy, have been called on to march to the rescue of their brethren languishing in slavery."
"Comrades! cold and snow-storms await us, and all the inevitable and harassing difficulties of a distant march in the Steppe during winter; but all the necessary preparations for the campaign have been carefully made, and your requirements anticipated as far as possible; your zeal, ardour, and bravery will ensure success and victory. The troops of the Orenburg Corps are for the first time marching in great force against the enemy. Russia is determined on punishing Khiva, that insolent and faithless neighbour. In two months, with God's help, we shall be in Khiva, and there for the first time in the Capital of the Khanate will the Russians, before the Cross and Bible, offer up fervid and loud prayers for their Tsar and country.

"I now address those troops who will remain to guard and protect the Orenburg Frontier and their own homesteads. Fortune has not decreed that you should share with us the dangers and difficulties of the approaching campaign; but you, nevertheless, deserve the grace and favor of the Emperor; men of every grade, both high and low, after taking leave of your comrades, who will march forth to seek the enemy, you will sacredly bear in mind your duty and your oath, and cheerfully do service for yourselves and for your absent comrades, to whom you will accord a joyful and hearty welcome on their return from the distant and difficult journey they are now about to undertake."

After this order had been read and divine service performed, the troops defiled past their Commander, and were afterwards formed into columns.

All the heavy stores which could not be despatched in the Bashkir Trains and with the caravan were transported beyond the River Ural, and equally distributed among the columns.
The detachment, for greater facility of movement, provisionment, and pasturage, was divided into four columns in the following manner:

The first column was formed of two Companies of the 2nd Battalion of the line, one Sotnia of Ural Cossacks, two small howitzers, and 360 Kirghiz camel-drivers with 1,800 loaded camels.

The Commander of this column was Lieutenant General Tolmachef, who was at the same time in command of all the Infantry of the detachment.

The second column consisted of two Companies of No. 5 Battalion, with the Staff of the Battalion, 50 Bashkir and 50 Orenburg Cossacks, two mountain howitzers, and 400 Kirghizes as drivers to 2,000 camels carrying heavy stores; Lieutenant Colonel Kuzminski, who was Chief of all the Artillery, was at the head of this detachment.

The third column comprised the 4th Battalion, a division of the Orenburg Regiment of Cossacks, a Sotnia of Ural Cossacks, two 12-pounder-guns, two 6-pounders, and six small mortars; rocket, mortar, artillery, boat, and pontoon attendants and trains; camp hospital, the Staff of the detachment, and 600 Kirghizes, with 3,000 camels, was intrusted to Colonel Mansurof, a Cavalry Officer.

The fourth column consisted of two Companies of No. 5 Battalion, one Sotnia of Bashkirs, two howitzers, and 300 Kirghizes with 1,800 camels, with stores, and was in charge of Major General Tsiolkovski, who was also at that time in command of all the Bashkir and Mescheriak forces.*

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* The number of Kirghizes and camels attached to each column is here given only approximately; bullocks were also driven behind each column at first, as long as there was good pasturage.
Besides these four columns, two Regiments of Ural Cossacks, with 1,800 camels, marched, on the 19th November, from the lower Orenburg Line, under the command of Colonel Bizianov, to join the main detachment. This contingent also entered into the constitution of the main force of the expedition, but in order to save unnecessary détour, it was despatched from the Kalmykovski fortress direct to the River Emba.

The first and second columns left Orenburg on the $\frac{1}{2}$th and $\frac{3}{4}$th November by the Berdiano-Kuralinsk Line, and the third and fourth marched on the 16th and 17th November in the direction of the Iletskaya Zachita; all these columns were to unite near Caravan Lake on the right bank of the Ilek River (a left affluent of the Ural River), and about 17 versts from Grigorievsk Post on the Line. Here, before crossing the frontier; an order of the day was read to the troops informing them that His Imperial Majesty the Emperor had been graciously pleased to invest General Perofski with the powers and privileges of a Commander of a separate Corps in the field.

Before the commencement of the march, the whole detachment was so organised as to meet the special exigencies of a winter and Steppe campaign; separate instructions were issued for the discharge of camp and other military duties during the expedition, and a system of signalling between the different columns was adopted.

The columns, as independent parts of the whole detachment, were formed of Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery, with a proportionate number of load-camels.

The Commander of the columns had entire control over everything relating to them, both as regards their
discipline and provisioning; to assist the Commanders several Officers were appointed, to whom separate parts of each column were entrusted.

In each column Officers were appointed, who by turns looked after the maintenance of order on the march and in the camp, and regulated the proper posting of camp sentries, &c.

For managing the Kirghizes, Caravan-bashis, one to every hundred Kirghizes, were appointed in each column.

Two hours before sunrise a general reveillé was sounded, the men then got up, breakfasted, took down their tents, and packed their luggage. At about 5 or 6 o'clock the men were mustered for loading the camels; the convoyer Cossacks proceeded to their posts and made the Kirghizes lead the camels to the packs, while the other men of the column were told off in parties of six to load the camels. The order of loading, and the proper distribution of the stores on the backs of the camels, was superintended by Officers. After the camels had been laden, the men proceeded to equip and arm themselves; a portion of them then mounted camels and the Cossacks their horses; after this the advance guard started forward at a trot, the whole body following in several caravan lines, camels loaded with one description of stores followed each other in the same line or file.

Two Kirghizes were attached to every 10 camels; one rode in front and the other walked at the side urging on the flagging camels and adjusting their load; whenever it was necessary to stop a camel for this latter purpose, it

* This was done only at the commencement of the campaign when hay had been provided along the road and pasturage was abundant; afterwards the march was commenced much earlier in the morning, in order that the halting place for the night might be reached sooner to allow sufficient time to feed the cattle.
was taken out of the file so as not to stop the camels following behind, and afterwards placed at the end of its file; or if left behind too great a distance, it would march with the rear guard until the night halt.

Each file of camels was placed in charge of six Cossacks who maintained order and assisted the camel-drivers. A Cossack rode in front of each file to show the way; the leading Cossacks endeavoured as far as they could to ride abreast.

The other troops marched with the advance and rear guards and at the sides of the column. The rear guard received all stragglers and consisted of a body of Cossacks, a portion of the camp patrol, and the camels destined to carry the troops.*

In order to allow the camels sufficient time for grazing, the column always halted $2\frac{1}{2}$ or 2 hours before sunset.

The camels were led to pasture under a guard consisting of a fourth of the whole number of Kirghizes and Cossacks in the column; the latter also did picket duty round the drove and camp.

Two or three sentries were stationed in front of each line of pilced luggage to prevent the Kirghizes opening the bales, which the sons of the desert were rather inclined to do.

The Cossack pickets, three men to each, were posted at the distance of a verst round the camp to observe that nobody stole in or out of the camp.

Towards dusk the camels were brought back from their pastures and fastened up for the night in the camp; the Officers called over their muster rolls of men and camels, and made their report to the Commander of the column.†

* Vide plan of marching and camping attached.
† It must be observed that subsequently the order of movement and encampment was modified by experience gained on the road.
The first two days were very fine, almost without wind and with 4° (R.) of frost, but on the \( \frac{21}{3} \)th November a northeasterly wind began to blow, and the thermometer sank to 10° (R.); on the \( \frac{21}{4} \)th December there was a small fall of snow, and on the following day, when the columns reached Iletsk Zachita, there were 18° frost in the morning, and 29° towards evening.

Henceforward frosts and snow-storms accompanied the columns without intermission on the whole march. For those who had always lived in warm houses, and but rarely ventured out of doors in winter, except when out hunting or performing short journeys, the frost during the first few days was intolerable. It was of course impossible to dress as warmly when out campaigning on horseback as when travelling; at night the frost generally increased, and sleeping on the frozen ground spread over with felt, under a felt tent, and even when rolled up in a sheepskin, is rather cold work. The men generally covered themselves up from head to foot to prevent their noses getting frostbitten; but during the night, from the breathing and perspiration of the sleepers, the sheepkins froze to the hair of their heads and their moustachios, so that in getting up in the morning, it took considerable time to disentangle the hair from the sheepskin. During the first nights nobody could sleep on account of the great frost, but afterwards habit and nature were triumphant. Frosts of 15° and 20° R. were at last regarded almost as thaws, and in spite of such cold weather, all slept soundly after a fatiguing stage.

Fortunately, some men provided themselves on the halt at Iletsk Zachita with iron stoves, and the tents furnished with these proved of great service.

On the 24th November all the four columns united near Caravan Lake; hence, after resting two days, they proceeded
up the right bank of the Ilek in échelons. The columns were to follow each other at the distance of a quarter or a day's march, and this order was observed at the night halts.

According to pre-arranged plans; all the columns, reaching Tangry-Bergen, were to cross over to the left bank of the Ilek, and concentrate themselves at the source of this river near Bish-Tamak locality.

Notwithstanding that there was a fall of snow, and there were constant frosts (from 11° to 20° R.), this movement was executed successfully; the distance was traversed in stages varying from 15 to 30 versts. The pasturage al the Ilek Valley was abundant, and though it was partially covered with snow, still this was not deep enough either to obstruct the progress of the trains, or interfere with grazing of the horses and camels, the latter being, moreoever, additionally fed with hay, which was either bought from the Kirghizes, or had been previously stored on the road.

The 16th and 17th December, the columns having traversed a distance of 274 versts from Orenburg, became concentrated at Bish-Tamak, where there was plenty of pasturage and a sufficient supply of fuel.

Before describing the subsequent progress of the expedition, it is necessary to become acquainted with the organisation of the columns, their order of marching, and their position at the night halts.

If it were possible to advance in the Steppe without being exposed to the chances of attack or loss of cattle from marauding Kirghizes, the most convenient and rapid method of performing the march would be to adopt the order observed by the trade caravans, which march in two or three lines abreast.

* The trade caravans, however, when apprehending an attack from robbers, covered the length of their train and advance in a broad front, or a greater number of lines abreast.
and dividing the detachment into several small columns, each consisting of 800 or 1,000 camels, without preserving any order, to allow each party to start in the morning whenever their camels would be packed, and to let them halt for the night at any point they may consider most convenient for themselves. But in such a case, it would be impossible to exercise any command over the whole detachment, and all military rules and precautions would necessarily have to be neglected.

It is evident that this manner of marching cannot be adopted by an expeditionary force despatched with military objects, which should be ready at any moment to repel an attack of the enemy from whatever quarter he might appear, and which should advance in such order as to be able to form a defensive encampment without loss of time.

It was necessary to plan an order of marching which should satisfy military requirements, and be at the same time of a simple character. Such a mode of advance was devised by the Officers of the Etat Major of the Orenburg Corps, and was based on the consideration that the detachment was organized of troops who had never seen warfare, and were accompanied by an enormous train in which there were more than 2,000 Kirghiz camel-drivers, of doubtful loyalty, requiring strict supervision, unaccustomed to order and discipline, and ignorant of the Russian language; and that it was necessary to instruct the detachment in the order of march which would have to be observed in entering the dominion of Khiva: a campaign, therefore, at a short distance from the "Line" would have to serve as an experiment and initiation of the advance, and deployment of the troops in the Steppe.

In order to command the detachment with greater efficiency, it would have been preferable to have allowed it to
march in one body; but the advance and disposition in the Steppe of a force consisting of more than 2,000 men and 9,000 camels presented the following drawbacks:

1st.—Large and good pasturage for the cattle, and fuel for the men, could not always be found at the halting places.

2nd.—It would be necessary to graze the camels at a great distance from the camp, and consequently it would be more difficult and occupy more time to collect them; moreover, as during the short winter days only two or three hours were available for grazing, the cattle could not be driven far from the camp.

3rd.—There are no established roads across the Steppe. When crossing ravines, gullies, rivulets, and rivers, it would not be always possible to advance with an extended front; hence all the columns would have to be contracted and drawn out into a long line, which would arrest the progress of each column for several hours. These detentions, as it proved afterwards, would have been still greater had the force not been divided into columns, and consequently the horses and camels would have endured greater fatigue by standing for many hours with their loads on their backs. It was for these reasons, therefore, that the expeditionary force was divided into separate columns, and as it was known that the enemy were not distinguished for bravery, discipline, or knowledge of military art, no serious danger was apprehended from such a division.

The detachment, as it was organised, resembled a large caravan or train carrying with it a supply of matériel for the whole campaign, provisions for two months, and a large quantity of miscellaneous stores, which entailed the necessity of adapting its military organization and camping
arrangements to the order of march and night halts observed by trains following in the rear of armies.*

To prevent desertion on the part of the Kirghizes attached as drivers, &c., to the force, and to give the detachment greater strength, the following order was adopted for marching and camping:—

Each column having arranged its packs according to the nature of the stores contained in them, organised them into two divisions, right and left, and placed its pack camels in rows from 12 to 20 deep, 6 to 10 of these rows forming the right division of the column, and the other 6 to 10 the left. The two outside rows of each column were to consist of the bulkiest packs, such as cases of biscuits, bundles of pressed hay, bags of flour, &c., so as they might serve as a protection against musket shots; the Artillery train advanced between these two divisions, and consisted of 4 to 10 files, the Military, Staff, Field Chaplains, and Clerks' train following next in succession. The distance to be kept between each file was to be from 6 or 8 to 10 paces.

Each column was to be preceded by a van-guard and followed by a rear-guard of a Sotnia or half a Sotnia of Cossacks, and lateral detachments of 25 Cossacks. All these

* The Russian expeditionary force being accompanied by a train so large as to amount to two camels to every combatant, could not advance in the same manner as, for instance, Bonaparte did in Egypt, where his trains were protected by being placed in the centre of squares, and where he was able to bring up his supplies along the Nile; nor could the Russians adopt the plan pursued by the French in Algeria, where the troops are seldom moved farther than 180 or 200 miles from the depôts, and where consequently no necessity exists for taking large supplies for an expedition. Thus Bugeaud, in his celebrated movement preceding the battle of Isli, pushed forward only two short stages from the entrenched camp at Lallah-Magrania, where his depot of stores was concentrated. The supplies for 10,000 French troops, occupying a space of only 150 fathoms in length and 25 in breadth, could be easily protected by the troops formed into battalion squares placed at short intervals of distance from each other.
covering parties marched at a distance of 1 or 2 versts from the column, and sent out patrols on both sides to the distance of a quarter or a whole verst. The remaining troops belonging to the columns were distributed either in the front, rear, or at the sides, and it was their duty to adjust the packs and raise the camels that fell on the march. Arranged in this order, the largest column, No. 4, consisting of 4,000 camels, occupied when on the march a breadth from 120 to 250 paces, and extended from 1,200 to 600 paces in length; in case of attack, it consequently could speedily prepare for action and repel the enemy.

At the night halts the columns were to be formed in an oblong square, for which purpose topographers were to be sent in advance, who marked the position to be taken up by each file and the principal portions of the camp, by stationing Cossacks at the several points.

Sentries were posted at all the angles of the camp, and guns were stationed at two angles of the square in a diagonal position. The clear way between the exterior line and the other parts of the camp served for the purpose of bringing up the Artillery, in case of attack, to any point where it might be required, and for stationing reserves behind the line of sharpshooters disposed behind the front row of packs.

At night sentries were posted in front of the outside row of packs; special sentries were also stationed round the horses and Artillery pack; the horses at night were always hobbled.

From this it will be seen that a change from marching to camping order did not involve any special transformation, with the exception of that of detaching two rows of pack camels from each side of the column, and placing them into a single file for the outside boundary line of the camp.
which was generally done when approaching the halting point; the remaining portion of the column encamped in the same order as it had marched.

The same order of camp formation was to be observed on the march by the columns in case of attack by the enemy.

On the alarm being given, each division of the troops forming the column was to form at its front; the covering parties were to throw out a line of skirmishers, and a quarter of the Infantry was to be told off as a reserve for sharp-shooting. In order that a part of the troops should be always ready to repel any attack, a quarter of the Infantry and Cavalry accompanying the column was to be kept always fully equipped both day and night, and to perform sentry duty at night along the interior rows of packs, so as to prevent the Kirghizes from robbing the stores; in case of need Cavalry supports were to be sent to the skirmishers. The mounted sentries along the inner rows, on an alarm being sounded, or in case of attack, were to form a chain round that portion of the camp which was occupied by the Kirghizes and their camels.

To prevent any sudden attack when the columns would be passing through defiles, the surrounding neighbourhood was to be surveyed, and positions occupied by the troops for covering the passage of the train through the defiles.

To prevent the cattle when grazing from being driven off, they were watched by mounted parties of soldiers, and pickets of Cossacks were stationed in the neighbourhood, who observed every military precaution in consequence of the cattle-lifting proclivities displayed by the Kirghizes. These precautions were all the more necessary, since information had been received on the 28th November that the Khivans
were marching in great force across the Ust-Urt with the intention, after effecting a junction with a body of friendly Kirghizes at Karatamak (the north-western bay of the Sea of Aral), to attack the advanced Russian fortification at Ak-Bulak; all the greater circumspection was to be observed, as they might detach parties for the express purpose of driving off the Russian camels and horses.

On the $\frac{6}{12}$th December, the frost rose above $32^\circ$ R, and the intensity of the cold congealed the mercury in the glass. Nevertheless, this did not prevent the detachment, which had reached Bish-Tamak and halted a day there, from celebrating the birth-day of the Emperor Nicholas in a suitable manner. On the next day, the detachment advanced into the heart of the Kirghiz Steppe. As long as it proceeded along the valley of the Ilek, the numerous hay stacks dotted along its banks, the hurdle enclosures which occurred at intervals, and which the Kirghizes wintering on the Ilek used for sheltering their cattle during the "Burans," reminded the troops, to a certain extent, of their native country, but as the Ilek was left behind, even these miserable traces of settled life disappeared. The march along the Ilek as far as Bish-Tamak, notwithstanding the great frost, was easily accomplished, the troops enduring no fatigue, and there being an abundance of hay, water, and fuel.

On the $\frac{7}{12}$th December, the columns having supplied themselves with fuel and hay, which had been previously stored here, were ordered to proceed to the fortification on the River Emba in the same order that had been observed on the march from Caravan Lake, that is, keeping at a distance of from three to five versts from each other. It had been intended that they should first march a distance of about 50 versts along the Isambai Rivulet forming one of the five
sources of the Ilek, and then in one stage of 20 versts to gain the sources of the Tyk-Temir River. The columns marched for 60 versts along the valley of this rivulet, and then leaving it at its point of junction with the Kuldenek-Temir, reached in two stages the River Emha, down which they marched for 30 versts to the fortification erected on the Aty-Yakshi, an affluent of the Emha.

As the columns followed the same route at a short distance from each other, and were exposed to the same inclement weather, local obstacles, and hardships of a winter campaign in the Steppe, a description of the advance of the main column to the Emha will apply just as well to the three other columns of the detachment.

The main column started from Bish-Tamak on the 19th December with 30° R. of frost. The snow, owing to the cold, was crisp under foot; no willow bushes were now to be seen, and in the distance the summits of hillocks covered with snow, and brightly illuminated by the sun, could alone be distinguished. This brilliant reflection and the whiteness of the snow commenced to affect the sight of the men. The column had scarcely advanced for seven or eight versts when, about noon, the sky became hidden in dense clouds; a north-easterly wind sprung up, blowing up clouds of snow, and soon attaining the force of a "Buran." It was the first time that the detachment experienced the violence of a "Buran."

Beyond a distance of 20 yards, no object was to be seen through the clouds of snow which were whirled about in every direction. The fury of the storm was so great that it was impossible to draw breath when facing the wind, and the intense cold penetrated to the bones. The order of advance could not be observed, and so as not to get lost in this fog of snow, the column was immediately halted.
The “Buran” lasted the whole night, and subsided towards noon next day. The Kirghizes said that, if the snow had not been hardened previously by the frost, the tents would have been buried in snow. There was a perceptible increase in the depth of the snow in the Steppe after this storm, and it was then that the detachment experienced all the hardship and fatigue of a winter Steppe campaign, when it had to cross ravines and hollows drifted over with snow. On the journey to the Emba there were no willow trees, and but few canes and reeds; consequently, the fuel consisted very often of roots, which had to be dug out of the snow. As the days were short, and there being no hay stored along the route, it was necessary to allow the cattle two hours a day to pluck the scanty herbage; but in order to perform a stage of 20 versts, it was requisite to commence the march long before light. The soldiers of the detachment were generally astir at about 2 A. M., when preparations were commenced by the cooks and servants for boiling tea and buck-wheat porridge. On some days, however, notwithstanding the severity of the frost, the detachment had to commence its march after a repast on frozen biscuits in consequence of there being no fuel to light fires.

Usually about 2 or 3 o’clock the reveillé was sounded, the men rose, breakfasted, and then about 5 or 6 o’clock were distributed according to their different posts; some were employed in taking down the tents and packing them on the camels, some loaded the store camels, while others placed the sick on sledges, &c., &c. All this was done in the dark, and sometimes the march was commenced before day-break, in order that the halting for the night might be reached early, and the cattle depastured before sunset.

The piteous cries of the numerous camels when being forced to rise on their feet, the neighing of horses, the babel
of tongues, Kirghiz, Bashkir, Uralian, and Russian; all these sounds intermixed blended into one wild discordant noise which resounded far and wide over the Steppe.

Thus day past after day. The Steppe became more devoid of water, fuel, and vegetation: the willow bushes were succeeded by reeds and these latter by roots, the frosts in the mean time not decreasing in severity. On the march from Iletsk-Zachita to Fort Emba, that is, from the 22nd November to the 21st December, only on one occasion did the frost subside to 9° R., and this accordingly was considered as a thaw. For eight days the frost ranged from 10° to 15° R., six days from 25° to 30°, and three days above 30°; these frosts were not unfrequently accompanied by a biting wind which assumed sometimes all the fury of a "Buran." The depth of the snow was increased by the snow drifts or mounds which daily increased the difficulties of the march.

The transport of the sick and the 6 and 12-pounder guns was especially attended with considerable difficulty; as the wheels of the hospital carts and gun carriages cut deep into the snow, the wheels were taken off and wooden slides fitted to the body of the carriages, by which means the difficulty was partially overcome. Along the whole distance from the Orenburg Line to the River Emba, the columns did not see a single Kirghiz Aúl, and it was only on the stage to Fort Emba that they passed some tents of Kirghizes of the Nazar tribe near which were grazing large numbers of horses and sheep.

Taking advantage of this opportunity, 1,000 sheep were bought from the Kirghizes for the provisionment of the column, and a few fresh camels procured in lieu of those which had become exhausted.

At last, after a very tedious and fatiguing march down the valley of the Emba, along which only six or eight
rows of camels could advance abreast owing to the depth of the snow, the column reached Fort Emba on the 19th December, where it found the detachment of Colonel Bizianov who had arrived from the Nijne-Urulsk Line already on the 21st December.

The whole march from Orenburg to Fort Emba, a distance of 472 versts, was performed by the detachment in 32 days. Not a single man had died from cold, although there were numerous cases of frost bites.
PART VI.


All the four columns were disposed in four separate camps around the fortification at a distance from ½ to 1 verst. As all the herbage around the fort was consumed, it was necessary to drive the camels to new pasturage ground at a distance of 25 verst; it was also desirable that the detachment should remain for a few days at the Embä Fortification to recruit its strength before encountering still greater fatigue, to pick out the weak and unserviceable camels, and to reduce the packs of the stronger animals to 4 or 5 poods each in order to economise their forces. The original packs of 6 or 7 poods formed together a load of 12 or 14 poods per camel, which was now too heavy for the exhausted camels. It was also necessary to await the arrival of the relief of fresh camels, which was on its way to the Embä, and to prepare means of transport for the sick along the remaining distance to Khiva, a matter of no ordinary difficulty. The men disabled by sickness and disease had hitherto been transported partly in waggons and partly on sledges; beyond the Embä, however, the great depth of the snow, the uneven character of the ground, the holes and hollows occurring almost at every step, and the steep ascent to the Ust-Urt involved the necessity of transporting the invalids on camels.

In Egypt and Algeria, where the only difficulty to contend against is the sultry heat, the arrangement of these
invalid packs was comparatively easy. In the Egyptian campaign of Bonaparte, boxes 5 feet long were fixed to the packs, one end of the box opening on hinges to allow the sick man to stretch out his legs when he wished. In Algeria, the French, in their expeditions into the desert, carry their sick on the backs of mules, in a kind of chair in which the sick man is strapped. The Russians could not adopt either of these methods, as the sick men would be liable to be frozen to death in severe weather. There remained only one method of conveying them, that of constructing a species of hammock about 6 feet in length filled with hay and wool, and placing the sick inside wrapped warmly in felt. Although the hammocks so prepared were not, may be, very comfortable to lie in, none of the men were injured by frost. The strongest camels were selected for carrying the sick, and two hammocks were slung across each camel. Fortunately, there was a person attached to the force who voluntarily assumed the duties of looking after the sick, and moving them to and from their hammocks. The name of this humane man was Chihachef, the celebrated Russian traveller, who had received permission from the authorities to join the expedition as an amateur, and he intended, after reaching Khiva, to proceed to survey the sources of the Oxus and Syr-Daria, the Pamir Mountains, from whence he proposed to return to Russia by way of Thibet and India.

According to pre-arranged plans, the fortification erected at Ak-Bulak was to be evacuated on the further advance of the troops, and the provisions stored there were to be carried with them; the sick and feeble and a portion of the heaviest articles it was decided to remove to the Emba Fortification. To carry out these dispositions, 40 sledges, with a small covering force, were despatched to Ak-Bulak a few days previous to the departure of the column.
During the whole progress of the march from the Line to the Emba Fortification, the column had not been attacked either by the Kaisaks or yet by the Khivans, and had not even seen the enemy. Although reports had been received of the collection of a considerable force of Khivans on the Syr-Daria at Karatamak (a bay on the north-western shore of the Sea of Aral), but as these rumours had been in circulation for nearly six months, they were at last discredited altogether. Suddenly the Commander of the Ak-Bulak Fort reported that he had been attacked by the Khivans.

They had appeared near Fort Ak-Bulak on the 18th December, 2,000 or 3,000 strong approaching at a brisk trot, and halting within a verst and a half of the fort; a body of their picked horsemen dashed off to attack the picket stationed at a short distance, but the soldiers had had time to make good their retreat into the fort. At the same time the mounted Khivans divided themselves into several bodies, and made a simultaneous attack on the fortification from the eastern and northern sides. Fortunately, a false alarm had been sounded the night before, when the men had been told off to their several quarters, and the Officers assigned their respective posts, consequently no confusion arose on the unexpected attack of the Khivans. Inside the fortification there were only 130 able men, but at the moment of danger the 164 sick soldiers in the fort rose from their beds, seized their arms, and joined their comrades on the walls. The Musketry and Artillery fire skilfully directed by two Officers of Mining Engineers repulsed the enemy with considerable loss. Notwithstanding this, however, they continued their unsuccessful attacks until nightfall, gathering out of gunshot in new bodies after each repulse, and then rushing on to the attack again, harmlessly discharging their muskets at the garrison. Observing that some haystacks stood in front of the entrance
to the fort on the western side, the Khivans repeatedly endeavoured to approach them, evidently with the intention of forcing their way into the fort under cover of the haystacks; they were, however, each time foiled in these attempts by the Cossacks and Infantry Soldiers who sallied out against them; in the night they attempted to set fire to the ricks, but in this they likewise failed.

On the next day, the enemy having previously observed that there were no guns on one face of the fort, attacked it from that side, but during the night a barbette had been erected there, and during the attack guns were hastily mounted on it, so that the Khivans on their approach were dispersed with grape. After this failure they retired back about 3 versts, and formed themselves into one body, ranged under their several banners. Hearing that a small Russian detachment was encamped at a short distance from the fort; the Khivans resolved to destroy it. This was the transport train that had been despatched for the removal of the sick and the superfluous heavy articles from Ak-Bulak to the River Emba, and which was at that time only one stage distant from the fortification. Being unaware of the proximity of the enemy, this detachment, under the command of Erofeyef, had halted at 17 versts from Ak-Bulak, the camels and horses had been let loose to graze, and the men were employed in digging roots for fuel and in erecting the tents. While so engaged, the Khivan horsemen made their sudden appearance, and, instead of immediately attacking the detachment, commenced driving off its horses and camels. This gave the Russians time to make a hasty entrenchment. The carts, sledges, and boxes were immediately formed into a temporary rampart, behind which the soldiers were placed to receive the enemy, with discharges of musketry. The Cavalry and Infantry of the Khivans soon made successive charges on the camp, but
were each time repulsed. At night the Khivans attempted to crawl up and take the Russians by surprise, but were driven off at the point of the bayonet and with musket shots. During the darkness, however, the Khivans succeeded in digging rifle pits and throwing up some trenches at a distance of 50 yards, on the four faces of the Russian camp, and opened fire from these in the morning. From this position, however, they were soon dislodged, and seeing the futility of continuing their open attacks, they collected the horses and camels they had seized and drove them straight before them on the Russian encampment in the hope of being able to approach the camp in safety behind the shelter of these animals. But Captain Erofeyef, divining their intention, detached 25 riflemen with orders to take up a position which would deprive the assailants of the protection of the horses and camels. This was skilfully executed, and the well directed fire of the riflemen created confusion among the enemy; a sortie was made at the same time from the camp, and the Khivans were beaten off with loss, without being able to carry off their dead, and losing a portion of the camels and horses previously seized by them from the Russians. Seeing the great loss they sustained in men, and the unsuccessful termination of their attacks against the camp, the Khivans had recourse to another stratagem: two of their horsemen galloped up within gun-shot and endeavoured to induce the Tartars and Kirghizes to join them, promising them favors and rewards if they did so, and threatening dire vengeance in case they refused. A few shots, however, soon put an end to their persuasive eloquence. The whole Khivan force retired soon afterwards, and were not seen or heard of for a long time. The Russians subsequently ascertained that they lost the greater part of their horses from the frost, many of the riders also
falling victims to the severity of the winter. Out of the whole of this mass of 2,000 or 3,000 men which had been commanded by the Kush-Begi or Minister of War, scarcely half returned to Khiva, and those were in a very sorry plight.

In the attack on Ak-Bulak, the Russian garrison had not a single man killed or wounded, while in Captain Erofeyef's detachment five men were killed, 13 men wounded, and 31 horses and 41 camels driven away. The total of the Khivan loss could not be ascertained, but between Ak-Bulak and the point of attack on Erofeyef's detachment 80 bodies were discovered.

Although the exhortations and threats of the Khivans did not at the time produce the slightest effect on the Kirghizes, who were witnesses of their cowardice and defeat, nevertheless, the exaggerated reports disseminated among the Kirghizes of the Steppe by the Khivans respecting the strength of their forces, and their reinforcement by an army of Kokanians, the threats of the Khan of Khiva, and the religious fanaticism stimulated and inflamed by Khivan emissaries, subsequently excited the Kirghiz camel drivers to such an extent that on one occasion they collected together to the number of about 200, and refused to proceed any further. This disorderly crowd, in spite of all entreaties, refused to disperse, and increasing in numbers disturbed the camp with their wild shouts and violent behaviour.

It was necessary to adopt severe measures so as to save the detachment from being left in the heart of the frozen Steppe, at a distance of 500 versts from the line, without any means of locomotion. The crowd was surrounded by the troops, and after two of the ringleaders had been shot, the malcontents dispersed and resumed their duties.
The influence of the Khivans, however, over the Kirghiz was not so easily counteracted on all occasions, as the following incident will show:

While the main detachment lay encamped at the Emba, a report was received that the supplies of provisions despatched in vessels to Novo-Alexandrofsk having been delayed at sea by contrary winds until late in the autumn, ten of the ships had become fixed in the ice, some in sight of Fort Alexandrofsk, and some within a hundred versts of Guriev, near the Prorvinsk Islands; that only two of the vessels had succeeded in returning to Astrakhan after sustaining considerable injury, and losing part of their cargoes which they were compelled to throw overboard.

On receipt of this intelligence, the Governor of Astrakhan received instructions to prepare 1,500 chetverts of biscuits with a proportionate quantity of buck-wheat, and to despatch a portion of these supplies by land to Novo-Alexandrofsk; the remaining portion was ordered to be sent by sea as soon as the navigation of the Caspian would become open in spring.

Owing to the exertions of the Commandant of Novo-Alexandrofsk, the vessels frozen in the ice near that fort were saved, and their cargoes safely brought on shore; those transports, however, which were wedged in the ice near Prorvinsk Post, were burnt by Turkmen and Kirghizes sent thither for this purpose by the Khivan. The former subsequently attacked the Kirghizes peaceably nomadizing in the vicinity of Fort Novo-Alexandrofsk, pillaged their property and drove off their cattle, threatening all the Kirghizes favorably disposed towards Russia with the same treatment. These threats produced their effect, and stopped, as it will be seen hereafter, the arrival of fresh camels at a time when they were most needed by the detachment.
The detachment, during its stay at the Emba, was joined by Aichuvakof, the Sultan-Ruler of the western portion of the Horde, who was accompanied by about 200 Kaisaks available for doing duty as scouts and messengers.

As Fort Emba, after the evacuation of Ak-Bulak on the advance of the detachment, was to form the nearest depot of provisions and point d'appui to Khiva, we must here give a description of its condition, and see what was the position and state of the expeditionary force, in order that the means available at that moment for dealing the final blow to Khiva might be more clearly estimated.

In the advanced forts, in spite of the healthy diet of the men, there were 168 cases of fever, dysentery, dropsy, and scurvy; the latter was the most prevalent disease, and must doubtless be attributed to the permanent location of the soldiers in mud huts, the nature of which accommodation was unavoidable, owing to the absence of timber in the Steppe for the construction of proper quarters. General Perofski, however, on reaching Fort Emba, ordered a portion of the sick to be taken out of the mud huts and placed in tents, notwithstanding the severity of the weather. The invalids consisted mostly of Infantry Soldiers of the Line, who had not been accustomed to the fatigues of a campaign, the proportion of sick Cossacks being at the same time very small. The number of deaths which had occurred since the establishment of both forts was 93. Small-pox also broke out at this period among the Kirghizes, and great care was consequently taken to isolate those affected by this disease from the rest of the detachment. On the 18th January 1840, the whole number of sick in the detachment amounted to 202. The loss in horses to this date had only been 8, while about one-fifth of the camels was at this time unserviceable, the scarcity of herbage and the fatigue of a winter march having completely reduced their strength.
To remedy this deficiency in camels as far as possible, it was decided to leave at the Emba the stores which were not urgently wanted. The Officers were also instructed to take with them only such articles as they strictly required.

On the completion of the new arrangements, such as reducing the weight of the packs, preparation of hammocks for the sick, &c., the several columns pushed forward; the first under Colonel Bizianov started on the 12th January 1840, and was shortly followed by the others in échelons.

While at the Emba the soldiers were exercised in making night signals by the ignition of gunpowder, in which manner all communications were subsequently correctly maintained between the columns, the men were also practised in firing with shot and shell, and experiments were also successfully made in exploding mines under the ice by means of a galvanic battery.
PART VII.

ADVANCE OF THE MAIN DETACHMENT TO AK-BULAK FORT—RECONNAISSANCE OF COLONEL BIZIANOF AND CAPTAIN RECHENBERG OF THE ETAT MAJOR—CAPTURE OF CORNET ATOF—DIFFICULTY OF THE MARCH TO AK-BULAK, AND A COMPARISON OF THIS MARCH TO THE PASSAGE OF RUSSIAN TROOPS OVER THE GULF OF BOTHNIA—CAUSE OF RECALL OF THE MAIN DETACHMENT FROM AK-BULAK TO THE EMBA FORTIFICATION.

As soon as all the necessary preparations for continuing the march were completed, the last column started forward on the 16th January. The reports received from the advanced columns and from the Kirghizes were far from being satisfactory. Heavy falls of snow, a very rare phenomenon in those parts, had obstructed the route. The Kirghizes in the autumn of each year were in the habit of migrating from the upper course of the Ilek to localities beyond the River Emba, on account of the mildness of the winter that prevailed in those parts, and the inconsiderable quantity of snow that was usually to be found southward of the latter river; this season, however, the experience of former years was completely reversed, and to this circumstance must the great difficulties encountered by the advancing columns be ascribed. The distance between the Emba Fortification and Ak-Bulak by the direct winter route did not exceed 160 versts, and was traversed by the columns in 15 days; notwithstanding this, however, the loss in camels was very great, and continued to increase daily. The detachment, when it crossed the line, had about 10,000 camels, but after passing Fort Emba, it could with difficulty muster 8,900 camels for transporting provisions and provender for two months; while at Ak-Bulak, which point was not even half-way to Khiva,
the number of serviceable camels was reduced to 5,188; the number that actually died on the road between the Emba and Ak-Bulak was only 1,200, the rest being abandoned on the road on account of their complete exhaustion.

To render the march of the unloaded camels less wearisome, the Infantry Columns advanced in front of them in four files, forming beaten tracks in the snow, the advance of the loaded camels being assisted in the same way by the Cavalry. Where the snow was very deep, the Cavalry was made to pass and repass several times over the same ground to enable the camels to proceed without any difficulty; in some parts the snow was even shovelled away in front by the soldiers; but in spite of all this, the camels continued to fall in great numbers, obstructing the advance of the columns. When a camel fell, it was necessary to stop to remove its load, and the men sinking to their knees and sometimes to their waists in snow exhausted their strength in this labor. When a camel fell, it rarely rose again, so that new paths had to be made round these obstructions for the passage of the camels following in the rear.

The guns had to be drawn by horses, and even occasionally they were obliged to be pulled out of the snow by the men. In some places the surface of the snow was quite soft, while in others it was nearly as hard as ice, and supported the horses, camels, and even the 12-pounder guns; but at times when it gave way, the extrication of the camels, sledges, Artillery, &c., was attended with great fatigue and difficulty. The camels and horses got cut about the legs, and some days only short stages of four verstas were made in consequence of such obstacles. In “Burans” or snow-storms, it was altogether impossible to advance; thus the first column which marched during a snow-storm was only able to traverse
20 versts in four days, and abandoned on the road a large number of sledges and carts, which the following three columns converted into fuel for cooking purposes.

After such severe frost and fatiguing stages, the strength of the camels should have been recruited with plentiful food, but the surface of the Steppe, poor as it was, was completely covered with snow. It was, however, still possible to give each horse a measure of oats and about 5 lbs. of hay daily, but to feed 8,000 camels daily on hay was of course not feasible; they, however, received about 5 lbs. of hay each daily, which was little enough.

To this it must be added that the frost, during this time, was 15 and 20° R., and although the men had to a certain extent become acclimatised, the great cold benumbed their limbs in spite of their warm clothing, and incapacitated them for all work; at the same time hard-work producing perspiration, exhaustion, and sound sleep, exposed the men to the liability of catching colds.

For the first 80 versts the columns marched along the left bank of the Arty-Yakshi, and then followed the course of the Talysai Rivulet, proceeding afterwards across saline marshes, which the frost rendered firm ground in winter, and enabled the camels, horses, and artillery to cross without any difficulty; even during summer droughts horses sink here up to their fetlocks in the oozy mud, and the wheels of carts laden with goods become embedded a foot deep; after a fall of rain, or during spring, it is altogether impossible to cross these saline marsh tracts which extend to Chushka-Kul over a distance of 80 versts. They are intersected by two ranges of hills, the Bakgir and Ali, over which there are convenient ascents and descents for vehicles; but along the whole of this marshy tract, a plentiful supply of good water springs is only to be found on the slope of the Ali Hills; the
pasturage for cattle throughout the whole distance is poor and scanty. In consequence of the frost and snow and a scarcity of fuel, it took the columns six or seven days to traverse these salines; on these stages they encountered the difficulties described above.

General Perovski, who had remained with a light detachment at Fort Emba to superintend the departure of the last column, and to make proper arrangements for the safety and requirements of the sick left behind, quitted the above fort on the 15th January, and after inspecting the columns which he overtook on the march, he proceeded forward to Ak-Bulak to make arrangements for the further advance of the troops. On reaching Ak-Bulak, he immediately despatched Colonel Bizianof and Captain Rechenberg with 150 Ural Cossacks, and one light field gun to reconnoitre the route ahead, and to find a convenient point of ascent to the Ust-Urt. This detachment, after proceeding for 150 versts in the direction towards Khiva, returned after an absence of eight days, having found that the depth of the snow for a hundred versts in front, as far as the ascent to the Ust-Urt, was still deeper than that over the Steppe already traversed; that the grass and bushes were buried in snow, and that some parts of the route were so encumbered with snow that they could with difficulty be passed even by horses. On the Ust-Urt, along which Colonel Bizianof advanced 20 versts, there was less snow than below, still even there the quantity was unusually great; no traces of the enemy were discovered anywhere, from which it was with great likelihood concluded that the Khivans had marched homewards in consequence of the extraordinary severity of the winter.

At this juncture the following event occurred, which had an unfavorable effect on the expedition generally:—Cornet Aitof, attached to the Orenburg Frontier Commission, had
been sent in the previous month of November to collect camels among the Kirghizes nomadizing between the lower course of the Ural and Fort Novo-Alexandrofski. With these camels, it was intended, as already stated, to transport the provision stores that were to have reached Novo-Alexandrofski by water to the main column, and to replace the loss of those camels that had died and become disabled during the march of the column. Aitof, with 538 camels which he had collected, was already marching towards Fort Emba, when, at the instigation of the Khivans, he was seized and bound by the camel-drivers and carried off to Khiva, his camels being returned to the different Auls from which they had been procured. One of the drivers, favorably disposed to the Russians, succeeded in making his escape, and gave information of the occurrence. Thus the hope of obtaining fresh camels and a supply of provisions for two months from Novo-Alexandrofski was frustrated by an unforeseen circumstance. Not contented with the seizure of Aitof, the inimical Turkmen and Adaef Kirghizes, mustering 200 strong, burnt 12 fishing vessels stationed near Prorvinsk Post, and attacked the post itself; but in this they were unsuccessful, being beaten back and dispersed among the surrounding reeds; they were able, however, to drive off 1,300 sheep grazing in the neighbourhood, and belonging to Russian traders.

In the mean time the detachment approached Ak-Bulak, and the third or main column, which comprised the park of Artillery, reached Ak-Bulak on the 26th January, 1840, 16 days after its departure from Fort Emba. Notwithstanding that this column had been preceded by the two foremost columns, and that it had left only six days after the second column, it was in some places obliged to clear a new route for itself, the tracks and trodden paths of the columns in advance
having been drifted over with snow. It was only now and then that the route pursued by the columns in front could be ascertained by the pillars of snow erected at some distance from each other by the Ural Cossacks, by the snow heaps which marked the night camps, and by the camels, living and dead, some frozen and partly devoured by wild beasts, that lay along the line of march.

The third column having a greater quantity of heavy stores, camels, and artillery than the other two, encountered greater difficulties on this portion of the march.

If the passage of Macdonald's Corps, 12,000 strong, in 1,800, over the Simplon be justly considered a wonderful feat on account of the extraordinary exertions of the French, and the great hardships to which they were exposed, how much higher must we estimate the endurance and discipline of the Russian troops who encountered difficulties immeasurably greater on their march, through the deep snows from the Emba to Ak-Bulak, during frosts and snow hurricanes of unprecedented severity, over a desert and frozen tract of 160 versts (107 miles), the advance extending over a period of half a month?

Notwithstanding all the fatigues of the march, the troops lamented their bad luck in not meeting the enemy whom they were impatient to face, and envied the Ak-Bulak garrison and the small force under Captain Erofeyef, who had been fortunate enough to be brought into contact with the foe.

Comparing the Khiva campaign of 1839 with the march of the Russian troops to Sweden across the ice of the Baltic in 1808, and giving every credit to the bravery, endurance, and devotion of the troops who performed that perilous journey, it must, however, be granted that the hardships endured by the troops on the march to Khiva during four months of winter were much greater.
After marching in hard frosts a distance of 500 versts through an inhospitable Steppe covered with deep snow, and after a short halt at Fort Emba, which did not, however, afford the men any rest owing to the heavy labor they had to perform there, the troops had to advance further across a Steppe still more barren and inhospitable. It was found necessary to clear the way for the 6,000 camels through deep snow drifts, and the men had very often to work up to their waists in snow, with frost at 20° R, adjusting the packs, loading and unloading them, &c. The unfortunate camels had become so weak from fatigue, insufficient food, and from the cold, that even the Kirghiz drivers who rarely walk did not mount them for several stages before Ak-Bulak, but proceeded on foot. A new source of anxiety appeared on the march to Ak-Bulak; the famished camels gnawed the bark boxes, matting sacks, and bags in order to get at the biscuits, flour, and corn they contained, and pulled the compressed bag out of the bundles; in this manner more of these stores were wasted than eaten by the camels, and it was consequently necessary to keep a strict watch over them, and repair immediately any damage done to the packs. At each halting place 19,000 packages had to be unloaded and again loaded, and before a fire could be lit, the materials for it, consisting usually of small roots of shrubs, had to be picked out of the hard and frozen ground; the ground had to be cleared of the snow for the tents, camels, &c. Briefly, the camp was anything but a resting place. Only towards 8 or 9 o'clock in the evening could the soldier or Cossack obtain a little repose, and by 2 or 3 o'clock next morning he was obliged to rise to go through the same round of heavy duties.

Along this treacherous route it was impossible to have anticipated what conveyance, whether carts or sledges, would
have been most suitable for the journey. When advancing to the Emba, while the snow was yet deep and of equal firmness, the use of sledges seemed to be preferable, and wooden *slides* were accordingly attached to the carriages of the 12-pounder guns, but when the snow became alternately firm and quite soft, and too weak for supporting any weight on its surface, the sledges proved of little service. It was, therefore, decided to transport 6 and 12-pounder guns and small howitzers on wheels, harnessing two horses to each gun.

When the detachment arrived at Ak-Bulak, the frost increased to 30° R. During this cold weather, in clear days, columns of the colours of the rainbow were often visible at sunrise in the sky, and on other occasions two suns appeared shining at the sides of the true luminary with almost equal brilliancy.

In such frost it was impossible to wash linen or observe personal cleanliness. Many of the men, during the whole campaign, not only did not change their linen, but even did not take off their clothes; they were, of course, covered with vermin, and their bodies became ingrained with dirt and predisposed to disease.

Fort Ak-Bulak, situated in the midst of salt marshes, and supplied with water from the Ak-Bulak spring, which was bitter and sulphurous to the taste, was in every respect worse than the Emba Fortification, and as there was no timber in the neighbourhood, no baths nor wash-houses for linen could be erected. The mud huts were damp, and the air in them was very injurious to the lungs; the walls also were covered with a deposit of saltpetre and magnesia. The neighbourhood consisted of salt marshes covered with coarse grass (called "Chi" by the Kirghizes, and which the camels only eat when famished), or of barren rocky hills. Willow
trees and grass were only to be found along the glen of the Chegan, distant about eight versts from the fortification. A bare ridge of rocks called the "Chink" by the Kirghizes extended at a considerable distance to the east and south constituting the boundary of the Ust-Urt, and bordering at one time, according to Kirghiz tradition, a large sea. These rocks were seen stretching away for 60 versts and were lost in the horizon. On the almost perpendicular slopes of these rocks there was no snow, which proved that they were inaccessible. Only here and there bright lines of snow were visible, displaying more shelving slopes in the range of rocks. The dark line of the "Chink" divided the snow of the elevated plateau of the Ust-Urt from the snowy expanse of the Steppe, which spread out to a boundless extent at the base of the ridge.

Field glasses were eagerly directed to the border of the Ust-Urt in the hope of discovering some of the enemy's horsemen, but, to the surprise of all, not the slightest trace of the enemy could be seen.

General Perofski left the Emba Fortification, on the 17th January, with a small Cossack detachment, and having overtaken the last two columns on the route to Ak-Bulak, was personally a witness to the hardships endured by the troops on the march to the last place, and saw the complete exhaustion of the camels. Seeing the position in which the expeditionary force was placed, the General sought the opinion of the Commanders of the columns as to the possibility of their camels reaching Khiva. The Commanders reported that, owing to the wearied condition of these animals, the scantiness of herbage, and the great depth of snow on the ground, any further advance to Khiva was impossible. The same opinion was confirmed by the Ruler of the Western Horde, the Sultan Aichuvakof, who, as a Kirghiz, was well
acquainted both with the powers of endurance of the camel and the condition of the Steppe. In addition to procuring the opinion of the Commanders of the columns and of the Sultan Aichuvakof, General Perofski, on reaching Ak-Bulak, despatched Colonel Bizianof to the Ust-Urt, as already stated, with the Ural Cossacks to examine the route in front, and having ascertained that the depth of the snow ahead was still greater, that the herbage and fuel were completely buried under it, that the weakness of the camels increased from day to day, that they were beginning to fall at the rate of a hundred daily, he became convinced that it was actually impossible, under such circumstances, to reach Khiva.

The following considerations had also to be taken into account:—

(1.) A distance of about 800 versts over a desert and barren Steppe covered with snow still remained to be traversed before the inhabited portions of Khiva would be reached.

Considering that the distance between Forts Emba and Ak-Bulak was only 160 versts, and that the columns were from 15 to 17 days in performing it, the whole journey to Khiva could not be completed even with fresh camels (under the existing frosty weather and deep snow) in less than a month, while, with the weakened camels of the columns, the time required for performing the remaining portion of the distance would be at least one month and a half; at the same time, with the enfeebled 5,000 camels, it was hardly possible to transport (besides the ammunition and other necessary stores) a month's supply of provisions for the men, horses, and camels.

(2.) Presupposing that the detachment were to overcome all the difficulties of the route, which was hardly probable, and to reach the Khiva territory, only a few days'
provisions would be remaining, the horses and camels would be completely exhausted, and from whence, in such a case, could a further supply of provisions be procured? How could the attacks of the enemy be repelled should they surrounded the expeditionary force with their cavalry, and pursuing it endeavour to cut off the horses and camels of the Russian force and prevent their being depastured? How was the enemy to be pursued and forced to surrender the spoil, in case he proved successful in driving off the Russian camels and horses?

The Khivans would no doubt conceal their provision stores, no great quantity of which would, in any case, be found at that time of the year, as all their surplus corn is sold to the neighbouring nomads. With the weak force of Russian Cavalry, which at this stage of the journey would probably be greatly reduced from its original complement, no successful operations could be made against the enemy, nor would it be possible to pursue him; therefore, without the means of conquering Khiva, it would be impossible to compel the inhabitants to bring in supplies of provisions and provender for the soldiers and camels, and in the absence of the means of subsistence, the force would be starved to death either at Khiva or on its march back. The two months' supplies of provisions which were to have been forwarded from Novo-Alexandrofsk, and which were calculated on at the planning of the expedition, were stopped by contrary winds, and the formation of ice in the Caspian in consequence of the early winter.

Cornet Aitof, who was collecting camels between this fortification and the lower course of the Ural, had been despatched prisoner to Khiva. A fresh stock of supplies in lieu of those which were to have been forwarded from Novo-Alexandrofsk could only have been forwarded at this time
of the year by the land route, but in the absence of all means of transport, this was of course impracticable. The detachment could also not wait for the re-opening of the navigation, and for the assemblage of fresh camels in consequence of the stock of provisions stored at the depots being insufficient to last during so protracted a period. It was also to be apprehended that, if the marauding nomads were to become acquainted with the distressed condition of the expeditionary force, the dangerous example which had been set by the Adaev and Bershev tribes would be likely to find imitators in other tribes. All communication between the detachment and the Russian frontier would then be cut off; the task of the Khivans, under such circumstances, would be comparatively easy, as their operations would be confined to watching the force and preventing the camels and horses being depastured. Certain destruction would thus be the fate of the detachment, as, even supposing it succeeded in fighting its way through the surrounding enemy, it could not march over a thousand versts, through a bare and waterless Steppe, without a sufficient supply of provisions. Under such circumstances, an advance on Khiva would be to doom the whole detachment to certain destruction.*

(3.) The Orenburg Infantry soldiers not being accustomed to the fatigues of a campaign, suffered severely from disease. On the completion of half of the journey, only 1,856 men could be mustered as effective out of a force of 2,750 who had left Orenburg. Out of the number on the

* The same considerations led to the retreat of the English from Cabul in 1842. With a force almost equal to the Russian, but with exhausted camels and horses, the English retreated on the 6th January to Attock; after marching seven days they became completely disorganized from cold and scarcity of provisions, and were eventually destroyed almost to a man by the Afghans.
sick list, 236 had already died, 528 remained under treatment, and 130 were invalided and left behind at Fort Emba. On reaching Khiva, the number of sick would in all probability be still greater.

(4.) Lastly, if the mortality and exhaustion among the camels were to continue in the same ratio as it, in all probability, would have done, the detachment would be obliged to return to Fort Emba before reaching Khiva, after abandoning its provisions and stores on the route, and encountering still greater difficulties than those which had already presented themselves. And, furthermore, if the enemy were at this juncture to commence marching to meet the Russians, might not the unavailable retreat of the latter be interpreted into a flight from the advancing enemy? In every case, therefore, it was preferable to succumb to the insurmountable obstacles of nature, and to retreat at once, than to give the miserable opponents of the Russians any pretext for exultation over an imaginary victory.

All these reasons convinced General Perofski of the impossibility of continuing the march to Khiva, and reconciled him to the mournful necessity of returning to Fort Emba, where there was a stock of provisions calculated to last the detachment until spring.

On the 1st February 1840, General Perofski issued the following order to the troops:—

"Comrades! It will soon be three months since we commenced our march with a sincere trust in God, and a firm resolution to fulfil the orders of our Emperor. Ever since we started, we have had to struggle against obstacles of the severest character, and a winter of unprecedented severity. These difficulties we have successfully overcome, but we have not had the satisfaction of meeting the enemy, and the only slight collision we had with him
showed his contemptible inferiority. In spite of all the fatigue you have endured, you are still full of energy and vigor; the horses are in good condition, and our supplies are plentiful. In one thing only have we been unfortunate: we have lost a large proportion of our camels, and those that are left are exhausted by hunger and fatigue. We are thus deprived of the means of transporting our stores of provisions for the remaining distance of the route. However painful it may be to forego the victory that awaited us, we must on this occasion retrace our steps towards our frontiers. There we shall await the further orders of the Emperor. Our next expedition will be more fortunate. It is a source of consolation to me to be able to thank you for the unflagging devotion and energy you have displayed under all the difficulties encountered on the march. Our Gracious Sovereign and Father shall know it all."

It was with great regret that the troops heard the announcement of the order to retreat; the Ural Cossacks in particular were sorry to be deprived of the satisfaction of beating the "infidels," and liberating their countrymen from slavery. Gloomily did all prepare for the march back, and the stirring songs which once resounded in the camp were heard no more. The store-sheds at Ak-Bulak were broken up, and preparations for packing the provisions in a light and transportable form were at once commenced. The stores which could not easily be taken back were either left on the spot or destroyed; some heavy articles, such as anchors, signal rockets, &c., &c., were buried in the ground, with a view to these being utilised on any future expedition.
PART VIII.


The last column which left the Emba on the 15th January under command of Colonel Heke arrived at Ak-Bulak only on the 3rd February. By Returns sent in from all the columns, it appeared that from the day the detachment left the Emba to the 16th February, the loss in camels amounted to 1,958, and to 2,100 on the 18th February; these numbers, it must be understood, did not include many she-camels which had foaled on the way and become unserviceable for transport purposes. The camels still alive were in such a weak condition that the first two columns on their march back were compelled to abandon on the route rations of provisions for 36 days. The remaining two columns following in the rear were obliged to do the same.

The weather continued to be very cold, the frost ranging from 15° to 20° R., and even higher when accompanied, as was frequently the case, by high winds. Fuel, consisting of small roots of plants and only procurable by digging deep in the snow, was very scarce in the neighbourhood of Ak-Bulak, and along the greater part of the route to the Emba. The soldiers, consequently, suffered greatly from the cold on these stages. In short, the march back was attended with the same difficulties and sufferings which had marked the advance.
As all the fuel and grass in the immediate vicinity of Fort Emba had been exhausted, and a great number of dead carcases and many impurities lay accumulated round the Fort, which would taint the air and spread disease with the approach of spring, General Perofski despatched General Tolmachev with a Sotnia of Cossacks to select a suitable camp site for the detachment at a distance of about 30 versts from Fort Emba.

The spot chosen by General Tolmachev for an encampment was situated at the fall of the River Saga-Temir and the Tegele Brook into the Emba. The herbage here was not consumed, bushes for fuel were plentiful, reeds were to be found in abundance at a short distance, and the quality of the water was pretty good.

The march from Ak-Bulak to the Emba occupied 10 days, and as there was, as already stated, a scarcity of fuel, the portable boats, pontoons, planks, ropes, &c., were utilised for the camp fires.

The route along this distance was strewn with dead and exhausted camels. The carcases of the dead animals were being torn to pieces by wild beasts, such as wolves, foxes, &c., who having scented the prey from afar had collected in great numbers, and prowled about at night in packs in the track of the detachments.

The whole quantity of stores abandoned and given in food to the horses and camels at Ak-Bulak and on the retreat amounted to 50 days' rations of biscuits and flour, 30 days' provision of buck-wheat, oats for two weeks, and stock of salt for the whole detachment.

Between the 16th February and 27th February all the four columns gained Fort Emba, and proceeded to the camps assigned to them on the Saga-Temir River and Tegele
Rivulet. To avoid the possibility of the troops being left in camp without provisions when the roads would break up, and the Em"ba overflow in spring, measures were adopted for the immediate removal of all the stores to the camp from Fort Em"ba while the camels were still strong enough to perform the work. The Cossack horses were also employed in these duties, and the stores, after being brought to the camp, were piled in stacks which were carefully protected with matting.

The construction of a lazaretto next engaged the attention of the Commanding Officers. The sickness among the Infantry men was daily on the increase; scurvy, in spite of all the precautions taken, spread not only among the men, but also attacked the Officers; the sufferers from this disease in the Forts were conveyed to the camp and placed in felt booths which were lined with reeds to make them more air-tight. The position of the sick was made as satisfactory as possible under the circumstances.

But still the principal source of anxiety to General Perofski was in finding the means for transporting his detachment back to the Line. In winter, the camels are always very lean, and the rigorous winter and deep snow of this year had reduced them to skin and bone. Some of the Kirghiz tribes had lost all their camels from the severe frost, and, consequently, a fresh collection of camels for the regiments of the detachment presented the greatest difficulties.

As General Perofski could not leave his detachment without having first taken efficient measures for provisioning the force and alleviating the sufferings of the sick, he remained in the camp until these arrangements were in a fair way of being effectually carried out.
As the use of fresh provisions is the best remedy against scurvy, a stock of bullocks was obtained after much difficulty, and rations of fresh meat were issued to the men daily. If, in spite of these preventive measures, the scurvy, instead of diminishing, increased, this unfavorable circumstance must be ascribed to the predisposition acquired by the men to the disease on the winter march, when bodily cleanliness could not be observed, and a regular change of linen obtained; but the unsatisfactory condition of the health of the men must also, in a great measure, be attributed to their inexperience of a Steppe life and to the saline properties of the rivers of the Steppe. According to calculations made afterwards, it appeared that from the day of the departure of the detachment to the 20th February, the number of sick cases, both in the marching columns and fort garrisons, amounted to 3,124, out of which 608 were mortal.

The following was the ratio of sickness and deaths among the different branches of the expeditionary force:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Ratio of Sickness</th>
<th>Ratio of Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orenburg Infantry</td>
<td>1 : 2</td>
<td>1 : 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division of 1st Orenburg Regiment</td>
<td>2 &amp; 3</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orenburg Cossacks</td>
<td>1 : 4 &amp; 3</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ural Cossacks</td>
<td>1 : 27</td>
<td>1 : 200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures show that the Orenburg Infantry troops are the worst, and the Ural Cossacks the best, qualified for campaigning in the Steppe.

That no time should be lost in collecting camels from the Kirghizs, who had not yet supplied any for the march to Khiva, Lieutenant-Colonel the Sultan Aichuvakof, favorably known for his zeal, knowledge of the Steppe, and strong influence over the Kirghizs, was sent early in March with two Sotnias of Ural Cossacks to obtain camels from the refractory tribes, and Captain. Rechenberg accompanied him as Assistant.
To punish the Adaev and Bershev tribes for their disobedience and breach of faith, a further complement of 300 Ural Cossacks and 2 field guns, under command of Colonel Bizianof, was, at the end of March, placed at the disposal of Sultan Aichuvakof, and the men were mounted on 200 camels which were hired from the neighbouring Nazaar tribe. On the $\frac{5}{3}$th March, Aichuvakof proceeded down the course of the Emba for 150 versts, and then marched to the Sagiz River, where lay the encampments of the Ojerei tribe, at Darien-Kop locality. Exercising good judgment and discretion, he succeeded in obtaining here 500 camels, after which he marched towards the Ust-Urt where other Kirghizes of the Ojerei tribes were seeking refuge, and keeping themselves aloof at the instigation of the Khivans. Colonel Bizianof, who now joined Aichuvakof, determined to pursue these Kirghizes at all hazards. Notwithstanding the swollen state of the Emba, he crossed it with 350 Cossacks and one gun, leaving 150 Cossacks behind to guard the baggage. After some forced marches, he overtook the Cherenov tribe near the Ust-Urt, and leaving a Sotnia of Cossacks to collect the camels, ascended the Ust-Urt by the Kara-Sai ascent, the only approach to the plateau at this point. After pushing on for about 70 versts, he came upon the fugitive Ojereis and Karakisiak's on the Sam sands, and obliged them to abandon their baggage and cattle and seek safety in flight. The approach of night, and the wearied condition of the horses, compelled Colonel Bizianof to give up further pursuit. By next morning the Kirghizes were out of sight. Considering further pursuit useless, Bizianof rejoined his baggage train on the $\frac{11}{6}$th April, and marching down the course of the Emba, surprised the Adaev tribe at the mouth of the river. He made a sudden attack on them, killing 450 men and securing a large number of camels which he despatched under escort to the detachment on the Temir River. After this feat
Bizianof marched to the River Ural, and finally returned to Fort Kalmy Kovsk on the 15th May.

In the mean time the main detachment remained encamped at Saga-Temir and Tegele in three separate camps. The frost lasted obstinately until the end of March, the whole month of February having been marked by severe cold. The frost continued to range from 15° to 26° R., and was at times accompanied by severe "Burans" or snowstorms. The mean temperature of the atmosphere from the commencement of the expedition to the 11th March (N. S.), a period of 101 days, was 18° R., an average unprecedented even in the most northern and unpopulated countries.

With the approach of spring, diseases of the eyes, arising from the dazzling brightness of the snow, and the smoke of the green twigs used for fuel, became very prevalent in spite of all the precautions used, such as horse-hair spectacles, &c. Cases of scurvy also increased towards spring.

By the 1st April, there were 801 men sick, which number subsequently increased to 857; two Surgeons, and nearly all the Hospital Assistants, were on the sick list.

Active preparations were now commenced for resuming the march back to the "Line;" swing beds were prepared for conveying the sick, saddles were made for the new camels, &c. Having received information that the collection of camels was progressing satisfactorily, although slowly, and would enable the detachment to commence its march to the "Line" in the month of May, General Perofski, escorted by 20 Cossacks, started for Orenburg on the 13th April, with the object of making the preliminary arrangements for a second campaign to Khiva.* General Tolmachef

* As soon as it became known that the first expeditionary force would not be able to reach Khiva, orders were at once issued for strengthening the Orenburg Corps with 6 battalions. Admiral Rimski-Korsakov was sent to ascertain the number of vessels
remained behind in command after the departure of Perofski who reached Orenburg by the 23rd April, by which time the snow had almost entirely disappeared off the ground, although no grass had as yet appeared.

Out of the number of 10,500 camels with which the expeditionary force had been supplied at starting, only 1,500 remained alive by the 13th April. On the same date, the number of sick in the camps amounted to 7 Civil Officials and 853 soldiers; the number of deaths that occurred on the march was 3 Civil Officials and 758 men. The numerical strength of the force encamped on the Saga-Temir River consisted of 86 superior and Subaltern Officers and 2,895 men. From the commencement of the campaign to the 4th May, the total mortality in the expeditionary force amounted to 8 Officers and 880 Soldiers.

on the Volga and Caspian capable of transporting these troops to the eastern coast of the Caspian, in order that Khiva might be reached by the route once followed by Prince Bekovitch. When it was found that there were not sufficient vessels available, it was decided to follow the same route as that which had already proved so disastrous to the first expedition, but with the difference that the troops should be concentrated in the Steppe early in the autumn, so that they might only have the Ust-Urt to march across during the winter.
PART IX.


On the 31st April two envoys arrived at the camp from the Khan of Khiva, bearing, as they declared, papers for the Emperor and General Perofski; but as a few days previous to their appearance a rumour had spread of the arrival of Khivan troops in considerable force in the neighbourhood of Ak-Bulak, and that they intended to attack the Russian camp, the envoys were at first regarded as spies. Cossacks and Kirghiz Scouts were sent in the direction of Ak-Bulak to ascertain the truth of the reports, and on their return they reported that they had seen mounted Khivan pickets on the Bakgir and Ali Hills.

All the necessary steps were at once taken for the defence of the camp against any sudden surprise; the sentries and patrols were doubled, and Cossack pickets stationed at advanced points. All these precautions, however, proved unnecessary; after a few days it was discovered that the mounted Scouts seen on Bakgir and Ali Hills were Kirghizes belonging to the tribe chased by Colonel Bizianof for not supplying the Russians with camels. They were depasturing their flocks along the Chegan Ravine, intending to migrate to the Barsaki sands when the pursuit would be pressed too closely. At Ak-Bulak, it is true, there were about 30 Khivans at this time who had come stealthily to seize the stores, &c., abandoned there by the Russian detachment.
RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGN.

The total number of sick in camp on the 13th May amounted to 1,130 men, of whom 613 were suffering from scurvy.

By the 1st May a considerable number of camels had been procured. Colonel Bizianof and the Sultan Aichuvakov had collected 1,030; 700 were received from Orenburg and 450 from the Sultan Yusuf, and all these added to the 1,300 remaining old camels made a general total of 3,480. As many of the old camels had not yet recovered their strength, and a large quantity of supplies was still expected from Orenburg, the detachment was detained in the Steppe until the 30th May.

Every thing being at last ready, the detachment started on the march in two columns on the 30th May, and proceeded along the old route towards Orenburg, carrying all the heavy stores and invalids, the latter consisting of 16 officers and 1,195 men. The march to the line was not marked by any greater difficulties than deep mud and frequent and heavy rain which retarded the advance of the columns.

After passing Bish-Tamak on the 12th June, the chief column taking all the invalids proceeded on the way to Orenburg, while the 4th and 5th battalions and the Orenburg Cossacks detached themselves from the columns, and marched to their different stations and quarters by the nearest route through Orsk. The Ural Cossacks under Bizianof, after having, as described, inflicted punishment on the obdurate Kirghizes, and sent forward the camels they had collected, had reached the line some time before; the remainder of the troops, after marching from Bish-Tamak along the Ilek, gained the “Line” at Caravan Lake on the 14th June. On the 20th June, the detachment, after having spent eight months
in the Steppe in the midst of a rigorous winter, snow, hurricanes, and storms, finally reached Orenburg. On the 23rd June, there still remained 609 men on the sick list; thus during the whole campaign the total loss by death amounted to 1,054 men,* the mortality being highest among the garrisons of the forts. The Ural Cossacks suffered less than any other portions of the force, notwithstanding that their duties were more arduous, and that they rigorously observed their religious fasts.†

In the month of July, the thanks of the Emperor were conveyed in a special order to General Perofski, and to all those who had taken part in the campaign.

Thus terminated the expedition against Khiva, which excited so much curiosity at the time it was planned, and gave rise to so much subsequent discussion.

* The other losses sustained by the expedition were equally serious: 204 horses died on the march, and out of the sum of 1,700,000 Rubles assigned for the purposes of the expedition, only about 40,000 Sr. Rubles remained unexpended, while the expenses which were obliged to be borne by the Bashkirs and Kirghizes amounted to no less than 2½ millions of Rubles each. The total cost, therefore, of the expedition was nearly 6½ millions, and it was estimated that the organization of a second would involve an expenditure of 16 millions Rubles.

† The mortality among the troops of the Khiva Expedition was in the following ratio: Infantry 1:3 and 5; Regiment of Orenburg Cossacks 1:26; Contingent of Orenburg Cossacks 1:4; Ural Cossack Contingent 1:80.

In the summer expedition to Khiva of Prince Bekovitch in 1817, a quarter of his men died on the march, while in the winter campaign of General Perofski in 1839, the mortality among the whole force employed reached about one-third; these two experiments would apparently point in favor of summer expeditions in the Steppe. Taking into consideration that the country traversed by General Perofski yielded an abundant supply of water, the commencement of the campaign in winter was decidedly injudicious. The whole force might have been collected on the Ust-Urt before winter set in. There were many Officers who condemned the plan of a winter campaign when it was in contemplation, but the opinions of those who supported their arguments in favor of it by quoting Lord Wellington's saying, that "sandy wastes are only traversable by troops in winter," unfortunately preponderated.
The objects of the expedition were to inspire fear and respect for the Russian name in the remote countries of Central Asia; to ensure free access to them for Russian traders; to explore the basin of the Sea of Aral, and to curb the insolence of the Khan of Khiva, who excited the Kirghizes against Russia, encouraged the traffic in Russian slaves, and excluded Russian traders from the Khivan markets; the expedition was also despatched for the purpose of liberating the Russian captives in Khiva who had long been languishing in captivity, and to solve the interesting geographical problem, which for so many years had been occupying the attention of the learned world, as to whether the Amu-Daria, or ancient Oxus, had at any former period disembogued into Caspian, and whether there was any possibility of diverting it to that course?

The return of the expedition after having performed less than half the distance to Khiva, prevented the realization of many of the above objects, but, nevertheless, the energy and determination displayed by the Russian Government produced good results.

The unsuccessful attack of the Khivan force, consisting of their picked horsemen, on Ak-Bulak, and on the transport train of Captain Erofeyef, which added to the severe losses they sustained from the cold in men and horses on their subsequent retreat, perplexed the Khan and his Council, and made them feel desirous of propitiating the anger of Russia. The cessation of direct commercial intercourse with Russia, by obliging the Khivans to have recourse to the medium of Kokan and Bukhara traders in obtaining Russian productions, entailed serious losses to the commercial community of Khiva. All Russian commodities were supplied to the Khivans at double their former cost, while the price of their own goods fell in the same proportion.
The first peaceful overtures on the part of the Khan were made through Cornet Aitof, who, as has already been described, had been taken prisoner and detained in Khiva. Aitof's position was at first a rather perilous one; he was strictly guarded in close confinement, and stood in incessant danger of losing his life. At last, when the Khan saw the necessity of submission, Aitof began to be treated as a visitor or guest, and was repeatedly summoned into the presence of the Khan for the purpose of giving his advice as to the best means to be adopted for the re-establishment of peaceful relations with Russia.

Frightened at the evident intentions of the Russians to renew their attempt to reach Khiva, the Khivans were all the more readily prepared to listen to Aitof's assurances of the Emperor's clemency and forbearance, and to commence negotiations for peace.

So early as the month of April, the Khan had promised, through his emissaries (who had presented themselves at the Russian Camp at Saga-Temir, as has been already described), to satisfy any reasonable demands on the part of Russia, and now, as an earnest of his good faith and inclination for peace, issued a Firman, forbidding his subjects, under pain of death, to plunder and kidnap the subjects of the Tsar. The Khan at the same time liberated his own Russian slaves, ordering all his subjects to free those in their possession, and made the released Russians present themselves to Aitof, in order that this Officer might assure himself that the bondsmen had really been liberated. The Khan then gave each Russian one Tilla (equal to about 4 Rubles Russian, or 12 Shillings English), and a bag of flour for their home journey, together with a camel to every two men. The Khan informed Aitof at his last audience that his contrition would not be confined to the liberation
of the Russian prisoners, and to the issue of the Firman prohibiting the traffic in slaves, but that he was also ready to satisfy the other demands of Russia.

Cornet Aitof returned to Orenburg and the liberated Russians, numbering 416 men, followed him on the 30th October.

The Khivan traders who had been detained in 1836 were at once liberated, their goods were restored to them, and many of them received special gratuities from the Government. Some Russian merchants accompanied the Khivan traders to Khiva with a stock of Russian goods, and were well received there.

A general amnesty was granted to the Kirghiz-Kaisaks and Turkmen on condition that they abstained in future from pillage and violence.

Captain Nikiforof was first sent to conduct negotiations with the Khan, and he was subsequently joined by Lieutenant Colonel Danilevski; these two Officers concluded a treaty of peace, and collected much useful information respecting the Khanate of Khiva; they also acquired a more exact knowledge than that previously possessed of the routes leading to that country, in order to prevent a repetition of the disasters of the campaign of 1839-40, or any future expedition.

In a few years the Russian trade with the neighbouring Khanates of Central Asia assumed a very favorable aspect; the Khivans had previously been in the habit of excluding Russian traders from their markets, and even plundering the Russian Caravans sent to Bukhara, or instigating the Kirghizes to do so. Trade with Khiva, under these circumstances, was only carried on along the "Line" or at Astrakhan and Nijni-Novgorod, and was entirely in the hands of
Asiatic merchants; but on the conclusion of peace with Khiva, Russia demanded the admittance of her traders to the markets of Khiva, and the Khan having consented, some Russian traders lost no time in availing themselves of this privilege.

By sending their own agents to Khiva, the Russian traders became better acquainted with the wants of the Khivans, and familiarised themselves with local trading customs. A company for trading with the Khanates was even formed, but owing to the death of its energetic promoter, the merchant Baranof, its operations were not of long duration. During the existence of this company, its affairs were ably and successfully conducted, its transactions being also extended to Bukhara and Kokan, to which Khanates Russian traders, after the example set by Khiva, were also admitted. The Russian trading company hired land in Khiva for the purpose of cultivating madder, indigo, and cotton, in the growth of which the natives displayed inexperience.

Another good result obtained by the Khivan Expedition was the security obtained for travellers crossing the Steppe on their journey to Khiva: the immediate effect of this was seen in the great impetus given to trade, and in the decrease in the prices of goods.

It must also be borne in mind that the expedition of 1839 served as a useful experiment for all future undertakings of a similar nature; should events ever require the presence of a Russian force in Central Asia, the experience gained during the campaign of 1839 will prove of the greatest value.

After some years had elapsed, Khiva, forgetting the danger of the past, became almost as inapproachable as formerly (necessitating the despatch of Ignatief's embassy
in 1858), and her relations with Russia began to revert to their previous condition, saving that the erection of Russian forts in the Steppe rendered the trade of Russia, as well as that of the Kirghizes under Russian protection, less exposed to the rapacity of the Khivans; but in the region extending between the Aral and Caspian Seas, the baneful influence of Khiva is felt even to the present day.

The very detailed account here presented of the Khiva Expedition of 1839 clearly shows the causes which led to its failure. In conclusion, we shall briefly allude to the impression produced by this expedition in Europe.

Without taking into consideration the seizure of the Cape of Good Hope, Malta, the Ionian Islands, &c., by England, it is sufficient for our purpose to point here to one event which occurred before the Russian Expedition to Khiva, but which, strange to say, did not excite public indignation: namely, this was the occupation of a large and powerful African State by one of the European Powers under the pretext of an insult offered to its Consul; the whole of Europe witnessed the occupation of Algeria by the French with scarcely a murmur. The guilt of the Algerian Bey, however, shrinks into insignificance when compared to the culpability of a whole line of Khivan Khans, not merely with regard to Russia, but to the whole of Christendom. For a long series of years Khiva tempted the patience of Russia by her treachery, outrages, robberies, and detention of many thousand Russians as slaves and bondsmen. In spite of all this provocation and accumulation of injuries, the march of a Russian force against Khiva gave rise to much hostile opinion.

Some European Journals displayed on this occasion their superficial knowledge of a subject which they pretended to discuss with all the gravity of competent judges; while other writers gave open expression to their malevolence
against Russia. The English "Times," whether designedly or out of pure ignorance we do not pretend to say, confused the name of the Commander of the expedition with that of "Borofski," a Polish Emigrant, who, the "Times" alleged, had gained the favor of the Emperor Nicholas during the Turkish war, and had been received into the Russian army with the direct rank of Major General. The French Press was, as usual, distinguished for its ignorance of everything not French; it boldly declared that a Russian Corps of 30,000 men was marching to Khiva, and later, that it had occupied the Khanate and was marching to India! It must, however, in justice be mentioned that the European Journals were misled by the report of the English agents who were at that time in Central Asia. Abbot from Khiva first transmitted the news of the advance of 24,000 Russians on Cabul and India. Burns from Cabul confirmed this intelligence in his letters. In bringing to the recollection of the reader these false rumours respecting the Russian expedition, we take this opportunity of repeating that the cause of the jealousy and mistrust with which the conduct of Russia was received in Europe proceeded from a complete ignorance of the countries conterminous with Russia on the south-east. A better acquaintance with the regions of Central Asia must long since have shown the world the impracticability of all ideas of conquest in this quarter, even if they existed. The publication of information relating to these obscure countries, and a correct exposition of the exact relations existing between them and Russia, is, in our opinion, the most effectual way of clearing Russia from the unjust imputations to which she has been exposed, and of confuting the erroneous interpretations of her policy in the East.