THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

ENDOWED BY THE DIALECTIC AND PHILANTHROPIC SOCIETIES

DO NOT REMOVE FROM BOOK

DATE DUE IS STAMPED BELOW

.\ n fr

THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

ENDOWED BY THE DIALECTIC AND PHILANTHROPIC SOCIETIES

UNIVERSITY OF N.C. AT CHAPPI

imitiiiil

10002064506

This book is due at the LOUIS R. WILSON LIBRARY on the last date stamped under "Date Due." If not on hold it may be renewed by bringing it to the library.
DATE pi^T. DUE	DATE DUE
		— — DcC 2 3
			2862
			-2005
	1989 ' ^
		APR 2 2 200§
k|PR i 3 19J
	JAN 25 9?
	)K 02*91
ilOVo 8 2	061
l£==t MA NOV 2	r 2 9 52002

\

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS •8?

	Digitized by	the Internet Archive
		in 2014

https://archive.org/details/kaisersmemoirswiOOwill_0

WILHELM II

The DI)=i.^=\

Kaiser's Memoirs

WILHELM II

Emperor of Germany 1 888-191 8

English Translation by THOMAS R. YBARRA

HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS

NEW YORK AND LONDON 1922

)

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Copyright, 1922 By McClure Newspaper Syndicate

Copyright, 1922 By Harper & Brothers Printed in the U. S, A.

First Edition

K-W

CONTENTS

CHAP. PAGE

I. Bismarck i

II. Caprivi 51

III. HOHENLOHE 59

IV. BuLOW 95

V. Bethmann 124

VI. My Co-workers in the Administration 171

VII. Science and Art 196

VIII. My Relations with the Church 208

IX. Army and Navy 223

X. The Outbreak of War 246

XI. The Pope and Peace 263

XII. End of the War and My Abdication 272

XIII. The Enemy Tribunal and the Neutral Tribunal 292

XIV. The Question of Guilt 303

XV. The Revolution and Germany's Future 337

I

I

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

CHAPTER I

Bismarck

PRINCE BISMARCK'S greatness as a states- man and his imperishable services to Prussia and Germany are historical facts of such tremen- dous significance that there is doubtless no man in existence, whatever his party affiliations, who would dare to place them in question. For this very reason alone it is stupid to accuse me of not having recognized the greatness of Prince Bis- marck. The opposite is the truth. I revered and idolized him. Nor could it be otherwise. It should be borne in mind with what generation I grew up — the generation of the devotees of Bis- marck. He was the creator of the German Empire, the paladin of my grandfather, and all of us considered him the greatest statesman of his day and were proud that he was a German. Bismarck was the idol in my temple, whom I worshiped.

But monarchs also are human beings of flesh and blood, hence they, too, are exposed to the influences emanating from the conduct of others ; therefore, looking at the matter from a human point of view, one will understand how Prince

I

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Bismarck, by his fight against me, himself de- stroyed, with heavy blows, the idol of which I have spoken. But my reverence for Bismarck, the great statesman, remained unaltered.

While I was still Prince of Prussia I often thought to myself : "I hope that the great Chan- cellor will live for many years yet, since I should be safe if I could govern with him." But my reverence for the great statesman was not such as to make me take upon my own shoulders, when I became Emperor, political plans or actions of the Prince which I considered mistakes. Even the Congress of Berlin in 1878 was, to my way of thinking, a mistake, likewise the "Kulturkampf." Moreover, the constitution of the Empire was drawn up so as to fit in with Bismarck's extraor- dinary preponderance as a statesman ; the big cui- rassier boots did not fit every man.

Then came the labor-protective legislation. I most deeply deplored the dispute which grew out of this, but, at that time, it was necessary for me to take the road to compromise, which has gen- erally been my road both on domestic and foreign politics. For this reason I could not wage the open warfare against the Social Democrats which the Prince desired. Nevertheless, this quarrel about political measures cannot lessen my admiration for the greatness of Bismarck as a statesman; he remains the creator of the German Empire, and surely no one man need have done more for his country than that.

Owing to the fact that the great matter of uni-

2

BISMARCK

fying the Empire was always before my eyes, I did not allow myself to be influenced by the agi- tations which were the commonplaces of those days. In like manner, the fact that Bismarck was called the majordomo of the Hohenzollerns could not shake my trust in the Prince, although he, per- haps, had thoughts of a political tradition for his family. As evidence of this, he felt unhappy, for instance, that his son Bill felt no interest in politics and wished to pass on his power to Herbert.

HIS GRANDFATHER'S SUCCESSOR

The tragic element for me, in the Bismarck case, lay in the fact that I became the successor of my grandfather — in other words, that I skipped one generation, to a certain extent. And that is a serious thing. In such a case one is forced to deal constantly with old deserving men, who live more in the past than in the present, and cannot grow into the future. When the grandson succeeds his grandfather and finds a revered but old states- man of the stature of Bismarck, it is not a piece of good luck for him, as one might suppose, and I, in fact, supposed. Bismarck himself points that out in the third volume of his memoirs (p. 40), when he speaks, in the chapter about Botticher, of the oldish caution of the Chancellor, and of the young Emperor.

And when Ballin had the Prince cast a glance over the new harbor of Hamburg, Bismarck him- self felt that a new era had begun which he no longer thoroughly understood. On that occasion a 3

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

the Prince remarked, in astonishment, "Another world, a new world!"

This point of view also showed itself on the occasion of the visit of Admiral von Tirpitz at Friedrichsruh, at the time when he wished to win the old Imperial Chancellor over to favoring the first Navy bill.

As for me personally, I have the satisfaction of recalling that Bismarck intrusted to me in 1886 the very delicate Brest mission, and said of me: "Some day that man will be his own Chancellor." This shows that Bismarck must have had some belief in me.

I feel no grudge against him for the third volume of his reminiscences. I released this vol- ume after I had sought and obtained my rights. To withhold the volume any longer would have been pointless, since the main contents had become known already through indiscretions; were this not true, there might have been varying opinions as to the advisability in the choice of the time for publication. Bismarck would turn over in his grave if he could know at what time the third volume appeared, and what consequences it had. I should be honestly grieved if the third volume had damaged the memory of the great Chancel- lor, because Bismarck is one of the heroic figures whom the German people need for their regener- ation. My gratitude and reverence for the great Chancellor cannot be impaired or extinguished by the third volume nor by anything else whatever.

4

/

BISMARCK

In the first half of the 'eighties I had been sum- moned to the Foreign OfHce at the behest of Prince Bismarck; it was then presided over by Count Herbert Bismarck. Upon reporting myself to the Prince he gave me a short sketch of the personages employed at the Foreign Office, and when he named Herr von Holstein, who was then one of the most prominent collaborators of the Prince, it seemed to me that a slight warning against this man ran through the Prince's words.

I got a room all to myself, and all the docu- ments concerning the preliminary history, origin, and conclusion of the alliance with Austria (An- drassy) were laid before me in order that I might study them. I went often to the home of the Prince and to that of Count Herbert

THE MAN WITH THE HYENA'S EYES

When I had thus become more intimate in the Bismarck circle I heard more open talk about Herr von Holstein. I heard that he was very clever, a good worker, inordinately proud, an odd sort of man, who never showed himself anywhere and had no social relations, full of distrust, much influenced by whims, and, besides all this, a good hater, and, therefore, dangerous. Prince Bismarck called him "The Man with the Hyena's Eyes," and told me that it would be well for me to keep away from him. It was quite apparent that the bitter attitude which the Prince showed later to- ward Holstein, his former collaborator, was form- ing even at that time.

5

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

The Foreign Office was conducted with the strictest discipline by Count Herbert, whose rude- ness toward his employees particularly struck me. The gentlemen there simply flew when they were summoned or dismissed by the Count, so much so that a joking saying arose at the time that "their coat tails stood straight out behind them." The foreign policy was conducted and dictated by Prince Bismarck alone, after consultation with Count Herbert, who passed on the commands of the Chancellor and had them transformed into instructions. Hence the Foreign Office was noth- ing but an office of the great Chancellor, where work was done according to his directions. Able men, with independent ideas, were not schooled and trained there.

This was in contrast to the General Staff under Moltke. There new officers were carefully de- veloped and trained to independent thinking and action, in accordance with approved principles, arid by dint of preserving old traditions and taking into account all that modern times had taught. At the Foreign Office there were only executive instruments of a will, who were not informed as to the important interrelationship of the questions turned over to them for treatment, and could not, therefore, collaborate independently. The Prince loomed up like a huge block of granite in a meadow ; were he to be dragged away, what would be found beneath would be mostly worms and dead roots.

I won the confidence of the Prince, who con-

6

BISMARCK

suited me about many things. For instance, when the Prince brought about the first German colonial acquisitions (Gross and Klein Popo, Togo, etc.), I informed him, at his wish, concerning the state of mind created in the public and the navy by this move, and described to him the enthusiasm with which the German people had hailed the new road. The Prince remarked that the matter hardly deserved this.

Later on I spoke often with the Prince about the colonial question and always found in him the intention to utilize the colonies as commercial ob- jects, or objects for swapping purposes, other than to make them useful to the fatherland or utilize them as sources of raw materials. As was my duty, I called the Prince's attention to the fact that mer- chants and capitalists were beginning energet- ically to develop the colonies and that, therefore — as I had learned from Hanseatic circles — they counted upon protection from a navy. For this reason, I pointed out that steps must be taken for getting a fleet constructed in time, in order that German assets in foreign lands should not be with- out protection; that, since the Prince had un- furled the German flag in foreign parts, and the people stood behind it, there must also be a navy behind it.

BISMARCK'S CONTINENTAL PREPOSSESSIONS

But the Prince turned a deaf ear to my state- ments and made use of his pet motto : "If the Eng- lish should land on our soil I should have them

7

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

arrested." His idea was that the colonies would be defended by us at home. The Prince attached no importance to the fact that the very assump- tion that the English could land without opposition in Germany — since Heligoland was English — was unbearable for Germany, and that we, in order to make a landing impossible from the start, needed a sufficiently strong navy, and, likewise, Heligoland.

The political interest of the Prince was, in fact, concentrated essentially upon continental Europe ; England lay somewhat to one side among the cares that burdened him daily, all the more so since Salisbury stood well with him and had, in the name of England, hailed with satisfaction the Double (i. e., Triple) Alliance, at the time of its formation. The Prince worked primarily with Russia, Austria, Italy, and Rumania, whose rela- tions toward Germany and one another he con- stantly watched over. As to the prudence and skill with which he acted. Emperor William the Great once made a pointed remark to von Albedyll, his chief of Cabinet.

The General found His Majesty much excited after a talk with Bismarck, to such an extent that he feared for the health of the old Emperor. He remarked, therefore, that His Majesty should avoid similar worry in future ; that, if Bismarck was unwilling to do as His Majesty wished. His Majesty should dismiss him. Whereupon the Emperor replied that, despite his admiration and gratitude toward the great Chancellor, he had

8

i

BISMARCK

already thought of dismissing him, since the self- conscious attitude of the Prince became at times too oppressive. But both he and the country needed Bismarck too badly. Bismarck was the one man who could juggle five balls of which at least two were always in the air. That trick, added the Emperor, was beyond his own powers.

Prince Bismarck did not realize that, through the acquisition of colonies for Germany, he would be obliged to look beyond Europe and be auto- matically forced to act, politically, on a large scale — with England especially. England, to be sure, was one of the five balls in his diplomatic- statesmanly game, but she was merely one of the five, and he did not grant her the special impor- tance which was her due.

For this reason it was that the Foreign Office likewise was involved entirely in the continental interplay of politics, had not the requisite interest in colonies, navy, or England, and possessed no experience in world politics. The English psychology and mentality, as shown in the pursuit — constant, though concealed by all sorts of little cloaks — of world hegemony, was to the German Foreign Office a book sealed with seven seals.

SOURCE OF RUSSIAN ENMITY

Once Prince Bismarck remarked to me that his main object was to not let Russia and England come to an understanding. I took the liberty of observing that the opportunity to postpone such

9

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

an understanding for a long time lay ready to hand in 1877-78, when the Russians might have been allowed to occupy Constantinople — had this been done, the English fleet would have sailed in without further ado to defend Constantinople and the Russo-English conflict would have been on. Instead, I continued, the Treaty of San Stefano was forced upon the Russians and they were com- pelled to turn about at the very gates of the city which they had reached and saw before them, after frightful battles and hardships.

This, I went on, had created an inextinguish- able hatred in the Russian army against us (as had been reported by Prussian officers who had accom- panied the Russian army on the Turkish cam- paign, especially Count Pfeil) ; moreover, the above-mentioned treaty had been cast aside and the Berlin Treaty substituted for it, which had burdened us even more with the hostility of the Russians, who looked upon us as the enemy of their ^'just interests in the East." Thus the con- flict between Russia and England, which the Prince desired, had been relegated far into the future.

Prince Bismarck did not agree with this judg- ment of ^'his" Congress, concerning the results of which he, as the ''honest broker," was so proud; he remarked earnestly that he had wished to pre- vent a general conflagration and had been com- pelled to offer his services as a mediator. When I, later on, told a gentleman at the Foreign Office about this conversation, he replied that he had

10

BISMARCK

been present when the Prince, after signing the Berlin Treaty, came into the Foreign Office and received the congratulations of the officials assem- bled there. After he had listened to them the Prince stood up and replied: "Now I am driving Europe four-in-hai^d!" In the opinion of the said gentleman the Prince was mistaken in this, since, even at that time, there was the threat of a Russo- French friendship in place of the Russo-Prussian — in other words, two horses were already to be counted out of the four-in-hand. As Russia saw it, Disraeli's statecraft had turned Bismarck's work as "honest broker" into the negotiation of an Anglo- Austrian victory over Russia.

Despite considerable differences in our opinions, Prince Bismarck remained friendly and kindly disposed to me, and, despite the great difference in our ages, a pleasant relationship grew up between us, since I, in common with all those of my gener- ation, was an ardent admirer of the Prince and had won his trust by my zeal and frankness — nor have I ever betrayed that trust.

During the time of my assignment at the Foreign Office, Privy Councilor Raschdau, among others, discoursed with me on commercial policy, colonies, etc. In these matters, even at that early date, my attention was called to our dependence upon Eng- land, due to the fact that we had no navy and that Heligoland was in English hands. To be sure, there was a project to extend our colonial posses- sions under the pressure of necessity, but all this could happen only with England's permission.

n

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

»

This was a serious matter, and certainly an un- worthy position for Germany.

INTERCOURT POLITICS

My assignment at the Foreign Office brought a very unpleasant happening in its wake. My parents were not very friendly toward Prince Bis- marck and looked with disfavor upon the fact that their son had entered into the Prince's circle. There was fear of my becoming influenced against my parents, of superconservatism, of all sorts of perils, which all sorts of tale bearers from Eng- land and "liberal circles," who rallied around my father, imputed against me. I never bothered my head with all this nonsense, but my position in the house of my parents was rendered much more diffi- cult for me and, at times, painful. Through my work under Prince Bismarck and the confidence reposed in me — often subjected to the severest tests — I have had to suffer much in silence for the sake of the Chancellor; he, however, apparently took this quite as a matter of course.

I was on good terms with Count Herbert Bis- marck. He could be a very gay companion and knew how to assemble interesting men around his table, partly from the Foreign Office, partly from other circles. However, true friendship never ripened between us two. This was shown particu- larly when the Count asked to go at the same time that his father retired. My request that he stay by me and help me to maintain tradition in our political policy elicited the sharp reply that

12

BISMARCK %

he had become accustomed to report to his father and serve him, wherefore it was out of the ques- tion to demand that he come, with his dispatch case under his arm, to report to anybody else than his father.

When Tsar Nicholas II, he who has been mur- dered, came of age, I was assigned at the instiga- tion of Prince Bismarck to confer upon the heir- apparent at St. Petersburg the Order of the Black Eagle. Both the Emperor and Prince Bismarck instructed me concerning the relationship of the two countries and the two reigning dynasties with each other, as well as concerning customs, person- ages, etc. The Emperor remarked in conclusion that he would give his grandson the same piece of advice that was given him, on the occasion of his first visit as a young man to Russia, by Count Adlerberg, viz,, "In general, there as well as else- where, people prefer praise to criticism." Prince Bismarck closed his remarks with these words: "In the East, all those who wear their shirts outside their trousers are decent people, but as soon as they tuck their shirts inside their trousers and hang a medal around their necks, they become pig-dogs."

From St. Petersburg I repeatedly reported to my grandfather and to Prince Bismarck. Natu- rally, I described, to the best of my knowledge, the impressions which I got I noticed especially that the old Russo-Prussian relations and sentiments had cooled to a marked extent and were no longer such as the Emperor and Prince Bismarck in their talks with me had assumed. After my return, both

13

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

mj grandfather and the Prince praised me for my plain, clear report, which was all the pleasanter for me since I was oppressed by the feeling that, in a number of things, I had been forced to dis- illusion these high personages.

TO OFFER DARDANELLES TO RUSSIA

In 1886, at the end of August and beginning of September, after the last meeting at Gastein of Emperor William the Great and Prince Bismarck with Emperor Franz Josef, where I also was pres- ent at the command of my grandfather, I was commissioned to report personally to Tsar Alex- ander II concerning the decisions made there and to take up with him the questions relating to the Mediterranean and Turkey. Prince Bismarck gave me his instructions, sanctioned by Emperor William; they dealt most especially with Rus- sia's desire to reach Constantinople, to which the Prince meant to raise no obstacles. On the con- trary, I received direct instructions to offer Russia Constantinople and the Dardanelles (in other words, San Stef ano and the Berlin Treaty had been dropped!). There was a plan to persuade Turkey in a friendly way that an understanding with Rus- sia was desirable for her also.

The Tsar received me cordially at Brest-Litovsk and I was present there at reviews of troops and fortress and defensive maneuvers, which, even then, unquestionably bore an anti-German look.

To sum up my conversations with the Tsar, the following remark by him is of importance: "If

14

BISMARCK

I wish to have Constantinople, I shall take it when- ever I feel like it, without need of permission or approval from Prince Bismarck." After this rude refusal of the Bismarck offer of Constantinople, I looked upon my mission as a failure and made my report to the Prince accordingly.

When the Prince decided to make his offer to the Tsar, he must have altered his political con- ceptions which had led to San Stefano and the Congress of Berlin; or else, on account of the development of the general political situation in Europe, he considered that the moment had come for shuffling the political cards in another way or, as my grandfather had put it, to "juggle" differ- ently. Only a man of the world importance and diplomatic ability of Prince Bismarck could em- bark on such a course. Whether the Prince had planned his big political game with Russia in such a way that he might, first, by means of the Con- gress of Berlin, prevent a general war and cajole England, and then, after having thus hindered Russia's Eastern aspirations, cater to these aspira- tions later, by a stroke of genius, in an even more striking manner, it is impossible for me to say — Prince Bismarck never told anyone about his great political projects.

If the above is true, Bismarck, trusting abso- lutely to his statesmanlike skill, must have reck- oned upon bringing Germany all the more into Russian favor because Russian aspirations were brought to fulfillment by Germany alone — and that at a moment when the general European polit-

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

ical situation was less strained than in 1877-78. In this case, nobody except Prince Bismarck could have played the tremendous game to a successful end. And therein lies the weakness in the superi- ority of great men. Had he also informed Eng- land of his offer to the Tsar? England must have been opposed to it, as in 1878.

In any event, the Prince now adopted the policy which I had already noted when I realized the dis- illusion of the Russians at having stood before the gates of Constantinople without being allowed to enter.

PROPHECY OF RUSSIAN DOWNFALL

At Brest-Litovsk, in the course of the constant military preparations of all kinds, I could easily see that the conduct of the Russian officers toward me was essentially cooler and haughtier than on the occasion of my first visit to St. Petersburg. Only the small group of old generals, especially those at the Russian court, who dated from the days of Alexander II, and who knew and esteemed ' Emperor William the Great, still showed their

reverence for him and their friendly feeling to- ward Germany. In the course of a talk with one of them concerning the relations between the two courts, armies, and countries, which I had found undergoing a change in comparison with former , times, the old General said : "C'est ce vilain con- gres de Berlin. Une grave faute du Chancelier. II a detruit rancienne amitie entre nous, plante la mefiance dans les coeurs de la Cour et du Gou- vernement, et fourni le sentiment d'un grave tort

16

BISMARCK

fait a rarmee russe apres sa campagne sanglante de 1877, pour lequel elle vout sa revanche. Et nous voila ensemble avec cette maudite Republique Frangaise, pleins de haine contre vous et rempli d'idees subversives, qui en cas de guerre avec vous, nous couteront notre dynastie." ^

A prophetic foreshadowing of the dov^nfall of the reigning Russian dynasty!

From Brest I went to Strassburg, where my grandfather was attending the Imperial maneu- vers. In spite of the failure of my mission I found calm judgments of the political situation. My grandfather was pleased at the cordial greetings from the Tsar, which, in so far as the personal relationship of the two rulers was concerned, showed no change of heart. Also, to my surprise, I received a letter from Prince Bismarck wherein he expressed gratitude and appreciation to me for my actions and my report. This meant all the more since my statements could not have been agreeable to my grandfather and the Chancellor. The Congress of Berlin had, especially in Russian military circles, done away with the remnants of the brotherhood in arms still fostered among us and had engendered a hatred against everything Prussian and German, stirred up by association

1 "It is that confounded Congress of Berlin. A serious mistake on the part of the Chancellor. He has destroyed the old friendship between us, sown distrust in the hearts of the Court and the Govern- ment, and engendered the idea of a great injustice done the Russian army after its bloody 1877 campaign, for which it wishes revenge. And here we are by the side of that damned French Republic, full of hate for you and of subversive ideas, which, in case of a war against you, will cost us our dynasty."

17

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

with French ofBcers, which was increased by the French until it developed into the desire of ven- geance by means of arms. That was the soil in which, later, the World War ambitions of our foes found nourishment. "Revanche pour Sedan," combined with "Revanche pour San Stefano." The words of the old General at Brest have re- mained unforgettably engraved upon my memory ; they induced me to bring about my many meetings with Alexander III and Nicholas II, at which my grandfather's wish, impressed upon me on his deathbed, that I watch over our relations with Russia, has always been my guiding motive. ,

RELIEF AT CHANCELLOR'S DISMISSAL

In 1890, at the Narva maneuvers, I was obliged to describe minutely to the Tsar the retirement of Prince Bismarck. The Tsar listened very atten- tively. When I had finished, the usually very cool and reserved sovereign, who seldom spoke about politics, spontaneously seized my hand, thanked me for this token of my confidence, regretted that I had been brought into such a situation and added, in exactly these words : "Je comprends parf aite- ment ta ligne d'action; le Prince avec toute sa grandeur n'etait apres tout rien d'autre que ton employe ou fonctionnaire. Le moment ou il re- fusait d'agir selon tes ordres, il f allait le renvoyer. Moi pour ma part je me suis toujours mefie de lui, at je ne lui ai jamais cru un mot de ce qu'il faisait savoir ou me disait lui-meme, car j'etais sur et savais qu'il me blaguait tout le temps. Pour les

18

BISMARCK

rapports entre nous deux, mon cher Guillaume [this was the first time that the Tsar so addressed me], la chute du Prince aura les meilleures con- sequences, la mefiance disparaitra. J'ai confidance en toi. Tu peux te fier a moi." ^

I immediately wrote down this important talk at the time it occurred. I am objective enough to ask myself to what extent the courtesy of one ruler to another and possibly, in addition, the satisfac- tion at the elimination of a statesman of Bismarck's importance, can have influenced the Tsar, con- sciously or unconsciously, in making the above- mentioned statement. Prince Bismarck's belief in the Tsar's trust in him was, subjectively, undoubt- edly genuine; and, moreover, there can be no doubt as to the esteem in which Alexander III held Bismarck's ability as a statesman.

In any even, the Tsar remained true to his word up to the day of his death. This, to be sure, did little to change Russia's general policy, but Ger- many, at least, was safe from an attack from that quarter. The straightforward character of Alex- ander III guaranteed this — it became otherwise under his weak son.

Whatever one's attitude may be toward Bis-

1 "I understand perfectly your line of action ; the Prince, with all his greatness, was, after all, merely your employee or official. As soon as he refused to follow your orders, it was necessary to dismiss him. As for me, I always distrusted him, and I never believed a word of what he had told me or said to me himself, for I was sure and knew that he was hoaxing me all the time. As to the rela-> tions between us two, my dear William, the downfall of the Prince will have the best of results; distrust will disappear. I have con- fidence in you. You can trust me."

3 19

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

marck's Russian policy, one thing must be ac- knowledged: the Prince, despite the Congress of Berlin and the rapprochement of France to Rus- sia, was able to avoid serious friction. That is equivalent to saying that, reckoning from the time of the Berlin Congress, he played a superior diplo- matic and statesmanlike game for twelve years

(1 878-90) V

GERMANY AS PEACEMAKER

One must also lay stress upon the fact that it was a German statesman who, in 1878, prevented a general war, even at the cost of weakening the relations of Germany to Russia, in the justified belief that he would succeed, being a statesman of genius who knew exactly what he was aiming at, in strengthening these relations once more, or, at least, in avoiding conflicts after he had over- come the crisis threatening all Europe.

He succeeded in doing that for twelve years and his successors at the helm of the ship of state succeeded in doing likewise for twenty-four more years.

When I was a Prince I purposely held aloof from party politics, concentrating my entire atten- tion upon my duties in the different army branches to which I was assigned. This afforded me satis- faction and filled up my whole life. For this reason I avoided, while I was Prince of Prussia, all attempts to drag me into party activities. Often enough endeavors were made, under the cloak of harmless functions, teas and the like, to ensnare

20

BISMARCK

me into political circles or for electioneering pur- poses. But I always held aloof.

The outcome of the treacherous malady which killed Emperor Frederick III was frankly told me in advance by German physicians called into consultation as experts by the English physician, Sir Morell Mackenzie. My deep grief and sor- row were all the greater because it was almost impossible for me to speak alone with my beloved father. He was guarded like a prisoner by the English physicians and, though reporters from all countries could look upon the poor sick man from the physicians' room, every kind of obstacle was placed in my path to keep me from my father's side and even to prevent me from keeping in constant touch with him by writing; my letters were often intercepted and not delivered. Moreover, from among the group of watchers, an infamous, organ- ized compaign of slander was conducted in the newspapers against me. Two journalists were especially active in this: one Herr Schnidrowitz and M. Jacques St. Cere, of the Figaro — a Ger- man Jew — who slandered him who was later Emperor in the most poisonous way in France, until the "Petit Sucrier" trial put an end to his activities.

I gave the dying Emperor his last joy on earth when I had the Second Infantry Brigade march past him, led by me in person. These were the first and last troops seen by Frederick III as Em- peror. He delighted his son by writing on this occasion, on a little card^ that he was grateful for

21

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

having had the pleasure of seeing these troops and proud to call them his own. This event was a ray of light during the gloomy ninety-nine days, which brought upon me also, as Crown Prince, much grief, humiliation, and suspicion. In fulfillment of my duty during this crisis, I kept a watchful eye upon all happenings in military, official, and social circles, and was inwardly outraged at the signs of slackness which I noted everywhere, most especially at the hostility against my mother, which was becoming more and more noticeable. More- over, I was naturally deeply hurt at the constant campaign of slander directed against me which depicted me as living in discord with my father.

HE BECOMES EMPEROR

After Emperor Frederick III had closed his eyes forever, the heavy burden of governing the Empire fell upon my youthful shoulders. First of all I was confronted with the necessity of making changes in the government personnel in various quarters. The military entourage of the two em- perors, as well as the body of officialdom, had grown too old. The so-called "maison militaire" (military household of Emperor William the Great) had been retained in its entirety by Em- peror Frederick III, without being required to discharge military duties. In addition, there was the entourage of Emperor Frederick III. I pro- ceeded to dismiss, in the friendliest way, all those gentlemen who wished to go into retirement; some of them received positions in the army, a few of

22

BISMARCK

the younger remained in my service for the tran- sition period.

During the ninety-nine days, while I was still Crown Prince, I had silently concerned myself with those personages to whom I proposed later to give appointments, since the physicians had left me no doubt that my father had only a short time to live. I ignored court or external considera- tions; nothing but previous achievements and character moved me to my choice. I did away with the term "maison militaire'' and transformed it into "Main Headquarters of His Majesty." In choosing my entourage I took the advice of only one man in whom I reposed special confidence, my former chief and brigade commander. Gen- eral— afterward Adjutant General — von Versen, a man of straightforward, knightly, rather harsh character, an officer of the old Prussian school, a typical chip of the old block. During his military service in line and guard regiments he had noted with an observing eye the court influences and ten- dencies which had often worked to the disadvan- tage of the officer corps in the old "maison militaire." In this direction the circle of ladies of high position, jokingly known among the officers as "trente et quarante" on account of their age, also played a certain part. I wished to eliminate such influences.

I appointed General von Wittich my First Adjutant General and General von Hahnke, com- mander of the Second Infantry Guard Division, chief of my Military Cabinet. The latter was a

23

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

friend of Emperor Frederick III and, while I was still serving with the First Infantry Guard Regi- ment, he was my brigade commander. These two were men of military experience and iron prin- ciples, who shared absolutely the sentiments of their master, and remained bound to me to the end of their lives by the most exemplary fidelity.

As the head of my court I appointed a man known to me from his youth, the former Court Marshal of my father, Count August Eulenburg, who remained at the head of the Ministry of the Royal House until his death in June, 1921, at the age of eighty-two years. He was a man of fine tact, uncommon ability, clear insight in court as well as political matters, sincere character, and golden fidelity to his King and his King's family. His manifold abilities would have enabled him, to the same degree that they had made him known as Court Marshal throughout Europe, to act with equal success as ambassador or as Imperial Chan- cellor. Working with unswerving zeal, endowed with winning politeness, he stood by me with help- ful counsel in many matters — dynastic, family, court, public life. He had to do with many men, in all social strata and all walks of life, by all of whom he was revered and esteemed, and he was treated by me likewise with friend- ship and gratitude.

VICTORIA'S HAND IS FELT

After consultation with Prince Bismarck, Herr von Lucanus from the Ministry of Public Worship

24

BISMARCK

and Instruction, was appointed chief of the Civil Cabinet, Prince Bismarck observed jokingly that he was pleased with this choice, since Herr von Lucanus was known to him as an able and enthusi- astic huntsman, which was always a good recom- mendation for a civilian official; he added that a good huntsman was a regular good fellow. Herr von Lucanus took over his post from His Excel- lency von Wilmowski. He discharged his duties admirably and, being well endowed in all per- taining to art, technical matters, science, and pol- itics, he was to me a counselor, untiring collabo- rator, and friend. He combined with a healthy knowledge of men a strong dash of refined humor, which is so often lacking in men of the Germanic race.

With Prince Bismarck I had stood on very good and trustful terms ever since my assignment at the Foreign Office. Then, as well as before, I revered the powerful Chancellor with all the ardor of my youth and was proud to have served under him and to have the opportunity now to work with him as my Chancellor.

The Prince, who was present during the last hours of the old Emperor and had listened with me to the latter's political testament to his grand- son— /. e.y his wish as to the special care to be lavished upon relations with Russia — ^brought about my summer trip to St. Petersburg as my first political act before the eyes of the world, in order to emphasize our relationship to Russia in accordance with the last wish of my dying grand-

25

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

father. He also had "travel arrangements" drawn up for me.

An obstacle was placed in the way of carrying out this plan by a letter from Queen Victoria of England, who, upon hearing of the projected visit to St. Petersburg, expressed to her eldest grand- son, in a good-humored but authoritative tone, her disapproval of the contemplated journey. She said that a year of mourning must first elapse, after which my first visit was due to her, since she was my grandmother, and to England, it being the native country of my mother, before other lands should be considered. When I placed this letter before the Prince, he gave way to a violent fit of anger. He spoke about "family dictation in Eng- land," of interference from that quarter which must cease ; the tone of the letter showed, he said, how the Crown Prince and Emperor Frederick had been ordered about and influenced by his mother-in-law, wife, etc. Thereupon the Prince wished to draw up the text of a reply to the Queen. I remarked that I would prepare the appropriate answer, steering the proper middle course between the grandson and the Emperor, and that I would show it to the Prince before dispatching it.

The answer paid heed in its outward form to the close relationship between a grandson and his grandmother, who had carried him in her arms when he was a baby and, in view of her age alone, commanded great respect — but, in its essentials, it laid stress upon the position and duty of the German Emperor, compelled to carry out uncon-

26

BISMARCK

ditionally a command of his dying father aflPecting Germany's most vital interests. It stated that the grandson was obliged to respect this command of his grandfather in the interest of the country, the representation of which interests had now devolved upon him by the will of God, and that his royal grandmother must leave to him the question of deciding in what manner this was to be done. I added that, otherwise, I was her loving grandson, who would always be grateful for any advice from his grandmother, who had derived so much ex- perience from her long reign; but that I was, nevertheless, in matters affecting Germany, com- pelled to retain my freedom of action; the visit to St. Petersburg, I said, was politically necessary, and the command of my Imperial grandfather was consonant with the close family relations between me and the Russian Imperial house; therefore it would be carried out.

The Prince approved of the letter. The answer, which arrived after a while, was surprising. The Queen agreed that her grandson was in the right ; he must act in accordance with the interests of his country ; she would be glad to see him, even if it were later on, at her own home. From that day onward my relations with the Queen, who was feared even by her own children, were of the best imaginable; from that day onward she never treated her grandson except as a sovereign of equal rank with herself 1

On my first journeys I was accompanied by Count Herbert, as the representative of the For-

27

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

eign Office. He drew up the speeches and con- ducted the political conferences, in so far as they were of an official nature, in accordance with the instructions of his father.

CONFLICT ON TURKISH POLICY

Upon my return from Constantinople in 1889 I described to the Prince at his request my impres- sions of Greece, where my sister Sophie was mar- ried to the heir-apparent. Crown Prince Constan- tine, and also my Constantinople impressions. In doing this, it struck me that Prince Bismarck spoke quite disdainfully of Turkey, of the men in high position there, and of conditions in that land. I thought I might inspire him in part with essen- tially more favorable opinions, but my efforts were of little avail. Upon asking the Prince the reason why he held such an unfavorable opinion, he answered that Count Herbert had reported very disapprovingly on Turkey. Prince Bismarck and Count Herbert were never favorably inclined to- ward Turkey and they never agreed with me in my Turkish policy — the old policy of Frederick the Great.

During the last period of his tenure of office as Chancellor, Bismarck declared that the mainte- nance of friendly relations with Russia, whose Tsar reposed special trust in him, was the most impor- tant reason for his remaining at his post. In this connection it was that he gave me the first hints concerning the secret reinsurance treaty with Rus- sia. Up to then I had heard nothing about it,

28

BISMARCK

either from the Prince or the Foreign Office, although it happened that I had concerned myself especially with Russian matters.

When I assumed the reins of government owing to the early death of my father, the generation of the grandson, as I have already remarked, fol- lowed upon the generation of the grandfather, which meant that the entire generation of Emperor Frederick was overleaped. This generation, through its dealings with Crown Prince Frederick William, was imbued with many liberal ideas and projects of reform which were to be carried out under the direction of the Emperor Frederick. Upon his death, this entire generation, especially the politicians, found itself deceived in its hopes of exerting influence, and felt itself, to a certain extent, in the position of an orphan. Those be- longing to it, despite the fact that they did not know my inner thoughts and aims, adopted a dis- trustful and reserved attitude toward me, instead of transferring their interest from the father to the son, for the purpose of furthering the welfare of the fatherland.

There was one exception to this — a representa- tive of the National Liberals, Herr von Benda — a man still in the full bloom of youth. While I was still Prince I had made his acquaintance at the great hare hunts got up by Councilor Dietze at Barby. There Herr von Benda had won my affec- tion and confidence when I, surrounded by older men, had listened to discussions on political, agri- cultural, and national-economic questions. In the

29

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

course of these, Herr von Benda held my attention by means of his independent, interesting judgment. I accepted with pleasure an invitation to Benda's country seat, Rudow, near Berlin, and from this arose the custom of a regular yearly visit.

The hours spent in the family circle at Rudow stand out pleasantly in my memory. His talented daughters used to regale us with music. The polit- ical conversations there proved Herr von Benda to be a man of great foresight, which, free from partisan considerations, gave him an open mind as to the general needs of the state to an extent seldom found among members of political parties. He gave me many a helpful piece of advice for the future, drawn from the depths of his faithful, genuinely Prussian heart, by which he was attached firmly to the family of his sovereign ; yet he was able to feel broad tolerance for other parties.

HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD PARTIES

The later periods of my reign proved that I was not hostile to any party, with the exception of the Ultra-Socialists; also, that I was not anti-Liberal. My most important Finance Minister was the Liberal, Miquel; my Minister of Commerce was the Liberal, Moeller; the leader of the Liberals, Herr von Bennigsen, was Chief President of Han- over. I stood very close, especially in the second half of my reign, to an elderly Liberal deputy, whose acquaintance I made through Herr von Miquel. This man was Herr Seydel (Celchen), owner of an estate in eastern Germany — a man

30 V

BISMARCK

with two clever eyes, which gazed forth from a clean-shaven face. He worked with Miquel in railway and canal questions, and was a thoroughly able, simple, practical man — a Liberal with a streak of conservatism.

Naturally, I had numerous dealings and points of contact with the Conservative party, since the gentlemen of the country nobility often met me at court hunts and other hunts, or else came to court and served in court positions. Through them I could become thoroughly informed on all agra- rian questions and learn where the farmer's shoe pinched him.

The Free Thinkers, under the "unswerving" leader, entered into no relations with me ; they lim- ited themselves to opposition.

In my conversations with Benda and Bennigsen we often spoke of the future of Liberalism, and, on one occasion, Benda made this interesting ob- servation: "It is not necessary and also not advis- able to have the Prussian heir-apparent dabble in Liberalism — ^we have no use for that sort of thing. He must be essentially conservative, though he must, at the same time, combine this with breadth, and avoid narrowness and prejudice against other parties."

Bennigsen agreed with me when I spoke to him of the necessity of having the National Liberals revise their program, which — originally bearing the motto: "Maintenance of the German Empire and Freedom of the Press" — had long since rallied the members around the Liberal banner — in order

31

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

that, by such revision, the proselytizing power of the old brand of Prussian Liberalism should not be lost among the people. Both the Prussian Liberals and the Conservatives, I continued, made the mistake of remembering too well the old period of conflict of 1 861-66; and, at elections and other political fights, they were prone to fall back into the habits of those days. That period, I said, had already passed into history and come to an end so far as our generation was concerned; the present had begun for us with the year 1870 and the new Empire; our generation had drawn a line under the year 1866; we must build anew upon the foundations of the Empire; political parties must shape their course also in this direc- tion and not take over from the past stuff that was outworn and, moreover, calculated to create dis- cord. Unfortunately, all this has not come to pass. Bennigsen made a very telling point when he said: "Woe to the North German Liberals if they come under the leadership of the South Ger- man Democrats, for that will mean the end of real, genuine Liberalism! Then we shall get the masked democracy arising from below, for which we have no use hereabout."

The Conservative party, honorable and faith- ful to its King, unfortunately has not always pro- duced leaders of superior endowments who were at the same time skillful, tactically trained poli- ticians. The agrarian wing was at times too strongly marked and was a burden to the party. Moreover, memories of the period of conflict were

32

BISMAIV^K

still too lively. I counseled union with the Lib- erals, but found little support. I often pointed out that the National Liberals in the Empire were true to the Empire and to the Emperor, for which reason they should be thoroughly welcome to the Conservatives as allies; that I could not and did not wish to govern without them in the Em- pire, and was absolutely unwilling to govern against them; that North German conserva- tism was misunderstood in some parts of the Empire because of differences in historical de- velopment; and that, therefore, the National Liberals were the natural allies. It was owing to these views of mine, for instance, that I removed Court Preacher Stocker, a man of brilliant achievement as a social missionary, from his post, since he made a demagogical provocative speech in South Germany, aimed against the Liberals there.

The Center party was welded together by the **Kulturkampf" and was strongly anti-Protestant and hostile to the Empire. Notwithstanding this, I had dealings with many important men of the party and managed to interest them in practical collaboration for the good of all. In this Schor- lemer (the father) was especially helpful to me. He never made a secret of his Prussian loyalty to his King. His son, the well-known Minister of Agriculture, even joined the Conservative party. In many matters the Center co-operated; at one period it possessed in its old leader, Windthorst, the keenest politician in the legislature. Never-

33

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

theless, in spite of all this, one could not help being aware of the underlying Centerist conviction that the interests of the Roman Church must always be maintained and never relegated to a secondary place.

THE BREAK WITH BISMARCK

When I was Prince William I was placed for a long time under the Chief President of the Province of Brandenburg, von Achenbach, in order that I might learn about home administra- tion, get experience in economic questions, and, moreover, take an active part in the work. Spurred on by the captivating discourses of Achen- bach, I derived from this period of my life a special interest in the economic side of the inner development of the country, whereas the purely judicial side of the administration interested me to a lesser degree. Improvements, canal construc- tion, highway building, forestry, improvement in all kinds of transportation facilities, betterment of dwellings, introduction of machines into agri- culture and their co-operative development — all of these were matters with which I busied myself later on; this being especially true of hydraulic work and the development of the network of rail- ways, particularly in the badly neglected territory of Eastern Germany.

I discussed all these matters with the Ministers of State after I had ascended the throne. In order to spur them on, I allowed them free rein in their various domains. But it turned out that this was

34

BISMARCK

hardly possible so long as Prince Bismarck re- mained in office, since he reserved for himself the main deciding voice in everything, thereby im- pairing the independence of those working with him. I soon saw that the Ministers, being entirely under Bismarck's thumb, could not come out in favor of "innovations" or ideas of the "young master" of which Bismarck disapproved.

The Ministry, in short, was nothing but a tool in the hands of Bismarck, acting solely in accord- ance with his wishes. This state of things was, in itself, natural enough, since a Premier of such overwhelming importance, who had won for Prus- sia and Germany such great political victories, naturally dominated his Ministers completely and led them despotically. Nevertheless, I found my- self in a difficult position ; the typical answer with which my suggestions were met was : "Prince Bismarck does not want that done; we cannot get him to consent to that; Emperor William I would not have asked such a thing ; that is not in accord- ance with tradition, etc." I understood more and more that, in reality, I had no Ministry of State at my disposal ; that the gentlemen composing it, from long force of habit,^ considered themselves officials of Prince Bismarck.

Here is an example to show the attitude of the Cabinet toward me in those Bismarck days: The question came up of renewing the Socialist law, a political measure devised by Prince Bismarck for fighting socialism. A certain paragraph therein was to be toned down, in order to save the law. 4 35

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Bismarck opposed the change. There were sharp differences of opinion. I summoned a Crown Council. Bismarck spoke in the antechamber with my adjutant; he declared that His Majesty completely forgot that he was an officer and wore a sword belt; that he must fall back upon the army and lead it against the Socialists, in case the Socialists should resort to revolutionary measures ; that the Emperor should leave him a free hand, which would restore quiet once for all. At the Crown Council Bismarck stuck to his opinion. The individual Ministers, when asked to express their views, were lukewarm. A vote was taken — the entire Ministry voted against me.

This vote showed me once more the absolute domination exerted by the Chancellor over his Ministers. Deeply dissatisfied, I talked over the matter with His Excellency Lucanus, who was as much struck as I was by the situation. Lucanus looked up some of the gentlemen and took them to task for their attitude, whereupon they made it clear that they were "not in a position" to oppose the Prince and declared that it was quite impos- sible for anybody to expect them to vote against the wishes of the Prince.

HANDLING A COAL STRIKE

The great Westphalian coal workers' strike in the spring of 1889 took the civil administration by surprise, causing great confusion and bewilder- ment, especially among members of the Westpha- lian provincial administration. From all sides

36

/

BISMARCK

came calls for troops; every mine owner wanted, if possible, to have sentries posted outside his room. The commanders of the troops which were sum- moned immediately made reports on the situation as they had found it.

Among these was one of my former barrack comrades, belonging to the Hussar Guard Regi- ment, von Michaelis by name, who was famous as a wit He rode, alone and unarmed, among the striking crowds of workers, who — the early spring being remarkably warm — ^were camped upon the hillsides, and soon managed, by his confidence- inspiring, jovial ways, to set up a harmless inter- course with the strikers. By questioning them he obtained much valuable information about the grievances — real and imaginary — of the workers, as well as about their plans, hopes, and wishes for the future. He soon won for himself general ap- preciation and affection among the workers and handled them so well that complete quiet reigned in his territory. When I, on account of nervous and worried telegrams from the big industrial leaders and officials received at the office of the Imperial Chancellor, inquired of Michaelis how the situation stood, the following telegraphed an- swer came from him: "Everything quiet except- ing the Government officials."

A mass of material was collected, during the spring and summer, from the announcements and reports received which showed clearly that all was not well in industrial circles; that many a wish of the workers was justified and, to say the least,

37

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

entitled to sympathetic investigation on the part both of the employers and of the officials. The realization of this, which was confirmed in me when I questioned my former private teacher, Privy Councilor Dr. Hinzpeter — a man particularly well informed on social phenomena, especially those in his own province — caused the resolve to ripen in me to summon the State Council, include employers and employees in its deliberations, and bring about, under my personal direction, a thor- ough investigation of the labor question. I decided that in so doing guiding principles and material were to be acquired which would serve the Chan- cellor and the Prussian Government as a basis for working out appropriate projects for new laws.

Inspired by such thought I went to His Excel- lency von Botticher, who at once prophesied op- position on the part of the Chancellor to such action, and advised strongly against it. I stuck to my ideas, adducing in support of them the maxim of Frederick the Great: "Je veux etre un Roi des gueux" ("I wish to be King of the rab- ble"). I said that it was my duty to take care of those Germans who were used up by industry, to protect their strength and better their chances of existence.

FURTHER CONFLICT WITH CHANCELLOR

The predicted opposition from Prince Bismarck was not long in coming. There was much trouble and fighting before I put through what I wanted, owing to the fact that some of the big industrial j

38

BISMARCK

iatcre8t« rtngcd themselves on the side of the Chaa- ccllor. The State Council met, presided over by me. At the opening session the Chancellor unex- pectedly appeared. He made a speech in which he ironically criticized and disapproved the whole undertaking set in motion by me, and refused his co-operation. Thereupon he walked out of the room.

After his departure the strange scene had its effect on the assemblage. The fury and ruthless- ness which the great Chancellor brought to the support of his own policy and against mine, based upon his absolute belief in the correctness of his own judgment, made a tremendous impression upon me and all those present. Neverthless, it stood to reason that I was deeply hurt by what had occurred. The assemblage proceeded to take up its work again and turned out a wealth of material for the extension of that social legislation called into being by Emperor William the Great, which is the pride of Germany, evincing, as it does, a protective attitude toward the laboring classes such as is not to be found in any other land on earth.

Thereupon I decided to summon a general social congress. Prince Bismarck opposed this also. Switzerland was contemplating something similar, and had thought of convening a congress at Berne. Roth, the Swiss ambassador, hearing of my scheme, advised canceling the invitations to Berne and accepting an invitation to Berlin. What he wished occurred. Thanks to the generosity of Herr Roth, it was possible to convene the congress at Berlin.

39

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

The material collected as a result of it was worked out and applied in the form of laws — only in Germany, however.

Later on I talked with Bismarck concerning his project of fighting the socialists, in case they resorted to revolutionary acts, with cannon and bayonets. I sought to convince him that it was out of the question for me, almost immediately after William the Great had closed his eyes after a blessed reign, to stain the first years of my Govern- ment with the blood of my own people. Bismarck was unmoved ; he declared that he would assume responsibility for his actions; that all I need do was to leave the thing to him. I answered that I could not square such a course with my conscience and my responsibility before God, particularly as I knew perfectly well that conditions among the laboring classes were bad and must be bettered at all costs.

The conflict between the views of the Emperor and the Chancellor relative to the social question — i, e,, the furtherance of the welfare of the laboring classes of the population, with participation therein by the state — ^was the real cause of the break be- tween us, and caused a hostility toward me, lasting for years, on the part of Bismarck and a large part of the German nation that was devoted to him, especially of the official class.

This conflict between the Chancellor and me arose because of his belief that the social problem could be solved by severe measures and, if the worst came to the worst, by means of soldiers;

40

BISMARCK

not by following principles of general love for mankind or humanitarian nonsense which, he be- lieved, he would have to adopt in conformity to my views.

BISMARCK'S LABOR VIEWS

Bismarck was not a foe to the laboring classes — on that I wish to lay stress, in view of what I have previously said. On the contrary! He was far too great a statesman to mistake the importance of the labor question to the state. But he considered the whole matter from the standpoint of pure expedi- ency for the state. The state, he believed, should care for the laborer, as much and in whatever manner it deemed proper; he would not admit of any co-operation of the workers in this. Agitation and rebellion, he believed, should be severely sup- pressed ; by force of arms, if necessary. Govern- ment protection on the one hand, the mailed fist on the other — that was Bismarck's social policy.

I, however, wished to win over the soul of the German workingman, and I fought zealously to attain this goal. I was filled with the conscious- ness of a plain duty and responsibility toward my entire people — also, therefore, toward the labor- ing classes. What was theirs by right and justice should become theirs, I thought; moreover, I believed that this should be brought about, wher- ever the will or power of the employers ceased, by the lord of the land and his Government, in so far as justice or necessity demanded. As soon as I had recognized the necessity for reforms, to

41

THE KAISER^S MEMOIRS

some of which the industrial elements would not consent, I took up the cudgels for the laboring classes, impelled by a sense of justice.

I had studied history sufficiently to guard my- self against the delusion of believing in the possi- bility of making an entire people happy. I real- ized clearly that it was impossible for one human being to make a nation happy. The truth is that the only nation which is happy is the one that is contented, or at least is willing to be contented; a willingness which implies a certain degree of realization of what is possible — a sense of the practical, in short. Unfortunately, there is often a lack of this.

I was well aware that, in the unbounded de- mands of the Socialist leaders, unjustified greed would be constantly developed anew. But, for the very reason that I wished to be able to combat unjustified aspirations with a clear conscience and in a convincing way, it behooved me not to deny recognition and aid to justified aspirations.

GERMAN SOCIAL PROBLEMS

The policy that kept in view the welfare of the workers unquestionably imposed a heavy burden upon all the industrial elements of Germany in the matter of competition in the world market, through the well-known laws for the protection of workingmen. This was especially true in relation to an industrial system like the Belgian, which could, without hindrance, squeeze the last drop out of the human reserves of Belgium and pay

42

BISMARCK

low wages, without feeling any pangs of con- science or compassion for the sinking morale of the exhausted, unprotected people. By means of my social legislation I made such conditions im- i possible in Germany, and I caused it to be intro- duced also in Belgium, during the war, by General von Bissing, in order to promote the welfare of the Belgian workers. First of all, however, this legis- lation is — to use a sporting term — a handicap upon German industry in the battle of world competi- tion: it alienated many big leaders of industry, which, from their point of view, was quite natural. But the lord of the land must always bear in mind the welfare of the whole nation; therefore, I went my way unswervingly.

Those workers, on the other hand, who blindly followed the Socialist leaders, gave me no word of thanks for the protection created for them nor for the work I had done. Between them and me lies the motto of the HohenzoUerns, "Suum cuique." That means, "To each his own" — not, as the Social Democrats would have it, "To everyone the same!"

I also harbored the idea of preventing to some extent competitive warfare, at least in the indus- trial world of the European continent, by bringing about a sort of quota-fixing in foreign lands, thereby facilitating production and making possi- ble a healthier mode of life among the working classes.

There is great significance in the impression which foreign workers get in studying Germany's social legislation. A few years before the war peo-

43

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

pie in England, under the pressure of labor trou- bles, awoke to the conviction that better care must be taken of the workers. As a result of this, com- missions visited Germany, some of them composed of workingmen. Guided by representative Ger- mans, among them Socialists, they visited the in- dustrial regions, factories, benevolent institutions, sanatoria of insurance companies, etc., and were astonished at all the things they saw. At the fare- well dinner given them the English leader of the workingmen's deputation turned to Bebel and made this concluding remark:

"After all we have seen of what is done in Ger- many for the workers, I ask you : Are you people still Socialists?" And the Englishmen remarked to a German that they would be quite satisfied if they could succeed, after long fights in Parliament, in putting through one tenth of what had already been accomplished years before in Germany to- ward bettering the condition of the laboring classes.

I had observed with interest these visits of the English deputations and marveled at their igno- rance of German conditions. But I marveled even more at a question asked by the English Govern- ment, through the channel of the English Em- bassy, on the same subject, which betrayed an abso- lutely amazing lack of knowledge of the progress made in Germany in the province of social reform. I questioned the English ambassador, remarking that England, having been represented in 1890 at the Berlin Social Congress, must certainly have

44

BISMARCK

been informed, at least through the Embassy, of the Reichstag debates, which had dealt in a de- tailed way with the various social measures. The ambassador replied that the same thing had also occurred to him and caused him to have the earlier records of the Embassy investigated, whereupon it had transpired that the Embassy had sent the full- est reports on the subject to London and that thor- ough reports had been forwarded home concerning every important stage in the progress of social re- form; but, "because they came from Germany, nobody ever read them ; they were simply pigeon- holed and remained there ever since ; it is a down- right shame ; Germany does not interest people at home."

Thus the Briton, with a shrug of his shoulders. Neither the British King nor Parliament had enough conscience or time or desire to work for the betterment of the working class. The "policy of encirclement" for the annihilation of Germany, especially of its industry, and, thereby, of its work- ing population, was, in their eyes, far more im- portant and rewarding. On the 9th of November (191 8) the German Radical Socialist leaders, with their like-minded followers, joined forces with this British policy of annihilation.

'WELFARE WORK" AT THE COURT

In a small way, in places where I had influence, as, for instance, in the administration of my court and in the Imperial Automobile Club, I laid stress upon the social point of view. For instance, I

45

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

caused a fund to be established, out of the tips paid for visiting palaces, which was destined solely to the benefit of the domestic staff, and which, in the course of time, reached a magnificent total. From this fund the domestics and their families received money for trips to bathing resorts, cost of taking cures, burial expenses, dowries for their children, confirmation expenses, and similar payments.

When I, at the request of the newly founded Imperial Automobile Club, took it under my pro- tection, I accepted an invitation to a luncheon in the beautiful rooms of the clubhouse, built by Ihne. In addition to magnates like the Duke of Ratibor, the Duke of Ujest, etc., I found there a number of gentlemen from Berlin's high financial circles, some of whom behaved rather wildly. When the conversation turned to the subject of drivers, I suggested establishing a fund which, in case of accident, illness, or death befalling these men, should provide means of livelihood for those whom they left behind. The suggestion met with unanimous approval, and the fund has had most excellent results. Later on I brought about the establishment of something similar for the skip- pers and pilots attached to the Imperial Yacht Club at Kiel.

Special pleasure was aflPorded me by the Kaiser Wilhelm Children's Home, founded by me at Ahl- beck, at which, in peace times, between May and the end of September in each year, a large number of children from the most poverty-stricken work- ing people's districts in Berlin were accommo-

46

BISMARCK

dated in successive detachments, each lot staying four weeks. This home is still under the tried direction of the admirable superintendent, Miss Kirschner, daughter of the former Chief Burgo- master of Berlin, and it has achieved most brilliant results, both in the physical and the psychical domain. Weakened, pale, needy children were transformed there into fresh, blooming, happy lit- tle beings, concerning whose welfare I often joy- fully convinced myself by personal visits.

For the very reason that I have spoken of my quarrel with Bismarck as a result of labor ques- tions, I wish to add to what I have already said about his basic position in the matter— an example showing how brilliantly the Prince behaved in something that concerned the workers. In this, to be sure, he was impelled by nationalistic motives, but he also realized at once that it was necessary to protect a large element against unemployment, which caused him to intervene with the full weight of his authority.

Sometime around 1886, while I was still Prince Wilhelm, I had learned that the great Vulcan ship- ping concern at Stettin was confronted, owing to lack of orders, with bankruptcy, and its entire force of workmen, numbering many thousands, with starvation, which would mean a catastrophe for the city of Stettin. Only by an order for the building of a big ship could the Vulcan shipyards be saved.

Spurred on some time before by Admiral von Stosch, who wished to free us once and for all

47

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

/ from the English shipbuilders, the Vulcan people

had set to work courageously to build the first Ger- man armored ship, christened by my mother in 1874 birthday, on which occasion I was

present. Ever since that time the warships built at the Vulcan yards had always satisfied naval experts — the concern, however, seldom built warships.

THE CHANCELLOR IN ACTION

The German merchant marine, on the other hand, had not dared to follow the path courage- ously blazed by Admiral von Stosch. And now the brave German shipyard company was faced with ruin, since the North German Lloyd had refused its offer to build a passenger steamer, alleging that the English, because of their years of shipbuilding traditions, could build it better. It was a serious emergency. I hastened to Prince Bismarck and laid before him the matter as I have described it above.

The Chancellor was furious; his eyes flashed, his fist came crashing down on the table.

"What! Do you mean to say that these shop- keepers would rather have their boats built in Eng- land than in Germany? Why, thai is unheard of! And is a good German shipyard to fail for such a reason? The devil take this gang of traders!"

He rang the bell and a servant entered.

"Have Privy Councilor X come here immedi- ately from the Foreign Office!"

In a few minutes — during which the Prince

48

BISMARCK

stamped up and down the room — the man sum- moned appeared.

^'Telegram to Hamburg, to our envoy — the Lloyd in Bremen is to have its new ship built by the Vulcan Company in Stettin!"

The Privy Councilor vanished in hot haste, "with his coat tails sticking straight out behind him." The Prince turned to me and said: "I am greatly obliged to you. You have done the father- land, and also myself, an important service. Henceforth ships will be built only in our yards — I'll take care to make this clear to the Hanseatic crowd. You may telegraph to the Vulcan people that the Chancellor will guarantee that the ship will be built in the Vulcan yards. May this be the first of a whole lot of such ships ! As for the work- ers whom you have thus saved from unemploy- ment, I hope that they will express their thanks to you!"

I passed on the news to Privy Councilor Schlu- tow at Stettin and great was the joy caused thereby. This was the first step upon the road destined to lead to the construction of the magnificent Ger- man express steamers.

When I went, after I had ascended the throne in 1888, to Stettin, in order to place honorary in- signia on the flags of my Pomeranian Grenadiers, I also visited the Vulcan shipyards, at the invita- tion of the directors. After my reception by the directors outside the yards, the great doors were flung open and I walked inside. But, instead of work and pounding hammers, I found deep silence.

49

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

The entire body of workmen was standing in a half circle, with bared heads ; in the middle stood the oldest workman of all, a man with a snow- white beard, bearing a laurel wreath in his hand.

I was deeply moved. Schlutow whispered to me : "A little pleasure for you, which the workmen themselves have thought up." The old workman stepped forward and, in pithy, plain words, ex- pressed to me the gratitude of the workmen to me for having saved them, and, above all, their wives and children, from hardship and hunger, by my appeal to Bismarck about the building of the ship. As a token of their gratitude, he asked my permis- sion to hand over the laurel wreath. Most deeply moved, I took the wreath and expressed my pleas- ure at receiving my first laurels, without the shed- ding of a drop of blood, from the hands of honest German workmen.

That was in the year 1888! In those days, the German laboring classes knew how to appreciate the blessing of labor.

CHAPTER II

- Caprivi

WHEN I began my reign, General von Caprivi was Chief of the Admiralty. He was the last general to hold this post. I at once took energetically in hand the development and reform — in fact, one may say the foundation anew — of the Imperial German Navy, based on my preliminary studies in England and at home. That was not to the liking of the General, who was able, but rather self-willed, and not entirely devoid of pride.

Unquestionably he had rendered valuable serv- ices in mobilization, improvement of the officer corps, and the improvement and development of the torpedo-boat organization. On the other hand, the building of ships and the replacement of worn- out material were in a deplorable state, to the detri- ment of the fleet and to the dissatisfaction of the shipbuilding industry, which was growing and looking about for employment

Being an old Prussian general, Caprivi's way of thinking was that of his day — that of his com- rades of 1864, 1865, 1870, 1 87 1 — in his eyes, the army had always done everything and would con- 5 51

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

tinue to do so in the future ; therefore, no great de- mands for money to be devoted to the navy should be imposed upon the country, since, should this be done, there was danger that the sums destined to the army might be decreased and its development thereby hampered. This idea, from v^hich he was not to be dissuaded, is false. The amounts granted did not flow into a reservoir from which they might be directed, by the mere turning of a valve, now into army, now into navy, channels. Whenever Caprivi was unwilling to demand anything for naval construction, in order, by so doing, to turn more money toward the army, things did not hap- pen as he foresaw. By his action the army re- ceived not one penny more, but merely whatever the Minister of War asked for and received in ac- cordance with his budget.

There was need of creating a Secretaryship of State for the Navy which, entirely independent of the Ministry of War, should have as its duty to de- mand and obtain for the navy as much as was required for the protection of our commerce and colonies. And that is what came to pass later on.

Caprivi soon came to me with the request that I relieve him from his post. He stated that he was not satisfied with it in itself ; that, moreover, I had all sorts of plans for the future affecting the navy which he considered impossible of realization, in the first place, because there existed no means of replacement for the officer corps — at that time the yearly influx of cadets was between sixty and

52

CAPRIVI

eighty — and a large navy without a large officer corps was unthinkable. In addition to this, he in- formed me, he had soon seen in the course of the inspection tours of His Majesty that the Emperor knew more about naval matters than he, the Gen- eral, which placed him in an impossible situation in relation to his subordinates.

In View of these circumstances, I parted with him, placing him in command of an army corps. Following the motto, ^^The navy for the seamen!" I chose, for the first time, an admiral as its chief, a step which was received in maritime circles with great joy. The man chosen was Admiral Count Monts.

BISMARCK'S SUCCESSOR

When I was soon afterward confronted with the rather unexpected retirement of Prince Bismarck, I found the choice of his successor a difficult one. Whoever it might be was sure to have a hard task, without any prospect of appreciation for what he might achieve; he would be looked upon as the usurper of a post to which he was not entitled, and which he was not qualified to fill. Crit- icism, criticism, nothing but criticism — that was sure to be the daily bread upon which the new Chancellor must reckon; and he was also cer- tain of becoming the target for the hostility of all those who favored Prince Bismarck as well as with that of the many who previously could not do enough in opposition to him. There was bound to be a strong current of enmity toward the new

53

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Chancellor, in which the old Prince himself would not be the least serious factor.

After taking all this into consideration, it was decided to choose a man belonging to Prince Bis- marck's generation, who had held a leading posi- tion in the wars and had already filled a Govern- ment position under him. Hence Caprivi was chosen. His age was a guarantee that he would be a careful and calm adviser for the ^^orphaned" young Emperor.

Very soon the question arose of the extension of the reinsurance treaty with Russia. Caprivi de- clared that, out of consideration for Austria, he was unable to renew it, since the threat against Austria contained therein, when it became known in Vienna — as it almost unavoidably would — was such as to lead to very disagreeable consequences. For this reason the treaty lapsed. To my way of thinking, it had already lost its main value from the fact that the Russians no longer stood whole- heartedly behind it. I was confirmed in this view by a memorial written by Count Berchem, Under Secretary of State, who had worked with Prince Bismarck.

The Agrarian Conservatives opposed Caprivi as a man without landed property and a violent fight raged around the commercial treaties. These difficulties were greatly enhanced because Prince Bismarck, ignoring his former maxims, took part in the fight against his successor with all his char- acteristic energy. Thus arose the opposition of the Conservatives against the Government and the

54

CAPRIVI

Crown, and the Prince in person sowed the seed from which later grew the "misunderstood Bis- marck" and that "Reichsverdrossenheit" (un- friendliness to the Empire) so often taken up in the newspapers. The "misunderstood Bismarck" created permanent opposition throughout my reign against my suggestions and aims by means of quo- tations, speeches, and writings, as well as by pas- sive resistance and thoughtless criticism. Every thing that was done was painted in black colors, made ridiculous, and criticized from top to bottom, by a press that placed itself quite willingly at the disposal of the Prince and often out-Bismarcked Bismarck in its behavior.

This phenomenon became most apparent at the time of the acquisition of Heligoland. This island, lying close in front of the great waterways leading to the principal Hanseatic commercial ports, was, in the hands of the British, a constant menace to Hamburg and Bremen and rendered im- possible any project for building up a navy. Owing to this, I had firmly resolved to win back this formerly German island to its fatherland.

THE DEAL FOR HELIGOLAND

The way to cause England to give up the red rock of Heligoland was found in the colonial do- main. Lord Salisbury proved inclined to ex- change the "barren rock" for Zanzibar and Witu in East Africa. From commercial sources and the reports of the commanders of German cruisers and gunboats which were stationed there and

55

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

cruised along the coast of the recently acquired German East African colonies, I knew that, as soon as Togo, Dar-es-Salaam, etc., rose to prosperity, the importance of Zanzibar on the coast of Africa as the principal port of transshipment would be a thing of the past, since, as soon as the above-men- tioned harbors were made deep enough and pro- vided with sufficient cargo-loading equipment for trading steamers, there would no longer be any need of ferrying goods coming from the interioi in dhows to Zanzibar, in order to have them again loaded on vessels there, since they could be loaded direct at the new harbors along the coast.

Therefore, I was convinced that we had, first, an acceptable asset for swapping purposes, and, secondly, a good opportunity to avoid colonial fric- tion with England and come to a friendly under- standing with her. Caprivi agreed, the 'negotia- tions were concluded, and one evening, shortly before dinner, I was able to tell the Empress and a few intimates the exceedingly joyful tidings that Heligoland had become German.

A first and very important extension of the Em- pire had been achieved — without bloodshed — the first condition for the upbuilding of the fleet was fulfilled, something which the natives of the Han- seatic towns and the rest of the North Germans had wished for centuries had come to pass. In silence, an important event had occurred.

Had Heligoland been acquired in the Chancel- lorship of Prince Bismarck, it would probably have been valued very highly. Having happened

56

CAPRIVI

under Caprivi, it loosed a lot of criticism. It was merely Caprivi, the usurper, who had had the audacity to sit in the Prince's chair, and the 'irre- sponsible," "ungrateful," "impulsive" young mas- ter who had done such a thing! Had Bismarck only wished, he could have had the old rock any day, but he never would have been so unskillful as to give up to the English for it the very promising African possessions, and he never would have allowed himself to be thus worsted. That was the sort of thing heard almost everywhere. The news- papers of the Prince joined loudly in this sort of criticism, to the great grief of the people of the Hanseatic cities.

Curious indeed were the criticisms occasioned by the swapping of Zanzibar and Witu, which ap- peared in the Bismarckian press, although previ- ously, when I worked under him, these newspapers had always explained that he had not much belief in the value of colonies in themselves and looked upon them merely as objects to be exchanged, pos- sibly, for something else, in deals with the British. His successor acted according to these ideas in the Heligoland question, and was most violently criti- cized and attacked. Not until the World War was on did I see articles in the German press which unreservedly admitted the acquisition of Heligo- land to be an act of far-sighted politics and added reflections as to what would doubtless have hap- pened if Heligoland had not become German.

The German nation has every reason to be thankful to Count Caprivi for this achievement,

57

THE KAISER^S MEMOIRS

since thereby the building of its navy and its vic- tory at the Skagerrak were made possible. As for the German navy, it long ago acknov^ledged this.

The school law of Count Zedlitz aroused violent new conflicts. When they led to Zedlitz's retire- ment, the cry arose among his adherents: "If the Count goes, so must the Chancellor."

Caprivi left his post, in a calm, dignified man- ner. He tried honestly, within the measure of his powers and abilities, to continue the traditions of Prince Bismarck. In this he found little support among the political parties, and, for this reason, all the more criticism and hostility in the public and among those who, had they acted for the right and the interests of the state, should have stood by him. Without one word of apology, Caprivi, in noble silence, lived all the rest of his life in almost soli- tary retirement.

58

CHAPTER III

, Hohenlohe

AGAIN I was confronted with the difficult jf'^ task of choosing a Chancellor. His posi- tion and activities were to be under somewhat about the same auspices and subject to the same conditions as in the case of his predecessor. But now there was more of a desire that he should be a statesman, an older man, of course, qualified to in- spire Prince Bismarck with more confidence than a mere general could do.

It was assumed that a statesman would know bet- ter how to walk in the footsteps of the Prince, politically speaking, and provide Bismarck with less opportunity for criticism and attacks. These latter had tended to create gradually among all Government officials, who dated mostly from the period of Bismarck, an unmistakable nervousness and dissatisfaction, by which the work of the entire governmental system was impaired to an extent by no means inconsiderable. Moreover, it lent to the opposition in the Reichstag a constantly renewed strength drawn from elements previously faithful to the Government, and made itself felt in a detri- mental manner. Especially in the Foreign Office,

59

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

the spirit of Holstein, the supposed representative of the "old, tried Bismarckian traditions," began to assert itself, so that the unwillingness to collabo- rate with the Emperor became particularly strong and the belief grew up that it was necessary to carry on, independently, the policy of Bismarck.

After mature deliberation, I decided to intrust the post of Chancellor to Prince Hohenlohe, who was then Governor of Alsace-Lorraine. At the outbreak of the War of 1870 he had succeeded, as Bavarian Minister, in getting Bavaria to enter the war on the side of Prussia. Ever since he had been highly esteemed by Prince Bismarck on account of his fidelity to the Empire. It was natural to ex- pect that Bismarck's opposition would cool off when confronted with such a successor. Thus, the choice of Hohenlohe as Chancellor was strongly influenced by consideration for Prince Bismarck and for the public opinion inspired by him.

Prince Hohenlohe was the typical old-style grand seigneur. He was thoroughly urbane by nature and in his dealings with others : a man of re- fined mind, with a slight touch of playful irony sometimes glinting through, keen on account of his years, a level-headed observer and judge of men. Despite the great difference in age between him and me he got along very well with me, which was shown on the surface by the fact that he was treated both by the Empress and by myself as our uncle, and addressed as such, which brought about a cer- tain atmosphere of intimate confidence in our in- tercourse. In his talks with me, especially in giv-

60

HOHENLOHE

ing his opinion as to appointments of officials, he offered very characteristic descriptions of the gen- tlemen being discussed, often combined with phil- osophical observations which proved that he had reflected deeply on life and humanity, and which were evidence of a maturity and wisdom grounded on experience.

Something happened during the first period of Hohenlohe's regime as Chancellor which throws an interesting light upon the relations betv^^een France and Russia. Having, at the time of the fraternization between Russia and France, re- ceived reliable information from the General Staff as well as from our Embassy at Paris to the effect that France contemplated withdrawing a portion of her troops from Algeria, in order to shift them to southern France either against Italy or against Alsace, I apprised Tsar Nicholas II of this news, adding the remark that I should be obliged to adopt counter-measures unless the Tsar could dissuade his ally from so provocative a step.

SOME DIPLOMATIC FENCING

At that time the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was Prince Lobanoff, formerly ambassador at Vienna, well known for his pro-French pro- clivities. During the summer of 1895 ^e had vis- ited France and been very cordially entertained. During the autumn, just as I was staying for the hunting at Hubertusstock on the Schorfheide near Eberswalde, Prince Lobanoff, on his return jour- ney from Paris, requested to be received in audi-

61

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

encc, at the behest of the Tsar. Upon being re- ceived by me he described the calm and sensible frame of mind which he had found in Paris and sought to quiet me, too, with regard to the above- mentioned troop movements, which, according to him, were mere empty rumor and chatter without any real basis. He added that he was bringing to me the most quieting assurances, that there was no reason for my feeling the slightest alarm. I thanked him heartily for his report, remarking that the word "alarm" was not to be found in the dictionary of a German officer; and I added that, if France and Russia wished to make war, I could not prevent it.

Whereupon the Prince, piously casting up his eyes toward heaven, made the sign of the cross and said: "Oh, la guerre! quelle idee; qui y pense? — cela ne doit pas etre" ("Oh, war! what an idea; who thinks of such a thing? it must not be"). To that I replied that I, in any event, was not think- ing about it, but that an observer — and he need not be very keen eyed — must assuredly consider the constant celebrations and speeches, as well as the official and unofficial visits exchanged between Paris and St. Petersburg, as significant symptoms which could not be ignored, and which were cal- culated to arouse great dissatisfaction in Ger- many; that, should it come to war, against my own will and that of my people, I felt that, trusting in God and in my army and people, it would be pos- sible for Germany to get the better of both opponents.

62

HOHENLOHE

To this I added still another statement, reported to me from Paris, which had been made by a Rus- sian officer who was in France as a member of an officers' deputation. Having been asked by a French comrade whether the Russians believed that they could beat the Germans, the gallant Slav replied: "Non, mon ami, nous serons battus a plate couture, mais qu'est-ce que ga fait? Nous aurons la Republique" (^^No, my friend, we shall be thoroughly beaten, but what does that matter? We shall get a republic").

At first the Prince eyed me, speechless, then, shrugging his shoulders, he remarked: "Oh, la guerre, il ne faut pas meme y penser" ("Oh, war, one must not even think about it"). The officer had merely expressed the general opinion of the Russian intelligentsia and social circles. As far back as my first visit to St. Petersburg, in the early 'eighties, a grand duchess said to me at dinner, quite calmly: "Here we sit all the time on a vol- cano. We expect the revolution any day! The Slavs are not faithful, they are not at all monarchi- cal, all of them are republicans at heart; they dis- guise their sentiments, and they lie, every one of them, all the time."

Three important events, related to foreign pol- itics, came within the period of Prince Hohen- lohe's incumbency of the Chancellorship: the opening, in 1895, ^f the Emperor William Canal (North Sea-Baltic Canal), begun under Emperor William the Great, to which squadrons or indi- vidual ships representing countries all over the

63

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

world were invited; the annexation, in 1897, of Tsing-tao ; and, third, the much-discussed Kruger dispatch.

THE SEIZURE OF TSING-TAO

Prince Hohenlohe played an especially impor- tant role in the annexation of Tsing-tao. He, too, was of the opinion that Germany needed some coaling stations for her ships, and that the demands of commercial elements that the opportunity for opening up China to international trade be not allowed to pass were justified. It was resolved that, under unimpaired Chinese sovereignty and after payment of the likin (octroi, or internal rev- enue tax), a trading port, with a marine coaling station as protection, was to be founded, wherein it was contemplated to allow China to co-operate to the utmost possible extent.

The station was to serve the ends of commerce, before all else, the military measures being lim- ited solely to the protection of the trading center as it developed; they did not constitute an end in themselves or a basis for further military enterprises.

Already several places had been considered, but these had proved, upon more careful investigation, to be unfitted, mostly because they had either bad connections or none at all with the interior regions, were not promising from a commercial-political standpoint, or were encumbered by privileges already granted to other foreign countries. Finally it was agreed — because of the reports of Admiral

64

. HOHENLOHE

Tirpitz, who was, at that time, chief of the East Asiatic cruiser squadron, and because of the opin- ion of the geographical expert, Freiherr von Richthofen, who, having been questioned on the subject, had drawn a most promising picture of the possibilities of development in Shantung — to found a settlement on the bay of Kiao-Chau.

The Chancellor proceeded to collect data on the political questions which arose as a result of this and which must be taken into consideration. It was particularly necessary not to interfere with Russia's designs, nor to disturb her. Further in- formation was obtained, some of it ffom our East Asiatic division ; from this source favorable reports came in as to anchorages and the ice-free nature of the bay of Kiao-Chau, and as to the prospects, if a port were to be founded there. From conversa- tions among the officers of the Russian China divi- sion, which had come to our ears in our intercourse with them, it was learned that the Russian Ad- miral, in accordance with orders from his Govern- ment, had anchored one winter in the bay, but had found it so desolate and so atrociously lone- some— there were no tea houses with Japanese geisha girls, which the Russians deemed abso- lutely indispensable to winter quarters — that the Russian squadron would never go back there any more.

It was also reported that the Russian Admiral had advised his Government most earnestly against prosecuting any further its intention of founding a settlement on this bay, since there was

65

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

absolutely no advantage to be derived from it. Hence, the Russians had no intention of gaining a foothold there.

This last piece of news arrived at about the same time as the answer from the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Muravieff, sent through the Ger- man ambassador, relative to the sounding of Rus- sian opinion, which had been made pursuant to instructions from the Chancellor. Muravieff set forth that Russia, to be sure, had no direct claims, based on treaty with China, to the bay, but that she, nevertheless, laid claim to it on the basis of the "droit du premier mouillage" ("right of first anchorage"), since the Russian ships had anchored there before those of any other fleet. This answer, it will be seen, ran counter to the report of our East Asiatic division relative to the statements made by the Russian Admiral.

When I, with Hollmann, met the Chancellor, in order to discuss the Russian claim to Kiao-Chau, the Prince listened to the reading of it with his little ironical smile, and remarked that he had been unable to find any jurist at the Foreign Office who could tell him anything about this wonderful claim. Was the navy in a position to do so? Ad- miral Hollmann declared that he, in all his experi- ence on foreign service, had never heard of it; that it was nonsense and an invention of Muravieff, whose only motive was unwillingness to have some other nation settle on the shores of the bay. I ad- vised that Privy Councilor of the Admiralty Perels, one of the most famous living experts on

66

HOHENLOHE

international maritime law and an acknowledged authority in this domain, be asked to deliver an opinion, in order to clarify the question. This was done. The opinion tore Muravieff's contention to pieces, corroborated that of Hollmann, and com- pletely did away with the legend about the '^right of first anchorage."

Months elapsed ; my August, 1897, visit to Peter- hof was imminent. In agreement with the Prince, my uncle, I decided to discuss the entire matter in person and frankly with the Tsar, and, if possible, put an end to Muravieff's notes and evasions. The talk took place at Peterhof. The Tsar stated that he had no interest in the territory south of the Tientsin-Peking line, which meant that there was no reason why he should place obstacles in our path in Shantung: that his interest was concentrated upon the territory on the Yalu, around Port Ar- thur, etc., now that the English had made difficul- ties for him at Mokpo ; that he would, in fact, be pleased if Germany should locate herself in future on the other side of the Gulf of Chih-li as Russia's welcome neighbor.

Afterward I had a talk with Muraviefif. He employed all his arts, wriggled back and forth in his statements, and finally brought up his famous / "right of first anchorage." That was all I wanted. I now passed to the offensive myself, striking out at him squarely with the opinion delivered by Perels. When I had told him, finally, as the Tsar desired, the result of the conversations between us two sovereigns, the diplomat was even 6 67

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

more embarrassed, lost his assumed calm, and capitulated.

Thus was the soil prepared, politically speak- ing. In the autumn came the news from Bishop Anzer of the murder of the two German Catholic missionaries in Shantung. The entire German Catholic world, particularly the ^'colonials" in the Centerist party, demanded energetic measures. The Chancellor proposed to me immediate inter- vention. While I was engaged in the winter hunt- ing at Lotalingen, I consulted with him, in one of the little towers of the castle there, as to what steps were to be taken. The Prince proposed to intrust Prince Henry of Prussia, who was present, with the command of the squadron that was to be sent out to reinforce the East Asiatic Division. I in- formed my brother of this in the presence of the Chancellor, whereat the Prince and the other gentlemen present were highly pleased. The Chancellor sent the news to the Foreign Office and to the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Biilow, who was away on a journey.

Kiao-Chau was occupied in November, 1897. In December of that year Prince Henry sailed, on board the Deutschland, with his squadron to East- ern Asia, where he later took over the command of the entire East Asiatic Division. On the 6th of March, 1898, the agreement with China concern- ing Kiao-Chau was signed. At the same time, Mr. Chamberlain in London brought up before the Japanese ambassador, Baron Kato, the idea of the

68

HOHENLOHE

conclusion of an Anglo-Japanese alliance, in order to bar Russia's advance in the East.

QUEST FOR COALING STATIONS

One will naturally inquire why, in the discus- sion of our audacious move, there is no mention of England, since she was certainly deeply interested therein. Preliminaries, however, had already been gone into with England. In order to meet the necessity for German coaling stations, I had in- tended to found, lease, or buy some in agreement with England, so far as might be possible. In view of the fact that my uncle, the Chancellor, was, as a member of the Hohenlohe family, related to Queen Victoria, known to her personally for years and highly esteemed by her, I hoped that this might tend to facilitate the negotiations which were entered into with the English Government for the above-noted purpose. My hope was dis- appointed. The negotiations dragged along with- out any prospect of successful termination.

I took occasion, therefore, at the behest of the Chancellor, to discuss the matter with the English ambassador at Berlin. I complained of the treat- ment received from the English Government, which everywhere opposed German wishes, even such as were justified. The ambassador agreed frankly with this, and expressed his astonishment at England's failure to meet Germany halfway, and at English shortsightedness, since, when a young, rising nation like Germany, whose develop- ment, after all, was not to be prevented, turned

69

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

directly to England in order to acquire territory with her consent, instead of going straight ahead or allying itself with other nations, it was certainly more than England could reasonably ask.

Moreover, he added that, since England already owned almost all the world, she could certainly find a place where she might permit Germany to establish a station; that he was unable to under- stand the gentlemen in Downing Street; that in case Germany should not succeed in obtaining England's approval, she would probably occupy, on her own account, such places as were suited to her ends, since, after all, there was no law against it.

I laid stress upon the fact that this agreed en- tirely with my own view and, in conclusion, I summed up my standpoint once more for the am- bassador: I told him that Germany was the only country in the world which, despite its colonial possessions and its rapidly growing commerce, possessed no coaling stations; that we were quite willing to acquire these with England's consent; that, should she refuse to show a realization of our situation and fail to meet us halfway, we should be compelled to turn to some other great power, in order, with its help, to found settlements.

This talk, likewise, was fruitless. Finally, the negotiations with England were broken off, with- out result, in a rather impolite manner. There- upon the Chancellor and I decided to appeal to Russia.

The occupation of Kaio-Chau aroused surprise and anger in the English Government. Having

70

HOHENLOHE

refused us her support, England had definitely reckoned on the belief that nobody would help Germany in attaining her goal. Now things had turned out differently, and there was no lack of recriminations from London. When the English ambassador took up this tone he was referred to the conversation with me, and it was made clear to him that it was solely the fault of his Govern- ment that it had come to no understanding with Germany.

England's attitude of aloofness surprised us at that time. An occurrence which, then, was un- known to me, may serve to throw light on the matter.

FINDS SEED OF WORLD WAR i

In a book {The Problem of Japan) which ap- peared anonymously at The Hague in 1918 and was said to have been written by an "Ex-Diplomat from the Far East," an excerpt was published from a work of the American, Professor Usher of Wash- ington University at St. Louis. Usher, like his former colleague, Prof. John Bassett Moore of

1 "Once the magnitude of Pan-Germanism dawned on the English and French diplomats, once they became aware of the lengths to which Germany was willing to go, they realized the necessity of strengthening their position, and therefore made overtures to the United States, which resulted, probably before the summer of the year 1897, in an understanding between the three countries. There seems to be no doubt whatever that no papers of any sort were signed, that no pledges were given which circumstances would not justify any one of the contracting parties in denying or possibly repudiating. Never- theless, an understanding was reached that in case of a war begun by Germany or Austria for the purpose of executing Pan-Germanism, the United States would promptly declare in favor of England and France and would do her utmost to assist them." — Roland G. Usher, Pan-Germanism, chap, x, p. 139.

71

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Columbia University, New York, has often been called into consultation as an adviser on foreign relations by the State Department at Washington, since he had a knowledge possessed by few other Americans on international questions affecting the United States. Professor Usher, in his book pub- lished in 191 3, made known, for the first time, the existence and contents of an ^'agreement" or "secret treaty" between England, America, and France, dating from the spring of 1897. In this it was agreed that, in case Germany or Austria, or both of them, should begin a war for the sake of "Pan- Gerrnanism," the United States should at once declare in favor of England and France and go to the support of these powers with all its resources. Professor Usher cites at length all the reasons, including those of a colonial character, which inevitably imposed upon the United States the necessity of taking part, on the side of England and France, in a war against Germany, which Professor Usher, in 1913, prophesied as imminent!!

The unknown author of The Problem of Japan went to the trouble of publishing in tabulated form the agreements between England, France, and America in 1897, in order thereby to show, in a way easily understood, the extent of the recipro- cal obligations. This chapter is extraordinarily worth reading; it gives a good glimpse into the preliminary history and preparation of the World War on the part of the Entente, which even at that time was uniting against Germany,

72

HOHENLOHE

although not yet appearing under the name of Entente Cordiale. The ex-diplomat remarks in this connection :

Here is a treaty that Professor Usher alleges to have been entered into as long ago as 1897, in which every phase of activity and participation in future events by England, France, and the United States is provided for, including the conquest of the Spanish de- pendencies, control over Mexico and Central America, the opening of China, and the annexation of coaling stations. And all these measures Professor Usher wishes us to believe were taken to defend the world against Pan-Germanism.

It is unnecessary to remind Professor Usher, or anybody else, for that matter, that Pan-Germanism, if we go so far as to assume that such a thing actually exists, had certainly never been heard of in 1897, which time Germany had not yet adopted her program for naval construction on a large scale, the same hav- ing been bruited for the first time in 1898. If, there- fore, it is true that England, France, and the United States harbored the mutual designs imputed to them by Professor Usher, and entered into an alliance to accomplish them, it will scarcely do to attribute the conception of the idea and the stimulus to its con- summation to so feeble a pretext as the rise of a Pan- Germanism. ^

Thus the ex-diplomat.

This is truly amazing. A definite treaty of par- tition directed against Spain, Germany, etc., ar- ranged even to minute details, was planned be- tween Gauls and Anglo-Saxons, in a time of the profoundest peace, and concluded without the

1 The Problem af Japan, by an Ex-Counselor of Legation in the Far East, chap, viii, p. 136, note. Published by C. L. Langenhuysen, Amsterdam and Rotterdam. 1918.

73

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

slightest twinge of conscience, in order to anni- hilate Germany and Austria and eliminate their competition from the world market! Seventeen years before the beginning of the World War this treaty was made by the united Anglo-Saxons and its goal was systematically envisaged throughout this entire period! Now one can understand the ease with which King Edward VII could pursue his policy of encirclement; for years the principal actors had been united and in readiness. When he christened the compact ^'Entente Cordiale," its appearance was for the world, especially for Ger- many, an unpleasant novelty, but in the countries on the other side it was merely the official acknowl- edgment of facts long known there.

In view of this agreement, one can understand also the opposition of England in 1897 to an agree- ment with Germany regarding coaling stations, and the anger aroused because Germany managed, in agreement with Russia, to gain a firm foothold in China, concerning the exploitation of which land without German participation a tripartite treaty had already been made.

Usher talked out of school and conclusively proved at whose door lies the guilt for the World War. The treaty directed against Germany — sometimes called the "gentleman's agreement" — of the spring of 1897, is the basis, the point of de- parture, for this war, which was systematically de- veloped by the Entente countries for seventeen years. When they had succeeded in winning over Russia and Japan likewise for their purposes, they

74

I

HOHENLOHE

struck the blow, after Serbia had staged the Sara- jevo murder and had thus touched the match to the carefully filled powder barrel.

Professor Usher's statements are likewise a com- plete refutation of all those who were impelled, during the war, to find the reason for the entry of the United States in certain military acts on the part of Germany, as, for instance, the Lusitania case, the expansion of U-boat warfare, etc. None of that is right. The recently published, excellent book of John Kenneth Turner, Shall It Be Again? points out, on the basis of convincing proofs, that Wilson's alleged reasons for going to war and war aims were not the real ones. America — or rather President Wilson — was resolved probably from the start, certainly from 191 5, to range herself against Germany and to fight. She did the latter, alleging the U-boat warfare as a pretext, in reality under the influence of powerful financial groups, and yielding to the pressure and prayers of her partner, France, whose resources in man power were becoming more and more exhausted. Amer- ica did not wish to leave a weakened France along with England, whose annexation designs on Calais, Dunkirk, etc., were well known to her.

It was a fateful thing for Germany — let this be stated here, in a general way — that our Foreign OflSce was unable to meet the broad policy of encirclement of England and the cunning of Rus- sia and France with an equal degree of diplomatic skill. This was partly because it had not really been trained under Prince Bismarck; and there-

75

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

fore when, after the retirement of the Prince and Count Herbert, the all-dominating will and spirit were lacking, it was not up to the task of con- ducting foreign affairs on its own independent initiative.

Moreover, it is difficult in Germany to train up good diplomats, since our people lack the taste and endowment for diplomacy which have shone forth brilliantly only from a few German minds, like Frederick the Great and Bismarck. Unfavorable also to the Foreign Office were the very frequent changes of Secretaries of State. Imperial Chan- cellors, following the example of Bismarck, main- tained their influence upon the Foreign Office and suggested the Secretaries of State who should direct its affairs. I acquiesced in the proposals of the Imperial Chancellors as to these posts, since I admitted their right to choose themselves their leading collaborators in the domain of foreign affairs. That these frequent changes were not cal- culated to work toward the continuity of political policy was a disadvantage that had to be taken into account.

The Foreign Office was largely influenced by the axiom : "No disagreeable quarrels with other powers" — "surtout pas d'histoires" ("above all, no yarns"), as the French general said to a company of soldiers which, he had heard, wished to mutiny. One of the Secretaries of State told me once when, in placing some matter before me, I had called his attention to the apparently serious situation in con- nection with some foreign question, that this simply

76

HOHENLOHE

must be righted, that the Foreign Ofiice based its acts primarily upon the maxim: ^Xet us have quiet."

Given this attitude, one can also understand the answer which the German representative gave to a German merchant in a South American republic who had asked him for help and intercession with the authorities, since his shop had been plundered and his property stolen: "Oh, don't bother me with these things! We have established such pleasant relations with this republic; any action undertaken in your behalf would only serve to up- set them." I need scarcely add that whenever such a conception of duty came to my attention I re- moved the official concerned from his post.

The Foreign Office enjoyed general unpopularity both among the people and in the army. I worked continuously, during the tenure of office of various Chancellors, for thorough reform, but in vain. Every new Chancellor, especially if he himself did not come from the ranks of the foreign service, needed the Foreign Office in order to work himself into foreign affairs, and this took time. But once he had worked himself in he was under obligation to the officials, and was reluctant to make extensive changes, burdened as he was by other matters and lacking detailed knowledge regarding the Foreign Office personnel, particularly as he still believed that he needed the advice of thosewho were^orientated."

DEVELOPMENT OF TSING-TAO

But let us return to Tsing-tao. Here everything was done to promote commerce and industry, and

77

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

done jointly with the Chinese; the flag of the Chi- nese Empire, moreover, was hoisted over the Cus- tom House at Tsing-tao. The development there was such^that the port, during the years immedi- ately preceding the war, ranked sixth among all Chinese trading centers in the commercial register of the great Chinese merchants and of the mer- chants' guild coming just after Tientsin. Tsing-tao was a prospering German commercial colony, where many Chinese worked side by side with Ger- mans; it was, so to speak, a great sample ware- house of German abilities and German achieve- ments, to which the Chinese, who formerly had not known Germany, her capabilities of achieve- ment, or her products, could repair for selec- tion and emulation ; it was a contrast to the naval stations of Russia and England, which were purely military, directed solely toward domination and conquest.

The rapid rise of Tsing-tao as a trading center aroused the envy of the Japanese and English, but this did not prevent swarms of the latter from journeying, with their families, to the splendid beach, enjoying its cool air and the beautiful Strand Hotel, and devoting themselves to playing polo and lawn tennis after they had escaped from the heat of Hongkong, Canton, and Shanghai. Envy prompted England in 1914 to demand that Japan should take Tsing-tao, although it was de facto Chinese. Japan did this joyfully, promis- ing to return it to China, but it was not returned until the beginning of 1922, after much pressure,

78

HOHENLOHE

although Japan had agreed with America that she was not to be allowed to make any territorial changes in China without previous consultation with Washington.

Thus a great German cultural work in foreign lands, which stood as a model of the method and manner which a cultured nation should employ in extending the advantages of its culture to another nation, was annihilated by English commercial envy. Some day, when Hongkong has gone the same way, England will repent of her act and bit- terly reproach herself for having abandoned her old maxim, in accordance with which she has acted for so many years : "White men together against colored men." When once Japan has made a real- ity out of her watchword, "Asia for the Asiatics," and brought China and India under her sway, England will cast her eyes about in search of Ger- many and the German fleet.

As to the "yellow peril," I had the following interview with the Tsar later, after the Russo- Japanese War, at a meeting between us.

The Tsar was, at that time, visibly impressed by the growing power of Japan and its constant menace to Russia and Europe, and requested my opinion concerning this. I answered that if the Russians counted themselves among the cultured nations of Europe they must be ready to rally to the defense of these nations against the "yellow peril" and to fight for and by the side of Europe for their own and Europe's existence and culture; But that if the Russians, on the other hand, con-

79

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

sidered themselves Asiatics they would unite with the ^^yellow peril," and, joining forces with it, would assail Europe. The Tsar, said I, must bear this in mind in providing for the defense of his land and organizing his army.

When the Tsar asked me what course I thought the Russians would take, I replied : ^The second."

The Tsar was outraged and wished to know at once on what I based this opinion. I answered that my opinion was based on Russia's construction \ . of railways and on the arraying of the Russian army along the Prussian-Austrian frontier. Thereupon the Tsar protested that he and his house were Europeans, that his country and his Russians would certainly cleave to Europe, that he would look upon it as a matter of honor to protect Europe from the "yellow men." To this I replied that if this was the Tsar's attitude he must make his mili- tary preparations conform to it without delay. The Tsar said nothing.

At all events, I sought to utilize Tsar Nicholas II's worry at the growing power of Japan to the advantage of Germany and general European cul- ture. Russia, despite siding with Japan, was the first nation to collapse among all those participat- ing in the war.

REPROACHES FOR JAPAN

The able statesmen of Japan, of whom there are quite a number, must be in some doubt as to whether they ranged their country on the right side in the war. Yes, they will perhaps ask them-

80

HOHENLOHE

selves whether it would not have been more advan- tageous for Japan to have prevented the World War. This would have been within her powers, had she ranged herself firmly and unequivocally on the side of the Central Powers, from which in former times she had learned so willingly and so much.

Had Japan adopted soon enough such an orien- tation in her foreign policy, and, like Germany, fought by peaceful means for her share in world trade and activity, I should have put the "yellow peril" away in a corner and joyfully welcomed into the circle of peacefully inclined nations the pro- gressive Japanese nation, the "Prussians of the East." Nobody regrets more than I that the "yellow peril" had not already lost its meaning when the crisis of 1914 arose. The experience derived from the World War may yet bring this about.

Germany's joint action with France and Russia at Shimonoseki was based upon Germany's situa- tion in Europe. Wedged in between on-marching Russia, threatening Prussia's frontier, and France, fortifying her borders anew with forts and groups of fortresses, confronted with a friendship between these two nations resembling an alliance, Berlin looked with anxiety into the future. The warlike preparations of the two powers were far ahead of ours, their navies far more modern and powerful than the German navy, which consisted of a few old ships almost without fighting value. There- fore it seemed to us wise to acquiesce in the sugges-

81

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

tion of this strong group, in order that it might not — should we decline — turn immediately to Eng- land and cause the entry of the latter into the com- bination. This would have meant the formation, at that time, of the combination of 19 14, which would have been a serious matter for Germany. Japan, on the other hand, was about to go over anyhow to England, in her sympathies. More- over, Germany's making common cause with the Franco-Russian group offered the possibility of achieving gradually a more trusting and less strained relationship in Europe and of living side by side with our two neighbors there in more friendliness, as a result of the common policy adopted in the Far East. The policy adopted by us at this juncture was also consistently based on the maintenance of world peace.

In the entire Kiao-Chau question, Prince Ho- henlohe, despite his age, evinced a capacity for sticking steadily to his purpose and a degree of resolution which must be reckoned as greatly to his credit.

Unfortunately in the matter of the Kruger dis- patch his prudence and his vision, so clear on other occasions, abandoned him : only by so assuming is his obstinate insistence on the sending of this dis- patch to be understood. The influence of such an energetic and eloquent personage as Herr von Mar- schall, former State Attorney, may have been so powerful, the siren song of Herr von Holstein so convincing, that the Prince yielded to them. In any event, he did his country an ill turn in this

82

HOHENLOHE

matter, and damaged me seriously both in Eng- land and at home.

THE KRUGER TELEGRAM i

Since the so-called Kruger dispatch made a big stir and had serious political consequences, I shall tell the story of it in detail.

The Jameson raid caused great and increasing excitement in Germany. The German nation was outraged at this attempt to overpower a little na- tion, which was Dutch — and, hence. Lower Saxon- German in origin — and to which we were sym- pathetic because of racial relationship. I was much worried at this violent excitement, which also seized upon the higher classes of society, fore- seeing possible complications with England. I be- lieved that there was no way to prevent England from conquering the Boer countries, should she so desire, although I also was convinced that such a conquest would be unjust. But I was unable to

1 Tremendous excitement was caused in England when the in- cident of the Kruger message became known. On January 3, 1896, the German Emperor telegraphed as follows to the President of the South African Republic:

"I congratulate you most sincerely on having succeeded, with your people, without calling on the help of foreign powers, by opposing your own force to an armed band which broke into your country to disturb the peace, in restoring quiet and in maintaining the inde- pendence of your country against external attack."

On January 6th, in conversation with Sir Frank Lascelles, Baron von Marschall protested against the view of the English press that it was an act of hostility against England and an encroachment on English rights for the German Emperor to congratulate the head of a friendly state on his victory over an armed band that had invaded his land in defiance of international law, and had been declared to be outside the pale of the law by the English Government itself. But it was not recorded that he disavowed the Kaiser's respon- sibility for it,

7 83

V

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

overcome the reigning excitement, and was even harshly fudged by my intimates on account of the attitude I adopted.

One day when I had gone to my uncle, the Im- perial Chancellor, for a conference, at which the Secretary of State for the Navy, Admiral Holl- mann, was present, Freiherr Marschall, one of the Secretaries of State, suddenly appeared in high excitement, with a sheet of paper in his hand. He declared that the excitement among the people — in the Reichstag, even— had grown to such propor- tions that it was absolutely necessary to give it out- ward expression, and that this could best be done by a telegram to Kruger, a rough draft of which he had in his hand.

I objected to this, being supported by Admiral Hollmann. At first the Imperial Chancellor re- mained passive in the debate. In view of the fact that I knew how ignorant Freiherr Marschall and the Foreign Office were of English national psy- chology, I sought to make clear to Freiherr Mar- schall the consequences which such a step would have among the English ; in this, likewise. Admiral Hollmann seconded me. But Marschall was not to be dissuaded.

Then, finally, the Imperial Chancellor took a hand. He remarked that I, as a constitutional ruler, must not stand out against the national con- sciousness and against my constitutional advisers; otherwise, there was danger that the excited atti- tude of the German people, deeply outraged in its sense of justice and also in its sympathy for the

84

HOHENLOHE

Dutch, might cause it to break down the barriers and turn against me personally. Already, he said, statements were flying about among the people ; it was being said that the Emperor was, after all, half an Englishman, with secret English sympathies; that he was entirely under the influence of his grandmother. Queen Victoria; that the dictation emanating from England must cease once for all ; that the Emperor must be freed from English tutelage, etc.

SAYS HE SIGNED AGAINST HIS WILL

In view of all this, he continued, it was his duty as Imperial Chancellor, notwithstanding he ad- mitted the justification of my objections, to insist that I sign the telegram in the general political interest, and, above all else, in the interest of my relationship to my people. He and also Herr von Marschall, he went on, in their capacity of my con- stitutional advisers, would assume full responsibil- ity for the telegram and its consequences.

Sir Valentine Chirol, at that time correspondent of the Times, wrote, in the Times of September nth, that Herr von Marschall, directly after the sending of the dispatch, had stated to him that the dispatch did not give the personal opinion of the Emperor, but was a governmental act, for which the Chancellor and he himself assumed full responsibility.

Admiral Hollmann, when the Imperial Chancel- lor appealed to him for corroboration of this point of view and was asked by him to uphold it to me,

85

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

declined to do so with the remark that the Anglo- Saxon world would unquestionably attribute the telegram to the Kaiser, since nobody would believe that such a provocative thing could come from His Majesty's elderly advisers, and all would consider it an "impulsive" act of the "youthful" Emperor.

Then I again tried to dissuade the gentlemen from their project. But the Imperial Chancellor and Marschall insisted that I sign, reiterating that they would be responsible for consequences. It seemed to me that I ought not to refuse after their presentation of the case. I signed.

Not long before his death Admiral HoUmann recalled the occurrence to me in full detail, as it is described here.

After the Kruger dispatch was made public the storm broke in England, as I had prophesied. I received from all circles of English society, espe- cially from aristocratic ladies unknown to me, a veritable flood of letters containing every possible kind of reproach, some of the writers not hesitat- ing even at slandering me personally and insulting me. Attacks and calumnies began to appear in the press, so that soon the legend of the origin of the dispatch was as firmly established as the amen at church. If Marschall had also announced in the Reichstag what he stated to Chirol, I personally ^ would not have been drawn into the matter to such an extent.

In February, 1900, while the Boer War was in progress and while I was with the fleet at Heligo- land attending the maneuvers of ships of the line,

86

HOHENLOHE

after having been present at the swearing in of re- cruits at Wilhelmshafen I received news by tele- graph from the Wilhelmstrasse, via Heligoland, that Russia and France had proposed to Germany to make a joint attack on England, now that she was involved elsewhere, and cripple her sea traf- fic. I objected and ordered that the proposal be declined.

Since I assumed that Paris and St. Petersburg would present the matter at London in such a way as to make it appear that Berlin had made the above proposal to both of them, I immediately telegraphed from Heligoland to Queen Victoria and to the Prince of Wales (Edward) the fact of the Russo-French proposal, and its refusal by me. The Queen answered expressing her hearty thanks, the Prince of Wales with an expression of astonishment.

Later, Her Majesty let me know secretly that, shortly before the receipt of my telegram from Heligoland concerning the proposal from Paris and St. Petersburg, the false version of the matter foreseen by me had indeed been told, and that she was glad to have been able, thanks to my dispatch, to expose the intrigue to her Government and quiet it as to the loyal attitude of Germany; she added that she would not forget the service I had done England in troublous times.

DEAL WITH CECIL RHODES

When Cecil Rhodes came to me, in order to bring about the construction of the Cape-to-Cairo

87

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Railway and Telegraph line through the interior regions of German East Africa, his wishes were approved by me, in agreement with the Foreign Office and the Imperial Chancellor; with the pro- viso that a branch railway should be built via Tabora, and that German material should be used in the construction work on German territory. Both conditions were acquiesced in by Rhodes most willingly. He was grateful at the fulfillment of his pet ambition by Germany, only a short time after King Leopold of Belgium had refused his request.

Rhodes was full of admiration for Berlin and the tremendous German industrial plants, which he visited daily. He said that he regretted not having been in Berlin before, in order to have learned about the power and efficiency of Ger- many, and to have got into touch with the German Government and prominent Germans in commer- cial circles. He said he had wished, even before the Jameson raid, to visit Berlin, but had been pre- vented in London at that time from so doing; that, had he been able to inform us before of his plan to get permission to build the Cape-to-Cairo line through the Boer countries, as well as through our colonies, the German Government would probably have been able to help him by bringing persuasion to bear upon Kruger, who was unwilling to grant this permission; that "the stupid Jameson Raid" would never have been made, in that case, and the Kruger dispatch never written — as to that dispatch, he had never borne me a grudge on account of it.

88

HOHENLOHE

He added that as we, in Germany, could not be correctly informed as to aim and actual purposes, the said raid must have looked to us like "an act of piracy," which naturally and quite rightly had excited the Germans ; that all he had wanted was to have such stretches of land as were needed for his rail lines — such, in fact, as Germany had just granted to him in the interior of her colonies — a demand which was not unjust and would certainly have met with German support. I was not to worry, he added, about the dispatch and not bother myself any more about the uproar in the English press. Rhodes did not know about the origin of the Kruger dispatch and wanted to console me, imagining that I was its originator.

Rhodes went on to advise me to build the Bag- dad Railway and open up Mesopotamia, after having had irrigation simultaneously introduced there. He said that this was Germany's task, just as his was the Cape-to-Cairo line. In view of the fact that the building of this line through our terri- tory was also made dependent upon the cession to us of the Samoan Islands, Rhodes worked actively in London toward having them turned over to us.

In home politics, Prince Hohenlohe, as Chan- cellor, showed a mildness which was not generally favorable. Owing to his long acquaintanceship with Herr von Hertling, he was able to establish friendly relations with the Vatican. His mildness and indulgence were also exercised toward Alsace- Lorraine, in which, as an expert of long standing, he showed particular interest. But he got little

89

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

thanks for this, since the French element, indirectly benefited thereby, behaved with ever-increasing arrogance.

PEN SKETCH OF HOHENLOHE

Prince Hohenlohe loved to employ mediation, compromise, and conciliation — toward the Social- ists likewise — and he employed them on some occa- sions when energetic measures would have been more fitting. He hailed with much joy my Far East trip to Constantinople and Jerusalem. He was pleased at the strengthening of our relations with Turkey and considered the plan for the Bag- dad Railway arising from them as a great cultural work worthy of Germany.

He also gave his most enthusiastic approval to my visit to England in 1899, made by me with my wife and two sons at the desire of my royal grand- mother, who, growing steadily weaker on account of her years, wished to see her oldest grandson once more. He hoped that this journey might serve to efface somewhat the consequences of the Kruger dispatch sent by him, and also to clarify some im- portant questions by means of conferences between me and English statesmen.

In order to avoid any unpleasantness from the English press, which, angered by the Boer War and the partly unjustified attacks of certain Ger- man newspapers, had been answering in like tone, the Queen had commissioned the author of The Life of the Prince Consort, Sir Theodore Martin, to inform the English press of Her Majesty's desire

90

HOHENLOHE

that a friendly reception be accorded to her Im- perial grandson. And that is what indeed came to pass. The visit ran its course harmoniously and caused satisfaction on all sides. I held important conferences with various leading men.

Not once in the entire visit was the Kruger dis- patch mentioned. On the other hand, my royal grandmother did not conceal from her grandson how unwelcome the whole Boer War was to her; she made no secret of her disapproval and aversion for Mr. Chamberlain and all that he represented, and. thanked me again for my prompt and sharp refusal of the Russo-French proposal to interfere and for my immediate announcement of this pro- posal. One could easily see how much the Queen loved her splendid army and how deeply she had been grieved by the heavy reverses suffered by it at the outset of the war, which had caused by no means negligible losses. Referring to these, the aged Field Marshal Duke of Cambridge coined the fine phrase : "The British nobleman and officer have shown that they can die bravely as gentlemen."

On my departure, the Queen bade me farewell with cordial and grateful greetings to her "much- cherished cousin," the Imperial Chancellor, whose ability and experience, she hoped, would continue to maintain good relations between our two countries.

My report entirely satisfied Prince Hohenlohc as to the success of my journey; at the same time, however, I was the object of the most violent

91

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

attacks from a certain section of the press and from many excited ^'friends of the Boers." The German lacks the very thing with which the English peo- ple has been inoculated, and to which it has been trained by long political self -discipline : when a fight is on, even though it be merely upon the field of diplomacy, the Englishman unquestioningly fol- lows the flag, in accordance with the proverb: "You can't change the jockey while running."

In the autumn of 1900 Prince Hohenlohe re- tired from the Chancellorship, since the work had become too arduous for a man of his advanced age. Moreover, the constant quarrels and disputes of the political parties with one another were dis- agreeable to him, and it went against the grain with him to make speeches before them in the Reichstag. Equally disagreeable to him was the press, part of which had taken the bit between its teeth and imagined that it could conserve the Bismarckian tradition by quoting sayings by Bismarck, and had greatly jeopardized relations with England, espe- cially during the Boer War.

CHANCELLOR'S RETIREMENT

The hope, aroused by the choice of Prince Ho- henlohe as Chancellor and his assumption of the office, that Prince Bismarck would place less obstacles in his path, had been only partly fulfilled. The atmosphere had been much relieved and Prince Bismarck brought to a much milder frame of mind by my reconciliation with him, which had received outward expression in his solemn entry

92

HOHENLOHE

into Berlin and his staying at the old HohenzoUern palace, but his adherents and those rallying around him for the sake of opposition were not to be dis- suaded from their activities. Moreover, the politi- cal representatives of the people succeeded, while I was on my way to Friedrichsruh to celebrate Bismarck's eightieth birthday, in refusing to pay homage to the old Imperial Chancellor, a thing which naturally deeply hurt the sensitive Prince Hohenlohe and filled him with indignation.

He, like myself, was deeply moved by the death of his great predecessor, and we, together with the German people, sincerely mourned Prince Bis- marck as one of the greatest of the sons of Prussia and Germany, in spite of the fact that he had not always made our task easy. I insisted upon hurrying back from my trip to Norway in order to pay honor to him who, as a faithful servant of his old master, had helped the German nation to unity, and under whom I, when I was Prince, had had the proud privilege of working.

It is said that one of the reasons why Prince Hohenlohe retired from his post was the advice of his son Alexander, who was much at his father's house; he was known in society as "the Crown Prince," and was essentially different from his lovable father.

Prince Hohenlohe could look back upon a series of successes during his term as Chancellor: the overcoming of the disputes concerning the "Citi- zens' Book of Laws," the reform of the military punishment procedure, the Naval law, the appoint-

93

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

ment of Waldersee to the command in China at the time of the Boxer War, Tsing-tao, and the Yangste Treaty. ?

He bade me farewell on the 15th of October, 1900. Both of us were greatly moved, for not only was the Chancellor and faithful co-worker parting from his Emperor, but also the uncle from his nephew, who looked up with grateful esteem to the old man. At the age of seventy-five years — an age when others have long since retired to rest and contemplation — he had not hesitated to obey the summons of the Emperor to subject himself to even more exacting labors and devote his time and strength to the German fatherland. When about to leave my room, he grasped my hand once again with the request that I might grant him, during the years of life still remaining to him (which he meant to spend in Berlin), the same plain, faithful friendship which he had so long noted and admired between me and Admiral von Hollmann. I shall always preserve him faithfully in my memory.

94

CHAPTER IV

Billow

,N the day after Prince Hohenlohe's farewell,

V^_^ the man summoned by me as his successor — Count Billow, Secretary of State for Foreign Af- fairs, arrived. His choice for the post was emi- nently fitting, because he was thoroughly cognizant of our foreign policy and, especially, of our rela- tions with England — which policy was becoming constantly livelier and more complicated — and be- cause he had already proved himself a skillful orator and ready debater in the Reichstag. The fact that the second of these qualities was lacking in his predecessor had often been painfully notice- able. When Prince Hohenlohe's intention to re- tire became known in the Imperial Council, the Bavarian ambassador at Berlin, Count Lerchen- feld, very pointedly remarked to me that for Heaven's sake I was not to choose another South German, since South Germans were not fitted for the leading post at Berlin ; North Germans were naturally better able to fill it and, therefore, it would be better for the Empire to select a North German.

I had been acquainted personally with Biilow

95

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

for a long time, ever since the period of his ambas- sadorship at Rome and his work as Secretary of State. Then I had often visited him at his home and had held many a conference with him in his garden. He came into closer relationship with me when he accompanied me on my journey to the Far East, where, in co-operation with the ambas- sador, Freiherr Marschall, he assisted me in get- ting into personal touch with the leading men of the Turkish Government. Hence, the relations of the new Chancellor with me were already begun and, to a certain extent, established, since we had for years discussed all political problems and spheres. Moreover, he stood much nearer to me in age than his predecessors, most of whom could have been my grandfather. He was the first "young Chancellor" of Germany. And this made our common task easier for both of us.

When I was in Berlin, scarcely a day went by without my taking a long morning walk with the Chancellor in the garden of the Imperial Chan- cellor's palace, during which outstanding business was cleared up and problems of actuality discussed. I often had a meal with him and always found at his table, where I was most hospitably received by the Count, his amiable wife and a group of the most interesting men, in choosing whom the Count was a master. He was likewise unsurpassed in skillfully conducting conversation and in the witty handling of the various topics that arose. To me it was always a pleasure to be in the company of the Chancellor and enjoy his bubbling wit, to

96

/

BULOW

exchange views at his table with many professors, savants, and artists, as well as Government officials of all sorts, in informal, unofficial intercourse and stimulating exchange of ideas.

The Count was an excellent narrator of anec- dotes, drawn both from books and his own personal experience, which he told in several languages. He liked to tell stories of the days when he was a diplo- mat, especially about his stay at St. Petersburg.

BULOW A DISCIPLE OF BISMARCK

The Count's father was an intimate friend of Prince Bismarck and had been one of his closest co-workers. Young Biilow also had begun his career under the great Chancellor; he had been brought up on Bismarckian ideas and traditions and strongly influenced by them, but, nevertheless, had not adhered to them to such an extent as to lose his independence.

In the course of one of the first talks which I had with Biilow as Imperial Chancellor he in- formed himself concerning my ideas of how best to handle the English and have dealings with them. I told him that I considered absolute frankness the most important thing in dealing with England and Englishmen; that the Englishman, in pre- senting his point of view and working for his in- terests, was inconsiderate to the point of brutality, for which reason he thoroughly understood any- body who acted similarly toward him ; that there must be no playing the diplomatic game, or "finess- ing," with an Englishman, because it made him

97

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

distrust those with whom he was dealing and sus- pect that they were not honest and wished secretly to cheat him ; that such devious methods could be successful only in dealing with Latin and Slavic nations; that, once the Englishman had become suspicious, there was nothing more to be done with him, despite the most honeyed words and most obliging concessions ; that the only advice, there- fore, which I could give the Chancellor was that he confine himself entirely to straightforwardness in his English policy. I said this with particular emphasis, since "finessing" was especially dear to the diplomatic character of Count Biilow and had become second nature to him.

I also took occasion, during this talk, to warn the Chancellor against Holstein. In spite of my warning — which was merely a repetition of that given me before by Bismarck — Biilow worked a great deal, or was obliged to work, with Holstein. This remarkable man had been able gradually, especially since the time that the Foreign Office had been, so to speak, orphaned by Bismarck's re- tirement, to create for himself a position that be- came steadily more influential and to maintain it under three Chancellors with such skill that he was considered indispensable.

Holstein was unquestionably possessed of great shrewdness, seconded by a phenomenal memory and a certain talent for political combinations, which, to be sure, often became a hobby in his case. His position was also based largely on the fact that he was looked upon in many quarters, especially

98

BULOW

among the older officials, as the "bearer of the Bismarckian traditions/' the man who upheld these in the teeth of '^the young master." His importance rested, above all, on his wide personal knowledge in the entire domain of the foreign service. Since he wielded, on account of this, an authoritative influence on all proposals relative to the appoint- ment of officials and hence, also, on the careers of the younger officials, it may be easily under- stood why he, little by little, had obtained for him- self a dominating position at the Foreign Office. But he sought more and more to obtain, at the same time, a decisive influence upon the conduct of foreign policy; he had, in fact, become the guid- ing spirit both of the Foreign Office and of Ger- man foreign policy.

HOLSTEIN'S SECRET POWER

The serious thing about this was that he exerted his far-reaching influence entirely from under cover and avoided all official responsibility as an adviser. He preferred to remain in the dark and exert his influence from there. He refused every responsible post — many stood open to him — every honorary title, every promotion. He lived in com- plete seclusion. For a long time I tried in vain to become personally acquainted with him, for which purpose I used to invite him to meals, but Holstein declined every time. Only once, in the course of many years, did he consent to dine with me at the Foreign Office, and it was characteristic of him that, whereas on this occasion all the other s 99

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

gentlemen present wore full evening dress, he ap- peared in a frock coat and excused himself on the plea that he had no dress coat.

The secrecy with which he surrounded himself in his work, so as not to be held responsible for it, became apparent also at times in the character of the memorials drawn up by him; they were un- questionably ingenious and attractive, but often as involved and ambiguous as the oracle of Delphi; there were occasions when, after a decision had been made based on the contents of one of these documents, Herr von Holstein would prove to a nicety that he meant exactly the opposite of what had been thought.

I considered it a serious matter that an irre- sponsible counselor should bring to bear such powerful influence, especially as he did so from under cover and, hence, in doing it, eluded the offi- cials who were in duty bound to exert influence, and who were the responsible parties. Often, es- pecially in the von Richthofen era, it happened that I would advise a foreign ambassador to discuss some political question, which he had taken up with me, with the Secretary of State, and he would reply: "J'en parlerai avec mon ami Holstein" ("I shall speak about it with my friend Holstein") . The fact alone that an official of the Foreign Office dealt with foreign ambassadors, going over the head of his superior, did not seem right to me; but that he should be dubbed by these foreigners "friend" seemed to me to go beyond what I deemed advisable.

ICO

BULOW

Matters had, in fact, developed gradually to such a stage that Holstein conducted a good part of our foreign affairs. To be sure, he still listened to the Chancellor in connection with them, but what the Emperor thought or said about foreign affairs was rather unimportant? If things turned out successfully, the Foreign Office reaped the reward; if things went wrong, then it was the fault of the "impulsive young master."

In spite of all this, Biilow, too, apparently thought Herr von Holstein indispensable at first; he worked together with him for a long time, until at last he, too, found unbearable the pressure which this strange man exerted on everybody. To Herr von Tschirschky, during his tenure of office as Sec- retary of State, belongs the merit of finally bring- ing the unendurable situation to a head. On being questioned by me, he declared that he considered it impossible that Herr von Holstein remain at his post any longer, since he was embroiling the whole Foreign Office, seeking to eliminate him, the Secre- tary of State, entirely, and creating all kinds of obstacles, likewise, for the Chancellor.

DISMISSAL— AND AN ENEMY

Thereupon I ordered Herr von Tschirschky to prepare the way for the dismissal of Herr von Holstein, which afterward took place, with the approval of the Chancellor, after the latter had recovered from the serious break-down in health which he had suffered meanwhile. Herr von Hol- stein himself showed what manner of man he was

lOI

/

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

6y going at once after his dismissal to Herr Harden and placing himself at the latter's disposal for the campaign against the Emperor.

The year 1901 gave Count Biilow plentiful op- portunities to show and assert himself in dealings with England. Count Biilow still believed strongly in the Bismarckian theory of having "two irons in the fire" — L e,, in making friendly agreements with another country while always remaining on good terms with Russia — in which he received support from the many pretended adherents of Bismarck.

From the midst of the Jubilee celebration of the two hundredth coronation anniversary, I was called to the deathbed of my grandmother, Queen Vic- toria, by a dispatch announcing to me the serious condition of the Queen. I hurriedly made the journey with my uncle, the Duke of Connaught, who was at Berlin as the Queen's representative at the festivities — he was the favorite son of the Queen and my particular friend, and a son-in-law of Prince Frederick Charles — and I was cordially received in London by the then Prince of Wales and the royal family. As my carriage drove out at a trot from the railway station a plainly dressed man stepped forward from the closely packed crowd standing there in absolute silence, to the side of the carriage, bared his head, and said: "Thank you, Kaiser." The Prince of Wales, later Edward VII, added : "That is what they all think, and they will never forget this coming of yours."

Nevertheless, they did forget it, and quickly.

102

BULOW

After the Queen had quietly breathed her last in my arms, the curtain fell for me upon many memo- ries of childhood. Her death signified the close of an epoch in English history and in Germany's re- lations with England. I now got into touch, as far as possible, with prominent personages, and noted everywhere a thoroughly sympathetic, friendly spirit, which made no secret of the wish for good relations with Germany.

At the farewell banquet impromptu speeches were made by King Edward VII and myself, which were cordial in tone and content, and did not fail to make an impression on their hearers. After the meal the English ambassador at Berlin clasped my hand and said that my speech had touched all his fellow countrymen's hearts, because what I said was sincere and simple, as was fitting for Englishmen ; that the speech must at once be made public, since it would have an effect through out the country, which was grateful for my com- ing; and that this would be useful to the relations between the two countries. I answered that it was a matter for the British Government and the King to decide, that personally I had no objections to having the speech made public.

Nevertheless, it was not made public, and the British people never learned of my words, which were the sincere expression of my sentiments and thoughts. In another talk later on with me at Berlin the same ambassador deeply regretted this, but was unable to say what the reason was for this omission.

103

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

In concluding my remarks on my stay in Eng- land I cannot pass over the fact that a portion of the German press was unfortunately lacking both in tactful appreciation of the grief of the English royal family and people, as well as of the obliga- tions which my family relationship and political considerations imposed upon me.

After my return home from England I was able to report to the Chancellor on the good impres- sions I had received, and particularly that opinion in England was apparently in favor of an under- standing and of closer relations.

Billow expressed himself as satisfied with the results of the journey, after we had talked at length about it at Homburg, and consulted as to how the situation created by the journey should be put to use. I suggested that we should unquestionably come to a good agreement, if an alliance — ^which I preferred — could not be brought about In any event, a firm agreement would suffice, I said, and would suit the English ; in the long run an alliance; might always develop from it.

The opportunity for such an alliance came with unexpected promptness. While I was at Homburg von der Hohe in the spring of 1901, Count Metter- nich, who was with me as representative of the Foreign Office, brought me a notification from Berlin that Mr. Chamberlain had inquired there as to whether Germany was ready for an alliance with England. I immediately asked: "Against whom?"— since, if England so suddenly offered to make an alliance in the midst of peace, it was plain

104

BULOW

that she needed the German army, which made it worth while to find out against whom the army was needed and for what reason German troops were to fight, at England's behest, by her side. Thereupon the answer came from London that they were needed against Russia, since Russia was a menace both to India and to Constantinople.

The first thing I did was to call London's atten- tion to the old traditional brotherhood-in-arms be- tween the German and Russian armies, and the close family ties between the reigning dynasties of the two countries ; in addition,* I pointed out the dangers of a war on two fronts, in case France came in on the side of Russia, and also the fact that we had acted jointly with France and Russia in the Far East (Shimonoseki, 1895) and that there was no reason to unloose a conflict with Russia at this time, when we were in the midst of peace; that the superiority in number of the Russian army on a peace footing was very great and the eastern frontiers of Prussia seriously threatened by the grouping of the Russian forces; that England would not be in a position to protect our eastern province from a Russian attack, since her fleet could accomplish little in the Baltic and would be unable to sail into the Black Sea ; that, in case of our making common cause against Russia, Ger- many would be the only one who would be in great danger, quite independently of the possibility of the entry of France into the fight.

Chamberlain then informed us that a firm alli-

105

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

ance should be made, by which England would naturally bind herself to come to our aid.

BRITISH ALLIANCE FAILS

I had also pointed out that the validity of an alliance could only be assured when the English Parliament had placed its approval upon it, since the Ministry might be driven from office by the will of the nation as expressed in Parliament, whereby signature of the Ministry might be rendered null and void and the alliance invalidated, and that we could look upon the Chamberlain suggestion, for the time being, merely as a purely personal project of his own.

To this Chamberlain replied that he would get backing from Parliament in due time and would find the way of winning the Unionists over to his idea; that all needed now was the signature of Berlin. Matters did not progress as far as that, because Parliament was not to be won over to Chamberlain's plan ; therefore the "plan'' came to nothing. Soon afterward England concluded her alliance with Japan (Hayashi). The Russo-Jap- anese War broke out, in which Japan — owing to the fact that it fitted in with her schemes — played the role of pawn for England's interests, which role had originally been reserved for Germany. By this war Russia was thrown from the east back to the west, where she might concern herself again with the Balkans, Constantinople, and India — which was to Japan's advantage — leaving to Japan a free hand in Korea and China.

io6

BULOW

In 1905 came my journey to Tangier, under- taken much against my will. It came about as fol- lows: Toward the end of March I intended, as in the previous year, to take a Mediterranean trip for the sake of my health, for which I proposed to avail myself of some ship running empty from Cuxhaven to Naples. The Hamburg was destined by Ballin for this purpose. At his request that I take along some other guests, since the steamer was quite empty, I invited a number of gentlemen, among them Privy Councilor Althoc, Admiral Mensing, Count Piickler, Ambassador von Varnbuhler, Pro- fessor Schiemann, Admiral Hollmann, etc.

Soon after the proposed trip became known Billow informed me that there was a strong desire at Lisbon to have me stop there and pay the Por- tuguese court a visit. To this I agreed. As the date of departure approached, Biilow expressed the additional wish that I also stop at Tangier and, by visiting that Moroccan port, strengthen the position of the Sultan of Morocco in relation to the French.

This I declined, since it seemed to me that the Morocco question was too full of explosive matter and I feared that such a visit would work out dis- advantageously rather than beneficially. Biilow returned to the attack, without, however, persuad- ing me of the necessity or advisability of the visit

AGAIN KAISER "GIVES IN"

During the journey I had several talks with Prciherr von Schoen, who accompanied me as rep-

107

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

resentative of the Foreign Office, as to the advis- ability of the visit. We agreed that it would be better to drop it. I telegraphed this decision to the Chancellor from Lisbon. Biilow replied em- phatically that I must take into consideration the view of the German people and of the Reichstag, which had become interested in the project, and that it was necessary that I stop at Tangier.

I gave in, with a heavy heart, for I feared that this visit, in view of the situation at Paris, might be construed as a provocation and cause an inclina- tion in London to support France in case of war. Since I suspected that Delcasse wished to make Morocco a pretext for war, I feared that he might make use of the Tangier visit for this purpose.

The visit took place, after much difficulty had been experienced in the open roadstead of Tangier, and it met with a certain amount of friendly par- ticipation by Italian and Southern French anar- chists, rogues, and adventurers. A lot of Spaniards stood upon a small square, amid waving banners and loud cries ; these, according to a police official who accompanied us, were an assembly of Spanish anarchists.

The first I learned about the consequences of my Tangier visit was when I got to Gibraltar and was formally and frigidly received by the English, in marked contrast to my cordial reception the year before. What I had foreseen was justified by the facts. Embitterment and anger reigned in Paris, and Delcasse tried to rouse the nation to war ; the only reason that he did not succeed was that both

io8

BULOW

the Minister of War and the Minister of the Navy declared France not yet ready.

The fact that my fears were justified was also corroborated later by the conversation between Delcasse and the editor of Le Gaulois, in which the Minister informed an astonished world that, in case of war, England would have sided with France. Thus, even as far back as that, I ran the risk, through the Tangier visit forced upon me, of getting blamed for the unchaining of a world war. To think and act constitutionally is often a hard task for a ruler upon whom in every case responsi- bility is finally saddled.

In October, 1905, the Paris Matin reported that Delcasse had declared in the Council of Ministers that England had offered, in case of war, to land 100,000 men in Holstein and seize the Kaiser Wil- helm Canal. This English offer was repeated once more later on, with the suggestion that it be af- firmed in writing. And the well-known Jaures, who was murdered in accordance with the political ideas of Isvolsky upon the outbreak of war in 1914, knew beforehand about the statements by Delcasse published in the Matin.

The downfall of Delcasse and the accession of Rouvier to his post are to be ascribed partly to the influence of the Prince of Monaco. During the regatta week at Kiel the Prince had assured him- self, by talks with me, the Imperial Chancellor, and Government officials, of the sincerity of our desire to compromise with France for the purpose of enabling us to live at peace with each other. He

109

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

stood well with the ambassador, Prince Radolin, and worked actively toward a rapprochement be- tween the two countries.

The Prince of Monaco himself was of the opin- ion that Delcasse was a menace to the maintenance of peace and hoped that he would soon fall and be replaced by Rouvier, who was a prudent politician thoroughly inclined to coming to an understanding with Germany. The Prince said that he was on good terms with Rouvier personally and would willingly place himself at the disposal of the Ger- man ambassador as a go-between.

NEGOTIATIONS FRUITLESS

Then came Delcasse's fall, and Rouvier became Minister. At once I caused the initiation of the measures wherein I could count upon the support of the Prince of Monaco. The Chancellor was instructed to prepare a rapprochement with France. And I particularly told Prince Radolin, who personally received his instructions in Ber- lin, to make good use of the Rouvier regime for the purpose of eliminating all possibilities of con- flict between the two countries. I added that the reports of the Prince of Monaco, with whom he was well acquainted, would be useful to him in relations with Rouvier. Prince Radolin proceeded with zeal and pleasure to the accomplishment of this worth-while task.

' At first the negotiations went well, so much so that I began to hope that the important goal would be attained and the evil impression caused by the

no

BULOW

Tangier visit effaced by an understanding. In the meantime, the negotiations concerning Morocco were continued ; they were concluded, after endless trouble, by the summoning of the Algeciras Con- ference, based upon the circular note of Prince Biilow, which pointed out that the Most-Favored- Nation Clause No. 17 of the Madrid Convention should remain in force and that the reforms in Morocco, for which France alone was working, should be carried out, in so far as necessary, only in agreement with the signatory powers of the Madrid Conference. These events, which riveted general attention upon themselves, relegated the special negotiations with Rouvier to the back- ground.

With regard to domestic policy, I had agreed with the Chancellor that his main task was to be the restoration of order in the relations between the parties in the Reichstag, which had got into a bad way under Hohenlohe, and, above all, to rally the Conservatives, who had been won over to the opposition by the Post-Bismarckians, once more to the support of the Government. The Chancellor accomplished this task with great patience and tenacity. He finally formed the famous ^^bloc," which arose from the great electoral defeat of the Socialists.

The Conservative party had many members who had direcf relations with the court, and also with me personally, so that it was easier for this party than for any other to become informed as to my plans in political and other matters and to discuss

III

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

my ideas with me before they took shape in proj- ects for laws. I have not the impression that this was done to the extent that was possible ; I might perhaps have come into agreement with the gentle- men, through informal conversations, in the ques- tion of the building of the Central Canal — op- posed, as is well known, by the Conservatives — as well as in the less important matters of the con- struction of the Cathedral and the Berlin Opera House, in which I was deeply interested for the sake of the Church and of art.

I am saying nothing new if I remark that it was by no means easy to deal with the gentlemen of the Conservative party. Through their traditional serv- ices to the state they had acquired great experi- ence and independence of judgment, and had thus formed firm political convictions, to which they held faithfully and in a genuinely conservative manner. From their ranks great statesmen, emi- nent Ministers, a brilliant officer corps, a model body of officials, had largely been produced. Therefore, the consciousness of their own merit was not without justification; in addition, their loyalty to their King was unshakable. The King and the country both owed them gratitude.

FINDS FAULT WITH CONSERVATIVES

Their weakness lay in the fact that they were at times too conservative — that is, they recognized too late the demands of the time and began by oppos- ing progress, although it might be progress advan- tageous to themselves. One may understand this in

BULOW

view of their past, but the fact remains that it worked to the detriment of their relations with me, especially during my reign, when the develop- ment of the JEcapire, particularly of industry and commerce, pushed rapidly forward; and I desired —and was obliged — to place no obstacles in the way of that development, but to promote it. When I said that it was not always easy, for the reasons adduced, to deal with the Conservatives, I am well aware that the same thing is maintained about me. Perhaps this is because I stood close to the Con- servatives on account of my traditions, but was not a Conservative for party reasons. I was and am, indeed, in favor of progressive conservatism, which preserves what is vital, rejects what is outworn, and accepts that portion of the new which is useful.

Let me add that in discussions I was able to endure the truth, even when it was uncomfortable and bitter, better than people are aware, provided it was told to me tactfully.

So that, when it is maintained that I and the Conservatives did not get along in dealings with each other, the same reason was at the root of the difficulty on both sides. It would have been better ito arrive oftener at an understanding with me in private conversations, for which I was always ready. And in the canal question, on which we could not agree, who was better qualified than the Conservative to understand arid appreciate the fact that I have never subscribed to the pretty couplet, "Unser Konig absolut, wenn er unseren Willen tut" ("Absolute our King may be, if he does what

113

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

we decree") ? For, had I acted according to that principle — a very comfortable one for me — the Conservatives, in view of their belief in a strong King who really governs, would logically have been forced to oppose me. Surely the Conserva- tives must have respected me for having matched their honorable axiom of manly pride before the thrones of Kings with mine of kingly pride before the Conservative party's throne, just as I did with regard to all other parties.

In any event, the occasional dififerences with the Conservative party and with individual Conserv- atives cannot make me forget the services rendered by men of this very party to the House of Hohen- zoUern, the Prussian 'state, and the German Empire.

Billow finally did the great trick of bringing Conservatives and Liberals together in Germany, thus getting a big majority for the parties siding with the Government. In doing so, the great abil- ities of the Chancellor, his skill, statecraft, and shrewd knowledge of men, shone forth most brilliantly. The great service rendered by him in achieving this success won him thorough apprecia- tion and gratitude from his country and fronl my- self; and, in addition, an increase of my trust in him. The boundless delight of the people of Berlin in the defeat of the Social Democrats at the polls led to the nocturnal demonstration, which I shall never forget, in front of my palace, in the course of which my automobile had to force a. way for itself, little by little, amid a cheering crowd of

H4

BtiLOW

many thousands surrounding it. The Lustgarten was packed with great multitudes of people, at whose tumultuous request the Empress and I had to appear on the balcony in order to receive their homage.

The Chancellor was present at the visit of King Edward VII to Kiel. Among the many guests was the former Chief Court Marshal of the Empress, Frederick, Count Seckendorff, long acquainted with Edward VII through his many visits to Eng- land, who reposed great trust in the Count. This gentleman, at the behest of Biilow, with whom he was friendly, arranged an interview between the King and the Chancellor.

It took place on board the royal English yacht after a breakfast to which I and the Chancellor were invited. Both gentlemen sat for a long time alone over their cigars. Afterward Biilow reported to me what had transpired at the interview. In discussing the possible conclusion of an alliance between Germany and England, the King, he told me, had stated that such a thing was not at all necessary in the case of our two countries, since there was no real cause for enmity or strife between them. This refusal to make an alliance was a plain sign of the English "policy of encirclement," which soon made itself felt clearly and disagreeably at the Algeciras Conference. The pro-French and anti-German attitude of England, which there came out into the open, was due to special orders from King Edward VII, who had sent Sir D. Mackenzie Wallace to Algeciras as his "super- 9 115

THE KAISER'S MEMQIRS

vising representative," equipped with personal instructions.

From hints given by the latter to his friends it turned out that it was the King's wish to oppose Germany strongly and support France at every opportunity. When it was pointed out to him that it might be possible, after all, to take up later with Germany this or that question and perhaps come to an understanding, he replied that, first of all came the Anglo-Russian agreement; that, once that was assured, an "arrangement" might be made with Germany also. The English "arrangement" con- sisted in the encirclement of Germany.

HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH BULOW

The relations between me and the Chancellor remained trustful and friendly throughout this period. He was present repeatedly at the Kiel regatta. Here, he found occasion, among other matters, to confer with the Prince of Monaco and a number of influential Frenchmen, who were guests aboard the Prince's yacht, among whom doubtless the most eminent was M. Jules Roche, the leading expert on European budgets, and a great admirer of Goethe. He always carried a copy of Faust in his pocket.

I In April, 1906, came the unfortunate collapse in the Reichstag of the overworked Chancellor. As soon as I received the news, I hurried there and was glad that Privy Councilor Renvers could give me encouraging news about Billow's condition. While the Prince was recuperating during the

116

BULOW

summer at Norderney, I went from Heligoland, which I had been inspecting, on a torpedo boat to the island and surprised the Chancellor and his wife at their villa. I spent the day in chatting with the Chancellor, who had already recovered his health to an encouraging degree and was browned by the sea air and sunlight.

In the late autumn of 1907 the Empress and I paid a visit to Windsor, at the invitation of King Edward VII. We were most cordially received by the English royal family and the visit went off harmoniously. After this visit I went for a rest to the castle of Highcliffe, belonging to General Stewart Worthley, situated on the south coast of England, opposite The Needles.

Before my departure for England, the Chancel- lor, who was much pleased at the English invita- tion, had long talks with me as to the best way for getting on a better footing with England, and had suggested to me a number of his desires and proj- ects, to serve me as guides in my conversations with Englishmen. During my visit I had frequent occasion to discuss the subjects agreed upon and conduct conversations as desired by the Chancellor. Cipher telegrams containing my reports on these conversations went regularly to Berlin and I re- peatedly received from the Chancellor approving telegrams. I used to show these after the evening meal to my intimates who accompanied me on my visit; these men, among them the Chief Court Marshal Count Eulenberg and Prince Max Egon Fiirstenberg, read them and rejoiced with me at

117

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

the harmonious understanding between me and the Chancellor.

After my return from England I made a general report to the Chancellor, whereupon he expressed to me his thanks for my having personally troubled myself so much and worked so hard toward im- proving the relations between the two countries.

DEFENDS FAMOUS INTERVIEW i

A year later came the incident about the so- called "interview," published in the Daily Tele- graph. Its object was the improvement of Ger- man-English relations. I had sent the draft submitted to me to the Chancellor for examina- tion through the representative of the Foreign Office, Herr von Jenisch. I had called atten- tion, by means of notes, to certain portions which, to my way of thinking, did not belong therein and should be eliminated. Through a series of mistakes on the part of the Foreign Office, when

1 One of the most startling incidents of the Kaiser's reign was the interview with him printed in the London Daily Telegraph of Oct. 28, 1908. In it he said that "Englishmen, in giving rein to suspicions unworthy of a great nation," were "mad as March hares"; and that "the prevailing sentiment among large sections of the middle and lower classes of my own people is not friendly to England. I am, therefore, so to speak, in a minority in my own land, but it is a minority of the best e-lements, just as it is in England with respect to Germany." German opinion was, he admitted, "bitterly hostile" to England during the Boer War, and, that the German people, if he had permitted Boer delegates in Berlin, "would have crowned them with flowers." He asserted that he had formulated a plan of campaign in South Africa which Lord Roberts adopted in substance.

The Kaiser was quoted in this interview as declaring Germany needed a large fleet chiefly on account of the Far Eastern situation.

The interview was republished in oflScial German organs, and caused as great a stir in Germany as in England. There were many debates on it in the Reichstag and one or two "investigations."

118

BULOW

the matter was taken up at my request, this was not done.

A storm broke loose in the press. The Chancel- lor spoke in the Reichstag, but did not defend the Kaiser, who was the object of attack, to the extent that I expected, declaring, on the other hand, that he wished to prevent in future the tendency toward "personal politics" which had become apparent in the last few years. The Conservative party took upon itself to address an open letter to the King through the newspapers, the contents of which are known.

During these proceedings, I was staying first at Eckartsau, with Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Aus- trian throne, and later with Kaiser Franz Joseph at Vienna, both of whom disapproved of the Chan- cellor's conduct. From Vienna I went to Donau- eschingen to visit Prince Fiirstenberg, to whom the press saw fit to address the demand that he should, being an honest, upright man, tell the Emperor the truth for once. When we talked over the whole matter, the Prince advised me to get together, at the Foreign Office, the dispatches from Highcliffe in 1907, and the answers to them, and have these laid before the Reichstag.

During this whole affair I underwent great mental anguish, which was heightened by the sud- den death before my eyes of the intimate friend of my youth. Count Hiilsen-Haeseler, chief of the Military Cabinet. The faithful, self-sacrificing friendship and care of the Prince and his family were most welcome to me in these bitter days. And

119

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

letters and demonstrations from the Empire, part of which sided with me and severely censured the Chancellor, were a consolation to me during that period.

After my return, the Chancellor appeared, lec- tured me on my political sins, and asked that I sign the document that is already known, which was afterward communicated to the press. I signed it in silence and in silence I endured the attacks of the press against myself and the Crown.

The Chancellor struck a serious blow, by his conduct, at the firm confidence and sincere friend- ship which had bound me before to him. Un- doubtedly Prince Biilow thought that, handling the matter as he did both in the Reichstag and with me personally, he could best serve me and the cause, especially as public excitement was running very high at that time. In this I could not agree with him, all the more so since his actions toward me in the Daily Telegraph affair stood out in too sharp contrast to the complaisance and recognition which Biilow had previously manifested toward me. I had become so accustomed to the amiability of the Prince that I found the treatment now ac- corded me incomprehensible.

A BREAK WITH BULOW

The relationship between Emperor and Chan- cellor, excellent and amicable up to that time, was, at all events, disturbed. I gave up personal rela- tions with the Chancellor and confined myself to official dealings. After consultation with the Min-

120

BULOW

ister of the Royal Household and the chief of the Cabinet, I resolved to follow Prince Fiirstenberg's advice as to getting together the Highcliffe dis- patches, and charged the Foreign Office with this task. It failed of accomplishment because the dis- patches in question were not to be found.

Toward the end of the winter the Chancellor requested an audience with me. I walked up and down with him in the picture gallery of the palace, between the pictures of my ancestors, of the battles of the Seven Years' War, of the proclamation of the Empire at Versailles, and was amazed when the Chancellor harked back to the events of the autumn of 1908 and undertook to explain his atti- tude. Thereupon I took occasion to talk with him about the entire past. The frank talk and the ex- planations of the Prince satisfied me. The result was that he remained in office.

The Chancellor requested that I dine with him that evening, as I had so often done before, in order to show the outer world that all was again well. I did so. A pleasant evening, enlivened by the visibly delighted Princess with charming amiabil- ity, and by the Prince with his usual lively, witty talk, closed that memorable day. Alluding to the Prince's audience with me, a wag wrote later in a newspaper, parodying a famous line: "The tear flows, Germania has me again."

By this reconciliation I also wished to show that I was in the habit of sacrificing my own sensitive- ness to the good of the cause. Despite Prince Billow's attitude toward me in the Reichstag,

121

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

which was calculated to pain me, I naturally never forgot his eminent gifts as a statesman and his distinguished services to the fatherland. He succeeded, by his skill, in avoiding a world war at several moments of crisis, during the period indeed, when I, together with Tirpitz, was building our protecting fleet. That was a great achievement.

A serious epilogue to the above-mentioned au- dience was provided by the Conservatives. The Civil Cabinet informed the party leaders of the Chancellor's audience and what happened there, with the request that the party might now take back its "Open Letter." This request — which was made solely in the interest of the Crown, not of myself personally — ^was declined by the party. Not until 1916, when the war was under way, did we get into touch again, through a delegate of the party, at Great General Headquarters.

Just as the Conservatives did not do enough out of respect for the Crown to satisfy me, so also the Liberals of the Left, the Democrats and the So- cialists, distinguished themselves by an outburst of fury, which became, in their partisan press, a veri- table orgy, in which loud demands were made for the limitation of autocratic, despotic inclinations, etc. This agitation lasted the whole winter, with- out hindrance or objection from high Government circles. Only after the Chancellor's audience did it stop.

Later, a coolness gradually arose between the Chancellor and the political parties. The Con-

122

BULOW

servatives drew away from the Liberals — rifts ap- peared in the bloc. Centrists and Socialists — but, above all, the Chancellor himself — brought about its downfall, as Count Hertling repeatedly ex- plained to me later — for the last time at Spa. He was proud to have worked energetically toward causing Billow's downfall.

When matters had reached an impossible pass, ^the Chancellor drew the proper conclusions and recommended to me the choice of Herr von Beth- mann as the fifth Chancellor of the Empire. After careful consultations, I decided to acquiesce in the wish of Prince Biilow, to accept his request for 'retirement, and to summon the man recommended by him as his successor.

/ I

CHAPTER V

Bethmann

I HAD been well acquainted since my youth with Herr von Bethmann Hollweg. When I was in active service for the first time in 1877, as Lieuten- ant in the Sixth Company of the First Infantry. Guard Regiment, it was quartered once at Hohen- finow, the home of old Herr von Bethmann, father of the Chancellor. I was attracted by the pleasant family circle there, which was presided over by Prau von Bethmann, a most worthy lady, born of Swiss nationality, amiable and refined.

Often, as Prince and later as Emperor, I went to Hohenfinow to visit the old gentleman, and I was received on every occasion by the young head of the rural district administration; at that time neither of m imagined that he would become Im- perial Chancellor under me.

From these visits an intimate relationship sprang up little by little, which served to increase steadily my esteem for the diligence, ability, and noble character of Bethmann, which were much to my liking. These qualities clung to him throughout his career.

As Chief President and as Imperial Secretary of

124

BETHMANN

State for the Interior Bethmann gave a good ac- count of himself, and, while occupying the last- named post, made his appearance successfully be- fore the Reichstag.

Co-operation with the Chancellor was easy for me. With Bethmann I kept up my custom of daily visits whenever possible, and of discussing fully with him, while walking in the garden of the Chancellor's palace, on politics, events of the day, special bills, and occurrences and of hearing re- ports from him. It was also a pleasure for me to visit the Chancellor's home, since Bethmann's spouse was the very model of a genuine German wife, one whose simple distinction earned the esteem of every visitor, while her winning kind- ness of heart spread around her an atmosphere of cordiality. During the Bethmann regime the cus- tom of holding small evening receptions, instituted by Prince Biilow and most enjoyable to me, was continued, and this enabled me to keep on associat- ing informally with men of all circles and walks of life.

, In the journeys which the Chancellor had to make in order to introduce himself, he won esteem everywhere by his distinguished calm and sincere methods of expression. Such foreign countries gs were not hostile to us considered him a factor mak- ing for political stability and peace, to the main- tenance and strengthening of which he devoted his most zealous efforts. This was entirely to my liking.

In foreign politics he busied himself from the

125

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

start with the position of England in relation to Germany and with the "policy of encirclement" of King Edward VII, which had made itself felt more and more since Reval, and was a source of worry to Bethmann. This was likewise true of the growing desire for revenge and enmity of France, and the unreliability of Russia. During his regime as Chancellor it became clear that Italy was no longer to be reckoned with militarily; the work of Barrere in that country made "extra tours" chronic.

Upon assuming office, Herr von Bethmann found the situation with regard to France cleared up to such an extent that the German-French Morocco Agreement had been signed on February 9, 1909. By recognizing thereby the political predominance of France in Morocco Prince Biilow had put the finishing touch to the German political retreat from Morocco. The standpoint which had deter- mined the trip to Tangier and, in addition, the Al- geciras Conference, was thereby definitely aban- doned. The great satisfaction of the French Gov- ernment over this victory was expressed in a man- ner unwelcome to us by the conferring of the cross of the Legion of Honor upon Prince Radolin and Herr von Schoen.

RECEIVES BRITISH ROYALTY

On the same day King Edward VII, with Queen Alexandra, made his first official visit to the Ger- man Emperor and his wife at their capital city of Berlin — eight years after his accession to the

126

BETHMANN

throne! Berlin received the exalted gentleman with rejoicing ( !!) and showed no signs of dissatis- faction at his unfriendly policy.

The King did not look well ; he was tired and aged, and suffered, moreover, from a severe attack of catarrh. Nevertheless, he accepted the invita- tion of the municipal authorities of Berlin to in- formal tea at the City Hall. From his description, which was corroborated by Berlin gentlemen, the function must have been satisfactory to both parties.

I informed my uncle of the signing of the Ger- man-French Morocco Agreement and the news seemed to please him. When I added, "I hope this agreement will be a stepping stone to a better understanding between the two countries," the King nodded his head approvingly and said, "May that be so!" If the King had co-operated toward this, my project would probably not have failed. Nevertheless, the visit of Their English Majesties engendered a more friendly atmosphere for the time being, which greeted Herr von Bethmann upon his assuming ofiice.

During his term of office Herr von Bethmann had plenty of foreign matters to handle, connected with the well-known events of 1909-14. Con- cerning this period a mass of material has been published in different quarters, for instance, in the book. Causes of the World War, by Secretary of State von Jagow. In the Belgian Documents the attitude of the German Government in the various complications is described from a neutral

127

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

standpoint. I had based this attitude on the following :

Caution on the one hand, on the other, support of our Austro-Hungarian allies whenever there is a plain threat against their position as a world power, com- bined with counsels of moderation in action. Efforts in the role of "honest broker" everywhere, activity as a go-between wherever peace seems endangered. Firm assertion of our own interests.

In viev^ of the "encirclement" ambitions of our opponents, v^e were in duty bound, for the sake of self-preservation, to work steadily at the same time toward building up our army and navy for purposes of defense, because of the central location of Germany and her open, unprotected frontiers. This period of history is also well described in Stegemann's book, and HelfiFerich and Friedjung also depict the prewar days interestingly.

"EDWARD THE ENCIRCLER"

The death of the "encircler," Edward VII— of whom it was said once, in a report of the Belgian Embassy at Berlin, that "the peace of Europe was never in such danger as when the King of England concerned himself with maintaining it" — called me to London, where I shared with my close rela- tions, the members of the English royal family, the mourning into which the passing of the King had thrown the dynasty and the nation. The entire royal family received me at the railway station as a token of their gratitude for the deference to fam- ily ties shown by my coming.

128

BETHMANN

King George drove with me to Westminster Hall, where the gorgeously decorated coffin re- posed upon a towering catafalque, guarded by household troops, troops of the line, and detach- ments from the Indian and Colonial contingents, all in the traditional attitude of mourning — heads bowed, hands crossed over the butts and hilts of their reversed arms. The old, gray hall, covered by its great Gothic wooden ceiling, towered im- posingly over the catafalque, lighted merely by a few rays of the sun filtering through narrow win- dows. One ray flooded the magnificent coffin of the King, surmounted by the English crown, and made marvelous play with the colors of the pre- cious stones adorning it.

Past the catafalque countless throngs of men, women, and children of all classes and strata in the nation passed in silence, many with hands folded to bid a reverent farewell to him who had been so popular as a ruler. A most impressive picture, in its marvelous medieval setting.

I went up to the catafalque, with King George, placed a cross upon it, and spoke a silent prayer, after which my right hand and that of my royal cousin found each other, quite unconsciously on our part, and met in a firm clasp. This made a deep impression on those who witnessed it, to such an extent that, in the evening, one of my relations said to me : ^^Your handshake with our King is all over London : the people are deeply impressed by it, and take it as a good omen for the future."

"That is the sincerest wish of my heart,'' I replied.

129

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

As I rode through London behind the coffin of my uncle I was a witness of the tremendous and impressive demonstration of grief on the part of the vast multitude — estimated at several millions — on streets, balconies, and roofs, every one of whom was clad in black, every man of whom stood with bared head, among all of whom reigned per- fect order and absolute stillness. Upon this som- ber, solemn background the files of British soldiers stood out all the more gorgeously. In splendid array marched the battalions of the English Guards: Grenadiers, Scots Guards, Coldstreams, Irish Guards — in their perfectly-fitting coats, white leather facings, and heavy bearskin head- gear; all picked troops of superb appearance and admirable martial bearing, a joy to any man with the heart of a soldier. And all the troops lining the path of the funeral cortege stood in the attitude of mourning already described.

During my stay I resided, at the special desire of King George, in Buckingham Palace. The widow of the dead King, Queen Alexandra, re- ceived me with moving and charming kindness, and talked much with me about bygone days ; my recollections stretched back to my childhood, since I, while still a little boy, had been present at the wedding of my dead uncle.

THE PICHON CONVERSATION

The King gave a banquet to the many princely guests and their suites, as well as for the representa- tives of foreign nations, at which M. Pichon was

130

BETHMANN

also present. He was introduced to me and, in conversation with him, I told him of the wishes which the Imperial Chancellor had communicated to me regarding our interests in Morocco and some other political matters, which M. Pichon readily- agreed to carry out. All other combinations con- nected in various quarters with this talk, belong in the domain of fancy.

Although the period between 1909 and 1914 de- manded extraordinary attention to foreign events, interior development was, nevertheless, promoted zealously, and efforts made to meet the demands of commerce, transportation, agriculture, and in- dustry, which were growing rapidly. Unfortu- nately endeavors in this direction were made much more difficult by the discord among political parties.

The Chancellor wished to accomplish every- thing possible of accomplishment. But his inclina- tion to get to the bottom of problems and his desire to deal only with what was, from his meticulous critical standpoint, thoroughly matured, tended, in the course of time, to hamper progress. It was difficult to bring him to make decisions before he was thoroughly convinced of their being absolutely free from objection. This made working with him tiresome and aroused in those not close to him the impression of vacillation, whereas, in reality, it was merely overconscientiousness carried too far.

In addition, the Chancellor eventually devel- oped a strong and growing inclination toward domination ; in discussions this tended to make him^ obstinate and caused him to lay down the law to

10 131

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

those thinking otherwise as dogmatically as a school teacher. This brought him many enemies and often made things hard for me. A boyhood friend of the Chancellor, to whom I spoke once about this, replied, with a smile, that it had been so with him even in school ; there Herr von Bethmann had constantly taught and school-mastered his fel- low students, of whom my informant was one, so that finally his classmates had nicknamed him "the governess." He added that this trait was a mis- fortune for Bethmann, but that it had so grown into his very being that he would never be able to get rid of it.

An example of this is Bethmann's relationship to Herr von Kiderlen, whom he desired to have as Secretary of State, despite my emphatic objections. Herr von Kiderlen was an able worker and a man of strong character, who always sought to assert his independence. He had been about one year in ofSce when Herr von Bethmann came to me one day, complained of Kiderlen's obstinacy and in- subordination, and asked me to appeal to his con- science. I declined, with the observation that the Chancellor had chosen Kiderlen against my wishes and must now manage to get along with him ; that the maintenance of discipline at the Foreign Office was a duty devolving upon the Chancellor, in which I had no desire to interfere.

FINDS FAULT WITH BETHMANN

Meanwhile, Bethmann's inadequacy to the post of Chancellor became evident. Deep down in his

132

BETHMANN

heart he was a pacifist and was obsessed with the aberration of coming to an understanding with England. I can perfectly well understand that a man of pacifist inclinations should act thus in the hope of avoiding a war thereby. His object was entirely in accord with my policy. The ways and means whereby Bethmann sought to achieve it were, in my opinion, unsuitable. Nevertheless, I backed his endeavors. But I certainly did not believe that real success would result. It became ever more apparent, while he was Chancellor, that he was remote from political realities. Yet he always knew everything better than anybody else. Owing to this overestimation of his own powers he stuck unswervingly to his ideas, even when things all turned out differently from what he had expected.

His reports were always admirably prepared, brilliant in form, and, heiice, impressive and at- tractive. And in this there was an element of danger. In his opinion there was always but one solution, the one which he proposed! The ap- parent solidity and thoroughness of his reports and suggestions, the illuminating treatment of the mat- ters reported upon from every angle, the references to experts, to foreign and native statesmen and dip- lomats, etc., easily led to the impression that solely the Bethmann solution was worthy of considera- tion. In spite of these thorough preparations, he made mistake after mistake.

Thus he had an actual share in our misfortune. When I returned from my Norwegian trip in 191 4

133

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

he did not place his resignation in my hands, to be sure, but he admitted that his political calculations had gone wrong. Nevertheless, I left him in office, even after his Reichstag speech and the English declaration of war of August 4, 1914, because I considered it most serious to change the highest official in the Empire at the most critical mo- ment in German history. The unanimous atti- tude of the nation in the face of the challenge from the Entente might have been impaired by such action.

Moreover, both the Chancellor and the chief of the Civil Cabinet maintained that they had the working classes behind them. I was loath to de- prive the working classes, which behaved in an exemplary manner in 1914, of the statesman whom, I had been told, they trusted.

The theory, constantly repeated to me in 1914 by the chief of the Civil Cabinet and the repre- sentative of the Foreign Office, that only Bethmann had the support of the working classes, was finally supplemented further by reports to me that the Chancellor enjoyed the confidence in foreign countries which was necessary to the conclusion of peace. Thus it came about that Bethmann always stayed in office, until, finally, the Crown Prince made the well-known investigation among the party leaders which showed that the above-men- tioned theory was mistaken. This mistake was made all the clearer to me when I read, at the time of Bethmann's dismissal — to which other fac- tors also contributed — the most unfavorable opin-

134

BETHMANN

ions of him, especially in the Social Democratic and Democratic press.

I do not wish to blame Bethmann with these frank remarks, nor to exonerate others ; but, when such important matters are discussed, personal considerations must be ignored. I never doubted the nobility of Bethmann's sentiments.

May I be allowed to say a few words here con- cerning the reform in the Prussian franchise, since the handling of this by Herr von Bethmann is characteristic of his policy of vacillation. During the winter of 1914-15, when, following the bril- liant summer campaign, the hard, severe winter trench-fighting had brought military movements to a standstill, the extraordinary achievements of all the troops and the spirit which I had found among officers and men, both at the front and in the hospitals, made such a profound impression on me that I resolved to provide, for the tried, mag- nificent "Nation in Arms," something in the politi- cal domain, when it returned home, which should prove that I recognized what it had done and wished to give the nation joy.

I often touched upon this theme in conversations and suggested reforms in the Prussian franchise; the man, said I, who returned home, after a strug- gle like this, with the Iron Cross — perhaps of both classes — must no longer be "classified" at the polls.

At this juncture a memorial was submitted to me by Herr von Loebell which proposed a reform in the Prussian franchise on similar grounds. The concise, clear, and convincing treatment of the sub-

135

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

ject pleased me so much that I had a number of gentlemen read the memorial, which took up, in its original form, only general points of view, without going into detail, and I was pleased to see that it found approval with all whom I questioned concerning it.

I had my thanks expressed to Herr von Loebell through the chief of the Cabinet, von Valentini, and caused Loebell to work out the matter in de- tail and make suggestions. This was done in the spring of 191 5. The memorial was very thorough and dealt with a number of possibilities for the franchise, without advising any one system. It was approved by me, and sent by the chief of the Cabinet to the Chancellor, with the command that it be discussed, in the course of the year, by the Ministers, and that their vote on it — pos- sibly, also, some suggestions from them — be laid before me. The franchise law, of course, was not to be proposed until after the conclusion of peace.

EARLY GERMAN VICTORIES

Immediately after that I went to Pless. The battle of Gorlice-Tarnow, with its smashing vic- tory over the enemy, brought on the Galician- Polish campaign, leading to the reconquest of Lemberg, Przemysl and the capture of Warsaw, Ivangorod, Modlin, Brest-Litovsk, etc., and com- pletely engaged my attention. I

The Lusitania case, too, cast its shadow over events, and Italy severed her alliance with us. So

136

BETHMANN

it is not to be wondered at if the franchise me- morial was pushed into the background.

The next winter, and the summer of 191 6, like- wise, with their fighting on all fronts, the terrible battle of the Somme, and the brilliant Rumanian autumn and winter campaign, took me to all sorts of places on the western and eastern fronts, even as far as Nisch — where the first memorable meet- ing with the Bulgarian Tsar took place — and to Orsova, so that I had no opportunity to take up the matter of franchise reform with the care that its importance demanded.

In the spring of 191 7 I asked the Chancellor to draw up an announcement of the reform, to be made to the nation at Easter, since I assumed that the Ministers had long since discussed it. The Chancellor drew up the text of the proclamation at Hamburg, in agreement with the chief of the Cabinet and myself ; he proposed that the method of voting be left open for the time being, since he was not yet quite sure about this. The Easter proclamation appeared ; it was based, like previous treatments of the matter, on the idea that the re- form was not to be introduced until after the con- clusion of peace, because most of the voters were away facing the enemy.

Party and press did what they could to postpone the accomplishment of my purpose by recrimina- tions and strife, by bringing up the question of the Prussian Reichstag franchise, and by the demand for the introduction of the franchise bill while the war was still in progress. Thus the question em-

137

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

barked upon its well-known and not very pleasant course, which dragged itself out on account of the interminable negotiations in the Landtag. It was not until after the retirement of Herr von Beth- mann that I learned through Loebell that the me- morial of 191 5 had never been submitted to the Ministers, but had lain untouched for a year and a half in a desk drawer; that the Chancellor, influ- enced by the desires expressed in the country, had dropped the various systems proposed and concen- trated upon the general (Reichstag) franchise, of the eventual introduction of which he was, doubt- less, inwardly convinced.

In any event, the original basic idea was thor- oughly bungled by Bethmann's dilatoriness and the strife among the parties. What I wanted was to present a gift of honor, of my own free will, on its triumphal return home, to my victorious army, to my "Nation in Arms," my brave Prussians, with whom I had stood before the enemy.

CHANCELLOR'S DIPLOMATIC POWER

One of the results of Bethmann's marked in- clination toward control was that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was, under him, a mere helper, so much so that the Foreign Office was almost affiliated with the office of the Chancellor, a state of affairs that made itself felt most especially in the use made of the press department. Beth- mann likewise asserted his independence decidedly in his relations with me. Basing himself upon the fact that, constitutionally, the Chancellor alone is

138

BETHMANN

responsible for foreign policy, he ruled as he pleased. The Foreign Ofiice was allowed to tell me only what the Chancellor wished, so that it happened sometimes that I was not informed con- cerning important occurrences.

The fact that this was possible is to be laid at the door of the Constitution of the Empire. And this is the right place for saying a word concern- ing the relations between the Emperor and the Chancellon In what follows I do not refer to my relationship to Herr von Bethmann, but, quite impersonally, to the difficulties in the relation- ship of the German Emperor to the Imperial Chancellors, which are caused by the Imperial Constitution.

I wish to call attention to the following points :

1. According to the Constitution of the Em- pire, the Chancellor is the director and representa- tive of the foreign policy of the Empire, for which he assumes full responsibility; he has this policy carried out by the Foreign Office, which is sub- ordinated to him, after he has reported on it to the Emperor.

2. The Emperor has influence on foreign pol- icy only in so far as the Chancellor grants it to him.

3. The Emperor can bring his influence to bear through discussions, information, suggestion, proposals, reports, and impressions received by him on his travels, which then take rank as a supple- ment to the political reports of the ambassadors or ministers to the countries which he has personally visited.

139

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

4. The Chancellor may act pursuant to such action by the Emperor, and may make it the basis of his decisions, whenever he is in agreement with the Emperor's point of view. Otherwise he is sup- posed to maintain his own point of view and carry it out (Kruger dispatch).

5. According to the Constitution, the Emperor has no means of compelling the Chancellor or the Foreign Office to accept his views. He cannot cause the Chancellor to adopt a policy for which the latter feels that he cannot assume responsibil- ity. Should the Emperor stick to his view, the Chancellor can offer his resignation or demand that he be relieved of his post.

6. On the other hand, the Emperor has no con- stitutional means of hindering the Cha