CovertAction
INFORMATION BULLETIN

DESTABILIZATION IN THE CARIBBEAN

Maurice Bishop of Grenada

Walter Rodney of Guyana

Michael Manley of Jamaica
Editorial

This is the largest issue of the Covert Action Information Bulletin ever published, with some of the most interesting and informative material we have brought to our readers. At the same time, for reasons which may be familiar to friends, we are somewhat behind schedule. Several recent events have unfortunately diverted our energies.

Jamaica

The comprehensive article in this issue, “Massive Destabilization in Jamaica,” covers fully the activities on that island which led to our on-the-scene investigation, culminating in a press conference at which we divulged the names of fifteen CIA people in the U.S. Embassy in Kingston. As we have “named names” for several years, and done complete analyses of individual stations before as well (for example, “Room 705, U.S. Embassy: The CIA Station in Madrid,” in CAIB Number 4), we were not prepared for the incredible scenario which followed.

Two days after the press conference, when we had all left the island, reports appeared that there had been a shooting and a bombing at the home of the man we had named as Chief of Station, N. Richard Kinsman. Initial reports were replete with inaccuracies, and as we discovered the “attack” was questionable to say the least.

The first inaccuracy was the report that the incident occurred two days after Kinsman had been exposed. He was, in fact, exposed in CAIB Number 6, in October 1979, an exposure which was well covered in the Jamaican media at the time. Initial reports also expressed relief that the bullets missed Kinsman, his wife and children. It then developed that the wife and children were not home that night, and subsequent investigators expressed some doubt that Kinsman himself was at home. Reports also circulated that the bullets had whistled through one of the bedrooms of the house. As the photograph we reproduce here shows, however, the bullet holes were in the side of a concrete wall by the house’s garage. Then there was the alleged grenade. Initial reports mentioned a hole “the size of a basketball” in the front lawn. Others said it was “the size of a grapefruit.” Whatever it was, it was a small hole in the ground dozens of yards from the house. What is more, no grenade fragments were found. It might have been the efforts of a dog to bury a bone!

To cap everything off, it turned out that both Mr. Kinsman and his maid, who was sleeping in a room at the rear, did not hear anything. Mr. Kinsman, amazingly enough,

Bullet Marks on Wall of Kinsman Garage

CONTENTS

Editorial
Overview: The Caribbean
Massive Destabilization in Jamaica
Guyana: The Faces Behind the Masks
Vicious Bombing in Grenada
Strange Activities on Antigua
The “Elections” in Dominica
Cuban Exiles and “Refugees”
Book Review: “The Spike”
Special Supplement:
The Principles of Deep Cover
Naming Names
Publications of Interest


2 Covert Action

Number 10 (Aug.-Sept. 1980)
did not call the police the following morning; he called the right-wing opposition newspaper, the Gleaner. Neighbors ultimately called the police.

We were, and are, convinced that the incident was a phony. It may never be proved that the CIA staged the incident, but it was the most helpful thing for them that has happened in years. Just as the Welch assassination in Athens in 1975 brought the Church Committee investigation of the CIA to a complete standstill, the Kinsman incident instantly created a wave of sympathy for the CIA, a barrage of attacks against CAIB, and renewed efforts in Congress to ban this magazine.

The invective was chilling. Members of Congress came close to calling us murderers; cub reporter Cord Meyer, Jr.—perhaps "retired" from his twenty-five years in the CIA—called us KGB agents in his syndicated column. Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, speaking of Louis Wolf, said simply, "I want him put away." The move to pass the Intelligence Identities Protection Act was revived with a vengeance.

The Intelligence Identities Protection Act

The most serious threat, not merely to the Bulletin, but also to freedom of the press, investigative journalism, and reform of government abuses here in the United States, is the so-called Intelligence Identities Protection Act. The Bills (H.R. 5615 in the House of Representatives and S. 2216 in the Senate) criminalize the disclosure of "information that identifies" any covert agent of the United States. "Cover agent" is defined to include all undercover employees of the CIA and all undercover foreign intelligence employees of the military and of the FBI, and any of their "agents," "informants," or "sources of operational assistance." This includes virtually anyone, U.S. citizen or foreigner, who has had any unpublicized relationship with the U.S. intelligence complex. Moreover, and most importantly, the Bills are not limited to the disclosure of classified information. The portions of the Bills which deal with former government employees who did have access to classified information identifying covert agents, and who disclose that information, will have the effect of stifling "whistleblowers," people within government who seek to halt abuses. But the unprecedented danger of the Bills lies in the admitted attempt, for the first time in U.S. history, to criminalize the analysis and publication by private citizens of information gathered from unclassified sources.

When the hysterical rush to pass the Bills into law began in early July, editorial writers jumped on the bandwagon without thinking. The New York Times, the Washington Star, the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, and many others hastened to prove their patriotism by calling for the passage of the Act. Deference to the First Amendment, to freedom of the press, was muted. "It's a ticklish task," the Bulletin admitted, but "we hope Congress can draft a law that will provide our agents with the carefully defined protection they need." The New York Times was more direct, if also more egotistical: "A law that would punish Mr. Wolf for publishing secret names in his CovertAction Information Bulletin could also punish a newspaper that identified an agent in the valid and necessary reporting of events or in the course of a legitimate study of the CIA." They went on: "Let us look at laws that might get at them, but let us not in the process compound the damage they do." That is, get CAIB, but don't get the New York Times.

In a press conference we called, and in numerous letters we wrote, we reiterated once again what we had said from the first day such laws were proposed. Since CAIB does not obtain the names of CIA officers under diplomatic cover from classified sources, there is no law that could "get" us that would not also "get" the New York Times and everyone else.

The establishment press shed some of their delusions of sanctity and began to see the point. The New York Times actually reversed its stand: "So long as they aren't caught using secrets that Mr. Agee learned at the agency, or stealing secret documents, they are free to guess at the identities of agents and to publish their speculations in newsletters." The Washington Post agreed: "To the extent possible, the CIA can remove from the public domain the materials that permit a Louis Wolf to operate. Beyond that, however, . . . his mischief cannot be the cause of an abridgment of the freedoms that the population as a whole enjoys."

The Congress went to extraordinary lengths to draft a law aimed at CAIB. The key language of the House version criminalizes one who, "in the course of an effort to identify and expose covert agents with the intent to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States, discloses with the intent to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States . . . any information that identifies a covert agent." The Senate version penalizes one who, "in the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose agents and with reason to believe that such activities would impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States discloses . . . any information that identifies an individual as a covert agent." The Senate defined pattern of activities as "a series of acts with a common purpose or objective."

It is obvious that the contorted language is an attempt to give the law the appearance of being a threat only to CAIB. But, as the more astute observers noted, the language is so vague and so slippery that it could be applied to almost any investigative journalist. A "series of acts" could be two stories on Watergate. One person's intent to reform could be another's intent to impair. An effort to stop unlawful activity in Angola could be considered an effort to impede foreign intelligence activities.

We do not care that the Times calls us "contemptible scoundrels," that the Star calls us "facile anti-Americans," that the Post calls us makers of "ugly mischief." (It is ironic, of course, that all of these publications, as well as the networks and the major newswires, have come to us for help whenever they wanted to know who the CIA personnel in a certain country were.) What concerns us is the apparent apathy on the part of leading investigative journalists and their publishers. Some of our friends are simply scolding us, saying that we are making life difficult for
them. It would be much easier for them if we did not publish the magazine. Then Congress would not be attempting, unconstitutionally, to ban it. This is the same argument that was made to us when we were planning the publication of "Dirty Work." People said that if we published a book with a list of the names of CIA officers, Congress might try to make that illegal. Wonderful, we responded; if we didn’t publish the book, they wouldn’t even have to try. The point is that journalists, publishers, and all civil libertarians should be screaming against these Bills. For the first time ever, Congress is contemplating passing an Official Secrets Act, trying to make it a crime to publish something which isn’t secret in the first place.

We should make it clear that we don’t intend to break this or any other law. If the Bills are passed we will immediately challenge them in the courts and ask that they be declared unconstitutional. We will continue to publish CAIR regardless; if we must temporarily suspend the Naming Names column during the court battle we will. But we don’t think we should have to reach that stage. Everyone who realizes the dangers of these Bills must let their representatives in Congress know.

In This Issue

We remain convinced that the Caribbean is one of the most crucial areas in the struggle between reaction and progress. The United States government admits that it is one of the major “trouble spots” in the world, but does not explain why the Caribbean is viewed in that light. Events in Jamaica, Grenada, Nicaragua, El Salvador and elsewhere make clear that the era of the Somozas and the Tairys is ending. The days when U.S. multinationals ran countries, not merely companies, are numbered.

We present an in-depth review of the events in Jamaica, as forces in the U.S. government desperately try to topple Michael Manley’s government of democratic socialism. We reprint in full the stirring speech which Maurice Bishop gave to the people of Grenada hours after the unsuccessful attempt on his life. We also publish an analysis of events in Guyana over the past several years, as the regime of Forbes Burnham advances from repression to outright terrorism, culminating in the murder of Dr. Walter Rodney.

Several other articles report on events in Antigua, Dominica, Florida and elsewhere, as they relate especially to the activities of the U.S. intelligence complex. We also present Fred Landis’s comprehensive review of “The Spike,” with a detailed analysis of the massive disinformation campaign led by Robert Moss.

Finally, we include a Special Supplement with an astonishing document, the CIA training manual, “The Principles of Deep Cover.” This manual reached CAIR anonymously, but we have investigated it, and are convinced that it is genuine. We believe it makes extremely important and interesting reading.

The Caribbean:
AN OVERVIEW

by Samori Marksman

Rum and reggae-rhythms, calypso and coke, beaches and bongo-drums, hot-sun and hedonism… By now the average North American is already familiar with these standard depictions of “the Caribbean reality.” Unfortunately, however, life for the overwhelming majority of Caribbeans is far from pleasurable. These “nativistic,” tropical-paradise images are more figments of a tourist imagination than true reflections of the day-to-day rigors of human survival in these poor, undeveloped Third-World societies. Had this misperception also been pervasive among U.S. government officials, then those Caribbean patriots who are merely seeking to rearrange their societies to provide basic human needs for their people, would not be faced with the degree of U.S.-engineered intrigue and sabotage against their respective efforts that we are witnessing today.

The real “Caribbean realities” are very much on the minds of those who formulate U.S. policy for the region. Recent political changes in Grenada and Nicaragua, the social leanings of the People’s National Party of Jamaica, the potential for radical social change in El Salvador and Guyana, and the success of the Cuban revolution are all studied and perceived in Washington as “threats to the national security of the United States of America.” And U.S. reaction to these changes has been swift and vicious — sometimes naked and ugly — as in Guyana, beginning with the CIA’s toppling of the Jagan government, the installation of the Burnham regime, up to the recent assassination of Dr. Walter Rodney; in Cuba, with the “permanent plot” of assassination, economic strangulation, and political destabilization against the government; and recently, in Grenada, with the attempted assassination of that country’s entire leadership.

At times U.S. reaction has been much less overt, more sinister, as in the CIA’s protracted campaign of destabilization against the government of Jamaica’s Michael Manley; the application of the strategy of “new-diplomacy,” that is, deploying a younger, “more hip,” more physically attractive corps of diplomats to the region; offering liberal sums of money and special training programs to trade union leaders from the region; or acts of economic destabilization via U.S.-based or U.S.-controlled multinational lending institutions, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development, the International Monetary Fund, the Caribbean Development Bank and so on.

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4 CovertAction

Number 10 (Aug.-Sept. 1980)
Why Such Hysteria in Washington?

The reaction of the U.S. and other North Atlantic governments to progressive changes in the Caribbean, changes which take some of these states onto a path of non-capitalist development, could, perhaps, be explained on two levels: 1) The "natural" systemic reaction, that is, the reaction of the capitalist bloc to what it perceives as contradictory tendencies within its "own" historic hemisphere-of-influence; and 2) The strategic reaction to what the North Atlantic bloc perceives as an "intrusion" by the Soviet Union into their traditional domain.

In neither case are those factors pertaining to the human, social and historic desires and interests of the Caribbean people themselves taken into account.

And what are those basic desires and interests?

Foremost is the desire to assume full responsibility for determining their own destiny. To be able to feed, clothe, shelter and develop themselves. And to work alongside all decent human beings to bring about a more humane global order.

The Caribbean islands are not economic monstrosities poised to devour the capitalist metropolis. They do not have multi-billion dollar trade surpluses with Western Europe and North America. They do not (with the exception of Trinidad) possess any known, large quantities of oil or natural gas. Nor do they own or control transnational lending institutions and industrial conglomerates.

These are basically poor, undeveloped, agricultural economies which do not perceive the primary contradiction in the world today as that of "East vs. West" but rather as one between the advanced North Atlantic capitalist countries of the so-called "First World" on the one hand, and those of the underdeveloped "Third World" on the other. In other words, they perceive it as a "North vs. South" contradiction.

In the smaller islands which make up the Eastern Caribbean Common Market (Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Lucia, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, and St. Vincent), the magnitude of their poverty is staggering—and is exacerbated further by their almost total dependency upon foreign financial support. Local consumption (in many cases) absorbs in excess of 100% of the Gross Domestic Product. Which means that virtually all investments are financed by external sources. Even the state (public) sectors of these economies rely upon external sources for no less than 85% of their investment capital. Many of these primitive economic circumstances are not dissimilar to those existing in the "more developed" Caribbean states of Jamaica, Guyana and Barbados. The economic conditions and their negative social spin-offs are, for the most part, colonial inheritances—handed down by the capitalist European states and later (after independence) aggravated by the avaricious economic and political policies of the U.S., Canada, the U.K., and France toward the region.

If one is to believe the policy utterances coming from Washington these days pertaining to the "new communist threat" in the Caribbean and, therefore, the need for the U.S. government to "become involved" in countering this threat, one might be misled into thinking that active U.S. intervention in this area is a new development.

U.S. interventionist policies date back to the eighteenth century when George Washington, while in the process of trading Black slaves from the North American mainland—in exchange for rum in Barbados—attempted to undermine British authority over the island. It evolved with U.S. military/merchant fleets and traders competing fiercely with the Spaniards, Dutch, French and English for monopoly of the slave traffic and control of markets and contested territories such as Haiti and Cuba.

In 1823, with the introduction of the hegemonic Monroe Doctrine, U.S. authorities now had "legitimate" grounds to lay claim and domination over the Americas, including the Caribbean.

U.S. de facto colonization of Cuba after the so-called "Spanish-American War" and the subsequent seizure and colonization of Guantanamo and Puerto Rico is now common knowledge.

It established a military base at Chagaramus on the island of Trinidad. It overturned a popular regime and installed a right-wing dictatorship in Guatemala in 1954. It invaded Cuba in 1961, the Dominican Republic in 1965, sent military ships to Trinidad and Tobago in 1970 to quell...
a popular uprising, and U.S.-based corporations set up
military installations in Antigua and Barbados in the mid-
1970's, and used their facilities in Antigua to transship
military hardware to the fascist regime in South Africa.
And, more recently, direct U.S. military assistance to Bar-
bados and other islands have become an integral part of its
new strategy for the region.

"Nothing to Lose"

The prevalence of unemployment rates over 50% among
adult workers in most of the territories (over 75% among
the youth), primitive health facilities (where they exist),
high illiteracy rates, non-existent Social Security pro-
grams, cave-age developmental "strategies," and regimes
which see their role as that of state watchmen for expatriate
financial interests, only serve as political mobilizing factors
—around which the workers, youth, peasants, declassed
and revolutionary intelligentsia can—and are rallying.
And in those territories where these forces have rallied
and organized to redress these conditions, the statal and para-
statal gendarme machinery, trained and equipped by U.S.,
Canadian, British and French police and intelligence agen-
cies, unleash their brutal repression against the people—as
was seen in Grenada under Gairy, in Nicaragua, Haiti,
Trinidad and Tobago and elsewhere.

The tide of radical social change currently surging
through the Caribbean basin is, unfortunately, seen by
U.S. authorities through eyes blinded by neo-Kiplingesque
paternalism and afflicted by Soviet/Cuban phobia. One
example is that after the social and economic devastation
left behind in Grenada from years of being in the eye of
what the Grenadians knowingly call "Hurricane Gairy," a
devastation which the courageous leadership of the New
Jewel Movement is attempting to correct, U.S. authorities
have only been able to come forward with paternalistic
counsel: "Don't establish relations with Cuba . . . or else!
"Don't deal with East European and Arab countries!"
"Don't go to the Non-Aligned Summit Conference!" etc.;
and pocket change: a few $5,000.00 "development" pro-
jects. Yet the changes in Grenada are seen as "Soviet and
Cuban expansionism," the fulfillment of the Kremlin's
manifest destiny.

Regrettably, this view is shared by many leftists and
academicians in North America. Some irresponsibly and
piously sling "analytical" terms and descriptions of the
emerging progressive Caribbean states—"Bonapartist,"
"surrogate states," etc.—which only serve to splinter, con-
fuse and weaken international support for these popular
movements and strengthen reaction. Others—betraying
a sense of eternal faith in imperialism's "good side" and who
subscribe to the theory of intra-bourgeois-party ambidex-
terity—sit and wait, lethargically, for "progressive ele-
ments" within the dominant, explicitly pro-imperialist par-
ties in the U.S., Canada, U.K., and France to rise and
implement new policies.

The mortal reality in the Caribbean today is that a
profound, dynamic, mass-based revolution is taking place
throughout the region. U.S.-led counterrevolution in the
area is equally widespread. "Stop Jamaica before it's too
late," "Don't let Grenada provide an example," "Stifle
Cuba," are strategies all in full operation. North Ameri-
cans, especially U.S. citizens who profess a sense of inter-
national good will and concern for humanity, must view it
as their duty and responsibility to call a halt to their gov-
ernment's and some private institutions' interference in the
internal affairs of Caribbean countries whose people are
crying out: "We are more than beaches . . . we are coun-
tries with real people."
Chile All Over Again?

MASSIVE DESTABILIZATION IN JAMAICA

1976 With a New Twist

by Ellen Ray and Bill Schaap

"In many other countries, somebody with a disciplined force of men behind him would have long ago taken the Government away from them . . . . In most Third World countries, our Ministers, Ministers of State, Party commanders, heads of statutory boards, among others, would now be in forced exile or buried in common graves."

A seditious statement, to be sure, but this quotation is not taken from a clandestine pamphlet circulating the back alleys of a sleepy capital in some banana republic. It is part of the daily fare of one of the many CIA-inspired provocateurs writing for the Jamaica Gleaner urging the elimination of the constitutionally-elected government of Prime Minister Michael Manley and his Peoples National Party.

Although the Gleaner unabashedly and fawningly supports the right-wing opposition Jamaica Labour Party, led by Edward Seaga, recent editorials and commentaries have not been aimed at encouraging Jamaicans to vote for the opposition in elections scheduled for early October. The bitter diatribes are deliberately directed towards creating disaffection and mutiny within the security forces, openly encouraging the overthrow of the government.

The June Coup Attempts

In most countries the writer of a column such as that quoted above (John Hearne, June 1, 1980), would be imprisoned for sedition and treason. The commitment of the Manley government to an unfettered press, however, a colonial commitment which the Gleaner is stretching to the breaking point, has protected the cantankerous and rabidly right-wing Hearne and his colleagues from such deserved treatment. Indeed, many observers fear that this excessive tolerance could lead to Manley's downfall, just as El Mercurio in Chile was instrumental in the overthrow of the Allende government.

Ominously, this column appeared only three weeks before an attempted coup against the Manley government, involving several dozen members of the Jamaica Defence Force and a few civilian members of a small rightist party. On the afternoon of June 22, loyal members of the security forces moved on the plotters, who had been under suspicion for several weeks, when it was learned that they planned to take action that night. Leaders of the military plotters, including three officers, were to meet with the civilian "ringleader," a fanatic named H. Charles Johnson, head of the minuscule Jamaica United Front (see sidebar), and proceed to take the Army's two V-150 tanks, over which the officers had control, kidnap the Chief of Staff, capture Prime Minister Manley, and force him to resign in a radio broadcast, under threat of execution.

By late afternoon all of the plotters were in jail, and in the ensuing several days the civilians were charged with treason-felony, and the soldiers with offenses ranging from mutiny, to failure to report a mutiny, to conduct detrimental to good order and discipline.

The "Comic Opera"

That the attempted coup had, under the circumstances, little chance of success, should not have detracted from its seriousness. Edward Seaga, who was—as is so often the case when unexpected violence erupts in Jamaica—visiting Washington, derided the episode as a "comic opera." To his chagrin his party had already issued a statement deploiring the incident and disassociating themselves from any knowledge of the plot or any connection with H. Charles Johnson. The JLP and the Gleaner quickly picked up Seaga's lead and began a series of speeches and articles trying to portray the attempted coup as a joke at best, and an invention by Manley at worst.

They were somewhat thwarted by the intervention of
Chief of Staff, Brigadier Robert Neish, who, in a rare television appearance, announced that the attempted coup was quite real, but that the plotters had been under observation and the situation was under control. The Commissioner of Police, William Bowes, also confirmed this report. Since both Neish and Bowes had been the favored objects of much JLP and Gleaner propaganda, they could not be directly attacked and some steam was taken out of their “comic opera” approach.

**Brigadier Neish Reporting on Arrests**

PNP supporters never took the incident as a joke, however. At a rally several days after the arrests, when Manley announced to the large crowd the maximum sentences for the charges (as low as two years for conduct detrimental to good order and discipline), they shouted, “Death. Death.”

The Model of Chile

Shortly after the attempted coup, Dr. Fred Landis, who was visiting the island, explained the striking parallels between the situation in Chile during the months before the September 1973 fascist coup and the situation in present-day Jamaica. During Allende’s nearly three years in office, there were seven attempted coups against the Popular Unity government; only the last succeeded. Three months before the Chilean takeover there was an attempted coup known as Tancazo, much like the H. Charles Johnson fiasco. The plotters were serious and thought they would succeed, but the powers behind them were not interested in success. Working together with the CIA, they knew very well that the plot would fail. But, they wanted to test the waters, a “dry run” to measure the reactions of the security forces and the people. Indeed, the “hero” of Tancazo, the loyal Army General who “smashed” the plot, was none other than Augusto Pinocchet.

Significantly, Landis noted, *El Mercurio*, the CIA-financed newspaper which played the role in Chile filled by the Gleaner in Jamaica, derided the Tancazo plot as a joke, an invention by Allende to get “sympathy.” Three months afterward, of course, the new junta with Pinocchet in command, launched the worst bloodbath that Latin America had ever seen.

The Focus of Destabilization

Most importantly, the propaganda campaign in Chile, planned, directed, and in large part executed by the CIA, took on a new focus as the denouement approached. The campaign shifted from one directed toward the population at large to one aimed narrowly at the security forces. The theory is that, if the masses of the people will not rise up against the government the CIA wants to overthrow, but instead support it, attention must be directed to the security forces as the only power base remaining to ensure a successful coup.

In Chile, *El Mercurio* and the right-wing leaders they fronted for concentrated on the military. They alleged communist plots to disband or destroy the military; they stirred up hatred against the government in the ranks, and in some cases entire columns were produced, calculated to change the opinion of a single military officer, or in one case an officer’s wife. The same pattern now appears in the Gleaner in Jamaica.

Before the last election in Jamaica the approach was different. The violence preceding the December 1976 vote was indiscriminate; arson, food poisonings, shootings, seeming to have little focus or pattern—sheer terrorism. The hand of the CIA from a large and active station in Kingston was evident. Following Henry Kissinger’s threats to Manley over his support for the MPLA in Angola, violence escalated dramatically. But the campaign was unsuccessful, and after Manley’s landslide victory, economic penetration and destabilization were given a chance. Yet, by early 1980, as negotiations with the IMF—the major instrument of economic interference—came to a standstill and were finally severed completely by the Jamaican government, a highly sophisticated campaign with a new focus emerged.

The Gleaner ran a series of stories spreading rumors of mismanagement and dissatisfaction within the Defence Force. They included a two-part article by a former Major who had fled Jamaica, which accused the military leadership, and especially the responsible Ministers and Deputy Ministers, of political interference.

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The McBeth Speech

Less than a month before the attempted coup, the Chairman of the Police Federation, Inspector John McBeth, speaking to the organization's annual conference, took an unprecedented step, in breach of constabulary law, calling for the removal of the Minister of National Security, Dudley Thompson. He said that the Police Federation would only support the government in actions which "we consider to be right and in the interests of the nation." McBeth railed against what he called "political interference" and said it was "unsafe and unwise" to allow Thompson to remain in office. Wilmot Perkins of the Gleaner wrote a column entitled "God bless McBeth!", which ended, "God bless them for it, even if they broke rules!" John Hearne's column was headed "Mr. McBeth's welcome words." Hearne anticipated the reaction of the masses, and protested, in advance, "This was no coup being hatched.

H. CHARLES JOHNSON, GUNRUNNING, AND EDWARD SEAGA

... When the Prime Minister announced the arrests of the group plotting the overthrow of the government of Jamaica, the "ringleader" was named: H. Charles Johnson, head of the Jamaica United Front, a tiny right-wing group with considerable assets but practically no members. Johnson had returned to Jamaica a few years earlier, after spending a number of years living in the United States. He had, it was known, served with the United States Army in Vietnam. Little else was known about him or his party, which espoused a rancorous form of right-wing nationalism, sometimes criticizing the JLP, but always excoriating the PNP and the WPJ.

Shortly after his arrest, however, an incredible document surfaced, one which had been talked about for years, known about for years, but never before seen in its entirety. The document, a copy of which CAIB obtained, is the transcript of a 1974 Gun Court trial against two small-time hoodlums, Mason Whyte and Lloyd Allen, who had been caught with weapons and ammunition. After the trial the transcript had been ordered sealed by the Court for reasons which become obvious when it is read.

The charges against Whyte and Allen were mundane; what was astonishing was Whyte's defense. He claimed that he had been framed by a Jamaican then living in Memphis, Tennessee, one H. Charles Johnson, and that the reason he had been framed was his refusal to continue to be a part of the gun-running operation of which Johnson was a part. Johnson obtained weapons in the United States and shipped them into Jamaica to a ganja smuggler named George Corcho; Corcho delivered the weapons to the ultimate consignee: Edward Seaga.

Whyte's testimony is replete with detail. He first met Johnson in Vietnam, where he too served in the U.S. Army. Johnson looked Whyte up in New Orleans, where he was living at the time, and offered to take advantage of Whyte's experience with weapons, and his pilot's license. Johnson drove Whyte to Georgia where he was shown an arsenal of M-1 carbines and .45 calibre Thompson semi-automatic rifles. Whyte crated the guns for Johnson, but refused to fly them into Jamaica. Whyte did other jobs for Johnson, including smuggling people both into and out of Jamaica.

Apparently to protect himself, Whyte decided to trace the Georgia weapons in Jamaica to see for himself what happened to them. He got there before the crates, saw them loaded into a van, and followed the van to the Psychedelic Shack Club on East Avenue in Kingston, where they were unloaded. He slipped inside with a camera waiting to see who was receiving the shipment. Two men arrived, and he photographed them standing by the crates of guns: George Corcho and Edward Seaga.

Whyte was convicted. Even if his story were true, there was little about the tale inconsistent with his subsequent possession of weapons. The appeals court affirmed the conviction but reduced his sentence to three years in jail. Some time later, Whyte mysteriously escaped from jail, an unheard-of feat. Shortly thereafter he was tracked down by police and killed in a shootout.

The incriminating photograph was never found, although Whyte testified that he had given a copy to Johnson who wanted it to help him collect some debts due from some of Corcho's men. Corcho, who owns the building in which the Psychedelic Shack Club (now the Echo Vibrations Disco) was located, was arrested shortly after the Whyte trial in what was at that time the largest ganja haul in Jamaican history. Corcho only recently was released from jail.

When Edward Seaga was asked about the incident at a recent press conference in New York City, he carefully answered that he did not know H. Charles Johnson; he never said how well he knew Corcho, a major JLP supporter. As for the picture, he replied, carefully again, "I have never seen such a picture."
This was an appeal to every voter to demand that the police of the country be given the sort of just regulation of their power which no passing politician could corrupt." Both Hearne and Perkins had no problem arguing, in the same breath, that the police should be outside of partisan politics and that it was commendable for them to call for the removal of the responsible Minister.

The honored guest at the police conference was Edward Seaga, who also openly espoused sedition. In the months preceding, Seaga had hinted darkly that the government was planning a "military solution" and that elections would be cancelled because violence would increase and Manley would declare a State of Emergency, as he had done in 1976 to stem the violence. True to Seaga's "predictions," violence did increase, though most of it is directed against PNP supporters, often instigated or overlooked by certain sectors of the police.

Having created the conditions which might indeed necessitate a State of Emergency, Seaga rallied the police against the notion. If it were declared the order should be disobeyed. The police, he said, should tell the politicians "to do the damn work themselves." He echoed the sentiments of Inspector McBeth, announcing to the footstomping cheering crowd (who, constitutionally, are required to be non-partisan) that Dudley Thompson was "running down the security forces" and should be removed. He was carried out of the hall on the shoulders of the police.

One day after the attempted coup, Seaga went further, in a speech in Washington, suggesting that the government would use the "comic opera" coup scenario as an excuse to declare a State of Emergency. "If such a State of Emergency were declared," he said, "we would defy it." He went on to predict that violence would spread from the Kingston area to the countryside, another prediction which began to come true in July when the JLP went on the rampage.

The Deputy Leader of the JLP, Senator Pearnell Charles, who spent time in jail on account of the 1976 Werewolf plot, announced that the JLP would defeat the PNP, by "underthrow or overthrow." Charles also said that the JLP government would revoke dissidents' passports, prompting denials from his own Party.

What mystifies observers, and suggests that Prime Minister Manley's deference to the unbridled debate which has gone dangerously beyond any reasonable bounds, and which in fact encourages violence, is that none of these speakers has even been threatened with charges if their speech is not more restrained. The Leader of the Opposition, the head of the Police Federation, the Gleaner columnists, all calling for the overthrow of the government and for disobedience of lawful government decrees, have brought about unprecedented events in Jamaica. And they deride an attempted coup as a "comic opera."

Wilnott Perkins's July 6 column ended like this: "So the Security Forces must make up their minds. They must either join the revolution and support the terror which seems obviously designed to usher it in. Or they must disobey any instructions, by whomever given, which are improper, illegal, and which inhibit their intelligence and their effectiveness. May I again remind our soldiers and policemen that they have a duty to disobey any order that is illegal; a duty, moreover, to defend our Constitution against all attack, from whatever quarter. Am I then inciting mutiny? And shall I be accused of promoting a coup? In this comic opera situation anything is possible; the more preposterous the more likely."

The Campaign Against Dudley Thompson

A further striking parallel with Chile is evident in the JLP's vicious campaign against the Minister of National Security. Under Allende the comparable position was held by General Carlos Prats, not a member of Allende's party but a staunch defender of constitutional democracy. The CIA-directed campaign focused its sights on Prats, and ultimately hounded him out of office with accusations of technical improprieties, charges of close relations with Cuba, and relentless personal attacks. (After the coup, Prats and his wife, then in exile, were murdered by agents of the Chilean secret police.)

The campaign against Thompson has been similar. As noted, Seaga and Inspector McBeth both called for his removal. A few days later, with timing quite fortuitous for the JLP, a lower court finally ruled on a challenge to Thompson's Parliamentary nomination which had been pending for more than seven months. During the 1978 by-election nomination process in Thompson's constituency, the JLP attempted to make a mockery of the procedure by promoting, under front organizations, more than eight other candidates, all named Thompson. Fighting and disorder broke out at the nomination filing office. Although Dudley Thompson was duly nominated, the JLP as well as the Gleaner called for a repeal of the process and a new nomination day for that constituency. The government then advised the Governor General to cancel the nomination and establish new proceedings, which occurred relatively uneventfully. Dudley and several other Thompsons were renominated, and he went on to win the seat by a large margin. Shortly thereafter, the one Thompson who had not gone along with the new nomination procedure, a JLP supporter named Donald Thompson, challenged the validity of the second procedure, with the assistance of some JLP lawyers.

On May 30, three days after the provocative Police Federation meeting, a judge ruled that the second proceeding was invalid and without authority. The opinion was issued orally, he explained, because he had been unable to find a typist to prepare the written opinion. Why a seven month delay could not have lasted until a typist was found was not explained but, coincidentally, both Prime Minister Manley and PNP General Secretary D.K. Duncan were out of the country at the time.

In the meantime, Roy McGann, the Deputy Minister of National Security, who might have been appointed to the position in the interim, had been set up by the police the day before. What was to have been an ordinary election march in his constituency ended in unexplained violence, two police raids, beatings, shots fired and stones thrown.
Eyewitnesses accused the police of inciting the entire incident. In any event, police searched McGann’s car and allegedly found a pistol, and arrested his driver for possession of a weapon. McGann was thus discredited just before he might have been able to defuse the Thompson court decision crisis.

In the absence of Manley and Duncan, it fell to the more conservative Deputy Prime Minister, P.J. Patterson, to act. Without consulting the Cabinet, Patterson bowed to the pressures, removed Thompson as Minister and temporarily assumed the portfolio himself. The next day another PNP Member of Parliament was interviewed on television about political harassment against members of his constituency. And the day after that his headquarters was surrounded by military men without identification numbers, and party workers were forced at gunpoint to lie on the ground. The MP was threatened if he went on television again. The same week three of Dudley Thompson’s party workers were shot to death. Gleaner columnist Dawn Ritch appeared in a television interview stating that she didn’t see why people thought Pinochet was so bad; he had done wonderful things for Chile.

Supporters of the government thought a coup was at hand; certainly all the events had been well coordinated.

Amid wild rumors Manley cut off his trip and immediately returned home. He reinstated Thompson and sent Patterson on a trade mission to Canada. Subsequently the Attorney General’s office issued a legal opinion noting that the government was appealing the lower court ruling, stressing that the election and seating of Thompson had not been challenged in the suit, only the second nomination proceeding (and Dudley Thompson had been nominated both times), and reiterating that in Jamaica, as in most countries, the Parliament is the sole judge of the constitutional qualifications of its members to sit.

Dudley Thompson

The JLP announced plans to boycott Parliament, due to sit shortly, so long as Thompson remained in it, but abandoned these plans as the actual date approached. The attacks on the Ministry of National Security continued unabated.

Violence in Jamaica

As noted above, indiscriminate violence marked the 1976 attempt to subvert the Jamaican elections. Jamaicans were shocked as a wave of shootings and arson swept the island, terrorizing the population and leaving hundreds dead or maimed. The terror culminated in the horrible Orange Lane fire in which a band of 50 armed paramilitary gunmen burned a block of tenements to the ground, forcing those attempting to flee back into the flames. At the same time, documents and weapons discovered in the possession of JLP leaders outlined a plan for a military coup with U.S. help before the elections. (See “CIA and Local Gunmen Plan Jamaican Coup,” CounterSpy, Vol. 3, No. 2, December 1976.)

A number of recent incidents demonstrate a similar campaign being waged:

- Almost four years later to the day of the Orange Lane fire, May 19, 1980, mercenaries still at large committed another crime of almost indescribable horror. The Even-tide Home for destitute old women was burned to the ground so rapidly that more than 150 aged, infirm women perished. Edward Seaga issued an incredible statement pointing out that some of the victims were JLP supporters and that he sympathized with their families. All over Jamaica people asked if JLP flesh was somehow worth more than PNP flesh.

- In late May reports reached Jamaica from an exclusive interview with a potential recruit, describing a black mercenary army being trained in Florida to fight for the “liberation” of an unnamed Caribbean island. Only blacks were being recruited, with Vietnam War veterans given a preference, contrary to the ongoing Cuban exile recruiting which has been present in Florida for more than twenty years. (See News Note in this issue.) The potential recruit said that “the recruiting exercise is not exactly wide open, but it is going ahead and has resulted . . . in the signing up of a considerable number of black Americans who are ready to fight.”

- Gunmen in early July shot up the Kingston Public Hospital several times, fired at armed policemen sent to guard the building, and threatened to burn the hospital—which caters to the poor of the Kingston area—to the ground. The Junior Doctors Association, representing many of the hospital workers, called for police reinforcements, noting that “the pattern of attacks indicated a systematic campaign to disrupt the health service.”

- As reported in the July 29 Daily News, foreign doctors working for the Jamaican government in various health services programs have received anonymous threatening letters and demands to leave the island.

- The incidence of unexplained power outages has greatly increased. Blackouts frequently occurred on nights

Number 10 (Aug.-Sept. 1980)
that the Prime Minister was scheduled to give a major speech (as JLP workers control the electric company), but recently power has been going off, usually unannounced, all over the island at all hours of day and night. Power company spokesmen continually issue apologetic statements, but do not explain to the public what is going on.

- Seven people were killed in mid-July in the impoverished Greenwich area of Kingston in a coordinated attack by at least five gunmen, kicking down house doors and opening fire. A JLP campaign jeep was reportedly involved in the operation.

- Around the same time, two men ostensibly repairing another JLP jeep stilled by the side of the road opened fire on a passing bus with M-16 rifles.

- On his trip to the United States, Seaga "predicted" more violence in store for Jamaica. Upon his return, his prediction was mirrored in further gunfighting, most of it coordinated and focused. Gangs of youths who were known to have little money and no resources suddenly had vague "jobs" getting $100 a week, motorcycles, and a gun. Killings continued, with PNP cadre and election workers most frequently the targets. Some of the gang members, killed in shootouts, were discovered to be in possession of large amounts of cocaine. Indeed eyewitnesses had often described the assailants as drug-crazed or "zombie-like." By late July, more than 350 people had been killed in Jamaica since fall elections were announced in February.

- In a most gruesome turn of events, it took more than two weeks to find a burial site for the seven Greenwich town victims, all PNP supporters, and four other PNP workers who had been murdered around the same time. The cemetery nearest the victims' homes, May Pen, adjoins the JLP stronghold of Tivoli Gardens, and residents threatened violence if the "socialists" were buried there. Plans to bury them in the more remote Calvery Cemetery were also disrupted by violent demonstrations, and the interments were moved to the distant Number Five Cemetery in Spanish Town. There, daily attacks on the gravediggers led to the necessity of police protection. Church leaders took to the radio, begging citizens to recognize that political differences end upon death.

There are only some of the incidents which plagued Jamaica in the weeks after the abortive coup attempt. Rumors circulated that July was "the month for killing women and children."

Other Indications of Outside Influence

The day after the Eventide fire, Seaga left for yet another trip to the United States to raise money from his friends, racist legislators, the CIA, and their supporters. Seaga's financial prowess is well known. As Finance Minister under the Hugh Shearer government which preceded Manley's, he had engineered a famous real estate deal wherein the Finance Ministry rejected a £60,000 appraisal for a property the government wished to buy, and snapped up the site at the value of the "revised" appraisal, £160,000! The person who owned the property sold to the government? Edward Seaga.

The Curriculum Vitae which Seaga hands out in the U.S. notes that he is the owner of Consulting Services Limited and Capital Finance Company Limited, "specializing in consulting and project and lease financing." He is also a member of the "Latin American Advisory Board to President of ADELA S.A., a unique private development bank operating throughout Latin America, owned by 200 of the largest corporations and banks in North America, Europe and Japan." In Jamaica only a politician who has no need or desire for broad based appeal would actually tout such connections.

Seaga's frequent trips to the United States and an unusually affluent JLP are not the only signs of outside help. The JLP somehow obtained and repainted green, the JLP color, about 90 surplus U.S. Post Office jeeps through its Miami affiliate, the Jamaica Freedom League. These were the same jeeps implicated in several incidents of violence noted above. Where they came from and how they were paid for is unclear. Local speculation centered on the Postal, Telephone and Telegraph International Union (PTTI), whose dominant force, William Dougherty, Jr., is now the Director of the American Institute for Free Labor Development. AILFD, a CIA creation under the cover of the AFL-CIO International Affairs Department, was instrumental in toppling governments in Guyana, Brazil and elsewhere. Dougherty, Sr., coincidentally, had been the first U.S. Ambassador to independent Jamaica in the early 1960s, while his son was occupied overthrowing the Goulart government.

Several "support groups" in the United States channel funds and material to the JLP. Most well-known are the Friends of Free Jamaica, based in New York, and the Jamaica Freedom League, a coalition of Jamaican and Cuban exiles based in Miami. The latter prints massive amounts of brightly-colored anti-government propaganda which quickly works its way to the island.

Number 10 (Aug.-Sept. 1980)
Some of Seaga’s pronouncements on government activities, and particularly his fixation with Cuban “influence,” although generally quite inaccurate, clearly point to U.S. and possibly British intelligence connections. Indeed a member of the National Security Council stated to the Latin America Weekly Report that “Seaga is one of our best intelligence sources.” The relationship is undoubtedly mutually beneficial. (CAIB Number 7 documents some of these connections.)

The influx of weapons into Jamaica is apparently a coordinated operation, a carry-over, no doubt, of the H. Charles Johnson network described in the sidebar. The gunrunning network appears also to have a symbiotic relationship with drug smuggling operations, which have a long history in Jamaica. When a route exists for moving drugs from or through Jamaica to Miami, the trip back is easily adapted to bringing in weapons. Jamaica is riddled with unpollised, unprotected airstrips used in ganja smuggling. But, as a May 13 Daily News editorial observed, they can easily be used by mercenaries; “an invading force could use them to attack and topple whatever regime is in power.”

There is speculation that a major group which might be involved in the weapons traffic is the Zionist Coptic Church, a ganja marketing cult which arose in the late 1960s. The Coptics, who are shunned by the traditional Rastafarian groups, control large farms and tracts of land, transportation companies, and even some commercial properties. They scandalized the island recently by evicting the police from a stationhouse the police had rented for nearly fifty years.

Another reason for involvement of the drug smugglers in the campaign against Manley was suggested in a May 6 article in the Chicago Defender, entitled “Is Drug Money Financing Ouster of Manley?” It suggested that the JLP, the Gleaner, and its “pornographic evening subsidiary paper, the Star” were stressing, in their propaganda about Jamaica’s relations with Cuba, the Cuban attitude against drug use, which “has apparently driven the cultists into the arms of the JLP, though covertly.” The article also reminded readers that Peter Whittingham, a Deputy JLP leader in Parliament, who had been involved in the 1976 “Werewolf” plot against the government, “was convicted in Miami for drug trafficking, and is still serving time.”

Much of the discussion above relates to the role of the Gleaner, and particularly the similarity between its role in Jamaica and the role of El Mercurio in Chile. CAIB uncovered a more direct connection. In issue Number 7, Fred Landis outlined in great detail the CIA’s long relationship with the Inter American Press Association, especially its role in the destabilization campaign against Allende. Its role was played primarily through El Mercurio. IAPA’s Technical Services Division, which has been directly linked with the CIA’s Technical Services Division at Langley Headquarters, provided technical training and equipment to El Mercurio. The CIA provided IAPA with technicians who worked out of IAPA’s Miami office and on El Mercurio’s premises. In 1970, when the campaign against Allende went into full swing, the IAPA TSD representatives installed computerized and automated typesetting equipment—well before the major U.S. papers had such systems—which were in fact tied in to a network of computers reaching back to Langley, retrieving and feeding CIA articles to El Mercurio instantaneously.

On July 1, 1980, CAIB spoke anonymously, with Gleaner publisher Oliver Clarke, an IAPA Executive Committee member since 1976, and learned that although there were no IAPA personnel based in Kingston, “one of their Technical Services Division personnel was down here a few weeks ago to give some training.” The Gleaner, which discontinued running Forum World Features articles when it was exposed as a CIA proprietary, which discontinued running World Feature Services articles when it was exposed as an MI-6 front, has been running, with more and more frequency, unattributed articles from distant datelines, with standard CIA themes. The TSD training is greasing the wheels for this part of the Gleaner propaganda machine.

Seaga’s Recent Ploys

One of the most potent disinformation weapons, standard procedure in past CIA destabilization operations, is for one side to accuse the other of precisely what it is doing. This muddies the waters and confuses the people. (See the review of “The Spike” in this issue.) The Gleaner has set the stage by accusing the government, in no uncertain terms, of being liars. “It is one thing to have incompetents for leaders,” wrote the servile Wilmot Perkins, “another thing entirely to have liars... The Government and its Party... are untrustworthy. Nothing they say is to be believed.”

The JLP consolidated the campaign with a full-page ad which appeared on June 26, “Beware PNP Plots to Smear the JLP. They have done it before. They will do it again.” Under this headline, in small type, the JLP alleged that every time they had been caught with weapons, it was a PNP plant; every one of their supporters detained under the 1976-77 State of Emergency was framed; all violence was caused by the PNP; and, most incredibly, when PNP supporters were shot and killed, they were actually being killed by their own friends—the “kill-your-friends-blame-the-enemy-plot,” the ad called it.

Although there is considerable evidence that forces around the JLP may be deeply involved in plans for a coup, it is Seaga who has constantly accused the government of planning what he refers to as a “military solution,” a phrase he introduced, typically, at a Washington press conference. Just what the fascists said about Allende. On June 18, at a JLP fund-raising dinner, Seaga announced that “the military solution planned by the government to regain power in the next general election had taken on international involvement, since the security forces had decided not to allow themselves to be used in that strategy,” according to the June 20 Gleaner. The speech was only four days before the attempted coup.

As PNP supporters and the Workers Party of Jamaica—well to the left of the PNP, but actively supporting the government in the general election—point out more and
more the evident hand of the CIA and of right-wing forces in the United States, the opposition continues to suggest that the government itself is planning a military coup, with the active assistance of the Cubans.

Relations With Cuba

Seaga's dire warnings, usually accompanied by fabrications in the Gleaner, and, often, in the overseas press, claim there is a massive Cuban presence in Jamaica. Figures given are in the thousands. There are in fact no Cuban military personnel in Jamaica, but a few hundred doctors, nurses, teachers, construction workers, and fishing instructors. There are more Peace Corps volunteers and transient U.S. military personnel in Jamaica than there are Cubans. But the myth not only persists, it is fostered in the U.S. As Pulitzer Prize winner Les Payne reported in the February 28 Newday, "Although it welcomed Jamaica's recent call for early elections, the Carter Administration remains determined to drive the country's Socialist prime minister from office unless he moderates his pro-Cuban policies." In an earlier article, Payne quoted a State Department source: "If within a 6-month testing period, Manley shows some signs of moderating his position, then we will take a softer line. If not, then we will continue to pursue a hard line."

The obsession with Cuba is all pervasive. According to the Gleaner, virtually every Cuban diplomat is an agent of Cuban intelligence, DGI. As is every businessman. Within hours of plane arrivals from Cuba, Seaga or the Gleaner announce passenger lists, and describe the backgrounds of many of the visitors. When a Cuban businessman was accused of failure to file the appropriate customs forms for a transshipment, Seaga immediately produced what he said was a detailed and complex outline of the entire corporate structure including, typical in the export-import business, Liechtenstein companies. No one could explain how Seaga had such information in a matter of hours.

Seaga announced at a speech duly reported in the Gleaner that the Cuban businessman was a DGI agent; his "evidence" consisted of information, undoubtedly provided by the CIA, that the company was part of an "international ring of companies." Not only that, some of the employees worked "irregular hours" and most of the employees knew personnel at the Cuban Embassy. Documents relating to the importation of goods into Cuba were even signed by the Cuban Ambassador. Similar information, all of it perfectly normal activity in the export-import business, is spread throughout the pages of the Gleaner in such detail, and with such conspiratorial tones, that the reader is urged to wonder: what is really going on.

As has been documented, the CIA spread similar stories about Allende's Chile. A Cuban presence, a Cuban threat, is the backbone of these destabilization campaigns. Seaga went beyond his calls for "international observers" as he stepped up the "military solution" hoax. After the attempted coup he upped the ante, demanding an international peacekeeping force. British, U.S. or OAS troops, no doubt to counter the Cuban threat. This was the ploy the United States devised in a last ditch attempt to prevent the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua. The proposed international peacekeeping force for Nicaragua was soundly defeated in the Organization of American States only weeks before the triumph of the Nicaraguan revolution. Similar calls are now being made for El Salvador. At the moment, though, Seaga is the only one raising this cry for Jamaica.

The Polls

The logic of Seaga's pronouncements and the entire JLP-Gleaner propaganda campaign hinges, oddly enough, entirely on a single political pollster. "The polls," say Seaga and virtually the entire Western press, deliberately using the plural, show the JLP far ahead in the election campaign; why then would the JLP consider a coup or any attempt to sabotage the elections when they would undoubtedly win in a landslide? The logic is simplistic enough to raise doubts in the minds of Western journalists, even when the other activities described are explained to them.

The flaw in the logic, however, is that Seaga is not ahead. One poll, and one poll alone, shows the JLP leading. That poll is the one conducted by Carl Stone, a political columnist for the Gleaner and a rabid JLP supporter. Imagine the credence which would be given in any Western country to a poll conducted by an openly partisan supporter of one side. The Daily News poll shows the contrary; detailed canvasses taken by the PNP during voter registration also show the PNP winning a majority of seats in the upcoming election.

The Realities of the Election Campaign

The proof is clear when one takes a closer look at the election campaign. Long before the actual voter registration process (called "enumeration" in Jamaica) began, the PNP announced all 60 of its candidates and began a series...
of election rallies throughout the country. More than 50 rallies were held and, at a dozen or so "presentation rallies" the PNP introduced its 60 candidates to the voters. During this time the JLP did not hold a single election rally and did not present a single candidate. This fact was completely ignored by the Western press, which spoke repeatedly of the well-oiled JLP election campaign, a campaign which did not exist!

When the JLP did finally announce its candidates, the list included a number of former military and police officials, an unusual practice in Jamaica.

On the last weekend in July, the JLP, fearful of small turnouts but stung by the criticisms of its failure to launch a campaign, decided to hold a single major rally in Montego Bay to present all 60 candidates. They predicted that 100,000-120,000 people would attend, the largest election rally in Jamaican history. According to the police figures, however, only 19,000 people attended, less than at most PNP local rallies. The JLP claimed 30,000; the Gleaner printed a picture of the podium, but not of the crowd. Stories abounded of people who had been brought across the island to the rally by offers of the free bus trip and then were stranded in Montego Bay when they discovered the buses had not been hired for the trip back.

The Gleaner, which had led a JLP-sponsored fight for reforms in the voter enumeration procedures early on, reforms which the government agreed to, logically should have supported voter registration, especially if the masses of the population backed the JLP as the Gleaner claimed. However, the paper launched a massive attempt to intimidate voter registration. They ran stories with such headlines: "Violence mars enumeration start," "Incidents in political hot spots as enumeration gets underway," "Governor general hopes for enumeration free from fear." The campaign was so distorted that the Press Association of Jamaica issued a report finding the Gleaner in violation of the Journalistic Code of Ethics. They pointed out that the effect of the campaign was "to undermine public confidence in the Electoral Reform measures, to discourage citizens from being enumerated and electoral officers from carrying out their jobs effectively."

Gleaner columnists woefully predicted that "we're not going to have a general election this year." After getting the electoral reforms they demanded, the Gleaner said "you have a choice. No election or an unfair one." Daily News columnist Mark Figueroa summed up the perplexity of the JLP's flip-flop:

"Indications are that the enumeration exercise is to become the latest target of attack for the right. To the ordinary Jamaican this may appear strange, given the way the government has bent over backwards to meet the opposition more than half way.

"But the record of the opposition on electoral reform makes it no surprise. Seaga has changed his position from no election without photographs to immediate elections even on the old list; to not a day before or after October 1980 to elections by July; to the government is plotting to call early elections, to his latest pronouncement that it may be necessary to abandon the electoral process."

There is no doubt that the PNP does not at present command the lopsided majority it did in 1976. Four years of destabilization and the machinations of the IMF have seen to that. But one can afford some slippage after a landslide and still be ahead; and that is precisely the situation. As the Miami Herald, which had swallowed the JLP propaganda whole for months, noted in late July, people were underestimating the charismatic popularity of Michael Manley and the organizational skills of D.K. Duncan. Even the Carl Stone poll finally indicated that Seaga was slipping. Gleaner columnist Dawn Ritch called hysterically for greater efforts on the part of the JLP, accusing Manley of attempting to buy the election by solving some of the food supply crisis in Jamaica.

D.K. Duncan

The cat was out of the bag. For months the JLP leadership had deluded their rank-and-file into believing in an easy victory and that it was the PNP which was responsible for all the unrest. But the JLP leadership knew the score, and it became obvious to everyone who had been planning what.

Making the Economy Scream

Before dealing with the actual CIA presence in Jamaica, a word about economic destabilization is in order. There is no question that the economy of Jamaica has suffered greatly in the past several years. But it is no coincidence that the real suffering began after Kissinger's vow to get Jamaica. As Richard Nixon told CIA Director Helms when Allende was elected in Chile: "Make the economy scream."

The major instrument used by the United States was the International Monetary Fund. The IMF's requirements for helping Jamaica out of its foreign debt problems, though written in lengthy financial documents, can be boiled down to a few words: Lower wages for workers and higher profits for the multinational. Manley believed, wrongly, in 1977, that he had to turn to the IMF. By January 1980 when Jamaica broke off all further dealings with the IMF, he had learned a hard lesson. The IMF was
neither impartial nor concerned with the interests of the Jamaican people. As a revealing article in the June 1980 *Multinational Monitor*, based upon confidential IMF documents demonstrates, Fund personnel in Jamaica "have been guided primarily by political considerations in their dealings with the island government." Indeed, the PNP's decision to break with the IMF has heightened U.S. antagonism and efforts to destabilize the Manley government. For the first time a significant Third World nation has taken a step to show the rest of the world that one can live without the IMF.

Seaga's pronouncements on the economy are extraordinarily superficial for a former Finance Minister. He first espoused what he called the "Puerto Rican model." He had the temerity to tell the people of Jamaica that they should aspire to the economic prosperity of Puerto Rico, based on its extremely close ties with the United States. He neglected to mention the 47% unemployment in Puerto Rico, the rape of the land by the petrochemical and pharmaceutical companies, the mass sterilization of Puerto Rican women.

As more information about Puerto Rican realities crept into the Jamaican media, Seaga moved to what he then called the "Central American model." He announced hopes to attract to Jamaica the manufacturers fleeing Central America because of the political upheavals there. As Mark Figueroa noted, was he opening Jamaica's doors to the "exploiters who literally sucked the blood of the people of Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras?" is "Somoza to be invited to Jamaica to invest the millions of dollars he stole?"

The latest quirk, espoused in a lengthy interview in late July in the *Gleaner*, was, of all things, the South Korean model. The South Koreans, the Jamaica Institute of Management was told, "know that they must work to live." "In South Korea the factories and offices open early in the mornings and work up to 5:30 and 6 in the evenings. Saturday is a full, regular working day." Not only should the multinationals run things; but also they should be allowed the privilege of a sweatshop economy. There is no doubt what Seaga has in mind for the working people of Jamaica.

The CIA Presence

Faced with the knowledge of events outlined above, the staff of *CAIB*, visiting Jamaica, determined that it was obvious there was a large CIA station present, and a busy one at that. Investigations confirmed our suspicions, and, as anyone who reads the newspapers is aware, we discovered at least 15 CIA personnel operating out of the U.S. Embassy. That is undoubtedly the largest station in the Caribbean, and perhaps the third or fourth largest in Latin America. One of the CIA personnel, the Deputy Chief of Station, William Adger Moffett III, is known to have special training and expertise in liaison operations with right-wing and paramilitary groups. During his posting in Haiti between 1973-75, his assignment was coordination with the Ton-Ton Macoute, "Baby Doc" Duvalier's private death squad.

Suspicious U.S. personnel not directly in the employ of the CIA also abound. At the time of the attempted coup it was discovered that the senior military attache at the U.S. Embassy, one Colonel Gerland E. Lindgren, was meeting outside the Embassy with numerous Army officers, well beyond anything which his official duties might require. He even met with Army officers on the grounds of Up Park Camp, the headquarters of the Jamaica Defence Force, wholly out of keeping with normal diplomatic protocol. As with most military attaches, Lindgren is probably Defense Intelligence Agency. Other non-CIA State Department personnel were noted cooperating closely with the CIA people. Some clear indications of deep-cover agents appeared.

One interesting discovery was the opening of a new route to Jamaica by Evergreen International Airlines in the middle of the summer when there were few tourists. Evergreen is the airline which flew the deposed Shah of Iran from Panama to Egypt, at the behest of the United States. Evergreen is also the airline which has initiated work at Walvis Bay, a portion of Namibia claimed by South Africa as an integral part of the Republic. Evergreen initiated airborne crew transfers for the Glomar Challenger, engaged allegedly in offshore oil drilling near Walvis Bay. The Glomar Challenger is the sister ship of the Glomar Explorer, the CIA vessel used in an attempt to raise a sunken Soviet submarine. (See *CAIB*, Number 9.) Evergreen, which owns the largest fleet of civilian-owned helicopters in the world, purchased from the Pentagon after the Vietnam War, has been reputed for some time to be either a CIA proprietary or a major contractor for the CIA.

Another interesting fact is that the bank used by the Jamaica Freedom League in Miami is the Bank of Perrine. According to the April 18, 1980 *Wall Street Journal*, the Bank of Perrine was the principal U.S. correspondent bank for Castle Bank of the Bahamas, the CIA's major financial institution in Latin America. Moreover, the Bank of Perrine was owned by Paul Helliwell, who, according to the *Journal*, was a major CIA operative who coordinated ten years of Nationalist Chinese attacks on the mainland during the 1950s, and was the "paymaster for the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961." Helliwell was active in CIA operations in Latin America till his death in 1976.

Yet another strange event came to the attention of *CAIB*. A local Jamaican journalist was at the office of the *Gleaner* in May when he heard over the office intercom that "Mrs. Descoteaux is here to see you." Mrs. Descoteaux is the wife of the former CIA Chief of Station in Jamaica, Norman Descoteaux, exposed in 1976 by Philip Agee. As noted in *CAIB* Number 9, Norman M. Descoteaux was, at least as of January 1980, Chief of Station in Algiers, Algeria. Perhaps the family was simply visiting, sightseeing at the *Gleaner*.

In light of these discoveries, and at the urging of several Jamaican groups, *CAIB* announced the CIA presence in detail at a press conference in Kingston. The subsequent phoney attack on the home of the Chief of Station led to the campaign against *CAIB* in Washington which is discussed in the editorial this issue. But the message for
Jamaica is clear. It was spelled out in a Daily News column by Horace Levy entitled, "On Dealing With Treason."

"Knowing a coup is going to be tried," he said, "sighting all the signs and publishing them, pinpointing even the month and week—does not prevent it from being tried. Neither does knowing about CIA involvement head it off. Neither does calling attention to the open wooing of the military by the right-wing press. Neither do rallies . . . . These are all fine and laudable things to do. It is just that they are insufficient for the task. Against the species of determined brute in question, what is needed is a set of really tough measures in all sectors—economic, security, political and political education . . . . It is hardly enough simply to be on the look-out for a set of people pre-classified as simply 'traitors.' More far-reaching political measures are required.

"One such, obviously, is to prevent the creation and dissemination of the distorted image and the twisted message of persuasion. Landis is convinced that 30,000 lives would have been saved in Chile if, as the Left sought, El Mercurio had been early closed down. The real traitors were located there.

"Another even more important but more difficult countermeasure is to seek by effective means to unify the people on a national rather than a partisan basis . . .

"The involvement of the U.S. Government is beyond doubt. The plotters' contact with the U.S. Embassy, the pattern of destabilization which only the CIA could coordinate, the give-away lie of the Gleaner that the 'Americans' had tipped of the security forces—do we need more? . . .

"Passing references to imperialism will not do. Neither will 'diplomatic' talk about a destabilization by an agency which is not named . . . . Certainly, it cannot be done by concealing from the nation the full meaning, the real source of the most serious attack on the institutions, life, and future of the nation in recent years.

"There are obvious economic advantages from keeping cordial relations with the U.S. But not to tell a people when war has been launched against them—this is outright sale of our birthright . . . . It cannot be too early to begin to build a national, indeed revolutionary, unity."

Conclusion

Levy's warning must be heeded by the people of Jamaica, and all the people of the Caribbean. Knowledgeable observers stress that the Manley government must emphasize the development of the Home Guard, an ambitious and necessary plan for the development of a real people's militia. Although Manley announced the plan in 1979, and despite sporadic upsurges in recruiting, it must be pushed to be effective. As Maurice Bishop and the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada have shown, a large militia, dedicated to the independence of the homeland, is an essential element in the struggle against destabilization.

The United States denies that it is destabilizing Jamaica, although it ignores the many articles pointing to secret White House and National Security Council memoranda on "getting Jamaica." The CIA of course denies it had anything to do with the phoney attack on the home of its Chief of Station, but no one denies the presence in Kingston of more than a dozen trained subverters. The State Department insists that it is neutral, but, when Edward Seaga was in Washington, and his arch-conservative friend Senator Richard Stone of Florida was unable to get members of the Congressional Black Caucus to meet with Seaga, State Department staffers then pressured members of the Caucus (unsuccessfully) to see him. The implication, not hidden at all, was that Seaga was going to be the next Prime Minister and they had better "familiarize" themselves with him. The pressure was so annoying in fact that it bolstered the Caucus's determination to launch an investigation into the NSC's plans to topple Manley.

Jamaica's development of democratic socialism, Jamaica's outstanding role in the Nonaligned Movement, Michael Manley's stature as a defender of progressive forces throughout the world, his cordial and understandably close relations with Jamaica's nearest neighbor, Cuba—all of these are anathema to the reactionary forces now in the ascendancy in the United States. No matter who is President of the United States, no attempt will be spared to topple Manley; only the Jamaican people can thwart those attempts.
Guyana:

THE FACES BEHIND THE MASKS

For obvious reasons, given the situation described below, the author of this article, who has spent considerable time in Guyana, must remain anonymous.

They have lived for these many years by putting on certain masks, by trying to fool the outside world—and even some Guyanese who live right here, with the mask of democratic government because they have a joke institution called parliament. In this mask they have something called a free press, free judiciary, etc., but we know that when we lost the right to choose our own government in free elections, we lost all other rights. It is just a matter of time—they take when they want to take, they give when they want to give until the time when the people intervene. Unmask them and show them that power belongs to the people.

Excerpt from speech by Dr. Walter Rodney, Georgetown, Guyana August 1979.

On Friday, June 13, 1980, in Georgetown, Guyana, Dr. Walter Rodney, internationally acclaimed historian and political activist was blasted to death by a bomb concealed in a walkie-talkie device that he had been tricked into testing. Ironically his murder, designed to silence his eloquent opposition, has ripped the last mask of respectability from the Guyana government of Linden Forbes Burnham.

Guyana's history during the last twenty years is replete with duplicity and bizarre occurrences, many of which have been directly linked to covert CIA operations. In addition, Guyana's Prime Minister Burnham, and his People's National Congress Party have become accomplished at the arts of deceit, dirty tricks, covert operations, and political violence in their efforts to maintain themselves in power and privilege.

The burden of this violence, fraud, and manipulation has been borne by the majority of Guyana's 827,000 citizens who have lashed out at each other under CIA and government-backed racial manipulation; been disenfranchised via vote fraud and election rigging; have been disgraced by the Jonestown affair; suffered from extreme poverty, malnutrition, and disease as a result of secretly negotiated deals between the ruling party and international lending agencies such as the IMF and World Bank; been set upon by thieves and thugs comprising the paramilitary arm of the House of Israel religious cult; and faced steadily escalating official repression in a society where one in every thirty-five citizens is armed by the State to protect the status quo.

Guyana, first colonized by the Dutch in 1621, became an English colony, British Guiana, in 1825. Then, as now, most of the population was concentrated along a narrow coastal strip of low-lying but fertile land. The critical need for fresh water for drinking and irrigating the sugar crops and the battles against the sea mandated a large, unskilled, cheap labor force. First, the need was met by importing African slaves. However, with the abolition of slavery in 1832, many Afro-Guyanese left the plantations and organized villages from which they fought for better wages and improved working conditions. The plantation owners responded with the importation of East Indian indentured laborers who unwittingly undercut black demands and began the long history of Black/Indian antagonisms that
have been manipulated ever since. Today, East Indians comprise 52% of the population and dominate the sugar industry. Africans, comprising 38%, dominate the bauxite industry and civil service jobs.

In the 1940's, racial divisions were surmounted and the powerful People's Progressive Party was formed under the leadership of Dr. Cheddi Jagan, son of an East Indian worker. The PPP's solidarity and Marxist analysis directly threatened colonial interests. A false rumor was circulated that the PPP planned to burn Georgetown so that the British could declare a "crisis situation" and land British troops. On October 9, 1953—a day that became known as Black Friday, Guyana's constitution was suspended and the duly elected PPP government removed from office to "prevent Communist subversion."

This inflammatory deceit gave the British government the excuse to turn Guyana into a police state for the next 4 years while they agitated racial tensions and again pitted East Indian and Black workers against each other. The British also encouraged Linden Forbes Burnham, an Afro-Guyanese with an excess of narrow, opportunistically ambivalent, to split from the PPP and to use racial invectives and an anti-communist platform to challenge Jagan in the 1957 elections. However, despite Burnham and his British Colonial Office support, Jagan's wing of the PPP carried 9 of 14 constituencies and again took office.

CIA-British Ouster of Jagan

The 1961 elections were marked by further Colonial Office gerrymandering and fierce campaigning that was aided by U.S. dollars channelled through the CIA-linked Christian Anti-Communist Crusade, but again the PPP won the elections.

After the third victory of the PPP, the U.S. and British operatives stepped up their destabilization activity. A campaign of racial violence and trade union manipulation was waged by the CIA, masquerading under cover as the American Institute for Free Labor Development. AIFLD's penetration of the Guyana trade union movement resulted in prolonged strikes and racial violence from 1962 to 1964. This gave the British an excuse to stall independence and rig the voting system by establishing a "proportional voting scheme" and "proxy voting." Although the PPP captured 46% of the total votes, they only won 8.6% of the 6,665 proxy votes. The proportional voting scheme allowed a coalition between Burnham's newly-formed PNC party and the ultra-right United Force party to out Jagan from office.

As reported in the April 10, 1967 London Sunday Times, Jagan's ouster was "relatively inexpensive for the CIA and accomplished with around $250,000. The price for Guyana was 170 dead and hundreds wounded, £10 million worth of damage to the economy and a legacy of racial bitterness."

In order to perfect the mask of democratic government after independence in 1966, Burnham established an election commission with representatives of each of three political parties. He then denied this commission access to the process of compiling a voter registration list. Instead, the voter registration list was compiled by Shoup Registration System International, a Pennsylvania-based CIA proprietary now disappeared that had also helped ensure "correct" voter registration in South Vietnam. Under Shoup's guidance, the registration lists were heavily padded by including horses, deceased citizens, and hanged criminals as valid voters. A British opinion research group has estimated that the majority of overseas voters who "registered" were nonexistent. With support like this, Burnham easily won the 1968 elections and began to consolidate his power. Despite this massive fraud, it was still insufficient to give the PNC the required 2/3 parliamentary majority to override the Westminster style constitution. In 1973 the Guyana Defence Force seized the ballot boxes "for their protection" and held them for 24 hours ... enough time to ensure Burnham's PNC a majority parliament.

Burnham's "success" at the polls led to the establishment in 1973 of the doctrine of "paramountcy" of the ruling party over the State apparatus and included the merger of the General Secretary of the PNC with the government's Ministry of National Development. Paramountcy thus allowed for direct access by the ruling party to the public till, and further established a device for government control and subsidy of nongovernmental groups such as the People's Temple cult and the paramilitary House of Israel. Exact details are unavailable because the PNC refuses to account for Ministry of National Development funds. Since 1975 this office has spent $54.3 million, of which 97.4% is unaccountable.
As Burnham's clique continued its grab for power, its Afro-Guyanese base of support began to erode due to worsening economic conditions although Burnham nationalized Guyana’s bauxite and sugar industries and postured as a nonaligned Third World leader bent on establishing "cooperative socialism."

Burnham’s socialist mask was perhaps intended to increase his bargaining power by pitting East against West in attempts to maximize foreign aid expenditures. The nationalization aspects of this decipt earned Burnham a reputation as a hard bargainer, but in fact Guyana’s treasury provided compensation to the multimational interests whose properties were seized. This "cooperative socialism" really means State capitalism and recent developments vis-a-vis the World Bank and the IMF auger the return of multinatinal investments and surrender of "nationalized resources."

Burnham’s "tilt" toward Cuba in the mid 70's and his socialist posturing apparently caused some concern in U.S. ruling circles but a severe cut in aid during the 1973-75 period combined with hints of CIA destabilization against his former friend brought the PNC regime around to a more acceptable position in 1977. In that year, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Terence Todman, said: "Guyana is seeking a different path to social and economic development, one with which we have no quarrel and which we have no reason to fear." Perhaps Todman’s absence of fear was predicated on his certain knowledge that U.S. penetration of Guyana was so complete and Burnham’s opportunism so consuming as to ensure ultimate loyalty to Western interests.

CIA Grooms Its Guyanese

A specific “development” project that was funded was the now infamous U.S. AID Office of Public Safety police training program. Exact figures are not easy to obtain but records that are available indicate that between 1966 and 1970, 521 Guyanese police officers were trained in the OPS program’s Latin American facilities. At least another 53 had received training in the U.S. by the end of 1973. (By 1976, Guyana’s police force numbered 3,121.) In addition, the OPS program supplied security forces with hardware such as jeeps, patrol boats, and aircraft, along with arms, ammunition, and riot-control equipment.

Along with the routine courses in police work American-style at the CIA-run International Police Academy, a number of Guyana’s finest went to special training courses operated by the CIA’s proprietary, the International Police Services Inc. (INPOLSE) out of a residential house in Washington, D.C. At least one officer Eustace V. Kendall attended the Texas Border Patrol “technical course” in bombing, arson, and assassination. This Texas facility was so dirty that even the Department of Defense refused to staff the operation. Information so far available shows notable graduates of the Washington INPOLSE program to include Cecil “Skip” Roberts, present head of Guyana’s Criminal Investigation Division and Norman McClean, now Chief of Staff of the Guyana Defence Force.

Although given a favorable AID evaluation, the OPS training program apparently did little to improve police capability in the apprehension of criminals as evidenced by the attempted assassination of WPA activist and University of Guyana biologist, Joshua Ramsammy. Ramsammy was shot and severely wounded in 1973. Police officers Wally Kelman and "Skip" Roberts identified the getaway vehicle, which was traced to Burnham’s cousin, Hamilton Green, the Minister of Labor and Health, Green, whose involvement in political thuggery looms large, was never taken into custody. Kelman was hustled out of the country and given enough cash to relocate in New York; Roberts was eventually promoted to his present post as CID chief.

The Ramsammy affair involving violence in open view of police, linkages to PNC hierarchy, official failure to conduct a proper investigation, and unavailability of a key witness bears striking resemblance to other mysterious violent episodes in Guyana history. The Jonestown massacre and killing of U.S. Congressman Leo Ryan, the daylight stabbing of Catholic Standard news photographer Fr. Bernard Darke, the shooting death of Education Minister Vincent Teekah, and the assassination of Walter Rodney also remain uninvestigated.

In 1974, Arnold Rampersaud, a PPP activist who had campaigned against highway tolls, was arrested and charged with the shooting death of a toll booth operator on the Corentyne Highway. The evidence was flimsy, involved several major impossibilities, and was widely believed to be a frame-up. Finally, after three trials and 1,250 days in prison, Rampersaud was declared “not guilty” by a unanimous Guyanese jury. The international defense team included the present Prime Minister of Grenada, Maurice Bishop, plus the presence of Amnesty International and other U.S. and U.K. observers. The prosecution was headed by private attorney Rex McKay, a PNC favorite who also has been tapped to present the State’s case in the now-pending arson trial of Working People Alliance (WPA) members.

Just as the Ramsammy shooting portended the official use of violence, the Rampersaud case contained elements to be repeated in future political trials. In addition, the jury verdict acquitting Rampersaud caused Burnham to push for the passage of an Administration of Justice Act that allows summary proceedings and excludes the right to jury trial for certain categories of crimes involving national security.

In 1978, government forces passed the Referendum Act which proposed a national referendum to permanently alter Guyana’s constitution and pave the way for an “executive presidency” that could be Burnham’s for life. Opposition to this proposal came from literally every segment of Guyanese society. Rather than compete with with nonexistent voters in the Shoup registration lists, these opposition forces organized a nation-wide boycott and monitored the polling places for the July 10, 1978 special election. Citizen efforts document voter turnout at 14%, while the PNC claimed a 71% turnout and overwhelming victory.

Another event with perhaps equally far-reaching consequences occurred just one month before the “referendum
to end all referendums.” In June, Burnham negotiated a secret deal with the International Monetary Fund that typically required harsh economic consequences for Guyana. In return for $81 million, Burnham agreed to widespread public sector lay-offs and other measures that resulted in dramatic reduction in real wages. The details of the arrangement were kept from the Guyanese public until after the July 10 referendum. As if the IMF reward for Burnham’s referendum vote to life presidency was not enough, U.S. funding also increased dramatically from $2 million in 1976 to $24.7 million in 1978.

Prime Minister Forbes Burnham and the late Jim Jones

Jonestown

On November 18, 1978, U.S. Representative Leo J. Ryan and four of his party were gunned down under the noses of Guyana Defence Force personnel and soon the world and later Guyana was to hear the horror of the Jonestown massacre.

Despite the sensational murders and “suicides” resulting in at least 914 deaths, there has been no investigation by Guyanese officials and only half-hearted prosecution of chief suspect Larry Layton. He was recently acquitted in a Georgetown court on attempted murder charges and many say he will never have to face trial for his role in the killings of Ryan, those in his party, or the hundreds of others at the People’s Temple. (Charles Bekman, the only other person to face charges related to Jonestown, has been sentenced to only two years for his throat slashing of Sharon Amos and her three children.) Defense Attorney for the cult killers is none other than Rex McKay, who has reportedly taken a sizeable fee and made large investments in the U.S.

The Jonestown death camp and related controversy, including the existence of a People’s Temple hit team, will probably never be fully explained. However, persistent rumors and abundant loose ends have led to the recent reopening of U.S. Congressional hearings into CIA linkages with the People’s Temple. The following is a partial list of some of the factors which have fed flames of controversy.

- Ryan aide Joe Holsinger reports that a White House official told him on the night of the Ryan murder that there was a CIA report from the scene.
- Large supplies of sophisticated behavior modification drugs were found in Jonestown.
- Jonestown also was well supplied with sophisticated arms.
- Unduly large amounts of cash were found in the camp.
- A number of Jonestown residents were U.S. criminals on probation or parole.
- Larry Layton’s father, who admits pouring cash into the People’s Temple, was a U.S. government biochemist, raising the spectre of MK-ULTRA.
- First reports indicated only 300 dead and one week later the world learned of the 914 person death toll. We are asked to believe that 600-plus bodies were hidden under 300!
- The Justice Department attorney picked to handle the investigation, William Hunter, “coincidentally” had a personal relationship with Timothy Stoen, the former San Francisco Assistant District Attorney who for a time was Jim Jones’s right-hand man.
- Leo Ryan’s name appears in “Who’s Who in the CIA” by Julius Mader.
- The removal of the bodies was conducted by U.S. military personnel.

The list is endless and for the Guyanese and American people, there is little likelihood that the truth will ever reach the surface. In Guyana, the Jonestown tragedy served to focus attention on other cult groups with similar deals involving the Burnham government. These include the Moonies, a Black group from Brooklyn, New York called The East, as well as the House of Israel. The latter is a largely Guyanese cult led by a fugitive North American who calls himself Rabbi Emmanuel Washington.

The Not-So-Kosher House of Israel

“Rabbi” Washington, or just “Rabbi” as he is called in Guyana, was known in the United States as David Hill. Before his mysterious appearance and rise to power and riches in Guyana, he was a thief and con artist with a record of more than thirty arrests, numerous convictions, and a one-year stint in Ohio’s facility for the criminally insane. Rabbi used the Black Power movement of the 60’s for personal aggrandizement.

The House of Israel was originally founded in Cleveland, Ohio in the mid-60’s by the David Hill who in prior dealings in Cleveland’s Black community was known as “Bishop.” Cleveland Plain Dealer accounts of Hill’s activities go back to 1964 when he was sought on bad check warrants in Cleveland and Columbus. Later, Hill teamed up with a Reverend Earnest Hilliard who had made a name for himself as a radio personality, the “Prophet” Frank Thomas.

Together, Hill and Hilliard shook down local businesses, and, in the process, stumbled on the fact that the McDonald’s fast food operation was owned exclusively by whites and took millions of profits from Cleveland’s Black com-
munity. Unfortunately for Hilliard, his powers of prophecy did not foretell his sudden demise in July of 1969 when he was murdered in his garage by a bullet in the brain.

The Rabbi, who stepped into Hilliard’s leadership position with the Black Unity Campaign against McDonalds, was questioned in the shooting death but charges were not filed. Meanwhile, Rabbi Hill continued to do what he did best. He used fraud to steal more than $50,000 from Cleveland’s Black community, utilizing a stack of McDonald’s franchise applications acquired in the boycott campaign to convince hardworking black citizens and parishioners that they only had to execute the forms and give Hill a check for $5,000 in order to acquire their own fast food franchise.

Hill was indicted for blackmail in the McDonald’s campaign and found guilty by an all-white jury, his one legitimate claim to persecution. He was sentenced to 4-25 years in prison. During the pendency of this case, he was also indicted by a Chicago grand jury on grand theft felony charges and bail was set at $150,000. In addition, an angry member of his church filed a complaint for money stolen by a bad check and Hill was also indicted on larceny-by-trick charges for bilking an area auto dealer.

A genuine Cleveland community activist who was in jail with Hill reports that “Rabbi” bragged of a deal with government officials. Non-believers were soon convinced when within weeks Hill was granted appeal bond in the McDonald’s case, had the Chicago bail reduced and posted via a bondsmen, and was released on the other pending charges.

He failed to appear in court on November 17, 1971 and soon surfaced more than 3,000 miles away in Guyana. Within seven years Rabbi Washington and his House of Israel has become established as a powerful force in Guyana political life. Services rendered by “Rabbi” to the Burnham regime include strike-breaking, physical harassment of opposition meetings, and murder. In an interview in 1981, the Reverend Washington confessed to the murder of a police officer and to smuggling weapons into the country.

A recent interview with Ohio prosecutor John Corrigan revealed that his office had no intention of seeking extradition. This fact coupled with Corrigan’s reputation as a hard-nosed ultra-conservative who has in the past spared no expense in prosecution of black activists, and Corrigan’s track record of active cooperation with FBI COINTELPRO agents, lead many to suspect that David Hill is in Guyana serving the Burnham regime because U.S. officials want him there.

There is also evidence that much of Hill’s present wealth has come from U.S. AID programs and other development assistance money. The Rabbi was paid for a time for work performed with a U.S.-funded brickmaking training program and reliable sources indicate that Hill is getting a monthly check from the Guyana Ministry of National Development which receives funds as a result of U.S. support.

There is also a Washington, D.C. connection of a more deadly sort. A former employee of a Washington-based shipping company claims that the House of Israel was the recipient of arms and ammunition handled by the D.C. firm.

For Guyana, 1979 may have marked the point of no return to the route to civil war. As economic conditions mandated by IMF austerity measures affected every sector of society, organizing efforts by the opposition People’s Progressive Party and the Working People’s Alliance gained momentum. The PNC regime, faced with an almost total lack of popular support, became more and more reliant on House of Israel thugs and force of arms to maintain power.

The year 1979 was also marked by signs of inner circle factional fighting as well as a strike by traditional Burnham supporters, the Afro-Guyanae bauxite workers. Despite desperate poverty and concurrent increases in malnutrition and disease, the IMF deemed the 1978 program successful and a new 3-year extended facility was negotiated. Part of the new deal was to be a public sector wage freeze despite prior government promises a of a $14 day minimum wage.

A Mysterious Fire

On July 10, massive public demonstrations marked the first anniversary of the rigged referendum and another significant event of that day was that the office of General Secretary of the PNC requested information from the Bank of Guyana that indicated a fraud investigation concerning the Ministry of National Development. Early the next morning the building which housed the office of the General Secretary of the PNC and the Ministry of National Development was burned to the ground in a spectacular fire in which the building was destroyed.

Number 10 (Aug.-Sept. 1980)
blaze marked by numerous explosions. Despite eye witness accounts that the fire was the work of men in Guyana Defence Force uniforms, eight WPA leaders were arrested and five were subsequently charged with various crimes. Three were charged with arson in connection with the fire: Dr. Walter Rodney, Dr. Rupert Roopnarine, and Dr. Omawale, all WPA leaders and leading academic figures.

On July 13, the public was notified of a major Guyana Defence Force shake-up. The CIA INPOLSE-trained Norman McClean was given the top command job over Clarence Price and Ulric Pilgrims. Subsequent disclosures by Arnold Molyneaux, a guard at the fire-ravaged building, indicated that in the early morning hours of July 11 immediately after the fire, he was taken to Prime Minister Burnham’s residence and that McClean, who was present, was already acting as Chief of Staff.

Thus, it appears that Burnham contrived to deal with dissident GDF elements who may have been responsible for the sensational fire, by removing them from power and then charging the opposition ala Reichstag in order to create diversion from his significant internal difficulties.

Despite the sleight of hand, Burnham’s problems continued to mount, as July 11 also signaled the beginning of the bauxite workers walkout and demands for the promised minimum wage. On July 14th, the PNC’s organ the New Nation contained a cartoon showing a mouse with a crucifix around its neck, being crushed to death by a house that it had attempted to bomb. At the bottom of the page appeared the words “Exterminate Rats!” and “War is declared.”

That day, as hundreds picketed the court house in protest of the arrests connected with the fire, House of Israel thugs set upon the crowd. Father Bernard Darke, a news photographer for the Catholic Standard was fatally stabbed. Another Standard reporter, Mike James, was severely beaten and Gordon Yearwood known for his opposition to Burnham was stabbed.

All of this occurred within yards of the police station and in plain view of several police officers. Yearwood recalled that as an officer moved to intervene, his attackers shouted: “Don’t shoot, we are ‘Rabbis’s Men.’” Police quickly moved to protect House of Israel property throwing up a guard around the premises. Several House of Israel members were charged in traffic court and fined GS136. Hamilton Green, Minister of Labor and Health and acknowledged “unofficial” goon squad leader, later attempted to pin the killing of Darke on an unnamed Catholic priest.

These events drew ever increasing numbers of Guyanese to opposition rallies and, on July 27, the Working People’s Alliance formally declared itself a political party dedicated to the building of scientific socialism.

Official Violence and Intimidation Escalates

On the labor front, the Afro-Guyanese bauxite workers rallied trade union solidarity such as had not been seen since the pre-1964 era, when the largely East Indian sugar workers and their union, the Guyana Agricultural Workers Union joined the walkout. By the end of August, trade union solidarity was capped by the addition of support from the Clerical and Commercial Workers Union, the National Association of Agricultural, Commercial & Industrial Employees, and the University of Guyana Staff Association. All of these events occurred amid increasing violence and stepped up beatings by police, openly operating with House of Israel elements. In one of the most vicious attacks on CCWU strikers, Hamilton Green personally led the fray.

In addition to the usual Burnham tricks, strict import controls required to meet IMF targets were used to deny newsprint to opposition newspapers. Most severely affected is the PPP’s Mirror which is reduced to a weekly 4-page format reaching only 8,000 instead of a daily with a circulation of 40,000. The independent Catholic Standard has been forced to pay exorbitant prices for printing to continue its weekly newspaper and is further burdened by defamation litigation initiated by Minister Green.

On October 25, 1979, Vincent Teekah, PNC Minister of Education and the only East Indian cabinet member, was killed while sitting in a parked car with Howard University Dental School teacher, Dr. Oswaldene Walker. Walker was whisked out of the country before police could take testimony from her and physical evidence such as powder burns negate the official version of a shooting from outside the car. To date no investigation of the killing has taken place.

On November 18th Ohene Koama was added to the list of these murdered when the WPA activist was gunned down in cold blood by police who later claimed he was armed. Eyewitness accounts are contrary and photographs taken at the scene have been denied to the press.

National Insurance Director Field-Ridley was fired when “Rabbi” Washington’s request for insurance following mysterious explosions at his House of Israel headquarters was denied. The headquarters was also shown to be a bomb factory. On the other hand, Court of Appeals Justice Crane, after reversing the lower court and denying the Mirror’s right to newsprint, was given the position of Chief Justice and later Chancellor of the Judiciary. Those looking for answers about Jonestown should know that the Guyanese official selected to investigate the matter is none other than the faithful Chancellor Crane, who to this day has yet to convene his first hearing on the grisly massacre.

The year 1980 began with the visible escalation of official police repression. The CID, under INPOLSE-trained “Skip” Roberts, became formally associated with gangster elements and House of Israel thugs. The “death squad” of the police force terrorized the public with National Security Act warrantless house searches, beatings and shootings.

Evidence of official terror was dramatically released on February 25, 1980 at a WPA press conference where government documents were revealed showing transfer of arms to the House of Israel. A top secret radio message transcription was also produced from “Moonbeam to Chief of Staff.” It read, “Re Delta Serra, plans for attacks
on known WPA members must be fatal" (Delta Serra presumably means Death Squad). The cable was dated November 20, two days after the fatal police shooting of Ohene Koama. The same day as the press conference another WPA member, Edward Dublin, was shot several times by police after an exchange of words outside a Linden night club. The original police version of the story that Dublin was stealing cement from a construction site was changed the next day following eyewitness accounts of cold-blooded murder.

February also marked the promulgation of the new PNC constitution and the publication of still another secret deal between Burnham and CIA-linked forces. It was revealed that in October 1979, the PNC had concluded a deal with a consortium of right wing U.S. religious groups headed by Franklin Graham (Billy’s son) for a massive resettlement of Southeast Asian refugees from Thailand to the Yarikita region of Guyana near the Jonestown camp. (See CA/IB Number 9)

These were no ordinary refugees, but were in fact the remnants of the once powerful Laoitan Hmong (formerly called Miao) which was recruited by and fought for the CIA under Colonel Edward Lansdale, Hugh Tovar, Edgar “Pop” Buell, and others in the secret war in Laos. Nor were they religious groups of the ordinary variety. They counted among their number elements of the Summer Institute of Linguistics/Wycliffe bible translators, which has been named as a CIA front by Time magazine.

For Guyanese with a bloody history of CIA destabilization, the plan was too much and widespread opposition forced the temporary postponement of this scheme to import a 40,000-strong mercenary army.

At the end of February 1980, James Mentore, head of the Special Branch and assistant Police Commissioner was fired for “leaking information to the opposition.” His dismissal and subsequent disappearance has led to much speculation as to his fate. Mentore, who received little attention by the U.S. media, has much to tell. As Security Chief he holds information that could unravel the Jonestown mystery as well as document the connections between Guyana government repression and U.S. assistance there-to. While many Guyanese suspect his disappearance can be traced to a death squad sanitizing operation, other rumors indicate his presence in the Washington, D.C. area as recently as June. It is known that CIA officer James Lee Adkins (named in CA/IB Number 9) sought contacts with WPA members immediately following Mentore’s disappearance, ostensibly seeking information concerning the Security Chief’s whereabouts. These attempted contacts were rebuffed and the true purpose of the CIA man’s inquiry is not clear.

By Spring 1980, the regime’s attempts to cover its real nature became more and more transparent. A bill known as Criminal Law Bill 1980 was rushed through Parliament in order to change results of pending cases resulting from the Referendum Anniversary arrests in July 1979. In response, the Guyana Bar Association staged a boycott and the legislation was condemned throughout the Caribbean.

Also, economic conditions reached an all time crisis as indicated by the government newspaper’s now classic announcement that “milk was banned in the public interest.” To add insult to injury Labor Minister Green proclaimed that there were no shortages, but that long lines at Guyana stores were caused by “lazy workers who were not responsible to customer requests.”

On June 30, the stalled arson trail began before the Chief Magistrate. As in the Rampersaud case, an international defense team was assembled and human rights observers gathered from the U.S. and the U.K. The trial, which lasted only three-and-a-half days, was set in an atmosphere of increasing violence. More than 20 persons were arrested throughout the country and six were charged with treason, a hanging offense not employed since 1823. In addition, the Guyana Bar made public evidence of torture against prisoners who were also denied access to counsel.

Arson trial defendants, Walter Rodney, Rupert Roopnarine, and Omawale were effectively denied public trial when House of Israel members were allowed to pack the court. WPA supporters were also subjected to violent harassment at home with stepped up “Death Squad” searches and parents intimidated by weapons placed at the heads of small children.

The trial itself was notable for its lack of substance. The government’s lead witness, Arnold Mollyneaux repeatedly contradicted his written statement and in the end was only believable insofar as he insisted that he believed the fire was set by Guyana Defence Force personnel. Mollyneaux’s death in July makes him unavailable for further questioning. The only other witness to give evidence, the police photographer, was also caught in contradictory testimony.

It is interesting to note that the government theory about the fire is that the three WPA members started the blaze with a mixture of paint and paint thinners despite witness statements indicating multiple explosions and rapid destruction which are inconsistent with the paint and thinners explanation. When the trial resumes in August 1980, a key witness will be Eustace V. Kendall, the firearms and explosives examiner who learned his trade at the CIA Texas Border Patrol facility.

Walter Rodney is Assassinated

One week after the trial adjournment in June, Guyana and the world were shocked by Walter Rodney’s murder. First accounts by the government were obviously prepared in advance of the killing and reflected the scenario envisioned by the PNC plotters. Official accounts first said that a man had been killed outside the walls of the Georgetown Jail when a bomb he was carrying to blast the prison detonated. The government claimed that the corpse was not immediately recognizable because the face had been blasted away.

Number 10 (Aug.-Sept. 1980)
In reality Walter was killed a block away from the prison and, although cut in half by the exploding walkie-talkie, his face was at all times recognizable. Further evidence of the government lie comes from witnesses at a Georgetown cocktail party who recall that Chief of Staff McClean excused himself at 8:45 p.m. on the 13th—within minutes after it happened—to meet with Burnham and others, saying Walter Rodney had been killed in an explosion! This was despite official allegations that it was not known until much later who had been killed.

Donald Rodney, who was in the car when his brother was killed, was injured by the blast, and was able to hide out with friends and provide an accurate account of the deception used to lure Walter to his death. Donald recounts that he and his brother had been meeting for several months with Timothy Smith, a GDF sergeant who was a British-trained electronics expert. Smith had promised to build walkie-talkie sets for the WPA. These were necessary because communication devices were routinely confiscated by police and banned via import controls.

Since Walter’s murder, the GDF officially claims no word of a Sergeant Timothy Smith and the house where he had resided is empty. However, public reactions to Rodney’s murder have been so strong that many have come forward and proof of Smith’s identity, including photographs, now exist. It is known that Smith’s service number 4141 was still listed on the army payroll in June and that an acquaintance recalls his training in England in 1977. True to form, witnesses have been sent out of the country and are not available for questioning. A mutilated corpse with hands cut off was recently found in the Guyana countryside and there is increased speculation that Smith, having served his masters well, has received his last reward!

The international horror at Walter Rodney’s murder has led to former PNC friends coming forward and in confidence detailing further evidence of the regime’s corruption.

Hamilton Green and Norman McClean are said to have visited Washington D.C. twice in the last week of May. McClean confided in several persons that the purpose of his visit was to acquire “electronic communications equipment.” The WPA claims that this included the rigged walkie-talkie anti-personnel device.

In addition, there is growing evidence of a well-organized network of PNC supporters in this country who continue to do the bidding of their Guyana-based masters and who finance activity with illicit drug sales. The center of the cover drug and goonsquad operations appears to be New York City and involves elements of a Guyana ex-police organization and the remnants of a New York cult. Green and McClean have made repeated visits since the assassination and are reported to have conferred with elements of the above groups in Brooklyn.

PPP and WPA sympathizers in North America have been attacked in recent weeks and many have received harrassing phone threats; several have been followed.

One former PNC supporter with good connections even reports that the mysterious James Mentore was killed last month by PNC thugs in Brooklyn. This report can neither be confirmed nor denied.

While many U.S. citizens and organizations have joined the growing condemnation of Guyana’s repressive regime, these sentiments have not been echoed by the official Washington establishment. To the contrary, one week after Walter Rodney’s brutal murder, the IMF and World Bank proudly announced a special joint funding package totaling 100-plus million dollars and support for a multi-billion dollar hydro-power aluminum smelter scheme slated for Guyana’s Upper Mazaruni district. These events have been heralded by the Washington Post as “good news for the Caribbean.”

Thus, with masks removed the face of imperialism is revealed and the stage is set for the final phase of the struggle by Guyana’s people against the Burnham dictatorship and the U.S. agencies which installed and have maintained it for sixteen years!
VICIOUS BOMBING IN GRENADA

Good evening, citizens of Free Grenada. Today imperialism struck its most savage, its most brutal, its most cold blow against the Revolution. Today, a monstrous crime was committed by imperialism and its local agents. Today is a sad day for our country. Today is a day when we gathered together to commemorate the anniversary of Butler and Strachan, two of our national heroes. But before the day was ended, even while we were commemorating the lives of these two outstanding Grenadians, we find now that in the future, 19th of June will be commemorating new martyrs, new heroes, new patriots, for our people's revolution and our struggle. At this point, two young comrades of our country, two young sisters, are dead, murdered by these cowards, murdered by these vicious beasts of imperialism. At this point, two more people of our country are gone.

A bomb was planted directly below the point where the leadership of the country was sitting. It was timed to go off at 3 o'clock, and at 3 o'clock it did go off. The fragments which were collected by our security forces indicate that a clock was connected to sticks of dynamite. It indicates also that it was done in a very sophisticated and scientific way. The first thing, therefore, we must note, sisters and brothers, is that a new technology has been introduced. This is not just a case of taking a box of matches and starting a fire. This is not just a case of the Mongoose Gang beating people up in the streets. This is not even the case of one or two criminal elements opening fire with guns and using bullets. Nor is it a case of someone just taking a stick of dynamite, lighting it, and throwing it. What we have here instead is a situation where people make a bomb and do so in a very clever way, in a way that indicates very clearly that they received training. This is not local technology. This is not the way of our Grenadian people.

We must note too that this was just not an attempt to kill the leadership of our country, important as that would be, important as it would be for any of these reactionaries and these murderers to wipe out the entire leadership at one time. We must note that the plan here was beyond that, because in the attempt to wipe out the entire leadership of the country, these murderers were prepared to kill dozens, hundreds, perhaps thousands of ordinary Grenadians. In our situation, only imperialism could be responsible for this. Can one think of an ordinary Grenadian counter-revolutionary being prepared entirely on his own, to wipe out hundreds of innocent Grenadians, while at the same time trying to kill the leadership? Can one think of any ordinary Grenadian agreeing to plant a bomb in a rally of thousands of Grenadians? At this point, two young women of our country are dead, murdered, blown to pieces, by this bomb. Two other young children are lying in a very critical condition. Ninety more of our citizens are right now hospi-
talized, lying in our St. George's Hospital, unsure whether they will live or whether they will die. Several dozen more people have been treated and have been discharged, and we hope that their injuries will not prove to be serious.

Today's events, sisters and brothers, comrades, remind us of the history of other countries like our own, which have faced the might and the fury of imperialism. Today's events remind us of Chile, remind us of the time when the Pinochet fascist gang killed hundreds and thousands of innocent Chileans in September, 1973. We remember the football park in Chile where innocent people who were on a hit list, prepared by Pinochet and his imperialist allies, were rounded up and brought to this park, and there brutally murdered. We remember the torture which followed, torture which extended not just to the workers, not just to the fighters and the leaders of the Party, but extended to the middle classes, extended even to priests and nuns. Torture knew no bounds. No one was safe from these criminals.

We remember, too, our sisters and brothers in Jamaica. We think of the Orange Lane fire of May, 1976, in Jamaica, when dozens of people were shot, when a fire was started, and when children were being carried out of that fire, the gunmen shot them back into the building to roast. We recall that just a few weeks ago, on the fourth anniversary of the same Orange Lane fire, another fire was started in Kingston, Jamaica, this time the Eventide old people's home, when more than 150 old people were burnt out, were killed. Who was responsible? Only imperialism and their local reactionary agents.

We think of our comrades in Cuba at this time. We think of their heroic sacrifices, we think of their courage. We recall the Bay of Pigs, when U.S. imperialism trained Cuban exiles in Miami and backed them up and sent them to Cuba with the intention of turning back the Revolution. They were routed by the brave, heroic people of Cuba. We think of the blowing up of the ship "Coubre." We think of the October, 1976, Air Cuban disaster, when 73 innocent people travelling on a Cuban plane were blown out of the skies, in order to appease the revenge and the thirst of imperialism. We think of the pirate ship attacks on Cuba. We think, too, of the dozens and dozens of unsuccessful assassination attempts at the Cuban leadership, and in particular at our friend and comrade, Fidel Castro.

Comrades, we think of Viet Nam, where thousands and millions of people were killed and massacred by U.S. imperialism. We think of the My Lai massacre, when innocent people were rounded up during that notorious war and brutally murdered—women and children, all innocent people.

Tonight it is important for us to try to put into context what today's events mean, because today's events did not just drop out of the skies by accident. Today's events are part of a total unfolding plan aimed at the destruction of the Grenada Revolution, aimed at the wanton devastation of our country, if we do not choose to continue along the old submissive and exploitative path that Gairy and his minions pursued. We think of the history of U.S. imperialism. We think of the days when the gunboats ruled the world, when you landed marines in someone else's country, in Guatemala in 1954, Dominican Republic in 1965, and dozens of other examples. We think of the occupations and the annexations of other people's territories, particularly in our region in Latin America and the Caribbean. We think of the assassinations of Sandino, the patriot of Nicaragua, of Allende, the hero of Chile, of so many other martyrs of this region who are to die at the hands of imperialism.

We think of the scientific way in which imperialism has evolved a new concept, called destabilization, a concept aimed at creating political violence, economic sabotage, a concept which when it fails, eventually leads to terrorism. We think of the attempts to use local opportunists and counter-revolutionaries, people who try to build a popular base, people who fail in building that popular base, and people as a result of having failed to fool the masses, then turn to the last weapon they have, in desperation, the weapon of open, naked, brutal and vulgar terror. Having given up all hope of winning the masses, these people now turn their revenge on the masses. They now seek to punish the masses, to murder them wholesale, to plant bombs in the midst of rallies, to get us afraid to continue to attend rallies, to try to break the backs of the popular support of the revolution, because imperialism was frightened and terrified by the Grenadian masses on March 13, 1980, when thirty thousand of our people gathered in one spot to celebrate one year of people's victory, people's progress, people's benefits. They were terrified by that, and as a result they now seek to intimidate, to browbeat, to frighten and terrorize the masses, to get them to be afraid to assemble, to get them to be afraid to continue to build their own country in their own image and likeness.

We think of the October-November plot last year. Remember what the plotters had in mind for our country, the slogans they were using, calling upon NATO, NATO which our people know nothing about, calling upon the CIA. Remember their plans to bring back the dictator Gairy. Remember their plan to try to burn down St. George's, to slaughter innocent people, to use the very same bombs that today some of them were able to use. Remember the Budhli Gang, which surfaced in the last few months, their pretense at being honest people, their pretense at being in support of the ordinary working and poor masses, their pretense at being revolutionaries. We think of this gang that believes a revolution is like instant coffee, where overnight changes can come. This gang that pretends that no benefits have come to the masses, when in fact their real aim was to take over the country in order to spread their own ideas. We think of this crowd. We think of their weapons. We think of the plan that they had to take over one of the P.R.A. camps, to try to subvert and influence some of the comrades in the People's Revolutionary Army. We think of their counter-revolutionary demonstrations. Remember that only last week when the home of one of them was searched by security forces, hundreds of bullets were found, and sticks of gelignite: only last week, sisters and brothers.

We think, too, of the numerous death threats, some on the telephone, some in letters which keep coming directed to different members of the leadership, threats so vulgar and so gross that half the time we are unable even to finish
these notes. We think of people like Stanley Cyrus, who continue to try to plot and plan and scheme and who hope that one day they will be able to return this country into the hands of imperialism, people who are willing to use any amount of violence and bloodshed to try to overturn the revolution, because they recognize, and recognize quite clearly, that people are the Revolution, that the Revolution is popular and strong and deeply rooted in the masses. They understand that reality. They know that after tasting 15 months of people's participation and people's benefits, that a people will fight back, and therefore the only alternative to the Revolution at this period in our history, is bloodshed, terrorism, open, naked, violent, fascist dictatorship. That is the only alternative.

We think of the Solid Shield 1980 exercises which were planned by the Americans, plans which included the use of more than 350 ships, several planes, more than 20,000 Marines, plans which included invading the territory of Cuba, going on to Guantanamo to stage their operations, plans which included learning and practicing how to mine the Caribbean Sea, so as to be able to block off our country, and other progressive and revolutionary countries in the region in any kind of situation. We think of the recent nuclear war alert that took place in the United States, when, because of a mistake in a computer, a mistake which took four minutes before it could be discovered, the world came very close to nuclear destruction. We think of the war mongers, of those who recognize the crisis now affecting international capitalism, of those who see their super-profits being drained away, of those who recognize that only if they are able to get a war economy moving again, to build more and more armaments and weapons of destruction, only in this way will their super-profits rise, and in pursuit of dollars, in pursuit of more and more profits, they are willing to destroy innocent children, innocent women.

Comrades, we have to recognize that this is a new stage. We have to recognize that what we are seeing, what we saw today, represents a new and higher stage in the plans of counter-revolution. Their desperation is now complete. This act and exhibition of gross and naked and vulgar terrorism which we saw today was aimed at frightening and terrifying our people into submission. What we saw today, comrades, was aimed at trying to reduce us into cowards, was aimed at trying to force us to return to the old days when they were able to dominate and exploit our country. Our Revolution was for justice, for food, for health, for housing, for clothing, for pipe-born water, for education, for people's control of our resources, for people's participation. Our Revolution was and is anti-imperialist. We are against the naked exploitation of our own resources for the benefit of a small minority of big multi-national corporations and their backers in big, powerful governments. Our Revolution was and is anti-colonialist. Our Revolution was and is in favor of the national liberation movements, in favor of the New International Economic Order, which aims at bringing social and economic justice to the poor and over-exploited countries of the Third World.

It is the masses who benefit from the Revolution. It is all of the people, except a tiny handful of exploiters and their foreign imperialist backers. Imperialism is afraid of this situation. They are worried about their profits, because dollars is the only god that they worship. They are afraid of the example of the Grenadian Revolution, and what it can do by way of indicating what a small and poor country, with a small population and limited resources can do for its people, if the people are serious about their own development, if they are willing to take their destiny into their own hands, if they are willing to stop looking outwards to the imperialist world and instead look inwards to the problems, the moods, the resources of their own people and their own country, and to use those resources to benefit their people.

They are afraid of the loss of the control and the exploitation which they were able to bring in the past. That is why our country is being attacked. That is why the United States considered, in the first few weeks of the Revolution, to have a naval blockade against our country. That is why the ex-ambassador Ortiz tried to organize a "human rights campaign," as he called it, against our country. That is why we were able to tell you last year about a plan that the CIA had worked out, a plan of destabilization, a plan of assassination, a plan of bringing terror to our people. But this country is our country. These resources are our resources. We have a right to choose how we are going to build our country. We have a right to determine who our friends are. We have a right to end exploitation in our country. We have a right to bring justice to the poor, and food and work, to the poor people of our country. We have a right to use our country, our labor, and our resources, to build our country. That is why we must fight back. That is why we cannot sit down and accept the plans of imperialism and local reaction.

Sometimes, sisters and brothers, a people are called upon to fight back, to draw on hidden and inner reserves of strength that they do not know that they have, to demonstrate extraordinary courage in the face of adversity, to fight back against what might appear to be impossible odds. Sometimes people are called upon to do these things. We are confident that as a result of today's monstrous crime, our people emerge stronger, more united, more vigilant, more powerful, than imperialism and its local terrorists and stooges.

We are confident that a united and determined people can never be turned back. We are confident that a well organized and conscious people can never be frightened, can afford to be brave, can afford to stand on our feet, and face the world. Revolutionaries do not have the right to be cowards. We have to stand up to fight for our country, because this country is ours, does not belong to anybody else. Our first task in this new situation is to protect, to consolidate, to defend, our Revolution. We have warned over and over again of the dangers that our country faces. We have pointed out on hundreds of occasions that imperialism will, not may, but will attack our country. We have pointed out, with absolutely no doubt in our minds, that imperialism and local reaction would keep plotting and scheming. We have said that revolution has laws, that one of the laws is that the more progress a country makes, the more benefits that are brought to the ordinary masses of the country, the more resistance you will see from counter-revolutionaries and from imperialism.
Some have doubted us. Some have felt that we are spending too much time talking of imperialism, that we are spending too much time looking for counter-revolutionaries, that we are talking too much about the possibility of our country being attacked and our people being murdered. Some believed the word of the revolution. Now they know. Now they understand. Imperialism, local reaction, they know no boundaries. They draw no lines. They make no distinction between killing people and killing animals. It is the same to them. The mercenaries they hire are quite correctly called “dogs of war,” because when they come, they do not look to see if it is a man or a woman or a child. They do not look to see if it is a soldier in uniform or a cripple on a bed, or an infant resting in its mother’s arms. They do not make these distinctions. And we have to be honest today, comrades, and point out that this is not the ending, this is the beginning, that what we have seen today can happen again.

Not just the People’s Revolutionary Army, not just the People’s Militia, not just our people in uniform, therefore, but all of our people must now prepare for people’s war to defend our country against local attacks and foreign invasion. All people who love our country must be willing to defend our country.

As I left to come down here to make this address, a fight is still going on, at the home of a man called Straughn Phillip, the headquarters of counter-revolution. That battle is still being waged. We must be conscious of this, because we have found evidence of a direct link between these local counter-revolutionaries and a number of other counter-revolutionaries and agents of imperialism residing abroad, some in countries not too far from here. We have a fair amount of details of the plans of these elements, and what we say to them is let today be a warning, that whenever they choose to come to land in our country, to try to turn back the people’s revolution, they are going to be wiped out, they are going to be dealt with without mercy. The same lack of mercy that today they showed when they planted a bomb, that same lack of mercy, that same firmness, but on this occasion, revolutionary firmness will be used to deal with them.

Starting tomorrow recruitment teams will be going around to all work places, to all villages, to all schools. These recruitment teams will be able to recruit at least 20,000 more Grenadians to become members of our militia, to mobilize our people for a state of war, to put our people on a war alert, to put them in a situation of serious preparation for defense of our country. We expect and look forward to the fullest cooperation of all teachers, of all employers, of all of our people generally, as we start this massive recruitment drive, because at this stage, the only guarantee against external attack and internal sabotage and subversion and terror is if our people are ready, able, and willing to fight to defend our country. All of our people must now move to the stage of learning how to defend the country, with guns in our hands, so when any of them land in this country with the intention of overthrowing our Revolution, they will understand that what they will meet is a fighting and combative people, a people prepared.
to die to defend their country.

We must not allow ourselves to fall into the trap of beginning to relax, because that is also one of the plans of imperialism. They use terror to frighten and to intimidate and to make us forget about production. We have to continue to produce. We must continue to struggle, to make sure that these deaths were not in vain. We must have more discipline, more production, an end to corruption, an end to inefficiency. We must have a militia of twenty or thirty thousand people that is prepared to wage a people’s war to save our country and to protect and to defend our Revolution. We must redouble our faith and our conviction that imperialism must not succeed. We must have a people prepared to fight back. We must give imperialism and reaction the answer that they will not be expecting, that we have not been cowed. We have not been frightened. We have not been intimidated, but we are prepared to continue to struggle. In the recognition that the struggle of the freedom loving people of Grenada, that the struggle to build a Grenadian revolution is a historic task which our country is shouldering, which we are doing not just for ourselves in Grenada, but for the entire region, for the entire Third World, because freedom and struggle and revolution and social progress are indivisible, cannot be separated. Freedom loving people throughout the Caribbean and Latin America are looking forward to the Grenada Revolution, want to see it succeed.

Those murderers will pay for what they have done. Imperialism will see us fight back. They will learn to respect the will and the fighting spirit of the Grenadian people and the Grenadian Revolution. Long live the popular people’s Revolution. Down with counter-revolution. Down with imperialism. The lives of these new martyrs must not be wasted. Their blood must be further manure and fertilizer to push our Revolution forward. Remember, a united, conscious, organized, vigilant people can never be defeated. Forward ever, backward never!

PRESSURES ON GRENADA

The Western press, urged on by reactionary forces within the U.S. government, has waged a war of pressure against Grenada since the first days of the Revolution. The culmination, to date, is a grotesque editorial in the August 10, 1980, Washington Star. Cuba and the Soviet Union, it says, are “again” exporting revolution. “As a result, Grenada, newest recruit to the ranks of leftist governments in the Caribbean, has become a training ground for terrorists of many nationalities. Members of the Baader-Meinhof group from Germany can be found there, along with Russians, Jamaicans, PLO Palestinians and a sinister English-speaking group known as the machete terrorists because, as the African Mau Mau once did, they mutilate their victims.”

This errant nonsense is followed by a quote from California “journalist” Georgie Anne Geyer, to the effect that President Carter is making the United States the first great power “that walks the decks trying to decide whether its own back yard is of strategic importance.” Georgie Anne Geyer is one of the leading apologists for the Pinochet regime in Chile, who led the campaign of slander and vilification against Allende immediately after his death. She is tied in with William F. Buckley, Jr., and other members of the Chile lobby, and is psychopathic about terrorists on the doorstep.

“In its own back yard.” Even as the right-wing lobby, the American Security Council, complains that the Caribbean, once “an American lake,” is becoming a “red sea,” leaders like Maurice Bishop are forced to remind the world that they are in nobody’s back yard. The arrogant pressures began in the first days after the Revolution when U.S. Ambassador Frank Ortiz met with Bishop to inform him that the United States would “not look kindly” on close relations with Cuba. Ortiz was replaced shortly thereafter by the ubiquitous Sally Shelton, hardly a typical ambassador. A few years earlier, Ms. Shelton had been a secretary in the office of right-wing Texas Senator Lloyd Bentsen (the original sponsor of the CIA’s proposed bill to outlaw the publication of CovertAction). Within an extremely short time she advanced to Legislative Aide, and soon thereafter was appointed Ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean. Her meteoric rise from Legislative Aide to Ambassador reportedly followed her use of unbridled sexism to win the votes of several conservative Senators for President
Carter’s Panama Canal Treaty. She is now similarly practicing diplomacy in the Eastern Caribbean.

Thus it was no surprise to many people when, shortly after the November 1979 coup attempt in Grenada, Stanley Cyrus was arrested on the island, accused of complicity in the action. He explained his return to Grenada some weeks before his arrest by pointing out that he had been asked by a friend of the head of a private high school in the countryside to come down for a few weeks to “teach the boys Spanish.” Several of the plotters already arrested, however, had led the authorities to discover that many of their meetings had taken place at Cyrus’s house. Funding from Trinidad, where Cyrus often travelled, also figured in the plot.

Cyrus protested his innocence, and supporters in the United States launched a massive campaign for his release. “Human rights” was the slogan; Cyrus was being beaten and starved to death by the Grenadians. A few months later, visitors to the prison observed a plump, healthy, and vocal Cyrus, who said not that he was being starved, but that he didn’t like the prison food, so his relatives brought him boxes of tinned food every week. Cyrus gave an interview saying nothing about torture.

In April, the government, under immense pressure, decided to release Cyrus as a gesture to its critics, and he immediately fled the island. He started a campaign, based in Trinidad, to vilify the People’s Revolutionary Government of Grenada. His information was rather precise and technical, for a so-called human rights activist. During one period of tension, when one of the small counterrevolutionary gangs was on the loose, Cyrus went on Radio Antilles to announce all the names of the gang, none of whom had been named at that time. Immediately after the brutal bombing described in Bishop’s speech on these pages, Cyrus was again on Radio Antilles, praising the demented killer Strachan Phillip as the first “hero” of the Grenada of the future. How anyone could praise someone who had planted a bomb in the middle of a crowd of innocent people, a bomb which killed three youths, is hard to imagine.

Grenada will survive the mouthings of a Stanley Cyrus, but it is a wonder that anyone listens to someone with his background and his bloodthirsty sentiments.

Another recent media lie is found in a July 8 CANA release, describing statements made by a former detainee released by the Grenadian government, James Harry. Harry said that prisoners were being tortured by methods including “pounding their toes with hammers.” James had, in fact, been one of the people rounded up at the time of the November coup attempt, who had confessed his involvement. Later he reversed his story, saying he had been pressured to confess, but when he was interviewed, on film, by visiting journalists, though he protested his innocence, he said nothing about hammers, or torture of any kind. (As former CIA officer Jim Wilcott noted in his article in CAIB Number 7, the CIA in Miami in the 1960s had a large program designed to feed false stories of mistreatment to arriving Cuban exiles and train them in presenting the bogus stories to the press. The same operation is now evidently being used against Grenada.)

Grenada now has its own home-grown media destabilizer, Stanley Cyrus. Grenadian-born Cyrus was a Spanish literature professor at Howard University in Washington, DC, when the Grenadian Revolution occurred, March 13, 1979. He professed to be a great supporter of the New Jewel Movement, led by Maurice Bishop, although most political activists on the Howard campus viewed him with some suspicion. For one thing, he travelled extensively, not just to Grenada, but to Trinidad and Venezuela as well, and he appeared to have some interest in an international construction company, unusual activity for a language teacher.

Before the Revolution Cyrus had purported to organize a Grenada chapter of CLAT, the Confederation of Latin American Workers. This was rather unusual, since Cyrus knew absolutely nothing about labor unions. Although CLAT takes a militant anti-CIA line, writers such as Philip Agee have pointed out that the CIA was always trying to infiltrate it.
STRANGE ACTIVITIES ON ANTIGUA:

CIA and Military Intelligence
On the Move

The government of Prime Minister Vere Bird of Antigua is one of the most reactionary in the Caribbean, a fertile ground for U.S. imperialist influence. It was Antigua which was the home for Space Research Corporation as it secretly channelled military equipment to South Africa, and it is Antigua which has been chosen by the U.S. Embassy in Barbados for its first "branch office," with a staff of nine.

But recent investigations by CovertAction Information Bulletin have uncovered more goings-on which indicate a large-scale upgrading of U.S. intelligence activities based in Antigua. The most blatant example was found in the news that the Voice of America planned to set up a relay transmitter on Antigua. That in itself would not be surprising; the BBC, Deutsche Welle, and Radio Nederland all have relay transmitters in the Caribbean. Radio Moscow has a relay station in Havana. All of the world's major shortwave broadcasters beam some of their shortwave programs to the Caribbean and Central America.

What is most unusual about the latest developments is that the VOA station in Antigua is going to broadcast on mediumwave, or AM, rather than on shortwave, as the other major internationals do. This means that the target is narrow—the Eastern Caribbean, rather than the entire Caribbean and Central America. The effect of the propaganda will be localized and intensified.

Indeed, the granting of permission to VOA caused a political storm in Antigua. Some time ago Deputy Prime Minister Lester Bird (the son of the Prime Minister) turned down the VOA request, informing the State Department that "every Caribbean government whether Right, Left, or Center in political orientation, would feel that Antigua had become a bastion of U.S. metropolitan presence in the Caribbean." Subsequently, however, the State Department dealt directly with the Prime Minister, who apparently did not share his son's hesitations. The deal was made and the Deputy Prime Minister refuses to comment.

The move focuses further attention on the reactionary base which Antigua has become for imperialism's machi-
CIA communications network for the Eastern Caribbean, in other words, a major telecommunications base.

These VOA operations, whatever they really entail, are apparently under the direction of E. Ashley Wills, First Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Barbados. The peripatetic Wills is also the Director for the Eastern Caribbean of the United States International Communications Agency (formerly USIA), the parent organization of VOA. Wills boasts that he “wears three hats,” the third job being, “I write all of Sally Shelton’s speeches.” Wills confided to CAIB, “You may not believe this [we didn’t], but we don’t need any CIA people in Barbados because the people of the area tell us everything we need to know.”

And there is more. The VOA relay is on the large U.S. military installation on Antigua, home of both a Navy base and an Air Force base. One of the poorest kept secrets on the island is that the U.S. Naval base is, in fact, the major “secret” underwater listening post for the Eastern Caribbean. The closing down of Space Research Corporation facilities on Barbados at the same time as the development of the revolution in Grenada has caused a great deal of activity in Antigua. Both the Naval and Air Force base are being “beefed up because of Grenada,” according to a CAIB source, who also said that, in connection with the underwater listening operations, the Navy is laying detection cables out of St. Croix and St. Thomas to replace some of the capacity lost when Barbados did not renew certain contracts with the U.S. military.

Antigua, therefore, is becoming a center of both CIA and military intelligence for the Eastern Caribbean. It can only be hoped that the people of Antigua will remain vigilant and alert to the comings and goings of all the “technicians.”

“ELECTIONS” IN DOMINICA:
RCPM, MI-6, CIA MANIPULATION?

A story appeared in the Winnipeg Free Press (May 26, 1980) concerning pressure exerted by the Canadian Department of External Affairs on the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to “begin providing gun-boats and other types of security assistance, including police training, to small Eastern Caribbean islands such as St. Lucia, St. Kitts, and Dominica.” According to the Free Press source, the pressure on CIDA from External Affairs was actually at the behest of the U.S. State Department, which is concerned about “Communism in the Caribbean.” Working through the Consultative Group on the Caribbean Development, a World Bank offspring, to get Canada involved in propping up police systems of non-socialist governments in the Caribbean, appears to be a State Department priority.

The Canadian government hastily denied the story. But CAIB can not only confirm the Free Press report, but expand the information from firsthand knowledge. During the July elections in Dominica, a member of CAIB’s staff was in the capital, Roseau, ostensibly as a tourist, and witnessed “diplomats” from the Canadian High Commission, the British High Commission, and the U.S. Embassy—all visiting from their home bases in Barbados—observing, and then celebrating the victory of the conservative Freedom Party, and thereafter meeting with numerous members of the Dominican Police Force.

Indeed, the day of the election one would have thought Clark or Thatcher or Reagan was running, as each of these visitors followed the radio broadcasts of returns, duly marking them on their respective printed tally sheets, and commenting on each candidate personally. They all had made numerous trips to Dominica, especially during the hurricane relief operations, and it was clear they felt high stakes in the outcome.

The largest visible delegation was from the British High Commission, with four people there, a woman who appeared publicly and three others—two men and a woman—who hid in the hotel and received reports from her. After the Freedom Party victory was announced, CAIB’s intrepid and still undetected reporter accompanied the Canadian, the British woman, and the U.S. Embassy “political reporter,” Donald Camp, to the police station, and saw each of them meeting with their favorite policemen to congratulate them and to set the times and places on the following day for serious meetings on materiel shipments.
The Canadian was overheard specifically promising better walkie-talkies and police broadcast equipment. It was like Christmas morning at the police station as the visitors asked the policemen what they really wanted.

Local progressives fear that the imminent overrunning of the 250-man Police Force has an immediate, short-term goal, the disbanding of the independent, armed militia force, also about 250 strong, which was formed by the people during the period immediately following the hurricane.

CA1B also learned from its unwitting Embassy sources that outgoing Prime Minister Oliver Seraphin may have been the victim of an extremely sophisticated operation designed to create reaction against his reelection campaign, and assure the Freedom Party victory. A group of "Miami businessmen"—Cuban exiles probably working for the CIA—had heavily funded his campaign. In a country where many people are still living in tents after the devastating hurricane, Seraphin flew from constituency to constituency by helicopter, piloted by Executive Air Services from the U.S. Virgin Islands; he gave away Texas ten-gallon hats, Caribbean "stingy brim" hats, and tams; and he handed out wristwatches which, when you pressed a button, flashed a picture of him. His full-color brochures, printed in Miami, were in stark contrast to the mimeographed and off-set materials distributed by the other parties.

Another ploy which backfired in Seraphin's face was the publically given to the February agreement between the government and Intercontinental Development & Management Co., Inc., of California. This amazing agreement would have given IDMC complete control of Dominica's tourist industry, banking interests, timber exploitation, and control of a large portion of the nation's industry. It even gave IDMC the right to make anyone a Dominican citizen. And everything was tax free. (It was a miniature version of OTRAG's agreement with Zaire, outlined in "Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa.") Patrick John, Prime Minister of Dominica before Seraphin, had attempted something similar with a Texas company, and was ousted from office in the weeks of rioting which followed.

The contradictions in the Seraphin campaign were also highlighted by the local paper, the Chronicle, which plays a role in Dominica similar to that of the Gleaner in Jamaica.

The coup de grace was administered by the U.S. Embassy in Barbados, which sent Deputy Chief of Mission Virgil Randolph III to Dominica a week before the election to protest Seraphin's distribution to his political cronies of a shipment of galvanized tin which had been sent by the U.S. as part of the hurricane relief. Though Donald Camp admitted privately to CA1B that the tin was rather defective to begin with, Randolph's mock outrage at Seraphin's petty theft also helped to turn people against him.

Seraphin's acceptance and use of the Miami money was either simply stupid, indicating that he completely misjudged the Dominican people and the suffering they have undergone, or it was part of a clever, and undoubtedly remunerative deal he made to throw the elections and hand control over to the Freedom Party. Many local observers believe the latter.

In any event, the real losers were the progressive forces, the Dominica Liberation Movement Alliance, who, through overt red-baiting and covert manipulation of the election campaign, were thwarted into the background. The avidly pro-American Freedom Party is now firmly entrenched in power, and the U.S., Britain, Canada, and France are rushing to buttress it militarily.

The above CIA document was among five that were declassified under a Freedom of Information Act request by the Center for National Security Studies on CIA domestic operations which, under the Agency's 1947 charter, are illegal. The document shows that in the Caribbean, as in Operation CHAOS during the Vietnam War, the CIA (and the FBI under its COINTELPRO activities) tried to find some foreign connections and funding support of anti-war and civil rights groups in the U.S. It also records the existence of the Caribbean Branch within the Western Hemisphere Division, whose importance at Langley has increased tremendously, especially since Somoza's overthrow in Nicaragua.
Cuban Exiles and "Refugees"
Training for Another Bay of Pigs

If there is one thing the CIA does well, it is the specialized field of paramilitary training. As we wrote in CAIB Number 6 ("Cuban Exile Terrorists on Rampage"), there are hundreds of Cuban extremists who have worked for the CIA during and since the ill-fated Bay of Pigs debacle. They are still using their training nineteen years later.

The latest chapter in this haunting by-product of two decades of CIA operations against Cuba has emerged in a feature article in The Boston Globe (July 13, 1980) by Malcolm Balfour and Len Stone. The two journalists were apparently brought to a place called "Campo Libertad" near Lake Okeechobee deep in the Florida Everglades. They describe "the staccato rhythm of rapid rifle fire" and platoons of recruits marching to and fro in full battle dress with M-16 semi-automatic weapons.

The camp commander, a 48-year-old former member of the U.S. Special Forces named Major Jorge Gonzalez, posed for a photograph in green-and-brown Army fatigue, an M-16 in his fist, a green beret on his head, and wearing large aviator sunglasses covering nearly half his face. Gonzalez did time in prison in Cuba, and also four years at the Federal Penitentiary in Atlanta, the latter for sabotage bombings in U.S. waters of ships owned by companies that did business with Cuba.

Gonzalez was a close associate of the militant Orlando Bosch who, among other acts of wanton terror, masterminded the in-flight bombing of a Cubana Airlines plane over Barbados in October 1976, killing all 73 passengers aboard. When Bosch and two other accomplices were arrested in Caracas (Bosch had slipped into the country using a false Costa Rican passport and also possessed an official Chilean passport issued by order of Gen. Pinochet), the Miami-based semi-secret club of CIA-trained terrorists, Alpha 66, cabled the Venezuelan president to plead for their release: "Alpha 66 considers that Your Excellency is not acting at the level which world democracy demands, and below the level that corresponds to who presides over the country of (Simon) Bolivar. With profound disgust." The 73 victims had not been dead three weeks.

All of the Cuban officers at "Campo Libertad" are U.S. Special Forces alumni. They start the training in the morning with hand-to-hand combat and mock landings. Many of those in training are newly-arrived "refugees" from the Peruvian Embassy siege in Havana, or are some of those released from prison by Fidel Castro in response to "humanitarian" pleas by the State Department and the AFL-CIO. Major Gonzalez bragged that his troops "will be a well-balanced invasion force . . . . I think you will be surprised at how soon the invasion will be on us. We have to be very cautious. But we are well prepared now . . . very well prepared."

The Gonzalez operation takes on even greater significance in light of persistent rumors emanating from Florida about other mercenary training camps (among them Alpha 66, the Abdala group, and the "black mercenary army" noted in the article on Jamaica in this issue), with special attention being given to a handful of recruits from several Caribbean nations. It is widely believed the latter are being prepared as a mini rapid deployment force that might be sent forth into Nicaragua, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Lucia, or elsewhere in the region. According to one report received by CAIB, a train car loaded with "serious armaments" vanished during the Liberty City riots in Miami. The weapons were not U.S. Government cargo, so therefore it is thought they were part of a clandestine Mafia shipment out of the country, but may well have "landed" in the hands of Major Gonzalez and friends.

What are U.S. authorities doing to stop this activity? Sgt. Paul Janowski of the Terrorist and Intelligence Unit in the Dade County Sheriff's Department was blunt about it: "We all know about Jorge Gonzalez and his training camp in the Everglades. Right now, his activities are all within the law." A local resident, whose home is situated on the edge of the camp, told the reporters he is frequently jolted out of his sleep by rifle fire and paramilitary exercises nearby. His daughter is afraid to stray far from the house.

NOTE: We regret that due to the time involved in dealing with the action in Congress and the aftermath of the Jamaican incidents (noted in the Editorial this issue) we have been unable to complete the editing of the interview on microwave interception promised for this issue. It will appear in the next issue of the Bulletin.
"The Spike": Thinly Disguised Fiction

Spy books, fiction and non-fiction, are commonplace. Some of the novels are well-written mysteries; some of the non-fiction accounts, especially those by insiders over the past several years, provide considerable insight into the workings of the CIA, MI-6, Mossad and other agencies. But "The Spike," by Robert Moss and Arnaud de Borchgrave (Crown Publishers, New York: 1980), is a horse of another color. It is much touted as the real inside roman a clef, a thinly-disguised look at what is really going on in the world.

Thinly disguised it is; truthful, even remotely close to the truth, it is not. As the analysis which follows by Dr. Fred Landis demonstrates, "The Spike" which purports to describe a massive left-wing disinformation plot is itself a part of a growing and well-coordinated right-wing design to do just that.

Moss, as Landis amply demonstrates, has extensive ties to the U.S. and British intelligence complexes. De Borchgrave, too, openly brags that he has "very high intelligence sources in Langley, in London, and elsewhere." For 16 years he has been a foreign correspondent for Newsweek magazine, travelling extensively. According to information reaching CAIB, de Borchgrave's prestige at Newsweek has been weaker recently due to his extremely conspiratorial nature. It was discovered that he keeps scores of dossiers, what he calls his "intelligence files," on many people in Washington, including many of his colleagues at Newsweek.

The plot of the "The Spike" is simple enough. It traces the development of a vaguely left-liberal Berkeley student and journalist, Robert Hockney, from a writer for Barricades Magazine (Ramparts, get it?) to a more and more skeptical world-famous investigative reporter to, finally, a mature and deeply conservative journalist convinced by massive proof that the Western media have been taken over by the KGB.

Indeed, almost everyone in the world left of center is a witting or unwitting KGB agent. The Director of the CIA, the Deputy Director of the National Security Council, the Deputy Director of the Arms Control Agency, the Vice-President are all moles. Senators, legislative aides, editors, reporters are all KGB agents. The New York Times, the Washington Post and other major papers compliantly serve the interests of enemy intelligence.

But the authors' wrath is turned most forcefully on the critics of the CIA and U.S. foreign policy in general. Philip Agee, the Institute for Policy Studies, the Transnational Institute are all working for the KGB. (Philip Kreps, the Institute for Progressive Reform, and the Multinational Institute, in the book.)

It is all part of Plan Azev, Leonid Brezhnev's plan to take over the entire world by 1985. (Honestly, that is what Moss and de Borchgrave say.)

Some of the sentiments expressed throughout the course of the book are mindboggling. The Greek junta colonels were "authentic Greek nationalists trying to stem the Red Tide." The My Lai massacre was a phoney. The Shah of Iran was cleverly depicted by Soviet propaganda "as a uniquely bloodthirsty tyrant, when in fact his regime was mild." (Chile, for reasons which Dr. Landis makes clear, is never mentioned in "The Spike.")

If this book were labelled non-fiction, it would undoubtedly be dismissed as mindless right-wing paranoia. By pretending to be non-fiction disguised as fiction, however, it has gained somewhat more credibility, and certainly more sales than it deserves. It isn't even well-written. But, for the reasons Dr. Landis sets forth, it should be taken seriously.
Robert Moss, Arnaud de Borchgrave, and Right-Wing Disinformation

by Fred Landis

A former aide to the Shah of Iran who defected two weeks ago has asserted that the Iranian government had given substantial gifts to a number of Western reporters in return for laudatory articles about the Shah's troubled regime... the former aide, Siamak Zandi, 37, was the head of the protocol section of the Iranian press office.

Among those he mentioned was Arnaud de Borchgrave, a senior editor of Newsweek magazine. The current issue of Newsweek carries an article by de Borchgrave of an interview with the Shah, one of the few the Iranian ruler has granted since street fighting broke out in his country. Zandi said he personally delivered to de Borchgrave at the Hilton Hotel in Tehran a matched pair of rugs worth $10,000 each.

He named a number of Europeans as recipients of expense money, free plane tickets, lavish hotel accommodations and gifts. Among them, he said, was Robert Moss. Moss is the more controversial, having written a book about Chile that was financed by one of the Central Intelligence Agency's front organizations.


Moss's Conspiracy Theories

After the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua, ABC-TV discovered that Somoza had purchased VISION, a weekly news magazine, in an effort to boost his sagging image. The editor of VISION, at a $20,000 salary, was Robert Moss.

Given the obvious problem of presenting these real-life episodes in a heroic light, Moss distorts the circumstances as experienced by his alter ego, "Spike" hero Robert Hockney: "The appearance of Hockney's article in Reader's Companion triggered off a savage smear campaign. The radical gossip sheets made out that he had been on the Shah's payroll. The campaign continued and intensified when Hockney published a follow-up article on the covert involvement of Castro's agents in the successful revolution in Nicaragua."

Fred Landis, a Chilean-born American psychologist, received his Ph.D. from the University of Illinois based upon his thesis, "Psychological Warfare and Media Operations in Chile, 1970-1973." He served as a consultant for the Subcommittee on CIA Covert Action in Chile of the Church Committee. He has recently co-authored the new book, "The Assassination of Orlando Letelier" (Lawrence Hill & Co.: 1980). Now this will hardly do. It wasn't the "radical gossip sheets" that exposed authors de Borchgrave and Moss, it was the major U.S. media, including the New York Times and Newsweek itself. Nor were these the only incidents.

Later that year Israeli intelligence, through a front called the Jonathan Foundation, organized a conference in Jerusalem to "combat Israel's growing isolation on the international scene." As reported in the Wall Street Journal (July 26, 1979), conference participants included Robert Moss, Brian Crozier, former CIA Director George Bush, former CIA Deputy Director Ray Cline, Senator Henry Jackson and a host of "safe" journalists. The most provocative allegations did not come from CIA officials, but from Robert Moss, who claimed the KGB was responsible for the fall of the Shah and Somoza.

According to the Wall Street Journal, "A considerable number in the press corps covering the conference were much annoyed by Mr. Moss's charges and told him so. Where was he getting his information? Was he really asking people to believe he had respectable evidence of a Soviet-led conspiracy in these matters? The reporters demanded a special press conference from Mr. Moss the next day. [Moss stated] it was perfectly sound journalistic practice for him to refuse to reveal his sources. The full extent of Soviet involvement, he argued, couldn't be ascertained and publicized except by a government intelligence operation."

The previous year, the "Spike" disinformation team was busily at work in Africa. When Katangese rebels invaded Shaba province, Moss announced they were really Cubans in disguise. Fidel Castro publicly denied any Cuban role. Since Castro had not been reticent in acknowledging that Cuban troops were present in other African states, he was generally believed. Writing in the Washington-based Policy Review (Summer 1978) Moss marveled at "The credibility with which statements from Castro and all the more startling evidence, of Cuban involvement have been published by Newsweek's Arnaud de Borchgrave."

On February 20, 1977 the London Daily Telegraph carried the banner headline, "Moscow's next target in Africa." This was the result of an in-depth analysis by Robert Moss. A map accompanying the headline clearly points out the next target: 2 arrows surround South Africa. Moss argues that the British and American insistence on including the guerrillas in a Rhodesian settlement means that "this is a pre-
scription for another Marxist Dictatorship, which will provide the base for black guerrillas and Soviet proxy troops to attack the ultimate target, South Africa."

For some reason nobody paid any attention to Moss's exposé. so the next month the South African government, through a front, the "Club of Ten," had the entire page of the Telegraph, reprinted as a full-page ad in major newspapers in Britain and the U.S., including the Washington Post and the London Guardian.

These newspapers had reason to reject the Moss story as news. In a series of articles (December 19-22, 1976) the Guardian showed how Robert Moss's book Chile's Marxist Experiment, was financed by, and its content determined by, the CIA. The Guardian came into possession of correspondence between Forum World Features and other CIA proprietaries with the publisher. Previously, correspondence between the Agency Headquarters and the CIA Station in London had appeared in the British press showing that Forum World Features was a CIA propaganda front.

This correspondence was given to the Guardian by the editor: David and Charles, who resigned over the unusual circumstances surrounding the handling of Moss's book. The CIA selected the title and an outline in 1971, then later picked Moss to write it, paid for his trip to Chile, and supervised the writing down to the last draft. Interestingly, the dust jacket for "The Spike" fails to mention "Chile's Marxist Experiment" as one of Moss's prior literary efforts.

The exposé led to a row in the House of Commons since Moss had been a speech-writer for Margaret Thatcher. The New York Times lead editorial of January 12, 1977 attacked the practice of the CIA concocting books, citing Moss as the prime example. Later, the Times (January 24, 1977) discovered that Moss's book had been published in the U.S. as well, a clear violation of U.S. law, which prohibits CIA propaganda activities in this country. This led to a Congressional investigation, led by Rep. Don Edwards (D-Ca.). Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights.

The Disinformation Mercenary

While these exposés had the effect of isolating Moss in the eyes of reputable journalists, they had the opposite effect on right-wing dictators. Publicity agents for the Shah and Somoza saw Moss as an intellectual mercenary who could be bought to fight their ideological battles. For a price, Moss would go to Rhodesia, South Africa, Iran, and Nicaragua and tailor his standard KGB plot to local circumstances, thereby justifying repression of the political opposition and denial of human rights.

The lack of familiarity with how intelligence agencies use journalists led some to depict Moss as a CIA officer or a James Bond. He is neither. The CIA does not often need journalists for general intelligence gathering, nor do high intelligence officials reveal real inside information to favored journalists. In terms of information flow, the purpose of an intelligence agency is to keep hard intelligence secret, and to make useful lies or disinformation public. In this sense, the "Spike" is accurate. Disinformation is the key to the relationship of the CIA and the media, and historically—as revealed by the Pike Committee in 1976—has been the single most frequent covert action by the CIA: The systematic introduction of false information into the communications systems of the enemy in order to confuse, divide, and demoralize. That is disinformation.

The Chile Connection

Admiral Canaris, head of the Nazi Abwehr; David Phillips, former Head of Covert Operations, Western Hemisphere for the CIA, and former president of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, and Robert Moss, all began their careers in intelligence work in Chile. Moss has an obsession with Chile. In "The Tribulation of Chile" (National Review October 10, 1975) he shows us a personal side: "As I drove through the cold, shabby streets of Santiago on my eighth visit to Chile, I found myself staring hard at the grubby little town that has not a single memorable building and asking myself: Why does this country mean so much to me?" According to a senior executive at The Economist, Moss was handled during his first trip to Chile by U.S. Ambassador Ed Korry, himself a former newsman who had worked in the "gray" area.

The London Daily Mail (December 1976) and Inquiry magazine (Feb. 19, 1979) both carried stories, based on what they described as classified CIA documents, concerning an organization of 20 Chilean journalists called the Institute of General Studies. The IGS was described as organized and controlled by the CIA, while Robert Moss was shown to be their British contact.

In 1970 the CIA had made a major effort to stage a military coup in Chile. Classified CIA reports at the time showed that this effort failed for two reasons: first, the military was reluctant to act without a clear legal justification; and second, the military did not have the necessary background, training, or interest in running the country.

The IGS was the solution to both. It acted as a conduit for CIA disinformation targeted at the military, creating spurious charges of Constitutional violations; and, as a think tank, the IGS was the counter-elite of technical experts to administer Chile after the overthrow of Allende.

After the October 1972 truckers' strike, Robert Moss put economists of the IGS in touch with dissident military officers. At these seminars it was explained, in purely technical, apolitical terms, why Allende was a disaster for the economy. These seminars were often held at the U.S. Embassy. A book on the reconstruction of Chile was issued by the IGS at this time in which Patricio Claro, attorney for the U.S. Embassy, wrote the chapter on the laissez-faire capitalist model for Chile. This model was to be implemented "after Chile overcomes its present Marxist phase."

The IGS did in fact provide all the civilian members of the military government after the coup of September 11, 1973. The final straw, the last provocation that got the
Army out of its barracks, was a piece of disinformation concocted by IGS member Juraj Domic. He came up with something called "Plan Z."

Plan Z

Plan Z purported to be a secret communist plot to neutralize, divide, and destroy the armed forces. Stories in El Mercurio and rumors spread by IGS were used to authenticate the forged documents, titled Plan Z, "discovered" by military intelligence.

The first use of this tactic by the CIA had been in Brazil, in 1964. There, the same secret communist plan to neutralize, divide, and destroy the armed forces was used, but the document was titled "PLAN XX."

In recent years British Intelligence has declassified some of its records from WWII. What these records show is that British Intelligence relied very heavily on deception; the science and practice of deception was the responsibility of the Double Cross Department or, Department XX. This Department XX helped in the creation of its U.S. counterpart, the OSS, which in turn helped get the U.S. into their war. Part of this effort included keeping secret their inception of the Japanese plans to bomb Pearl Harbor. Admiral Yamamoto coded his plans for December 7, 1941, PLAN Z. Deliberately titling the Brazilian deception Plan "XX" and the Chilean deception "Plan Z," was both an inside joke among the Anglo-American intelligence officers in South America, and a way of ensuring that the intelligence branch would not pick up as fact the garbage spewed out by its disinformation agents.

The agents used to spread Plan XX in Brazil were two then obscure government officials: Vernon Walters and Frank Carlucci. In the period June-September 1973, when the IGS was spreading Plan Z in Chile, Vernon Walters was acting director of CIA. He had been Deputy Director, but the Nixon "Saturday Night Massacre" made Schlesinger Secretary of Defense. and a technicality delayed Colby's swearing in until September 4. The individual who later replaced Vernon Walters as Deputy Director at CIA? Frank Carlucci.

Making "History"

What did Moss learn in Chile? An intoxicating lesson. That intelligence-connected journalists can make history instead of just reporting it. Or, as modestly described in "The Spike," "He was not merely a witness with an incredible ringside seat. He, Robert Hockney, was helping to change world history. He felt like a surfer riding, mastering, a tidal wave."

It is too easy to dismiss Moss as a self-inflated right wing propagandist. That is the general reaction to Moss, and to "The Spike." among the liberal Washington press corps. Those who dismiss Moss so easily might stop to consider: the vocal public endorsement "The Spike" has received from current and former CIA officials; the fact that neither the authors nor book reviewers treat it as fiction; that according to a classified U.S. Senate report the CIA has influence over 200 newspapers, and that these newspapers have treated "The Spike" as the Bible; that it was published simultaneously in five countries and erupted with a publicity campaign in all five including radio, TV, and full-page newspaper ads; and lastly, Moss's central role in forming three intelligence-connected think tanks in Santiago, London and Washington. It is graduates of these think-tanks that now run the governments of Chile and Britain, and may soon help to run the government of the United States.

The "Laboratory Model"

What is the magic formula that Moss learned in Chile, that led to such extravagant claims as "He was helping to change world history?" Why did former CIA Director William Colby in closed door hearings make several references to Chile as a "laboratory model?"

The formula developed for overthrowing governments and replacing them with conservative, intelligence-connected think tanks has certain specific elements: the think-tanks themselves, militant national businessmen's organizations, and coordination among military intelligence. The catalyst is disinformation. The Chile military solution model assembled these ingredients, used disinformation to create a crisis, and offered the think-tank personnel to the military as a solution to the crisis. The military then simply put it into effect. A similar Third World model is being implemented now, with minor adaptations, in Jamaica, as is shown elsewhere in this magazine.

In Britain, the electoral solution model was used. Here too the think-tank members present themselves as part of the solution, but are installed by their becoming a part of an ultimately successful conservative election strategy. The disinformation and the artificial crises remain the essential ingredients of the plan.

It is suggested that a similar plan is in the works for the United States, keyed to the 1980 elections. The think-tank personalities are deeply involved in the Reagan campaign, offering their ideas, made plausible by their own disinformation, as the solution to the foreign policy crises. The catalyst, again, is disinformation. The first, and perhaps most important piece of intelligence-connected disinformation in this campaign is "The Spike."

"The Spike" unites into a coherent whole each and every single piece of disinformation spread by these think-tanks over the last four years. In June of 1976 the London-based Institute for the Study of Conflict held a series of strategy sessions on how to bury detente and maneuver the U.S. back into the role of world gendarme (especially of those strategic pieces of real estate where the British could no longer afford to fly the Union Jack). Present were Robert Moss; Arnaud de Borchgrave; Brian Crozier; Vice Admiral Sir Louis Le Bailly, Director General of British Military Intelligence; Major General Fergus Ling; Brigadier W. F. K. Thompson; Brian Breidham, foreign editor of the Economist; Frank Barnett, President of the National Strai-
The Chile Military Solution Model

The first open call for a coup in Chile appeared in March of 1975 on the front page of a CIA-funded magazine, SEPAS. The cover story read “An English Recipe for Chile-Military Control” and was attributed to Robert Moss. The think-tank Moss worked with in Chile, the IGS, was a kind of disloyal opposition. In 1972 it organized and mobilized a new business movement (the Comando de Acción Gremial) into a national strike. Years later Pinchevet would state that it was this crisis that finally led the Army to prepare contingency plans for seizing power. It was IGS disinformation about a Marxist plot to nationalize the truckers that sparked the strike. The detonator which led the Army to implement their plans for a military solution one year later was something called Plan Z. Here is Moss’s version from “Chile’s Marxist Experiment”:

“The collapse of Chile’s Marxist experiment was foreshadowed by a chilling phrase that had cropped up amongst the dense foliage of political slogans on the Santiago walls. The words ‘Ya Viene Djakarta’ (‘Djakarta is Coming’) were exotic and probably incomprehensible to most Chileans. But the purge of the Indonesian Communists after the failure of their plot to assassinate the generals who had been more or less content up to that moment in 1965, to play along with Sukarno, bore a striking resemblance to what later took place in Chile—although the cost, in terms of human lives, was infinitely less the second time around.”

The CIA mailed thousands of cards with this slogan to the Chilean military. Whether by accident or a way of later saying “Killroy was here,” Djakarta was spelled in English rather than in its Spanish “Yakarta.”

The Britain Electoral Solution Model

On his return to Britain, Moss became a speech-writer for a then little-known member of Parliament, Margaret Thatcher. Moss wrote her speech attacking the “Sovietization of Britain,” which gave Mrs. Thatcher the nickname “the Iron Lady.” Moss became the leading light in the Institute for the Study of Conflict. Like IGS, ISC served as a way of bringing CIA journalists and military intelligence officers together.

Moss founded and became the president of a British version of the Chilean Comando de Acción Gremial, the National Association for Freedom. According to the Guardian (December 21, 1976) Moss organized the NAFF under the banner of halting the “Sovietization of Britain through the Labour Government and the influence of the trade unions.” It was this ISC that issued the disinformation (57 Labour MPs are Marxists, Soviet plan to Com- munitize Britain, etc.) that provided the catalyst for the formation of NAFF. The leaders of the NAFF then formed themselves into a Conservative Shadow Cabinet that today the Conservative government.

In 1977 Moss and friends set up a would-be British Intelligence Station for Capitol Hill, a think-tank calling itself the Heritage Foundation. An indication of their activities is provided by Heritage Communicate No. 8 (October 1977) which reports a visit to Washington by Sir Keith Josephs, “Shadow Minister for Policy in Britain’s Conservative Shadow Cabinet.” The communicique further states that a reception is being sponsored for Sir Keith by the British Embassy and the Heritage Foundation. It did not mention that Sir Keith was a founding member of the NAFF.

The New York Times (December 1977) and former FWF writer Russell Warren Howe (More Magazine, May 1978) have identified Brian Crozier as a CIA contract agent, and Moss as his protégé. During the time Crozier was working for CIA he used the journalistic covers of: defense correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, Director of Forum World Features, Founder of the Institute for the Study of Conflict, correspondent for National Review, publisher of the London Economist “Foreign Report”, and correspondent for Soviet Analyst. As Crozier retired from many of these positions they were all taken over by Moss.

The Right-Wing Answer

What is the alternative to the Sovietization of Britain? In his book, “The Collapse of Democracy,” Moss argues that liberal democracy is a luxury of the past, that the only viable alternatives are authoritarian regimes, such as Chile, or Marxist totalitarian, such as the Soviet Union. In a full-page ad in National Review for Moss’s “The Collapse of Democracy” the heading reads: “He puts the date for the totalitarian transformation of England as 1985.”

Under the slogan of “Stopping the Sovietization of Britain by 1985,” Britain found itself with a right-wing government by 1978.

This propagandist was used as a tool to counter and deceive people for two actual crises manufactured at this time: a series of insoluble strikes, and escalating terrorism and counter-terrorism in Northern Ireland. From Moss’s own handwriting we know that he had two mentors in fomenting these crises, Hills Copeland and Cord Meyer. Jr. Meyer was CIA Station Chief in London at the same time the main figure in charge of the Agency’s covert operations. Copeland was formerly head of the Gaming Room on the fourth floor at CIA Headquarters, where simulations of
strikes were elaborately acted out before being implemented in Chile.

NAFF's main activity was to turn strikes from symbolic ritual into overt war. It did so by turning each strike into a national testing ground of the ability to resist—not the normal economic demands of unions but "communist encroachment."

Coordination with military intelligence was facilitated by a leading figure at ISC, Sir Peter Wilkinson who, according to the Guardian (July 16, 1976), "was recently the Coordinator of Intelligence in the Cabinet Office and formerly head of Administration at the Ministry of Defence."

Through such contacts Crozier and Moss became instructors at military intelligence training schools. A report by a police college at Bramshill on the ISC pilot course on terrorism states: "This would be the first time that policemen in this country were introduced to the idea that political terrorism grew out of the early stages of subversion and that it was the responsibility of the police to detect these phases. . . ."

Once Moss and the ISC, as experts on terrorism, indoctrinated officers being sent to Ireland in the notion that terrorism proceeds through certain discrete, identifiable stages and that terrorism is a communist tool, then they are psychologically predisposed to react to routing IRA activities as something that will escalate and is alien. This is apart from the fact that their informational environment (mass media, etc.) was manipulated to make them feel that the IRA had shifted into a higher stage of violence. This was accompanied by new orders to commanders in the field authorizing them to search and arrest and detain without warrant.

As with labor strikes, the net effect was to turn fairly ritualized conflicts that had existed for hundreds of years into national crises. Freud once stated that the goal of psychoanalysis was to "replace hysterical misery with every day unhappiness." The goal of CIA psychological operations is the reverse.

The anti-IRA commandos, graduates of ISC courses, began a cycle of terrorism and counter-terrorism that reached as far as London. Neither the IRA, nor Euroterrorism, nor Eurocommunism, nor the Soviets took over Britain, but the right-wing think-tank or Shadow Government Moss helped assemble did.

A Word About Portugal

Before proceeding with a description of how Moss's institutes for CIA subversion operate in Washington, it might be useful to describe briefly how some of these personalities, organizations, and tactics operated during the Portuguese crisis of 1974-1975.

A CIA contingency plan for Azorean secession in the event of losing control of Portugal was put into effect. These contingency plans existed because the Azores provide the single most strategic base run by U.S. and British Intelligence for the detection of Russian submarines.

(Other critical anti-submarine warfare centers are in Australia, where Moss's father is a high Naval Intelligence Officer, and a series of bases on Chilean territory.)

The CIA contingency plan had two stages and two teams: the Portuguese group was a straight official U.S. and British intelligence effort to keep Portugal in NATO and prevent Portugal from going Communist; the team "liberators of the Azores" was a last-ditch plan involving a motley collection of Azorian exiles and intelligence-connected soldiers of fortune who would be unleashed if the first plan failed.


Walters and Carlucci dusted off the "Communist Plot to Assassinate Military" which they had used to great effect in Brazil in 1964. This deception was to prepare the psychological climate for a right-wing coup March 11, 1975 by General Spinola. Moss had already written a cover story for National Review from Portugal based on the assumption that this new "Plan XX" would succeed. The article, "The Making of Europe's Cuba" (April 11, 1975) was only slightly modified, to make the Communists responsible for provoking Spinola prematurely: "Evidence suggests that General Spinola and his friends walked wide-eyed into a trap. They were led to believe that the Communists were about to stage a "Night of the Long Knives" and were apparently duped by agents provocateurs..."

Moss's fairy tale then shifts linguistically and strategically into the same content as IGS disinformation agent Juraj Domic's article on the Czech and Indonesian models of a Communist plot to seize total power (the center piece of the Chilean Plan XX, or Plan Z): "three features of the Prague Coup are being exactly copied in Portugal today. The first is the Communist use of character assassination..."

Moss ends with a tongue-in-cheek reference to the Azores plan, "...it is certainly not too soon to imagine the government auctioning off the military facilities in the Azores."


Richard Allen is the link between the two groups; if the first group won, he would gain in prestige as a national security strategist. His connections with the second group were more basic. Allen not only had extensive personal investments in the Azores, he acted as a highly paid consultant for other investors, such as Vesco. He is at present the major foreign policy advisor for Ronald Reagan.

George Vine is a career CIA officer, a friend of Robert Moss, and the man Attorney General Mitchell sent to Switzerland to spring Vesco from jail.
Victor Fediay set up a media operation on Capitol Hill, with Moss’s assistance, called Capitol Information Services. Fediay put together the risk capital from right-wing and criminal circles necessary to finance the mercenary army of the OAS which was to lead to the seizure of power. On September 5, 1975 Fediay set up a meeting at the Hotel Raphael in Paris with agents of the OAS and Azorean secessionists. General Spinola flew from Brazil to Paris to attend this meeting. These elements set up a “Clandestine Government of the Azores in Exile.”

Albert Blaustein is a professor of Constitutional Law at Rutgers who wrote the Constitution for this proposed Republic of the Azores. In a telephone interview, Blaustein admitted having written the Human Rights section for the Chilean Junta’s new Constitution together with IGS member Jaime Guzman.

The Lisbon office of Aginter-Press was an unusual hybrid. The parent company in Paris was strictly a CIA media operation, a CIA wire service, but in Lisbon it served as a cover for OAS recruitment of mercenaries and arms smuggling. The CIA plants distributed by Aginter-Press were similar to Chile: Communist Threat to Free Press (Communist plot to infiltrate newspaper unions, Communist restrictions of credit and newsprint) as exemplified by the case of the alleged Communist Seizure of La Repubblica.

The outcome was that despite the failure of the Spinola coup, the Portugal Team was able to keep things under control, mostly by massive infusions of funds to the Socialists and political action to split the Socialists from the Communists.

Despite the fact that the Azores Plan was never fully implemented, it is instructive to see how the two plans were complementary, that there was a mixture of National Security and greed, and that Richard Allen was a common denominator to both.

**The United States Electoral Solution Model**

The plumbing began to be put in place in 1975 with a $1,000,000.00 grant from the National Strategy Information Center to set up The Committee for The Present Danger. The National Strategy Information Center was the conduit used by the CIA to pay for books commissioned by Forum World Features, including Moss’s “Chile’s Marxist Experiment.” Most of Reagan’s foreign policy advisors are members of this Committee for The Present Danger. The chief of this group of course is Richard Allen, whom we have discussed above.

In 1975 the CIA’s Institute for the Study of Conflict in London set up an American clone, the U.S. Institute for the Study Of Conflict. Its first President was James Theberge, head of Latin American Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). As part of the CIA psychological operations preceding the March 1973 Chilean Congressional elections, 3 black propaganda stories were fed into Chile: a Soviet plan to establish a submarine base in Chile; North Korea moving a guerrilla training base from Cuba to Chile; and a Communist attempt to use violence to intimidate opponents from voting. The channels for laundering these stories were three books planted by the CIA and released through the Center for Strategic and International Studies: “Soviet Sea Power in the Caribbean,” by James Theberge; “Russia in the Caribbean,” by James Theberge; and “The Stability of the Caribbean,” by Robert Moss. Even though these books were not published until late 1973, selected parts were picked up by UPI and placed in El Mercurio February 28, 1973—soon enough to have an impact on the March elections but too late to be disapproved, as a CIA fabrication.

After James Theberge was appointed U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua, he was replaced as President of the U.S. Institute for the Study of Conflict by George Tanham. Tanham was the former CIA Station Chief in Bangkok, Thailand, where the current CIA Deputy Station Chief was Robert Gene Gately. The London Institute for the Study of Conflict, (and Forum World Features and every other CIA operation in London Moss worked for), was registered in the State of Delaware by Gately as part of the holding company Kern House Enterprises. This was named after Harry Kern, a CIA agent who was foreign editor of Newsweek and who recruited both Gately and Arnaud de Borchgrave.

In its 1975 Statement of Purpose, the U.S. ISC states that the U.S. is ill prepared to cope with subversive infiltration of the media: “the United States, the preeminent power in the Free World, is experiencing its own problems with subversion. The U.S. Institute for the Study of Conflict has thus been established to address this complex problem which has not been fully recognized in this country. It will attempt to bridge the gap between the limited coverage in the press, and the specialist publications of policy research institutions.”

The exposure of the CIA-linked FWF and ISC in London at almost exactly the time the U.S. clone was becoming operational, led Tanham to adopt a low profile and move its offices into the Washington headquarters of the Rand Corporation, of which he is Vice-President. They have a journal, Terrorism and Conflict (published by Crane and Russak, New York). Before the first issue, Tanham stated in an interview that this publication would deal with such topics as “psychological warfare, terrorism, and political assassination.” After four years, this publication has added little to what is known on these topics other than to argue that psychological warfare is a Soviet invention, that terrorism is international and the KGB is behind it, and that the most notorious act of political assassination to occur on their very doorstep—the assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Karpen Moffit—was a KGB attempt to create a martyr.

**Disinformation**

The basic theme of “The Spike” is similar, to argue that the Soviets have invented this strange thing called disinformation. For Moss to accuse anyone of spreading disinformation is like Caligula blaming the Christians for in-
venting sadism. Or more specifically, it recalls a 1966 U.S. Army Training Film, “County Fair,” in which the sinister Viet Cong is shown in a jungle clearing heating gasoline and soap bars in a vicious Communist invention called napalm.

From 1971-73 the single most frequent CIA disinformation spread out of the Santiago Station, for use abroad, was planted by Robert Moss in The Economist. This operation was overseen by then U.S. Ambassador to Chile Nathaniel Davis and by the individual CIA assigned to “orient” foreign journalists in Chile, Embassy press attaché Franklin J. Tonnini.

In 1975 CIA Director William Colby authorized $6,000,000 for use in Italy before the crucial June 1976 elections. Italian TV is a state monopoly which does not allow political ads or electoral propaganda, so then U.S. Ambassador to Switzerland Nathaniel Davis arranged for the purchase of the huge blocks of time on Monte Carlo TV. This space was filled with a daily “news” commentary by the editorial staff of the CIA-controlled Il Giornale Nuovo of Milan. Davis also arranged for CIA placements in other newspapers to be read on Swiss TV and Monte Carlo TV, both of which reach Italy. The documentaries were filmed daily in Milan by Tonnini and Il Giornale Nuovo reporter Michael Ledeen.

Today there are two influential policy quarterly's published in Washington, one is edited by Michael Ledeen (Washington Quarterly, formerly the Washington Review of Strategic and International Studies), and the other with the editorial assistance of Robert Moss (Policy Review). It is these publications which over the last years have planted all the single items of deception which make up “The Spike.”

“Eurocommunism”

With the exposure of ISC, CIA withdrew its support, which was taken over by British Intelligence which also set up its station for Capitol Hill, The Heritage Foundation. The first article in the first issue of the Heritage quarterly, Policy Review, is Robert Moss’s “The Spectre of Eurocommunism.” The article, like most of Moss’s work, is an elaborate inside joke. He begins by attributing the term Eurocommunism to Spanish Communist Party leader Santiago Carrillo, when in fact it was both invented and put into circulation by Il Giornale Nuovo. Once the Communists themselves had been made responsible for coining the term, Moss tried to show that it was all part of a Communist deception to confuse the unwary into accepting them as democrats. He cites polls which show that many Europeans have swallowed this line to the extent of believing that the Communists in power would respect freedom of the press. Moss unmask their real Stalinist side by this example: “The Italian Communists have been trying to silence a television station that is outspoken in its criticism of them, Tele-Monte-Carlo.”

Those who have invented Eurocommunism, charges Moss, are actually following blueprints for the seizure of power based on the Chilean model, “blueprints for Communist takeovers that have been issued from Moscow.”

At the risk of being repetitious, the reason for forcing oneself to wade through Moss’ intellectual cesspool is that, while it has a surface appearance of right-wing propaganda, most is actually intelligence release disinformation. It therefore becomes a reliable guide, in reverse, to the intentions and activities of these propagandists. This is especially so in the above, revealing sentence on “blueprints...” based on the Chilean model.

The real problem for Moss is that while the intelligence agencies of Britain, Australia, South Africa, Israel, etc. still think that the Chilean model is a great success, some elements in the U.S. Congress are temporarily unsure.

The next article in this opening of the United States Solution is by Robert Schuettinger, Director of Studies of the Heritage Foundation. In “The New Foreign Policy Network” he says that U.S. policy has been taken over by a mafia of leftist Senate staffers, many of whom are graduates of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. “One of the influential leaders of this network is William Miller, currently staff director to the Select Committee on Intelligence... he has been called the 'Godfather' of the Hill foreign policy network.” He goes on to state that another influential leader of this network, Anthony Lake, headed the Carter transition team. “...The most influential of all transition teams, the so-called 'State, Defense and Intelligence Cluster,' chaired by Anthony Lake.” Schuettinger then quotes a Russian journal to demonstrate that the Communists are perfectly aware of the above.

In “The Spike,” Anthony Lake has been renamed “Perry Cummings,” and William Miller is “RICH ADAMS;” they are described as “traitors,” “KGB penetration agents or "moles," and the leading instruments of a Soviet "Plan Ares," to destroy the U.S. by 1983.

The reality that these conservative writers are reacting to is that there are certain centers of power in the U.S., such as Congress and the media, that, as a result of Watergate, Vietnam, and the intelligence agency scandals, are no longer as responsive to conservative foreign appeals, including those of the British. But that is not what they say. Policy Review begins by stating that these centers of power are no longer in friendly hands and Moss in “The Spike” finishes up by claiming that they are in KGB hands.

In 1978 Policy Review issued a series of reports on the problems posed for the continued existence of democracy by an unregulated free press. In “The Power of the Press: A Problem for Our Democracy,” M. Kampelman identifies the American press as the second most powerful institution in the country next to the Presidency and says that the unrestrained power of the media is the greatest challenge faced by democracy. The enemy is identified as advocacy journalism, a fad which is most virulent at the Washington Post and the New York Times, and which is made responsible for the alleged destruction of the CIA, the Viet Cong psychological victory during the Tet offensive, the overthrow of Presidents Johnson and Nixon, etc.
In "The Third World and the Free Press" (Policy Review, Summer 1978), Jeffrey St. John begins by quoting the editor of the Chicago Tribune: “The Russians seek to foster news media control worldwide because control of media is a major element in their political system.” Now we have moved from saying that the problem is that the media is irresponsible to saying that the Soviets are trying to take it over. In “The Spike,” David Halberstam and Seymour Hersh are unwitting dupes of KGB news plants.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies


This CSIS includes former Deputy Director of CIA Ray Cline, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former CIA Director James Schlesinger, each of whom brought with him his own entourage of NSC, State and CIA staffers. The CSIS is an intelligence-connected think-tank and conservative shadow cabinet. In its propaganda aspect, their publications are supervised by communications director Jan Vandracek, who attended the crucial June, 1976 conference at the London ISC together with “Spike” authors Moss and de Borchgrave. They had never felt a necessity for a quarterly policy journal until the Robert Moss of Italian disinformation, Michael Ledeen, showed up. In addition to Soviet plots to take over the press, other concerns of Ledeen have been Eurocommunism, Euroterrorism and KGB moles.

The KGB “Moles”

Despite the pretentious titles of Moss and Ledeen’s “policy journals,” neither has ever written a serious, analytical, scholarly piece. Legitimate conservative analysts are perfectly aware of this fact and resent the artificial promotion which these intelligence-connected sloganeers have received. Ledeen writes at the level of the National Enquirer; he grabs media attention by coining and manipulating certain “hot” items which upon investigation of the evidence turn out to be hot air. Nowhere is this more evident than in Ledeen’s discovery of the KGB mole inside the CIA. On ABC-TV news (September 24, 1978), in Commentary magazine, and in New York magazine, Ledeen went public with his “discovery” of the KGB mole.

In New York (October 2, 1978) Ledeen writes, “...one former CIA director says that the responsibility for the United States’ recent difficulties may arise from the activities of a ‘mole’... No one today knows whether there is a ‘mole’ in Washington or Langley, but the events of recent months have grim implications...”

In Commentary (May, 1978), “Hiss, Oswald, the KGB and Us.” Ledeen by way of two book reviews attempts to rewrite the last 25 years of history and blame all our national disasters, including the Kennedy assassination, on KGB moles and Soviet disinformation. The books under review are: “Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case,” by Allen Weinstein and “Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald,” by Edward Jay Epstein.

The personal odyssey of Weinstein is recounted, a nice liberal boy who starts openly, naively, trusting in the innocence of Alger Hiss, only to discover that Richard Nixon and Joe McCarthy were right!

This odyssey of a naive liberal who discovers a subterranean world of KGB moles is the basic narrative structure of “The Spike.” Moss’s alter-ego, Robert Hockney, starts out (implausibly) as a radical at Berkeley, and writes an article on CIA activities on campus. This brings him to the attention of the Institute for Progressive Reform (the Institute for Policy Studies), a liberal think-tank in Washington. After he writes an article exposing CIA-media links for a liberal San Francisco magazine, the IPR gives Hockney a grant to go to Europe to see what he can find there. Gradually Hockney discovers that the CIA exposes have been fed to him by the KGB, and moves more and more to the right, becoming, in the end, as rabidly paranoid as his mentor, former CIA Counterintelligence chief James Jesus Angleton (Richard Flowers).

The purpose of all this is stated in the first line of Ledeen’s “Hiss, Oswald, the KGB, and Us”: “One of the most durable and most damaging legacies of McCarthyism has been the besmirching of the good name of anti-Communism.”

What Moss, Ledeen and their intelligence agency mentors intend to do is revive the good old American practice of: When in a Crisis—Have a Witchhunt. Charles de Gaulle once remarked that the U.S. historically has turned to witchhunting rather than problem solving every time it has found itself in a crisis. No witches are usually found, but the witchhunt does reduce social tensions, and serves as a cover for the installment of right-wingers in office.

Conclusion

We have shown how Moss, acting in concert with a CIA network of think-tanks, businessmen, and intelligence officers, has spread disinformation at critical periods in Chile and Britain, which has led to the installation of his allies in power. Moss had a Plan for Chile, a Plan to Sovietize Britain by 1985, and now a Plan Azev to destroy the U.S. by 1985.

Those who consider Moss a bad joke should carefully consider his past string of successes, and the fact that disinformation is not designed on the basis of logical plausibility, but rather on a careful psychological assessment of what the target of the propaganda will accept or ideally wants to believe. As the careers of Nixon and McCarthy attest to, there is always a large segment out there in America that wants a crusade or a witchhunt. Moss, de Borchgrave and friends have carefully laid the groundwork.
THE PRINCIPLES OF DEEP COVER

Most of the exposures of CIA personnel which appear in this magazine, and all of the information in our column "Naming Names," relate to CIA employees serving under diplomatic, or light, cover. As our readers know, these officials are relatively easy to uncover precisely because their cover is light. Indeed, secrecy is not an objective in such cases; the objectives are deniability, diplomatic immunity, and access to Embassy facilities.

Uncovering deep cover agents is much more difficult, because of the painstaking efforts directed at secrecy which are the hallmark of a deep cover placement. Nowhere is this more clearly and significantly explained than in the document which follows. The CovertAction Information Bulletin has obtained a copy of a manual entitled "Principles of Deep Cover," by C.D. Edbrook, a basic text in CIA training. This manual is of such importance to anyone wishing to understand the mechanics of deep cover operations that we have decided to reprint it in full.

PRINCIPLES OF DEEP COVER

C.D. Edbrook

The simplest and therefore the most used device an intelligence service has for getting its unwelcome officers covertly into other countries is to assign them to cover jobs in its government's diplomatic missions, consulates, and other official representations there. The Soviet bloc services call this "legal cover," most Western services simply "official" cover. Aside from providing for communications home, a secure place to work, and a measure of protection from prosecution for espionage, it has the advantage that the cover duties can usually be made light enough to leave most of the officer's time free for intelligence activity. The official position also opens the way to many useful contacts, although it precludes others. It has the accompanying disadvantage that the disguise is a pretty shabby one. It requires no Herculean counterintelligence effort to determine which foreign officials probably have intelligence connections; they can be kept deniable, but not really secret. Moreover, some kinds of intelligence activity cannot be carried out from an official position.

It is therefore necessary to supplement the "legals" with "illegals," the intelligence officers under official cover with operatives under "deep" cover, living as legitimate private citizens with such authenticity that their intelligence sponsorship would not be disclosed even by an intensive and determined investigation. These officers are sometimes career staff employees of the intelligence service and sometimes citizens of either the sponsoring or another country with a contract or agent relationship to the service. For the sake of simplicity we shall speak of them all as "agents," although they are in a different category from the indigenous agents recruited locally by a case officer. They do have an agent relationship to an official-cover case officer, for they must usually depend on the official-cover people—the "legal residentura" in Soviet usage, the "station" in ours—for their communications and administrative support and, at least in most Western practice, for direction and operational guidance.

Nonofficial cover is sometimes used for brief ad hoc missions and fixed-term operations, but the difficulties and advantages of really deep cover are felt most in a long-range operation of indefinite duration, one expected to continue as long as it produces useful information, perhaps through the full career of the agent. Infiltration into high circles of another government, an opposition group, a military clique, or an ethnic minority, or, for a Western service, penetration into an orbit installation or the leadership of a Communist party are types of missions for which deep cover of indefinite durability may be required. It is the principles of this kind of cover that concern us here.

Because the deep-cover agent must usually devote a large share of his time to carrying on his ostensible legitimate occupation, his intelligence production is quantitatively small. He is therefore an expensive agent, justified only by the uniqueness of the information he produces or can be expected in long term to produce. The establishment of a deep-cover operation should consequently derive without exception from the objective to be achieved, not from the availability of the agent or the opportunity for cover. Although this principle should be self-evident, it is not in practice unusual that an intelligence service begins with an agent who wants a deep-cover assignment, tries various kinds of cover on him for size, and then, more or less as an afterthought, finds a plausible mission for him. Negligence of the objective through a preoccupation on the agent's part with the establishment of cover is another frequent fault. In one case on record a young man was permitted to spend four years exclusively building cover for himself, being required only to attend a university in the target area and then establish himself as a salesman there. By the time he was in a position to start producing he had lost interest in the intelligence objective and resigned.

Importance for Planners

Sometimes the unfailing symptoms of a big hurry to go nowhere in particular betray the fact that the planners of an operation have lost sight of its long-term objective. Some years ago the cover specialists of an agency were asked to produce immediately a "flexible cover" that would give an agent "mobility," not much work in the way of cover duties, and "a logical reason for interest in diversified local groups." It was not specified in what way the cover was supposed to flex, to what places the agent should be able to move, or in what kinds of local groups he should have an interest. There was available, however, a cover position in market research which seemed to meet these requirements and in which the agent had had some experience; but this would require him to take a month's training prior to

SECRET

Number 10 (Aug.-Sept. 1980)

CovertAction 45
departure, and it was therefore rejected. So he was put into free-lance writing, although he had had no experience in that field. The hope that an operation so thoroughly conditioned during its formative stage by the early departure date would somehow serve an intelligence purpose was, of course, a vain one; when old Mobile and Flexible came back two years later he had produced nothing.

The rational preparation and conduct of an operation can have no other guide than its purpose, and this purpose must therefore be defined at the outset. Mobility and flexibility may indeed be required by some assignments: a scientist or labor expert, for example, whose intelligence assignment requires him to meet target colleagues at professional conferences in a number of neighboring countries needs a cover job that gives him sufficient time and a plausible reason to attend these conferences. But other intelligence missions can be fulfilled only by agents whose cover work keeps them in a certain place, and there are on record cases in which a deep-cover agent has been unable to give the necessary attention to his operations because his cover job kept him constantly moving about. The end must determine the means.

The purpose should also be a worthy one. A deep-cover mission is not justified if it can do no better than wander along the fringes of an intelligence target, eliciting scraps of information and misinformation, or "collect operational information available in the normal course of cover work and spot potential agent material." It is wasteful to have a deep-cover agent doing the routine jobs that can be done just as well by an official-cover man or his ordinary local agents and informants. The targets that call for deep cover are those to which official government representatives lack access or in which they must conceal their interest or from which only an independent channel will elicit information not meant for official consumption.

The primacy of the objective does not imply that there is a rigid sequence in which cover and agent cannot even be considered until the objective has been determined. It means only that the intelligence objective should be established before the steps are taken that commit the service to the operation. The service's headquarters will have negotiated cover openings and its field stations will have spotted cover opportunities of various kinds without regard to any specific projected operations. There are also usually available some good agents for whom there is no suitable assignment at the moment. It is better that these cover openings and these agents should remain unused for the time being than be misused in the pursuit of an unworthy objective only because they are available. Experience shows that the successful operations are generally those in which the planners have arrived at a valid objective and made sure that the cover and the agent were suitable for the pursuit of that objective before going ahead with the implementation of the project.

The intelligence objective, once chosen, is of course not immutable. Constancy of purpose is of vital importance in most long-range operations, but a service should be ready to make the most of any unexpected opportunity that permits it to raise its sights. In recent experience a deep-cover agent who had been sent to the field to work through locally recruited agents suddenly found himself in the entourage of a high-priority target; another, after one uneventful tour and a transfer under the same cover to another country, gained access to the inner circle of a very important target person. These agents were able to capitalize on their opportunities because their cover had been well prepared and they had been careful to preserve it during periods when operational prospects were not bright.

Nevertheless, one cannot rely on chance to provide an operation with purpose. The untimely termination of cover ventures intended to be long-range is often charged to the unsuitability of the agent or the inadequacy of his cover, but close examination may reveal that the faulty element is itself the result of an underlying failure of the planners to derive the operation from a worthy purpose clearly understood at the start by everyone concerned.

Importance for Agent and Station

A lack of specific purpose has a very disquieting effect on agent morale. Agents sometimes express the belief that adequate thought is not given by their contact man, the field station, or headquarters to the ultimate achievement that is desired from them on their project. Their remarks are generally to the effect that there is not a consistent plan or objective, that they are given the blanket advice "to get out and see what can be developed" with regard to practically any political party or government agency, that they are seldom given the opportunity to learn how, if at all, their activities are integrated into the overall area program or objectives, and that this is not a deliberate effort on the part of the field station or their station contact to keep them compartmented but rather an indication of the nonexistence of a long-range plan. Such impressions, even if groundless, are not conducive to vigorous and purposeful activity.

The field station has an essential role to perform in determining the objective as well as the means of a deep-cover operation in its area and it must share in the early planning. Chiefs of station should keep headquarters currently informed as to which long-range intelligence objectives they and their successors will need to approach through nonofficial cover, what kinds of cover would be the most effective in reaching those objectives, and what kind of agent would be professionally and personally suited for the cover job and the operational tasks involved. Headquarters, in turn, should consult the station in the early planning of a particular long-range cover project. Although a headquarters area desk will have a greater or lesser understanding of the field situation, its information may be dated or incomplete. The field station certainly has the most intimate knowledge of the problems and in addition will have more faith in the prospects of an operation and feel more deeply committed to its success if it has helped to shape it.

A few years ago an agent was placed under commercial cover and sent to the field "to assess the area for deep-cover and operational possibilities and to develop intelligence operations." There was a station in the area and it should have been able to assess cover and operational possibilities, but apparently headquarters had not discussed with it what objectives needed to be pursued through nonofficial cover.

SECRET

46 Covert Action

Number 10 (Aug.-Sept. 1980)
and what type of agent would have a good chance of attaining them; no attempt was made to define the kind of operations the agent was expected to develop or to specify the nature of the targets he was to work against. This agent had neither business nor operational experience; yet he was expected to start a business in a country that had inhibitory laws on trade and on currency exchange, to make a difficult assessment of operational possibilities, and to seek out his own intelligence mission. The operation failed and was terminated after two years.

Collaboration between headquarters and the field station is needed in the early planning stage in order to bring together a broad central view of intelligence needs and an intimate knowledge of the local scene. These two complementary elements are required to give an operation a precise orientation toward a priority objective, and this objective must be determined early enough to insure that the cover and the agent are suited to it.

The period of preparation is one of commitment; it comprises a series of major steps which steer the projected operation along a course that becomes increasingly difficult to change or halt, until a point is reached where the service is committed to go ahead with whatever investment of funds and manpower may be required. These major steps have to do with the selection and preparation of the agent and his cover. Hasty preparations have no place in long-range operations. Haste is justifiable and even necessary in situations of urgency where one must work at top speed towards a short-term goal; in such cases security and durability are knowingly sacrificed to the extent required by the pressure of circumstances. But to be durable, cover must be genuine, and to be genuine it must be prepared at a pace consonant with the normal pace of the cover pursuit itself, not according to an operation timetable. This is the only way to avoid built-in causes of failure of all sorts—morale problems, administrative snarls, unsuitable agent, thin cover, and other security hazards.

**Durability of Cover**

The first requisite of cover is that it should convincingly explain the agent's presence in the area. This requisite becomes increasingly stringent with time, and to endure over the years a cover must be such as to appear logical in its own terms. There have been too many salesmen who did not sell, students who did not study, consultants who were not consulted, some of them living on a generous scale with large families, deluding themselves that all was well until perhaps the chief of station was queried by his cover boss, "Is so-and-so one of yours? He looks as phony to me as anyone I've ever seen!"

A few years ago an agent who had had medical training was sent to a city described in the project as "a historical mecca for graduate doctors." His cover occupation was the sale of medical supplies and his intelligence mission was to develop sources in the scientific field. One month after his arrival the station estimated that his cover would be good for at least nine years. After six months, however, the station requested his transfer because the cover was wearing thin. Now it came out that the day when the historical mecca enjoyed an excellent reputation for its medical facilities had long since gone. Something had obviously gone wrong with someone's objectivity; the tendency to overstate the merits of a project is particularly strong when it is first submitted for approval.

There had been warning indicators when this cover was being negotiated: two medical supply firms that had been approached had said they would not place their own men in that area because it would not be profitable, and one of them agreed to send the agent there only because the service wanted it that way and was willing to foot the bill. When a service chooses to ignore the counsel of old-line companies whose business it is to know what works in a certain place and what does not, it should be for compelling reasons and with an appreciation of the problems ahead.

The cover with the best chance of enduring in any area is one that does not feed off the area but contributes needed skills or knowledge or a commodity that is lacking. In countries that are trying to develop economic autarchy the authorities may scrutinize the activities of foreign businessmen with severity, ruling that any foreign-owned or foreign-operated enterprise must benefit the national economic structure. Here agents involved in businesses that are not financially sound or have no significant volume of business are sadly out of place. But local firms may need citizens of another country to help them in their dealings with firms located in that country, and such employees would probably have greater freedom of movement and better access to local targets than those of the local branch of a foreign firm, as well as protection in case of expropriation or nationalization of foreign assets. Or non-commercial cover may be more desirable in some places: in newly independent countries, for instance, teachers or technicians may be more needed and welcome than business representatives, and the desire of the new governments to get them elsewhere than from the former colonial power may provide another nation with cover opportunities for its own nationals or for third-national agents.

The plan for long-range cover must take into account any likelihood of drastic changes in the area that could affect the viability of a particular type of cover. If there is such a likelihood, an agent cannot use cover whose survival depends on an indefinite continuation of the status quo. Aside from the hazards to commercial cover entailed in the trend towards economic autarchy, there may be political changes which would make it more difficult for Westerners, or citizens of a particular Western country, to move about. Such prospects call for timely preparations in the establishment of third-national cover agents in advance.

Finally, the most important element of cover durability is legitimacy. There are suspect covers just as there are suspect persons, and a cover cannot confer upon the agent a legitimacy it does not itself possess. A newly founded company once offered to cover any number of a service's agents as consultants in several underdeveloped countries, expecting that the service in return would subsidize its own early development. These consultants would have come under the scrutiny of the genuine foreign consultants who had been there for years, and the inevitable checks on the standing of the home office would have quickly exposed
Cover and the Objective

The function of explaining the agent’s presence in the area, difficult though it is under unfavorable circumstances, is still only a part of what cover should do for an operation. Cover should always be considered in relation to the intelligence objective, and insofar as possible it should provide legitimate access to the targets being attacked. The ideal solution is achieved when the activities of the agent in doing his cover job provide the basis for the operational contacts desired. If this ideal arrangement is not possible, the cover should at least be compatible with the objective. Otherwise, there can be only competition and conflict between them.

One agent, married and with children, was recently reported to be working 30 hours a week for his cover firm and 40 to 50 hours a week for intelligence. The poor fellow was running himself ragged, neglecting his family, and even so not doing justice to either of his unrelated jobs. His cover had been chosen almost exclusively to establish him in the area, too little attention being paid to the operational opportunities it should provide. The two functions must be considered concurrently during the planning stage; if avenues to the intelligence objective are left to be improved later, the agent’s access, if he ever develops any, may be to targets already within easy reach through the official cover of the station, and his presence in the field, while adding to the station’s problems, will not add to its resources.

There is also a security advantage in a close relation between cover and intelligence work. If the two occupations are unrelated, the operational coming and goings do not benefit from the protective interpretation that the known cover job should normally suggest to observers. The field station is in a position to know which specific cover pursuit can provide and explain operational contact with the target persons; in fact, the station would normally want to have an agent under cover only after finding it impossible, or unwise or inadequate, to recruit a person already in place in a similar situation.

Knowledge of the facts of the local situation will reduce the large amount of guesswork that often goes into the choice of a cover and thereby obviate the unreasonable demands that otherwise come to be placed on it. An agent was once sent to a colonial country to recruit agents within the European community, but two years later it was decided that his efforts should have been directed at the native groups. His cover did not permit him to make this about-face, and so the impasse was blamed on “rigid cover.” A certain amount of latitude may be desirable in some forms of cover, and this latitude can be planned at the start to serve a known operational need, but latitude or flexibility in cover should not be used as a hedge against failure to study and interpret the pertinent facts in the first place and to select a cover in the light of those facts. The factors that enter into the establishment of cover that is both durable and operationally effective are numerous and intricate, and that is why it is risky to go ahead without the best knowledge of the field situation that the station can provide.

Cover Arrangements

Cover negotiations with a business firm afford the service a valuable preview of what kind of collaboration it can expect in the joint enterprise. If the firm wants the service to pay a disproportionate share of the business expenses, it is probable that its professed desire to contribute to government aims is specious and that intelligence interests will be pushed aside. There is no need for high cost in an agreement with a company already doing business in the area in question, particularly if the agent is already in place or is destined to go there. If the company goes out of its normal way and incurs additional financial expenses and risks, the service naturally has to bear a larger share of the burden; but if the company offers to place any number of agents in all sorts of positions without regard to the facts of business, it probably envisages a quick and generous bounty from the government rather than reasonable business profits patiently earned.

The cover negotiations can of course also give the company some idea of the seriousness of the service’s intentions. If the service professes to need and want a sound and durable cover and at the same time proposes to use it to rotate a number of agents on two-year tours, the firm cannot be expected to think very highly of its long-range planning, or of its concept of cover, or of its practice of economy for that matter, and may be tempted to make the most of the opportunity for profits.

The agreements with the company should be as simple and clear as possible and understood in the same way by both parties. In addition, those arrangements that affect the agent should be clearly understood by him at the very start and be made known to the field station involved at the same time; otherwise the station case officer’s meetings with the agent and his correspondence with headquarters will be taken up for a long time by the too common three-way debate on the substance and interpretation of the cover arrangements, to the detriment of the operation.

When a cover agreement is negotiated it should be decided early who in the company has to be made witting. If the matter is left for spot decisions to be made as arrangements develop, the number of people in the know will keep growing as one after another is brought into the picture to facilitate the solution of problems that arise. There is no assurance, of course, that the witting company people will observe the need-to-know principle, but the firm itself has an interest in keeping secret its connection with intelligence. The witting persons are more likely to maintain secrecy if they know that there are very few of them and if they realize the importance the service attaches to keeping that number small.

Experience shows that there are security problems both ways, from cutting in too many people and from not cutting in enough. The problem in both cases generally stems from a real or imagined urgency which prompts the service to interfere with the natural development of cover. For instance, it has an agent who is not very well qualified for the cover job and is not company-trained, perhaps not yet hired by the company; but he is ready to go! The personnel manager is cut in to hire him, a section chief is cut in to
streamline his training, the field manager is cut in so that he will not expect too much from him, and so on. Or else the company president removes all obstacles by fiat without explaining anything to anyone; everyone is hostile and suspicious, and the operation is off to a bad start. Time is wasted in trying so desperately to save it: the agent often returns from an unworkable assignment without having done anything for the service.

**Career Contract Agents**

One of the most serious problems of many deep-cover agents has been the uncertainty about career that results from their dual status in the intelligence service and in their cover; they have felt the demands of both pursuits and the reassurance of neither. Some services have tried to protect their own interests by requiring that agents going into business firms waive at the outset, when the cover arrangements are made, any right to transfer to their cover firms for some years after resigning from the service, the firms for their part agreeing not to hire them for that period. Such a provision confines the agent to his intelligence career, in which, however, he may tend to have less and less confidence the longer he remains on the outer rim of the intelligence organization. In such circumstances it is probably wiser for the service to permit immediate transfer to the cover firm and maintain its operational relationship with the agent by means of contract.

In one such case a staff agent with three years of intelligence experience but still quite clean was placed in a cover job while yet young enough to be starting on a career without prior job experience. An intelligent, enterprising, and personable young man, he did excellent work for the cover firm for 28 months; he looked genuine to the general public, and his long-range intelligence prospects seemed good. But his intelligence performance, according to rigid standards mechanically applied, did not permit a promotion in the service. It was clear that he would be better off with the cover salary and allowances than with his service pay, and the discrepancy was likely to increase as time went on.

He was therefore transferred outright to the firm, which was happy to have him as a permanent employee, with a verbal assurance from the service that it would attempt to reintegrate him at a suitable grade if he should lose his job because of his intelligence association or for some other cause not of his own making. He became a contract agent of the service, paid according to his usefulness and reimbursed for expenses incurred on its behalf. The release of this agent does not mean that intelligence interests will be sacrificed or that intelligence work will be only incidental, because he is a high-caliber young man with a bent for intelligence, and his motivation lies in the very nature of the work. It is unlikely that the service will ever lose him.

It is more the manner than the fact of separation from the staff of a service that deprives it of the work of trained and experienced officers. Once a good agent has found career opportunity and security in his cover firm, it is sensible to complete the transition and put an end to his equivocal status if the transfer stands to serve the interests of all concerned. Similarly, agents can be allowed or even encouraged to develop professional or other types of self-employed cover to the point that their economic security rests principally on their cover activity, buttressed by a stipend from the service and underwritten by the understanding that, if they do well operationally, they can be assured of a career in the service in case unavoidable circumstances destroy their career.

This kind of arrangement has two great advantages: first, the cover takes on real depth and solidity as the years go by; and second, the service is freed from innumerable administrative headaches that may otherwise plague its cover operations. One of these administrative headaches is that dependable irritant to relations with the agent, the recovery of cover payments that exceed his service entitlement. One terminated agent felt so strongly about kicking back a Christmas bonus that he wrote to headquarters, saying he was willing to return the money to the cover company but would not turn it over to the service under any circumstances. When advancement in the cover firm is rapid and the difference between cover salary and service pay gets progressively larger, the administrative tangle becomes so frustrating that there have been serious proposals to freeze the cover salaries of agents while their colleagues are being promoted. Such an expedient would violate security as well as decency, and it would be unrealistic to expect an agent in such circumstances to give the cover job a proper effort.

If in particular instances the interests of the service and the agent call for his retention on the staff although assigned to long-range cover duties, the career contract should be supplemented with special administrative provisions to assure him of service rights, benefits, and career opportunities comparable to those he would have on regular duty. The unorthodox nature of nonofficial cover requires desstandardized practices and diversified personnel patterns. This diversification can be further advanced by greater use of natural cover.

**Natural Cover**

Many of the problems of deep cover are avoided when a service can recruit suitable agents already embarked on legitimate careers. A company president who claimed no intelligence experience once suggested out of common sense that instead of placing its man in his firm a service might better recruit one of his employees in the overseas branch in which he was interested. In another instance a government which needed information on the deployment and activity of certain air forces did not have to put a man under cover because its station in the area recruited one of its own citizens who represented a gasoline company and was in constant contact with key officials of the target air forces. This agent was able to develop the needed information in the normal course of business.

Some companies are willing to furnish information on all the young men they recruit for their foreign branches and to make those selected as potential agents available for training with reasonable assurance that they will eventually be assigned where the service wants them. Similarly, some employers are willing to furnish biographic and evaluative information on their overseas employees for assessment.
and possible recruitment, and to arrange to bring back the
recruits for a training period. The agents recruited in these
ways would continue to pursue normal business careers
and to expect from that source their salaries, allowances,
bonuses, and promotion, as well as their financial security
and their status in the community. They would be compen-
sated equitably for intelligence services rendered, and there
should be no termination problems or dual-status adminis-
trative difficulties.

The recruitment of persons already employed or about
to be hired by a firm would require fewer company em-
ployees made witting than the placing of a man from the
service; normally it should be only one or two key officials.
There would be none of the difficulties which the family of
a converted staff employee has to face when it needs to
adjust to a new mode of living. The greatest advantage of
all, however, lies in the quality of the cover itself. Natural
cover is the most convincing of all, and the best way to fool
all the people all the time is to be genuine. Only on rare
occasions, such as a cover reassignment, would there per-
haps be a need to interfere discreetly with the normal
course of events. The principal dangers, here as elsewhere,
would be impatience and the real or fancied urgency of
short-term goals.

Cover Qualifications

Once it has been decided what forms of cover can serve
the intelligence objective, the task is to find an agent who
has the qualifications for one of the possible cover jobs and
who can, in addition, do the intelligence job that consti-
tutes the sole reason for the undertaking. It is easy to hope
for, but very difficult to find, the ideal agent who has dual
qualifications. The problem, in fact, is often regarded as a
dilemma: if the agent is already established in the cover
company he never really gets the feel of intelligence; if he is
an intelligence officer venturing forth into the business
world, he is generally unconvincing in his cover life, and his
tour of duty is of short duration despite original long-term
plans; in the rare cases where the experienced intelligence
officer has good cover qualifications, the service risks los-
ing him to the cover pursuit, and sometimes does. Not quite
a dilemma, this is a serious problem which can be solved
only by making concessions.

If a cover operation is to endure, the agent’s qualifica-
tions for his cover job must be unimpeachable. These qualifi-
cations are more exacting in some pursuits than in others
and the amount of expertise required may be less for a
young agent than for an older man, but no agent can be
expected to succeed in his cover unless his cover prepara-
tion and performances are convincing in their own terms.
For this reason, when the ideal agent with dual qualifica-
tions is not available for a particular long-term cover mis-
ion, cover and durability must take precedence over intel-
ligence training and experience. A deficiency in these is not
insurmountable if the agent has the necessary aptitude for
intelligence work. His training will have to be highly con-
centrated to suit his specific mission, and his experience
will have to be gained on the job under the close direction
of his case officer.

Agent Aptitude

50 CoverAction

Given a well-defined mission, a good cover, and an agent
capable of living his cover effectively, an operation which is
successful in terms of cover will still fail if the agent lacks
the ability to perform his intelligence mission. In sacrificing
intelligence experience to requirements of cover, therefore,
it is vital not to sacrifice on the point of the agent’s native
ability to do a clandestine intelligence job. Many people are
fascinated by espionage and like to talk about it, even in
first person, but not so many are suited by character and
temperament to engage in it. There are even loyal and
patriotic businessmen who question the need for clandest-
ine collection of information; one company president be-
ing sounded out for a cover possibility quickly put an end
to the exploration when he remarked that he did not “see
the need for such devious methods.” This is a rather wide-
spread attitude among businessmen, who in their own
highly competitive field nevertheless appreciate the impor-
tance of obtaining and safeguarding inside information.

On the other hand, there may be indications of an agent
candidate’s flair for intelligence work in the amount of
shrewdness and discretion he shows in the conduct of his
overt affairs. In any case he will have a lot to learn and need
a lot of energy to learn it. A native ability for intelligence
work entails not only the right attitude but also the neces-
sary amount of drive; and the cover agent must possess the
personal dynamism and resourcefulness needed to work
effectively at the end of the line. The translation of an
agent’s native ability into the skills required by his mission
is discussed in the next section of this article.

Living the Cover

Living one’s cover is an around-the-clock job. It requires
first of all that the agent in his cover work have as much
competence and put out as much effort as his colleagues in
comparable jobs. In certain instances special qualifications
like language skill or area familiarity may compensate for
other lacks, but he must conform to whatever pattern is
established. Any departure from the norm provides factual
justification of the instinctive hostility that rivals in a com-
petitive field feel towards a newcomer; any special treat-
ment obtained in order to get things done easily and quick-
ly, such as a shortening of company training or protective
intercession by the top management, will only intensify
this hostility and arouse suspicion. And, of course, the
agent himself must resist the very human tendency to sur-
round himself with the mysterious aura of one engaged in
special work.

Occupational interest is an important factor in living
one’s cover because competence and interest go together
and each helps the other. It is only natural, moreover, that
the agent should be expected to show an interest in the
occupation he ostensibly has chosen as a career. A hobby
can therefore be an indication of an agent’s suitability for a
particular cover position. One man with a passion for
firearms was placed under cover as the representative of a
dealer in small arms; wherever he was the conversation
inevitably turned to guns, and his cover took care of itself.

There is an important corollary to the requirement for
good performance on the cover job, and that is the need to
live the kind of life that goes with the job. Here the de-
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mands on the agent are extended to his family, and the difficulties of living in accordance with cover status are generally greater for the family than for the agent himself. When there are young children there may be real hardships that should be anticipated. But it should be a prerequisite for any deep-cover assignment that the agent and his family be able to adapt themselves to the living conditions and social life of people in the cover situation.

The pull exerted by a privileged way of life is a constant danger among staff agents who have previously served under official cover. No amount of cover work can hide such conspicuous breaches as access to PX supplies or a closer association with the official government colony than the cover occupation would normally bring about. Staff officers are often vehement in their professional desire to go out under nonofficial cover but, once there, unwilling to forego any of the amenities of official cover; they are probably not so much attracted by the challenge of the lone game as repelled by the regimentation at headquarters and the larger stations. A mature and stable staff officer under nonofficial cover once satisfied an almost compulsive urge to visit a bowling alley where he knew many of his former associates would be playing in a league; when the incident was raised with him later as a probable security hazard, he ruefully admitted his imprudence but explained that he just had to see someone with whom he could identify himself.

The Right Case Officer

There is a tendency at large stations to entrust the less active operation to the less experienced case officers, and long-range cover operations are of course seldom productive immediately. Operations that have prospects of quick and valuable intelligence dividends are often run as vest-pocket affairs by a top station officer or the chief himself; those that have no prospects of quick results are often delegated far down the line. Field stations are pressed with work and pressured to produce, but a station's chief should work out a reasonable distribution of its effort between immediate needs and long-term investment.

Nonofficial-cover operations cannot be mass-produced and run by the book; each one has its own character and its own problems, and each requires the right case officer for the right agent if it is to have any real chance of success. The case officer's task is to develop and maintain the agent's effectiveness, and he cannot succeed in this task without the agent's absolute confidence in his competence and reliability. He must have the necessary experience, maturity, and personality to deal with that particular agent. He is generally the agent's sole link with the service; in fact, in the agent's mind he is the service, and his merits and failings are extended to the service as a whole. His whole manner with the agent must suggest that he has no duty more important than that of directing and supporting the agent in his mission. The operational practices whose importance he wants to impress upon the agent he must teach by his own example and not by precept alone. Finally, he must have a well-balanced combination of imagination and judgment in order to deal with the constant novelty of deep-cover situation and problems.

It is also important to provide for the availability of the same case officer for a relatively long period of time, because nonofficial-cover operations are more vulnerable than any other kind to the disruptive effect of frequent case officer rotation. It is a frequent complaint of agents that with each change of case officer there appears to be a change in emphasis and guidance, and inasmuch as the case officer is the sole channel for the agent's direction, there is no corrective for this impression of inconsistency. When a case officer must be replaced, the transition should be planned well enough in advance not only to permit the choice of a successor well qualified professionally and personally to direct the particular agent but also to allow this successor to get the feel and tempo of the operation. The agent will not fear that the operation is apt to be swayed by the whim of his immediate handlers if the new case officer introduces any necessary changes after a smooth period of transition.

Clandestine Contact

The procedure for initial contact with the agent should be decided before he is in place, and it must be compatible with the ultimate purpose of the operation; if the agent's cover is to endure, he has to be handled as a sensitive agent from the very start. A continuous clandestine relationship is needed from the outset to condition the agent properly for his role; it will help keep his clandestine mission ever present in his mind despite the demands of cover work, and it will sustain his morale by demonstrating the importance the case officer attaches to the security of the operation. The regularity, the relative frequency, and the average duration of case-officer contacts necessary to the successful development and maintenance of a long-term mission require that most if not all of them be clandestine meetings under safe conditions.

Whether or not there should be overt contact and what sort of overt contact would be advantageous are problems that involve a number of factors. The best bet is to keep the relationship entirely clandestine until both case officer and agent can analyze these factors and make an informed decision. It is necessary to restrain the tendency toward carelessness that often characterizes the period of cover establishment when the agent more or less abstains from aggressive intelligence activity. The tendency to be complacent is all the greater when the political atmosphere is relaxed, but the situation can change quickly and it may then be too late to tighten up.

The factors that should influence the decision to surface or not to surface the contact lie in the nature of the environment and of the intelligence mission itself. In areas where contact between the nationals in question or between them and local persons is commonplace, an occasional overt contact may serve to avert suspicion in case one of the clandestine contacts is accidentally exposed. Many successful operations are handled in this manner. In other areas, overt contact between case officer and agent may not be advisable. The agent's mission may be such as to make overt contact inadvisable in any circumstances, for instance one in which he is acting the part of a political renegade.

There is another consideration that should enter into the decision whether or not to surface, even in the most favor-
able operational climate. Case officers under official cover who have a large number of legitimate overt contacts may feel that one more will appear equally innocent to all onlookers. But not all onlookers will add the same figures and reach the same totals, and it may be that this one relationship will arouse the curiosity of certain persons and lead them to probe beneath the surface; it is always possible to chance upon the right conclusion from a partial set of facts. There are generally valid arguments both for and against surveilling. A wise decision requires a knowledge and appraisal of the fine points involved before the irrevocable act is committed.

Once a decision to surface has been reached, the cover situation of the two principals should determine the manner of the surveilling. It should be done in such a way as to appear natural and to minimize any suspicion of contrivance. One agent and case officer who had children in the same school and participated in school support activities formed a nodding acquaintance susceptible of further development. Some agents find legitimate reason to consult the case officer in his official cover capacity. Others meet their case officers at the homes of mutual acquaintances. Still others may have to contrive a meeting if their overt positions do not provide a ready logical justification for their encounter.

There is also the question of frequency of overt contacts. One chief of station avoids all but the rarest social contact with his covert agent because, he soundly reasons, the counterintelligence opposition, if alerted, would probably never hear the contrived explanation but only note the fact of meetings. Another case officer reports that some close friends whom he saw several times a month were wrongly suspect to the opposition, whereas his deep-cover agent, whom he very rarely saw overtly, was apparently considered clean. If these officers should relax and slide into the habit of careless contact, they might soon reach a point of no return: once government interest in an agent is suspected the damage cannot be undone.

On-the-Job Training

It is important to maintain regular contact with the non-official-cover agent from the very start, even though he may not yet be fully-embarked on his intelligence mission. The case officer must condition his agent to live according to his cover status, within his ostensible cover income, and be sure that he does not allow himself to fall into benefits such as the acquisition of PX commodities to which he is not normally entitled. The period when the agent establishes his cover is the critical time when his attitude toward his twofold job takes shape. Too often an agent is allowed to occupy himself solely with covert work for a long time; afterwards it is always difficult, and in some cases it is impossible, to revive his interest in intelligence. The cover job, for lack of competition, quite naturally occupies the agent’s full time and interest, and the longer one waits the more difficult it is to superimpose a second job.

Furthermore, the case officer has an operational interest in the successful establishment of cover, that necessary prelude to active operations. One case of agent neglect during this early period has consequences even worse than a drift away from the intelligence objective. Two agents were placed together in the same cover office, told to build cover, and left pretty much to themselves. They developed a bitter hostility toward each other which the station was either unaware of or unconcerned about. Headquarters repeatedly heard of the flareups only through the company president. This very cooperative person must have gained a poor opinion of the kind of supervision exercised by the service, and the agents themselves could not have helped making the inevitable comparison between the commercial and the operational management.

The case officer’s concern with the period of cover establishment is not only protective, that is to avoid cover pitfalls and prevent the agent from losing interest in intelligence. This period must also, and principally, serve to prepare the agent for the task ahead. The nature and extent of the preparation needed will vary from case to case, depending on the agent’s prior experience and training and on the tradecraft and reporting demands of his intelligence mission. Formal training, valuable as it is, is only a preparation for experience, not a substitute for it, and the case officer will have to develop the results of any pertinent past training the agent may have had into practical skills.

First of all, the case officer must keep abreast of the agent’s cover problems and progress in order to blend matters of operational import into his activity at the right time and in the proper gradation. At the same time he must make sure that the agent understands his mission thoroughly, for that is the entire purpose of the operation, anything else being only a means to the end. He must see to it that the agent gets sufficient practice, to the point of perfection if necessary, in the particular tasks that his mission will require, such as observation, elicitation, and assessment, practice that can be done in the normal course of cover work. The product of these exercises should be submitted in the form of reports—biographic reports, target data, general information reports, and written assessments. The agent may need technical skills, some of which, like photography, can be practiced as a hobby, and some, like secret writing, only in seclusion. Whatever skills he needs he must master, for there should be no major deficiency in the makeup of the long-term agent. Conversely, however, his training should not be loaded with non-essentials.

The agent should regularly report his contacts, some of whom may be of interest to the station whether or not it plans for him to use them. He must be trained to transmit information accurately and completely, and he must appreciate the importance of operational data in the evaluation of his information. He must be alert to the by-products of his work toward his own objective, such as spotting information and other operational leads. He must understand the complementary purposes of cover—to protect the agent and expose the targets—and he must learn to use his own cover safely and effectively. These fundamentals will naturally have been covered in his briefing and training, but the case officer needs always to bear in mind that an agent who lives in isolation can in a surprisingly short time become oblivious of the most elementary principles of tradecraft unless they are kept constantly before him.

A long-term nonofficial-cover agent, we have noted,
must have the right attitude towards clandestine work and the necessary drive to keep going without constant prodding. There is much that he can do by himself in preparing for his mission, and if he is to become conversant with all aspects of the situation related to his intelligence mission, no amount of briefing can make up for his own lack of initiative. It is up to the agent, with appropriate station support, to acquire background information and keep up with overt developments in his field of intelligence interest, so that he can recognize the significance of his requirements and of the information he collects to fulfill them. If his objective, for instance, is the penetration of a political group, he should find information easily available on its leaders present and potential, its sources of support, its stand on important issues, its allies and enemies, its relationships abroad, the divisions within its ranks, and so on; and he must of course also be familiar with the wider national backgrounds in which the group operates.

All this information is indispensable for the agent’s performance of his mission, but it is important even in the preparatory stage when he discusses with his case officer his intelligence objectives, his ideas with respect to attaining them, and his progress in working his way closer to his targets. The intelligence tasks and discussions of this early period will work toward the necessary correlation in the agent’s mind of his cover occupation with his intelligence mission, and they will sharpen his alertness to possible intelligence significance in whatever he hears or sees. He should reach the point, as one officer expressed it, where he views his whole environment “through intelligence eyeglasses.”

At the same time, the exercises and discussions will provide a running gauge of the agent’s competence and enable the case officer to keep currently planned a workable progression of intelligence tasks. This progression should nourish the agent’s confidence and self-reliance and help him advance smoothly to the point where he can develop and handle his own sources of information, the primary skill of an intelligence collection officer. There are instances where the progression of tasks does not quite achieve this desired result; in these, the case officer may further ease the agent’s transition to active operations by turning over to him a secure going operation if there is a suitable one at hand in the general sector of his intelligence mission.

Intelligence Support

A long-range intelligence agent under nonofficial cover is not a lone operator in the sense that he can be expected to work without direction. For reasons of security he must be able to stand a considerable amount of isolation from the service, but it should be clear to him that this isolation is an operational necessity, not the result of neglect or oblivion. His morale has to be maintained over the years, and the morale of a good agent can be sustained only by the inner feeling that he is doing a valuable job as an integral part of the service. This feeling cannot be instilled by reassuring words; it can come only from the agent’s own day-to-day recognition of the value of his mission and his work in furtherance of the broader missions of the station and even of the service as a whole. An agent once pictured his uneasiness in these terms:

“The rule is followed that there is no use showing the agent any material that does not concern his project. He has little opportunity to call on someone else for advice. It is unlikely that he will ever hear what happens to the information he turns in, or whether headquarters found it useful or not. He is in the unfortunate position where his shortcomings are open to almost instant scrutiny and not hidden by the mass of work in an office.”

Too narrow an interpretation of the need-to-know principle can demoralize the man at the end of the line. In the interest of his effectiveness no less than of his morale, the agent must be given a sufficiently well-rounded interpretation of his progress; and that means that the case officer himself has to be well informed on the station’s general operational program and performance in order to discuss the agent’s work with him in its wider context. The agent should also receive currently, beyond the usual requirements and target information, any background data and any general guidance that will help him recognize operational opportunities outside of his assigned tasks and propose new approaches to his own objectives. If he receives anything less than all-out operational support, the expensive deep-cover agent will be working at a fraction of his capacity.

Furthermore, the considerable amount of time and effort required to keep a good agent primed for his best performance is not so much an operational overhead as an investment; not only should it yield a better intelligence product, but it should also develop and maintain a sound initiative in the agent and enable him to become less dependent on his case officer for day-to-day guidance. In short, nothing is more important to the agent than timely evaluations of his performance and production, and there is no better stimulus and guide for improvement. If it is at all possible, an occasional secure contact with the station chief would contribute to the agent’s sense of belonging and it would be a shot-in-the-arm for him to hear from the top man a few well-informed remarks about his work and its value. The goal of intelligence support of the long-term agent is to keep him constantly oriented and inspired towards his informational objectives.

Maintenance of Purpose

We have already stressed the fact that the agent must have a clear understanding of his mission at the outset and that he and his case officer must keep it constantly in mind. Headquarters and the station must have the same understanding of the purpose of the operation, they must both agree to it, and if this purpose is a valid one they should stick to it. The temptations to redirect cover operations are many and varied: they should be examined thoroughly and, unless the change is unquestionably for the better, they should be resisted. There is no surer way to befuddle the agent than to force him repeatedly to change his course, and often there is no more certain way to doom the operation. A radical change in target, as for example from one ethnic group to another, will be wholly incompatible with the pattern of activity already established by the agent, and it may be incompatible with his basic cover.
Frequent organizational and personnel changes in a service bring a succession of officers with differing views into control of cover operations, and some new officers are prone to make changes before they fully understand the intent of their predecessors. Sometimes deep-cover operations are diverted and exposed for the sake of expediency: the chronic urgencies in some unsettled areas lead, sometimes justifiably, to the commitment of cover resources to purposes for which they were not originally intended. Much less justified are those purely administrative urgencies which prompt a service to throw a nonofficial-cover agent into a routine and perhaps insecure operation because someone is needed and he happens to be at hand. Operations in which such hasty resort is made to expediency are usually characterized by general laxity; the natural limits of the cover are overstepped, the elements of risk are glossed over, and tradecraft is ignored. One long-range agent who was well established in his cover and had obtained good access to targets was assigned to replace a departing case officer in charge of an operation that was already compromised; he had to be withdrawn from the area a few months later. The agent was lost without benefit to the operation. Long-range operations demand consistency.

Progress and Production

The unorthodox nature of the deep-cover agent entails a need to judge his work by different standards from those used in evaluating the performance of persons under official cover. Even among themselves deep-cover operations differ from one another, and their value cannot be determined by any common criteria. Some operations officers, who may complain loudly when deep-cover operations are put through the budget wringer along with the rest of the wash, are still prone to measure their value with the same yardstick they use for other agent operations, that is, production statistics. Some officers, on the other hand, may go to the opposite extreme, treating the agents as sleepers and demanding patience and the long-range view without giving any inkling of the time and manner of the awakening.

The right view, of course, is in the happy medium, a posit on easier to state than to define. The long-range agent should not be pressured to produce as soon as he is in place, but except in rare cases he is not exempt from all operational performance. In the preceding section we have described tasks he can perform from the very start, tasks that will contribute to his training and experience, maintain his interest and morale, and sometimes be of immediate value to the station. These tasks will also hasten the day when he becomes truly operational. If no intelligence production is expected in the early stage, there must still be progress, and the operation should be judged by the operational headway it makes toward its objective, according to an estimate of reasonable expectation outlined in advance.

A premature demand from headquarters for production may change the case officer’s concern for operational progress to project justification, he may as a result direct the agent towards readily accessible targets, and the operation will have acquired a new purpose—its own survival. A long-range intelligence operation deserves headquarters’ patience; but headquarters in turn is entitled to progress, and eventually to production. There is no place in a mature service for the epitaph over a terminated operation that it has been “extremely valuable as experience” although it had produced nothing or for the consolatory view of a malingering agent that he is not producing but “his cover is excellent.”

The goal of clandestine intelligence operations is the collection of clandestine information. If there is a major defect in an operation, that is if it is apparent that it cannot and will not become productive, it should be terminated in order to give the case officer time to develop better operations. To the question, when should one expect production to begin? there is no single answer, because circumstances vary with the operation. But if the persons most closely concerned with an operation cannot give an approximate date it is probably not progressing towards production. There is a natural reluctance to end a going operation, even if it is not going anywhere. It was once reported in the review of an operation that “a kind of operational inertia set in, and it was easier for all concerned to let the operation run than to terminate it and sort out the pieces.” But to prolong an unsuccessful venture on mere hope or through force of habit is an expensive exercise in futility.

Long-range cover operations will always be difficult to prepare and to maintain, and there is never a certainty of success. They are always vulnerable in the sense that one weak element can nullify the excellence of all the others, and even the soundest cover operation can be destroyed by pure bad luck. But although one can never be sure of success, the odds against it can certainly be reduced. They can be reduced by not persisting in doing things the hard way. The recruitment of suitable agents already under natural cover and the transfer to career contract agent status of staff agents who make good with a cover organization can limit the use of staff agents in long-range cover operations and spare much of the grief that stems from their morale problems and their tightfitting, buttons-in-the-back administrative suit, with salary adjustments, bonus kickbacks, covert tax returns, and so on.

Chance of success can be improved in a more basic way by keeping in check the habits and the tempo that sometimes ooze over from official cover practices to nonofficial cover, with lamentable results. Nonofficial cover requires, not the mechanical efficiency of the assembly-line workers, but the patient inventiveness of the artisan, and an official-cover carryover is especially harmful to operations intended for long-term coverage of sensitive targets. A repetition of previous mistakes is generally the result of congenital haste and a fondness for short cuts: long-term cover operations allow few concessions to expediency.

This paper has laid particular stress on planning and preparation because the early period is decisive; after a certain point the die is cast and litlle can be done to improve or redirect an operation. And yet, though totally sterile, it may continue for years, at great expense and constituting a time-consuming treadmill for the case officer in whose lap it falls. That is why long-range cover operations require patient and painstaking effort from start to finish.
NAMING NAMES

In this issue CAIB has uncovered the locations of twenty-six CIA officers in eighteen countries. They include twelve Chiefs of Station and four Deputy Chiefs of Station.

Egypt

In Bulletin Number 8 we listed the new Chief of Station in Cairo, Egypt, Murat Natirboff. From the most recent Diplomatic List we have discovered his Deputy, Charles T. Englehart, born November 11, 1942. Englehart served as a consular officer in Karachi, Pakistan from 1971 to 1972, when he returned to Headquarters. In 1975 he was detailed to the Foreign Service Institute, and reappears in August 1979 as the First Secretary (Political Affairs) at the Cairo Embassy, where he is serving under the nearly 60-year-old Natirboff.

Also in Cairo is Mati Lohuuru, born in Germany May 11, 1945, and naturalized as a U.S. citizen in 1962. Lohuuru’s biography indicates that after two years as a member of the U.S. Army, from 1970 to 1972, he spent two years as a civilian “area analyst” for the Department of the Army, a giveaway CIA training cover job. In 1973 he was detailed for language training at the Foreign Service Institute, and in 1974 was at the FSI Field School in Beirut, Lebanon. In 1975 he was posted to the Kuwait Embassy as a political officer, and in August 1978 he was transferred to Cairo, ostensibly as Second Secretary (Political Affairs).

Ethiopia

The new and experienced Chief of Station in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia is Joseph Richard Johnson, born July 11, 1925 in Tennessee. Johnson’s records also show that he went from active duty military service, in 1952, to a three year CIA training stint as a “political analyst” for the Department of the Navy. After this period under military cover he switched to diplomatic cover, serving from 1956 to 1959 as a political officer at the Hong Kong Consulate General. After a brief period in mid-1959 back at Headquarters he was switched back to military cover, serving from 1959 to 1961 as an “analyst” for the Department of the Army. In November 1961 he resumed diplomatic cover as a consular officer at the Georgetown, British Guiana Consulate General. In 1964 he returned to Headquarters, and no entry regarding him appears in ensuing State Department records. However, according to the March 1980 Addis Ababa Diplomatic List, he is back under diplomatic cover as Attaché at the Embassy there. Given his seniority, he is undoubtedly Chief of Station in this politically key African nation.

Guyana

In Bulletin Number 9 we disclosed the Deputy Chief of Station in Guyana, James Lee Adkins. CAIB has now learned that his boss, the Chief of Station, is Leonard K. Barrett, born October 17, 1930. Despite his age, records of Barrett’s whereabouts are scant. He served as an economic-commercial officer at the Caracas, Venezuela Embassy from 1970 to 1973. As of at least September 1977 he was posted to the Georgetown Embassy, as Chief of Station, and as of April 1980 his cover position was known to be Second Secretary.

Honduras

CAIB has learned that the Chief of Station in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, at least as of January 1978, was Leonard D. Therry, serving as Attaché. Therry, born June 27, 1937, served in Quito, Ecuador as an economic-commercial officer from 1969 to 1971, when he was transferred to Montevideo, Uruguay, this time as a political officer. We have found no records covering the intervening period until, in January 1978, he appeared in Tegucigalpa.

Hong Kong

The new Chief of Station in Hong Kong is Robert F. Grealy, born August 24, 1924 in Massachusetts. The Biographic Register indicates that Grealy served from 1951 to 1962 as a “plams officer” for the Department of the Army, obviously a decade spent under military or deep cover. In 1962 he surfaced as a consular officer at the Jakarta, Indonesia Embassy, where he served until late 1965—during the period of the bloody coup against Sukarno. In fact, his departure from Jakarta was just 23 days after the launching of the long-prepared coup. From 1965 to 1967 he was back at Headquarters, and in July 1967 he appeared in the notorious role of public safety advisor for AID at the Bangkok, Thailand Embassy, where he remained until at least mid-
1971. He played a role in the massive CIA operations in Indochina during this period, which included the secret war against Laos, coming mostly out of U.S. air bases and border areas in Thailand. This CIA veteran next appears on the January 1980 Hong Kong Diplomatic List where he is undoubtedly Chief of Station.

**Malaysia**

The new Chief of Station in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia is **Robert L. Skidmore**, born August 20, 1930 in New York. Skidmore seems to be an academic recruitment; according to the *Biographic Register* he was employed from 1955 to 1956 as a teacher at the University of Wisconsin, when he embarked upon three years in the tell-tale position of “analyst” for the Department of the Army. He then surfaced under diplomatic cover as a political officer at the Tehran, Iran Embassy, moving up to Third Secretary and then Second Secretary, before returning to Headquarters in 1963. He served at Athens, Greece from 1967 until early 1972, after which there are no State Department records referring to him until December 1979, when he appears on the Kuala Lumpur Diplomatic List as Attache, and, in fact, Chief of Station.

Serving under Skidmore is **Donald J. Nicol**, born July 17, 1931 in Massachusetts. Nicol went from the U.S. Navy in 1957 to “analyst” for the Department of the Army, spent two years first at George Washington University and then as a Navy officer, before returning to the cover position of analyst. He first surfaced under diplomatic cover in 1964, detailed to the Foreign Service Institute for Indonesian language and area training. He was posted to the Jakarta Embassy in 1965, as a political officer, transferring to the Seoul Embassy in 1969, apparently as Deputy Chief of Station. At least by 1974 he was back at Headquarters, and the next reference to him found is the December 1979 Kuala Lumpur Diplomatic List, indicating his posting there as Attache; but, in reality, Deputy Chief of Station.

**Japan**

A case officer serving at the Tokyo, Japan Embassy is **Robert E. Brown**, born January 22, 1939. Brown’s State Department records indicate university training out of the Singapore Embassy from 1969 to 1970; service as a political officer at the Surabaya, Indonesia Consulate from 1970 to 1971; Headquarters from 1971 to 1972; followed by more than three years as an economic-commercial officer at the Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Embassy. The next record found indicates that in September 1979 he was posted to the Tokyo Embassy in the cover position of First Secretary.

**Jordan**

**Thomas Alan Twetten** was named in the July 1979 *Bulletin* as Chief of Station in New Delhi, India. *CAIB* has just learned, from the January 1980 Amman Diplomatic List, that the very month his name appeared in the *Bulletin* he was transferred to the Amman, Jordan Embassy, where he is undoubtedly again the CIA Chief of Station. Twetten, born March 31, 1935, has served previously in Lagos, Nigeria; Benghazi, Libya; Accra, Ghana; and, as noted, New Delhi.

**Republic of Korea**

A CIA veteran, **Robert George Brewster**, born October 24, 1926 in Illinois, is the Chief of Station in the sensitive post of Seoul, Republic of Korea. Brewster, an attorney, appears to have been recruited from the Illinois bar, which he left in 1953 to commence four years of training under cover as an “analyst” for the Department of the Army. His subsequent diplomatic postings included the Chiangmai, Thailand Consulate from 1957 to 1959; the Bangkok, Thailand Embassy from 1959 to 1962; the Jakarta, Indonesia Embassy from 1965 to 1967; and the Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Embassy from 1971 to 1973. According to the April 1979 Seoul Diplomatic List, Brewster arrived there in June 1978, in the cover position of Attache. If he is still there, he is undoubtedly Chief of Station.

**Kuwait**

Middle East specialist and CIA veteran **James M. Fernald** is Chief of Station at the Kuwait, Kuwait Embassy. Fernald, born June 19, 1931 in New Jersey, whose full biography appears in *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe*, has served in Beirut, Lebanon; Taiz, Yemen; Sana’a, Yemen; Amman, Jordan; Jidda, Saudi Arabia; and Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; prior to his posting in June 1978 to Kuwait. His name appears on the January 1980 Kuwait Diplomatic List, as First Secretary. However, since he rarely remained in a single posting for more than two years, it is uncertain he is still in Kuwait.

56 CovertAction

Number 10 (Aug.-Sept. 1980)
Joseph A. Malpeli, born November 15, 1939 in Pennsylvania, is a case officer working at the Jidda Embassy. Malpeli has served in Dacca, Pakistan and in New Delhi, India. He was posted to Jidda in July 1978, as Second Secretary and political officer.

Singapore

In Bulletin Number 7 we noted the presence of the well-known Robert Gene Gately as Chief of Station in Singapore. Gately was one of the mainstays of the CIA proprietary, Forum World Features, serving as its managing editor from 1963 to 1967, Gately's Deputy Chief, we have ascertained, is Thomas Bell Graham, born June 14, 1933 in Tennessee. Graham is another academic recruit, having been an instructor at the College of William and Mary in 1958 and a high school teacher in 1959, before beginning two years as a "political analyst" for the Department of the Army. He then began diplomatic cover, serving at the Tokyo, Japan Embassy from 1962 to 1968, when he was transferred to Manila, Philippines, returning to Headquarters in 1971. After two years at Headquarters, he is not found in State Department records until 1979, when in August he was posted to the Singapore Embassy as Attaché.

Spain

In our April 1979 issue (Number 4), we described in some detail the CIA station in Madrid, Spain. We noted that the position of Chief of Station had been held by Robert D. Gahagen till 1976, when he was replaced by his Deputy, Dean J. Almy, Jr., until 1977, when Nestor D. Sanchez took over. We have now learned that shortly after our article, which was reprinted in a Spanish magazine, Sanchez left and was replaced as Chief of Station by Ronald Edward Estes. Estes, born June 28, 1931 in Washington, DC, whose full biography appears in Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe, served under deep cover from 1957 to 1962. Since then, under diplomatic cover, he has served in Nicosia, Cyprus; Prague, Czechoslovakia; Headquarters; Beirut, Lebanon; and Athens, Greece. The January 1980 Madrid Diplomatic List indicates that he arrived in Madrid in July 1979, as Attaché, and, in fact, Nestor Sanchez's replacement as Chief of Station.

Sri Lanka

A case officer serving in the Colombo, Sri Lanka Embassy is Gene W. Wojciechowski, born January 29, 1937. He served as a political officer at the Vientiane, Laos Embassy from 1971 to 1973, and at Headquarters from 1973 until at least 1975. The next record found is the June 1980 Colombo Diplomatic List which states that he was posted to Colombo as Second Secretary and Vice-Consul in February 1979.

Switzerland

Thomas A. Korn, a telecommunications officer whose biography appears in Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe, appears on the Bern, Switzerland Diplomatic List as a commercial secretary, posted there in August 1979. It is somewhat unusual that Korn, who spent at least ten years as a telecommunications officer in Beirut, Lebanon; Conakry, Guinea; The Hague, Netherlands; and New Delhi, India; should surface as a commercial secretary. Unless there is another Thomas A. Korn, he may have moved from telecommunications work.

Turkey

As Turkey receives massive IMF grants, and continues to maintain a large U.S. military presence, and, after the Iranian revolution fills a greater geopolitical role in the region, CIA activity there can be expected to increase. Indeed, massive repression is in full swing. The CIA Chief of Station there, John H. Kenney, is a veteran of long and varied experience. Kenney, born November 4, 1927 in Massachusetts, served in Singapore from 1957 to 1960; in Medan, Indonesia from 1960 to 1962; in Conakry, Guinea from 1963 to 1965; in Zanzibar, Tanzania from 1963 to 1967; in Nairobi, Kenya from 1967 to 1968; in Paris, France from 1972 to 1974; and in Saigon, Vietnam from 1974 to 1975. In April 1975 he returned to Headquarters (presumably leaving the Embassy as one of the refugees aptly described by journalist Wilfred Burchett as "helicopter people"). From 1976 to 1978 no references to him have been found in State Department records. However, according to the June 1979 Ankara Diplomatic List he was posted there as Attaché in April 1978. Assuming he is still there his seniority indicates that he is Chief of Station.

A case officer also in Turkey is James M. Warrick, born October 31, 1937 in Nebraska. Warrick was a general services officer at the Nairobi, Kenya Embassy from 1964 to 1967, when he became a "program coordinator" for AID. In 1970 he resumed normal diplomatic cover as a political officer in Blantyre, Malawi. In 1972 he returned to Headquarters, and in 1975 he was posted to Dakar, Senegal. In July 1978 he arrived at the Ankara Embassy as Second Secretary (Consular Affairs).

Venezuela

CAIB has uncovered four CIA officials at the Caracas, Venezuela Embassy, all of whom arrived in late 1979. The Chief of Station is Donald H. Winters, born October 31, 1936 in Louisiana. Winters spent two years under military cover with the Department of the Air Force, followed by two years at San Carlos University in Guatemala. He then served in Panama City, Panama from 1964 to 1967; at Headquarters from 1967 to 1969; in Santiago, Chile from 1969 to 1973; and in Quito, Ecuador from 1973 to at least late 1974, where he was Deputy Chief of Station. The next record found, the July 1979 Caracas Official Gazette, indicates he was posted there as Attaché.

Serving under Winters are Walter M. Berwick, C. Paul Plumb, Jr., and Donald G. Ryan. Berwick spent two years in CIA training, from 1965 to 1967, as a "research analyst" for the Department of the Air Force, followed by diplomat-
ic postings in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic; Bogotá, Colombia; and Tokyo, Japan. According to the Gazette, he was posted to Caracas as Second Secretary in September 1979.

Plumb also served as an “analyst” with the Department of the Army from 1959 to 1965, before his posting to the Santo Domingo Embassy, for two years. For the next 11 years, no State Department records on his whereabouts have been found. According to the Gazette he was posted to Caracas at least as of July 1979, as Attaché.

Ryan also spent some time under the obvious cover of “research analyst” for the Department of the Army, from 1969 to 1973, and was also posted to Santo Domingo from 1973 until 1977. He too is listed in the Gazette, posted to Caracas in July 1979 as Assistant Attaché.

A large portion of the Caracas station seems to have very light cover and experience in the Dominican Republic. This may be a coincidence, but if CAJB readers have any thoughts why experience in Santo Domingo might be particularly relevant to service in Venezuela at this time, we would be interested to hear from them.

(Continued from page 60)

Persamiento Critico, a bi-monthly review of the Puerto Rican left, in Spanish. From: Pensamiento Critico, P.O. Box 22918, 65th Inf. Station, Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico 00929. Subscriptions: Puerto Rico, $6US; United States, $9US; Other countries, $14US.


Puerto Rico Libre, the bi-monthly bulletin of the Puerto Rico Solidarity Committee. Single copies, 50US. For subscription information write to: PRSC, P.O. Box 319, Cooper Station, New York, NY 10003, U.S.A.

Struggle, the weekly newspaper of the Workers Party of Jamaica (formerly the Workers Liberation League). For details, write to: Struggle, Box 187, Kingston 7, Jamaica.


Vanguard, the newspaper of the Oilfield Workers’ Trade Union of Trinidad and Tobago. For details write to: Vanguard, 4A Lower Hillside St., San Fernando, Trinidad, Trinidad and Tobago.

Other Publications of Interest

Psychological Warfare in the Media: The Case of Jamaica, an illustrated report on the recent testimony of Dr. Fred Landis on The Jamaica Gleaner. A brief but interesting and informative pamphlet. Send $1 plus postage to Press Association of Jamaica, 10 Surbiton Road, Kingston, Jamaica.

Without a Trace, This book was originally published clandestinely in Zurich, Switzerland. It is an astonishing manual for political activists on the whole spectrum of scientific and technical means by which police trace evidence of crimes. It has been published as a paperback book by Partisan Press, $4.95 from: Partisan Press, P.O. Box 2193, Seattle, WA 98111, U.S.A.

MERC: American Soldiers of Fortune, by Jay Mallin and Robert K. Brown (Macmillan, $12.95). This book on mercenaries throughout the world, by the editor of the rabidly right-wing magazine Soldier of Fortune and a “recognized authority on terrorism,” is not recommended for its politics, but as a helpful insight into the minds of the “dogs of war” who fight for hire, almost invariably on the side of reaction and racism.

The Scourge of Secrecy, by Richard Harger (Gordy Press, 330 Pine Ridge Road, Jackson, MS 39206, U.S.A.). This book by a former Air Force Intelligence officer deals with secrecy and surveillance as elements of U.S. foreign and military policy, especially attempts to stifle both within and outside the military. It discusses campus surveillance and disruption of the anti-war movement.


In “The Norwegian Connection” (Bulletin Number 9, p. 4) there were two typographical errors. The first name of the Norwegian Captain mentioned in the second paragraph is Anders, not Ader; in footnote 11, the Norwegian magazine cited is named Ikkevold, not Ikkevold.

58 CovertAction

Number 10 (Aug.-Sept. 1980)
DIRTY WORK 2: The CIA in Africa
Edited by Ellen Ray, William Schaap, Karl Van Meter and Louis Wolf

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PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST

Newspapers and Magazines on the Caribbean

A large number of newspapers and magazines, from both within and outside the region, are devoted in whole or in part to the struggles of the Caribbean Basin. The list below does not purport to be complete (and readers with information about other publications are requested to send us details for publication), but it represents a good beginning library. Where we have what we believe to be current subscription information, it is given; in other cases readers should write to the publication for details.

Caribbean Contact, monthly, from Caribbean Contact Ltd., P.O. Box 616, Bridgetown, Barbados. Subscriptions: CARICOM, $7US; USA and Canada, $9US; U.K. and Canaça, $10US; Latin America, $8US; Other, $12US.

Freedom, newsletter of YULIMO in St. Vincent. Write for details to: YULIMO, Paul's Avenue, P.O. Box 519, Kingstown, St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

Free West Indian, bi-weekly newspaper of Grenada. Write for details to: Free West Indian, St. Georges, Grenada.

Gombay, monthly magazine of the Belize Institute of Friendship and Culture. Subscriptions: Mexico, Central America and Caribbean, $15US; elsewhere $20US. From: Gombay, P.O. Box 927, Belize City, Belize.


Latin American Newsletters. Latin American Newsletters publishes the Latin America Political Report, the Latin America Economic Report, the Latin America Commodities Report, the Latin America Weekly Report, and the Latin America Regional Report. These weekly publications are expensive, but extremely well-researched and well-respected, using correspondents around the world. For rates, write to: Latin American Newsletters, Ltd., 90-93 Cowcross Street, London EC1M 6BL, United Kingdom. U.S. representative: Terry Thometz, 2901 18th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20009, U.S.A.

Mirror, the newspaper of the PPP of Guyana. Write for details to: The Mirror, P.O. Box 822, Govt. Industrial Estate, East Bank, Demerara, Guyana.


Outlet, the newspaper of the Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement. Write for details to: Outlet Publishers, Tanner St., St. Johns, Antigua.

PAJ News, the monthly journal of the Press Association of Jamaica. Individual copies: J$0.40. Write to: Press Association of Jamaica, 10 Surbiton Road, Kingston 10, Jamaica.

(continued on page 58)